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This thesis analyses how Spain as a raising power in the Mediterranean, has developed its 
diplomatic strategies and mechanisms to gain diplomatic influence, international recognition 
and power. On the other side, it also analyses how France as a competing and rival power 
reacted to those diplomatic offenses and to what extent they became collaborators or 
competitors.  
Geopolitical interests, domestic politics, historical and contextual pre-conditions 
architected their diplomatic strategy. Political communication and lobbying strategies 
deployed by them as political entrepreneurs and brokers, were defined to construct a new 
socio-political imaginary and to gather political and public opinion’ consensus in order to 
achieve planned aims and objectives.  
This thesis focuses on the evaluation of the policies propelled by these political 
brokers and entrepreneurs. In order to propose a valid evaluation system the thesis has 
implemented a wide number of methodological tools that will allow the researcher to 
understand –and explain and demonstrate – complex scenarios and dynamics, avoiding 
generalizations and speculation in the process. In order to do so the researcher has adopted a 
long-term, multivariable –quantitative and qualitative analysis- that allows a better 
understanding of political, diplomatic and socio-economic trends, mechanisms and processes. 
The thesis avoids also a Eurocentric approach and has developed a symmetric discourse 
aiming at placing European and southern Mediterranean interests at the same level.  
This thesis concludes demonstrating that Western leaders, political entrepreneurs and 
brokers, have been trying to find and support cooperative and collaborative regimes. In 
parallel, leaders from Southern Mediterranean countries have been playing that game in order 
to consolidate their leadership. Despite the number of Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, 
projects and mechanisms European partners did not show a commitment to choosing the right 
objectives and expectations for the challenges they faced. Therefore, at a managerial level, 
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SECTION 1  
INTRODUCTION, THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGY. 
13 
 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
The Mediterranean space has been defined in many ways across history. It has been re-
defined recently by Abulafia as the Great Sea.
1
 Greatness suggests majesty, power and 
respect. But it also hints at conflict, ambitions and passions. Braudel, the most acclaimed 
“mediterraneanist” always acknowledged that he loved the region with passion.2 
Undoubtedly, the history of the Mediterranean is the history of dichotomies and 
contradictions, hopes and disillusion.  
However, the objective of this research is not to define the Mediterranean space and 
its complexity/ies. This research does not consider the Mediterranean space as an entity. Nor 
will it be examined as a commercial area or a space of exchange.  For the benefit of this 
thesis, and beyond its geographical and cultural dimensions, the Mediterranean is understood 
as a transactional good that has been manipulated, used, and traded, multi-directionally, for 
political, economic and diplomatic goals. The Mediterranean space, at least for the purposes 
of this thesis, is not a concept.  Rather this dissertation focuses on how two neighbouring 
countries –Spain and France – have developed their national political and diplomatic interests 
and strategies in “marketing”, “selling” and “trading” with Mediterranean issues –the 
Mediterranean as a brand or a product- between mid-1980s until 2010.  
 
Main Objective.  
The main objective of this dissertation aims at understanding how both Spain and France 
have been conceptualizing, designing, implementing and managing policies and mechanisms 
to lead Euro-Mediterranean politics and to achieve greater diplomatic influence, regional 
power and strategic leadership within the EU and the southern Mediterranean rim.  
Specific Objectives.  
In order to address this main objective a number of specific objectives have been defined.  
                                                          
1
 Abulafia, D. (2011): The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press. 
However this definition was already used by the Jews.  
2
 Braudel, F. (1996): The Mediterranean and The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. University of 
California Press. Vol. 1. P. 17.  
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 To analyse the historical setting that frames Franco-Spanish relations towards the 
Mediterranean region prior to Spain’s accession to the EEC (European Economic 
Community) in 1986.  
 To assess how Spain has been developing a particular communication strategy and 
rhetoric in order to attract the attention of EU member states with the purpose of 
gaining diplomatic and political influence and relevance and how, in so doing, it has 
been possible to develop a communitarian approach towards the Mediterranean.  
 To understand how stakeholders and parties have been acting as political 
entrepreneurs, brokers and opportunists in order to identify political windows that 
would allow them to pursue partisan or national interests according to a national 
agenda.  
 To examine critically how the rhetoric, the political communication and the 
diplomatic efforts to design mechanisms and policies to regulate Euro-Mediterranean 
relations have been failing due to a lack of consistency and theoretical and pragmatic 
misconceptions. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership and especially migration-related 
issues will be discussed in in this context.  
 To examine how and why Spain and France as political and diplomatic entrepreneurs 
and brokers have been managing symbols and deploying political and diplomatic 
rituals in order to pursue and achieve their political objectives across the Euro-
Mediterranean region.  
  To understand how political and diplomatic continuity or discontinuity may disrupt 
national or international strategic objectives and to examine the extent they can be the 
cause of failures or successful experiences within complex projects involving a very 
wide array of stakeholders and expectations.  
 To critically assess the political, social and budgetary responsibility of governments 
and involved stakeholders both from the Southern Mediterranean rim and the EU in a 
number of failed experiences, communicational strategies, promises and objectives, 
and, to gain an understanding of how the evolution of the historic, political and 
economic cycle have shaped, and impacted on, the implementation of such 
mechanisms, policies and strategies over time.  
 To examine the role that migration policies and dynamics from 1990 to 2010 have had 
in challenging the consistency of the EU policies, mechanisms and objectives and in 
widening the gap between Northern and Southern Mediterranean stakeholders.  
15 
 
Research Questions.  
 Do political communication strategies define the success or failure of political 
entrepreneurs, brokers and institutions?  
 Is there coherence and consistency in how political entrepreneurs, brokers and 
institutions define their communication strategies and how they behave in practice? 
 Did migration related issues challenge the mechanisms and processes created, 
designed, implemented and institutionalized by political entrepreneurs, brokers and 
European institutions.  
 Did these political entrepreneurs and brokers really take into consideration southern 
partners and the development of consistent and long-term cooperative policies? 
 
1.1. Literature Review. 
The scholarly debate on the Mediterranean as a concept is large and has been growing over 
the last decade. However “the Mediterranean”, as a concept, was considered by scholars in 
the early nineteenth century, as Chambers highlights.
3
 As a subject its changing nature is 
related to modern geographical, political and historical classifications and interpretations that 
have been mostly determined by a European approach. During the 1920s and 1930s authors 
like Monroe and Norwich explored the historical, cultural and political nature of this sea.
4
 
But the Mediterranean as a subject for scholarship in the modern era was definitely launched 
by Braudel in 1949 when he published his classical “Mediterranean corpus”.5   
In considering geographical, cultural, social, political, economic and organizational 
factors Braudel stressed that the Mediterranean is not a single sea, but many seas. This is in 
fact a very powerful idea because it removes the Mediterranean from a monolithic 
conceptualization. However, within this apparent dynamism, Braudel conceded more 
importance to the ecological, geographical and physical space rather than to human agency. 
The heritage of this school of thought was very strong evidenced in Horden and Purcell’s 
2000 work on the nature of a corrupting sea.
6
  
                                                          
3
 Chambers, I. (2008): Mediterranean Crossings: The Politics of an Interrupted Modernity. Duke University 
Press.  
4
 Norwich, J.J. (2007): The Middle Sea: A History of the Mediterranean. Doubleday. First edition, 1929; 
Monroe, E. (1938): The Mediterranean in Politics. Oxford University Press. First edition, 1938.  
5
 Braudel, F. (1996): The Mediterranean: And the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philippe II. University of 
California Press. Vols. 1 and 2.  
6




 Continuing with the interdisciplinary but historical methodology Abulafia has 
challenged the Braudelian perspective through a number of publications mostly since 
1994.
7
In 2003 Abulafia challenged Braudel and some other authors like Horden and Purcell 
because he considered that they were not successful in paying enough attention to human 
agency.
8
 This perspective and approach ended up with his book on the human history of the 
Mediterranean, where geography and the physical spaces are shaped, understood and 
managed by actors, not the other way around.
9
  
Conceptually speaking, this represents a crucial contribution to the study of 
contemporary complex realities and spaces, such as the Mediterranean basin. This research 
represents the most suitable approach for international relations, politics or diplomacy related 
issues. On one hand it recognises the value of these Mediterranean “seas” as a scenario and 
on the other hand it acknowledges how human agency has defined, structured and managed 
these dynamic scenarios as trading goods for shoring up and underpinning the attainment of 
political objectives and diplomatic influence and leadership.  
 
1.1.1. Franco-Spanish Rivalry. 
With regards to Franco-Spanish relations, Laia Mestres has asked whether they are relations 
among friends, partners of allies.
10
 Relations between these neighbouring countries are rooted 
in the very beginning of imperial history. The Pyrenees as the barrier that naturally separates 
Spain from France is one of the most stable and oldest boundaries in Western Europe since 
the Roussillon was annexed to France in 1659-1960.
11
 However, this “sleeping” boundary 
that could be seen as synonymous with peaceful coexistence does not directly translate into a 
lack of conflict, as Sahlins has pointed out.
12
 
 For instance, Rule has studied the Franco-Spanish rivalry between 1462 to1700.
13
 
Schroeder has analysed the rivalry between France and the Habsburgs, thus shedding light 
                                                          
7
 Abulafia, D. (1994): A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca. Cambridge University 
Press.  
8
 Abulafia, D. (Ed.) (2003): The Mediterranean in History. Thames and Hudson, London.  
9
 Abulafia, D. (2011): The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press.  
10
 This definition was done by Juan Carlos I in 1999 during the first State visit of Jacques Chirac to Spain. 
Mestres I Camps, L. (2005): Veinte Años de Cooperación Entre España y Francia: Amigos, Socios o Aliados? 
Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals. N°75. Pp. 151-172.  
11
 Stewart, D. (1965): Assimilation and Acculturation in Seventeenth-Century Europe: Roussillon and France, 
1959-1745. Greenwood Publishing Group. P. 13.  
12
 Sahlins, P. (1989): Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees. University of California 
Press. Pp. 1-2. 
13
 Rule, C.J. (1999): “The Enduring Rivalry of France and Spain ca. 1462-1700” In Thompson, W.R. (Ed.): 
Great Power Rivalries. University of South Carolina. Pp. 31-59.  
17 
 
and understanding on the period of the Thirty Years War and the signing of the Treaty of the 
Pyrenees in 1658.
14
 Folmer and Hoffman have also written about the Franco-Spanish rivalry 
but concentrated on North America over a period of 200 years.
15
  
Continuing with this historical perspective, Soumille wrote about the Franco-Spanish 
rivalry in the Maghreb during, before and after the French revolution concentrating on the 
defence of the Catholics over that period.
16
The same rivalry continued and increased after 
1808 when France was defeated during the Peninsular War due to the intervention of the 
Britain, as Esdaile has studied.
17
 This episode had an enduring impact on Spanish-French 
relations and deepened future tensions.  Due to geostrategic interests, North Africa has been a 
regular stage for Franco-Spanish disputes in more recent times. For instance, Ybarra Enríquez 
analysed Franco-Spanish rivalry during the decolonization of the Maghreb between 1951 and 
1961.
18
 Franco-Spanish disputes and tensions concentrated over that period predominantly on 
Morocco. Both countries were claiming sovereignty or influence over a number of territories 
as Maghraoui has analysed.
19
 
Aside from these episodes, but influenced by this long-standing rivalry, France was 
very reactive against Franco’s regime between 1945 and 1975. Especially during 1946 France 
closed the border with Spain and, along with Britain and the US, signed off on the Tripartite 
Declaration.
20
 One of the most relevant aspects that determined the lack of Franco-Spanish 
collaboration was the terrorist question since the 1940s.
21
 As an example of this lack of 
collaboration and rivalry, France did not collaborate with Spain in the fight against terrorism 
until 1989 when the Guardia Civil was allowed to act in France even though very few 
                                                          
14
 Schroeder, P.W. (1999): “A Pointless Enduring Rivalry: France and the Habsburg Monarchy: 1715-1918”. In 
Thompson, W.R. (Ed.): Great Power Rivalries. University of South Carolina. Pp. 60-85.  
15
 Folmer, H. (1953): Franco-Spanish Rivalry in North America. 1524-1763. A.H. Clark Co. California; 
Hoffman, P. (1984): The Chicora Legend and Franco-Spanish Rivalry in La Florida. The Florida Historical 
Quarterly. Vol. 62. N°4. Pp. 419-438.  
16
 Soumille, P. (1991): Rivalites Franco-Spagnoles Avant et Pendant la Revolution Français. Awraq. Estudios 
Sobre el Mundo Árabe e Islámico Contemporáneo. N°12. Pp. 179-195.  
17
 Esdaile, C. (1988): War and Politics in Spain, 1808-1814. The Historical Journal. Vol. 31. Issue 2. Pp. 295-
317; Esdaile, C. (2003): The Peninsular War: A New History. Palgrave Macmillan.  
18
 Ybarra Enríquez, N.C. (1998): España y la Descolonización del Magreb: Rivalidad Hispano-Francesa en 
Marruecos 1951-1961. UNED, Madrid.  
19
 Maghraoui, A. (2003): Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The Hague and The Western Sahara Dispute. 
Mediterranean Politics. Vol. 8. Issue 1. P. 121.  
20
 Güell, C. (2009): Las Potencias Internacionales Ante la Dictadura Española, 1944-1955. Aresta, Madrid. P. 
108; Basora, A. (2009): “US-Spain Relations from the Perspective of 2009” In CIDOB: International Yearbook 
2009. Bellaterra. P. 92.  
21
 Hualde Amunarriz, X. (2010): La Question Basque. Un Factor de Tensión entre Francia y la España 
Franquista, 1945-1975. Revista de la Fundación Sancho el Sabio. N°32. Pp. 95-116.  
18 
 
extraditions have occurred since 1984. This change was possible from 1988 when a socialist 
government closer to Spanish government came to power.
22
 
If rivalry has been a dominant theme of the literature, there have also been times and 
contexts when Spain and France have cooperated. Temple-Patterson’s study of their joint 
plan to invade Britain in 1779 provides one such example.
23
 Trade relations and competition 
explain this. As Nichols and Murray have shown, Britain was increasingly jeopardising 
Spain’s monopoly in the Latin American and Caribbean region.24  
In considering the aforementioned Moroccan War of Independence, France and Spain 
collaborated in 1958 during the Operation Ecouvillon against the Armée de Liberation 
Nationale (ALN) in the Western Sahara.
25
 The most intense collaboration between Spain and 
France was possible after 1989 when both countries started to work together against Euskadi 
ta’ Askatasuna (ETA).26 This cooperation improved relations between the two countries and 
allowed a more fluent communication especially, during Felipe Gonzalez’s era of rule and 
Aznar’s first term in office. 
In considering this historical rivalry and the episodic cooperation, this past has shaped 
and conditioned, partially, contemporary Franco-Spanish relations and has been well studied 
by authors like González del Miño.
27
 In fact, until Spain joined the EEC in 1986, the 
Pyrenees blocked the communication and political interaction between the two countries. 
Even in 1994 authors like González del Miño highlighted this lack of understanding, alliance 
and affinity despite the absence of war over the previous 180 years.
28
  
As shown above the historical rivalry between the two countries has been broadly 
studied. However, even though there is evidence of Franco-Spanish rivalry since the 1990s, 
this thesis aims at explaining how these long-standing rivalries have affected the Euro-
                                                          
22
 Morán Blanco, S. (1996): La Cooperación Hispano-Francesa en la Lucha Contra ETA. Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid. Doctoral dissertation. Pp. 414-416.  
23
 Temple-Patterson, A. (1960): The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish Attempt to Invade Britain in 1779. 
University of Manchester Press.  
24
 Nichols, R.F. (1933): Trade Relations and the Establishment of the United States Consulates in Spanish 
America, 1779-1809. The Hispanic American Historical Review. Vol. 1. N°3.P. 289-313; Murray, D. (1980): 
Odious Commerce: British, Spain and the Abolition of the Cuban Slave Trade. Cambridge University Press. P. 
8.  
25
 Op. Cit. Maghraoui, A. (2003): P. 123. See also: Mohsen-Finan, K. (2002): The Western Sahara Dispute and 
UN Pressure. Mediterranean Politics. Vol. 7. Issue 2. Pp. 1-12. 
26
 Bask independentist group created in 1959.  
27
 González del Miño, P. (1988): Las Cumbres Hispano-Francesas: Nueva Diplomacia Entre Vecinos. 
Cuadernos de la Escuela Diplomática. N°1. Pp. 159-174; González del Miño, P. (1991): La Heterogeneidad de 
las Relaciones Bilaterales Hispano-Francesas Durante el Cambio Político Español: 1969-1986: Sus Constantes 
y Sus Variables. Universidad Complutense de Madrid.  
28
 González del Miño, P. (1994): “Las Relaciones Bilaterales Hispano-Francesas” In Calduch, R. (Ed.): La 
Política Española en el Siglo XX. Ediciones de las Ciencias Sociales. Pp. 223-235.  
19 
 
Mediterranean process. In order to do that, it will be explained how, when and why France 
and Spain have been cooperating or competing for Euro-Mediterranean diplomatic and 
political influence and power. Therefore for the purposes of this dissertation, understanding 
the nature of the Franco-Spanish rivalry should be interpreted as a parallel aspect not as a 
central one. In considering this comment as it is possible to appreciate in the table of 
contents, the attention devoted to Spain and France is clearly inclined towards the former one. 
The reason of this is mostly related to the main and specific objectives specified above as 
well as to methodological related aspects as it is going to be commented below.   
According to the main and specific objectives, the dissertation has taken into 
consideration specific case-studies that have been relevant to understand how political 
entrepreneurs, brokers or opportunists have understood the Mediterranean as a political 
window to get higher penetration and diplomatic weight within the EU. Even though Spain 
and France have clear interest in the Mediterranean their approaches have been different. On 
one hand, France represents a much stronger European stakeholder when it comes to its 
influence in the Mediterranean. Mostly in North Africa, where its industrial, trading and 
economic power is much more solid and structured than the Spanish one.
29
 
As it is going to be demonstrated in chapter 9, until the arrival of Sarkozy as French 
president, France’s foreign policy was more focused on economic and industrial diplomacy. 
Before Sarkozy, France was not acting as a leading political entrepreneur or broker trying to 
sell the Mediterranean to gain diplomatic stature within the EU as Spain did. This factor 
explains why the thesis focuses more on Spain’s actions. As the thesis focuses on explaining 
how political brokers and entrepreneurs set their political agenda based on national interests 
the relevant case-studies to understand this dynamics gravitate in favour of Spain.  
As per the objectives of this dissertation, the strongest Franco-Spanish rivalry before 
the establishment of the Barcelona Process, was related to the French clear opposition to 
Spain’s accession to the EEC. This is analysed in chapter 5. After 1985, Spain deployed its 
brokering and entrepreneurial strategy to sell the Mediterranean to Europe. France 
accompanied the process supporting these initiatives with more or less intensity as a 
European member while its attention was concentrated on economic and industrial issues. 
The second episode of clear rivalry that is analysed in this thesis is the French proposal to 
create the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). This is analysed in chapter 9. These are the 
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two more relevant case studies that better illustrate the rivalry between two countries acting 
as political entrepreneurs and brokers. 
 In considering Mediterranean politics, whereas Spain acted as a major entrepreneur 
and broker in launching the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) -1995 to 2005- and the 
Alliance of Civilizations –founded in 2005- France just leaded the first steps of the UfM –
formed in 2008- and this episode evidenced a clear example of rivalry between the two 
countries.  
1.1.2. Mediterranean Politics. 
Representative scholarly work on Mediterranean politics is both very available and 
fragmented. For the purpose of this dissertation six main policies and mechanisms will be 
considered: The Mediterranean Global Policy, The 5+5 Dialogue, the Barcelona Process or 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the 
Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Embedded 
within the chapters, the thesis will also analyse some other parallel Euro-Mediterranean 
initiatives such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), the Mediterranean Forum launched by Egypt in 
1994, the Eurofor and Euromarfor and the MEDA programme.  
With regard to the operational point of view of these six policies and mechanisms this 
part of literature review will conclude and coincide with three points. First, Gómez has stated 
that these policies have demonstrated the EU’s ability and capacity “to embark upon strategic 
foreign policy behaviour but that the ability to consistently translate strategic objectives into 
effective action is not yet in evidence”.30 Second, as Monar has stressed, the EU’s policy in 
the Mediterranean “suffers from the gap between its apparent potential to act and its actual 
performance”. 31 Third, as Schimmelfennig, Sasse and Gänzle have highlighted, EU policies 
and mechanisms in following union member’s needs, ambitions and strategic interests 
through the different enlargements, face two kinds of entrapments: a rhetorical entrapment 
and a procedural entrapment. 
32
 These three elements will form part of the analysis and 
argument of this thesis.  
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1.1.2.1. EEC/EU Foreign Policy and the Global Mediterranean Policy.  
The development of EU foreign policy corresponds to the EU institutional building process. 
Therefore the development of such a policy has corresponded and evolved according to the 
needs and strategic interests of member states.  National needs, preferences and interests 
marked the way that EU foreign policy has evolved, as Bulmer and Moravcsik have studied.
33
 
This idea will be valuable to understanding the role as political entrepreneurs that 
certain countries, like Spain or France, have played in designing and lobbying for new 
proposals – i.e. the Euro-Mediterranean policy – to define and develop a more integrative EU 
foreign policy. This has made defining the contours of the EU foreign policy slow.  
As Smith has highlighted, European co-operation with regards to both foreign policy 
and security was completed in its third decade.
34
In 1970 the European-Political Co-Operation 
(EPC), was created and it transitioned in 1991 to the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) before the defence integration within the framework of the European Council of 
Cologne and Helsinki took place in 1999.
35
 
 In considering the aforementioned facts, EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean 
has followed its own dynamic. Bicchi has studied EU foreign policy towards the 
Mediterranean since 1957 to contemporary times.
36
 Joffé has explained that the beginning of 
the Mediterranean policy started in 1956 with the intention of decreasing the economic 




However it is important to note that from 1957 to1972 EU foreign policy was non-
existent. Nevertheless European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean rapidly integrated 
the political and diplomatic agenda due to the geo-strategic interest of the Middle East. In 
1970 the six original members of the union gathered in Munich to discuss the framework that 
constituted European Political Co-Operation.  
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As Monar and Nuttall have noted, the first topic to be discussed related to the Middle 
East.
38
 Calabrese by quoting Western European officials reminds us that they have always 
asserted that European interests cannot be separated from the Mediterranean basin.
39
This was 
also valid for the US approach and geo-strategic interests towards the Mediterranean, as Pero 
has shown in the period 1968-1976.
40
 
 As Tayfur has mentioned, the EEC’s interest in developing a policy towards the 
Mediterranean was mostly motivated by the changing nature of security challenges.
41
 In fact 
two years after the constitution of the EPC, in 1972, it launched the Global Mediterranean 
Policy (GMP). As Tsoulakis mentions, the implementation of the GMP coincided with major 
politico-economic events like the energy crisis and the empowerment of both OPEC and 
southern countries.
42
With regards to the potential challenges the Euro-Mediterranean region 
had to face with regards to the EEC enlargement and the interactions with Southern 
Mediterranean countries Pomfret and Koliris have studied the economic implications and 




1.1.2.2.The 5+5 Dialogue.  
The availability of scholarly literature on the 5+5 Dialogue is limited and it is rarely 
examined  as a stand-alone research topic. Most of the journal papers dealing with this issue 
embed it within issues related to the EMP and other policies and mechanisms. Joffé has 
explained that the 5+5 initiative was launched by President Francois Mitterrand at the 




Barbé, Mestre I Camps and Soler I Lecha have studied how after French interest in the 
Mediterranean started to fade during the second half of the 1989, Bettino Craxi, Prime 
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Minister of Italy, looking to strengthen the socialist alliance with Spanish president Felipe 




1.1.2.3.The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).  
The launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona Process, from 1995 onward 
resulted in an increase of scholarly work related to Euro-Mediterranean issues. As Joffé has 
stated, the EMP represented the culmination of European political, diplomatic and economic 
attempts to design and implement a common policy towards the Mediterranean during and 
after the end of the Cold War.
46
 Gomez and Barbé have studied the first stages of the 
partnership and how it was negotiated.
47
 
Joffe, Branch, Marquina, Brad, Liotta, Hahn, Montanari and Guillespie among others 
have studied the implications, limitations and challenges of the EMP since its inception in 
1995 focusing on issues including politics, development, economics and trade.
48
 Gillespie, 
has studied how the architecture and philosophy of the Barcelona Process was challenged by 
the events of September 11, 2001,
49
 while authors like Suzan have examined the new security 
approach adopted by both the Barcelona Process and the EU to fight terrorism.
50
 
 Another very important part of the literature has concentrated on analysing the role 
and influence of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in dealing with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.
51
 Assenburg has studied how the Middle East conflict can be defined as the main 
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obstacle that has challenged the entire Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) almost since 
its launch despite the initial optimism.
52
 
Nevertheless, the European Commission, along with some other scholars like Joffe 
and Vasconcelos, has been also making efforts to show the positive impacts of the Barcelona 
Process.
53
 On the economic and trade side, Bensassi, Márquez Ramos and Martínez Zarzano, 
have concluded that within the Barcelona Process framework, Southern Mediterranean 
economies have benefited due to an increase of their exports into the EU.
54
 
Most of these works, however, provide a northern Mediterranean or European 
perspective and sometimes reflective criticism is lacking. Examples of initial criticism can be 
found in Marks who stated that global economic liberalization would promote greater 
instability in the south. He also argued that any potential success would not depend upon the 
EU’s actions but upon how Southern Mediterranean countries would be able to address and 
deal with their own instability.
55
  
This issue has become the most important and relevant factor of contemporary Euro-
Mediterranean politics. Authors like Khader, on the contrary, have been working to re-
evaluate a southern point of view and have been criticising Euro-Mediterranean policies and 




Moreover, the Mediterranean has been also been a place of competition and strategic 
interest for a number of stakeholders and this has ended up with the design and 
implementation of a number of parallel initiatives and mechanisms that have contributed to 
making the panorama more confusing and the policies less efficient. In this sense, Ünven Noi 
has examined how the EMP has clashed with the Broader Middle East and North Africa 
(BMENA) initiative of the US.
57
 The BMENA was launched in 2004 in Rabat after a meeting 
called the Forum for the Future. It was conceived by George W. Bush’s administration to 
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foster democracy in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world through political and economic 
liberation following a neo-liberal approach.
58
However, as Dalacoura has pointed out, the 
objectives were heavily concentrated on economic issues rather than focusing the attention on 





1.1.2.4. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
As Del Sarto and Schumacher have highlighted, until 2004 the UMP has been the most 
important mechanism channelling the relations between the EU and Southern Mediterranean 
countries.
60However, the international context between 1995 and 2005 challenged the EMP’s 
philosophy and hypotheses. On one hand the Middle East peace talks did not evolve as the 
EMP would have desired. The aftermath of 9/11 altered the global scenario, the US promoted 
intervention in Iraq and the Madrid -2004- and London bombings -2005- contributed to 
deepening the tensions between the West and the Arab world.
61
 On top of that, as Smith has 
mentioned, during 2004 the EU was enlarged by 10 states, a move that resulted in new 
neighbours and new external borders that required new policies and mechanisms.
62
 
Within this context the ENP was proposed and launched in 2004. The European 
Commission’s Benita Ferrero-Waldmer explained that the ENP was designed to allow each 
country to determine the level and the strength of collaboration with the EU that they 
desired.
63
 This represents mainly the development of a bilateral policy between the EU and 
partner countries.
64
This policy was built upon Romano Prodi’s new proposal in 2002 to bring 
up to speed the EU’s foreign policy based on the idea of a “wider Europe” surrounded by a 
“circle of friends”.65  This project was described by Prodi as “sharing everything with the 
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Union but institutions”.66 Basically this meant developing a Common European Economic 
Space where bilateral relations with neighbouring countries would follow mostly economic 
and not political or institutional procedures.  
As soon as it was launched some authors expressed their doubts and criticism over the 
ENP. Sasse considered that both conceptually and empirically the ENP was weak if the 
policy is measured against a rationalist conditionality model.
67
 The lack of institutional 
commitment was one of the most relevant points to be criticised. Lavenex considered that the 
EU was seeking to expand the legal boundaries by restricting openings of the institutional 
boundaries.
68
 Fostering economic reforms without considering political and institutional 
transformations is not realistic. Kelley wondered whether “the potential of ‘everything 
without institutions’ [would] motivate democratic and human rights reforms?” 69  
This asymmetric relationship has been also been noted by Smith, who stated that the 
ENP was requiring too much from neighbours whereas in return for a number of vague 
incentives.
70
 Following this rationale, Gänzle noted that the ENP aimed at integrating third 
countries into “policy-taking” instead of “policy-making” processes.71 This perspective 
clashes with the initial hypothesis that the ENP tried to propose that the process would 
increase the sense of co-ownership. 
In considering the Mediterranean sphere, the ENP was intended to strengthen the 
EMP not to substitute it.  However as Natorski has stressed, with the adoption of the ENP, 
initiatives and objectives proposed by the EMP or the Strategic Partnership with the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East would remain unclear.
72
 Youngs has pointed out that the 
ENP had to face a number of challenges: the new redistribution of funds among new member 
states; an increasing bilateralism that clashed with the EMP’s multilateral approach and 
objectives towards the Arab world; and the increasing claims from Arab countries to be 
considered according to their particular specificities. According to Johansson-Nogués this 
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In addition, this new initiative entailed new political and diplomatic dynamics within 
the region and increased competition among states. As Bicchi and Natorski have noted, by 
acting like entrepreneurs EU member states attempted to find new ways to increase their 
influence and new leadership.
74
  One of the most relevant problems of Southern 
Mediterranean countries is related to political and democratic reforms. The EMP was 
inefficient in proposing such changes. With regards to the ENP, as Emerson and Noutcheva 
have pointed out, the new mechanisms would prioritise economic issues over political 
reforms.
75
 Therefore unsolved problems for the stability of the region and the promotion of 
democracy remain as Schimmelfennig and Scholtz have demonstrated.
76
 These elements 
would undermine the entire argument, rationale and value of the ENP.
77
   
 
1.1.2.5.The Alliance of Civilizations (AoC).  
Even though the AoC was adopted in 2007-2008, the scholarly debate on this topic basically 
coincides with the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the EMP and the proposal of the 
ENP (2004-2005). Naïr has stressed that “an” AoC would help to soften the increasing 
tensions between the West and the Arab world.
78
 However this initiative immediately 
generated controversies, reactions and contributed to political polarization. Bardají and 
Kamen claimed that this political initiative was inaccurately designed and proposed from a 
political, budgetary and conceptual point of view.
79
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Conceptually speaking, Balci has defined the AoC as the clash/alliance dichotomy and 
as an initiative that was represented by a “reactionary identity”.80 Vallespín, following a 
similar critical approach, examined the role future stakeholders would play within such a 
complex mechanism, recognising that this factor would determine the success or the failure 
of such an initiative.
81
 
Despite the critics, authors like Petito, have considered that the AoC could contribute 
to defining the limits of a global political discourse that could contribute to the elaboration of 
an international political theory.
82
  Barreñada considered that the AoC has been one of 
Spain’s most innovative proposals due to its cultural and political impulse to fight against 
global security problems.
83
  Cajal considered that the AoC was “a Spanish ethical initiative 
for a lasting world peace”.84 Both authors consider the AoC to be a major success of the 
Spanish diplomacy. Celso has stressed that this policy and multilateral diplomatic effort 
ensured Spain’s strategy to define a national Post 3/11 antiterrorist policy.85 
 
1.1.2.6.The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).  
The UfM was adopted by the EU in 2008 after Nicolas Sarkozy introduced the idea of a 
Mediterranean Union during a speech in Toulon in 2007. The scholarly literature on the UfM, 
its inception and its developments has followed the same trend as the other policies 
commented on earlier. Strong criticism mixed with positive reviews. Emerson has pointed out 
that Sarkozy’s initial proposal was poorly conceived and “awkwardly presented politically.”86 
Soler i Lecha has pointed out that the proposal of a Mediterranean Union was the initiative 
that revolutionised most Euro-Mediterranean politics since 2005.
87
  
However it also revolutionised European politics. As Balfour and Schmid have 
commented, Sarkozy’s proposal provoked strong opposition and criticism from Germany 
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through Angela Merkel, because the initiative did not take into account the EU’s existing 
communitarian efforts, policies and mechanisms to deal with Southern Mediterranean 
partners.
88
 Balfour mentions that the concepts of “Mediterranean Union”, “Barcelona 
Process: Union for the Mediterranean” and the final “Union for the Mediterranean” have not 
been a semantic evolution. These definitions have been coined in order to be supported by all 
EU member states.
89
Gillespie has described and studied how tensions with European and 
non-European states challenged an initiative that aimed at placing France as leader, promoter 
and centre of a new Mediterranean political, diplomatic and economic reality.
90
  
With regards to Franco-Spanish relations and Spain’s reactions to Sarkozy’s 
initiatives, Soler i Lecha has noted that Spain, as the former political leader in the 
Mediterranean had to react in order to either minimise the impact of the French proposal 
against the existing EMP or, on the contrary, try to strength it.
91
 The main question however 
remains: Do these new mechanisms and policies overlap or complement existing initiatives?  
Authors like Aliboni, Joffé, Lannon, Mahjoub, Saaf, Vasconcelos or Ammor describe the 
final formula and design of the UfM as a continuation of the UMP, and argue that there is 
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CHAPTER 2  
THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
 
2.1.Theoretical Approaches.  
Examining human, political or diplomatic agency in the Mediterranean implies the 
assessment of how humans, politicians or diplomats act, react, communicate, interact and 
plan. How they identify their political windows. How they define a certain strategy. How 
they lobby, bargain and try to gather political and public consensus. How they aspire to lead 
certain political and diplomatic processes and mechanisms.  
 Choosing a suitable theoretical approach should comply with the philosophical 
approach that frames the main and the specific objectives of the dissertation, as well as its 
methodological apparatus. It would be possible to classify theories of international relations 
into four different families. First, authors like Waltz, Copeland and Mearsheimer among 
others, have studied the variables that configure the distribution of power among 
states.
93
Within this category Deutsch, Ruggie or Rosencrance have devoted scholarly efforts 
to assess trade, financial flows as well as interstate communication.
94
Other authors like 




 Second, as Walt has enumerated there is a group of theories that concentrate their 
attention on
96
: The study of different types of regimes
97
; the characteristics of bureaucratic 
and organizational politics, a group of theories that are relevant to this dissertation
98
; the level 
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 Third, authors like Jervis, Mercer or Byman and Pollack –among others- have 
concentrated their scholarly efforts in assessing both individual and group 
psychology.
101
Within this group of theories and considering a systemic approach it would be 
important to mention decision theory. Applying this theory to international relations, it is 
possible to assess, criticize and explain the levels of rationality, coherence and achievement 
of objectives by studying the behaviour of groups, agents and individuals and how it shapes 
the decision making process.   
This approach is also relevant to this dissertation because the author accepts the 
transformative and influencing capacity of political actors such as political brokers and 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, this approach overcomes “structural” perspectives –shared in 
contradictory ways- by neo-realists and scholars working on world-system theory. As Wendt, 
has mentioned, this two theories fail to recognize the “mutually constitutive nature of human 
agents and system structures”.102 
Fourth and finally, studies developed by Finnemore, Ruggie and Wendt, have been 




 The aforementioned groups of theories use a wide array of methods that can be 
borrowed from different disciplines. However, there are theories that might present higher or 
lower degrees of applicability and are mostly descriptive. Realism and its variations, 
however, do represent the most applicable framework and its wide acceptance by policy-
makers is out of discussion. Nevertheless in considering big families of theories such as 
idealism, realism, Marxism, functionalism and critical theories, there is a marked trend 
among scholars and theorists to consider these theories as uncommunicated compartments. 
This happens to the point that scholars and theorists tend to identify themselves –almost 
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doctrinally- with their theoretical frameworks and therefore, interconnections or mixed 
approaches can be penalised by the “scholastic” –not scholarly- community.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, the author has preferred not to follow a precise 
theoretical program but integrating theories and approaches that can better serve the purpose 
of the main objective, the specific objectives and the methodological design of this 
dissertation. The author has decided to use an interdisciplinary approach that helps to assess 
with a greater degree of precision complex situations and scenarios related with international 
affairs per se, but also with the aspects related to individual and collective behaviour as well 
as communication processes as a baseline paradigm. In this sense, the author has used a 
theoretical framework that may appear initially contradictory, especially when it will be 
proposed the combination of realism and constructivism.  
This dissertation accepts that the realist approach is the most accurate one to 
understand state’s interests, strategies and decision making process. They are guided first of 
all by their own interest, the perpetuation of their influence as well as their security. Their 
interests with regards to foreign policy remain –or should remain stable-, while their alliances 
might be variable according to the context. However, as political entrepreneurs and brokers, 
their strategies as well as their decision making process and communicational strategies are 
more understandable using a complementary approach: constructivism. Constructivism helps 
to understand how ideas, myths and fears can mould the international system and how, for 
instance, public opinion can be shaped and manipulated to follow or support political 
postulates and strategies.  
 In considering the above mentioned comments, the philosophical backbone of this 
dissertation is represented by the discussion and the understanding of how on one hand, 
theory can explain the way practitioners –diplomats and political brokers, opportunists or 
entrepreneurs- understand their daily tasks and how and why they act. On the other hand, to 
use and capitalize these practices and experiences to contribute to both the elaboration of 
applicable theories that can better explain complex processes as well as generating the bases 
for improving decision making processes and evaluation frameworks. Therefore, the 
theoretical approach of dissertation aims to shed light and bridge the gap between theory and 
practice to better explain procedural aspects, decision making processes and agenda setting. 
Walt has stated that IR theorists have not been able to satisfy the demands of policy and 
decision makers.
104
A similar view has been defended by Jentleson and Wallace.
105
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  For the purposes of explaining and achieving the objectives defined in this thesis, the 
author has identified five main theoretical strands. They have been chosen due to their 
complementary nature and their convergence towards the main objective of this dissertation 
as well as with the intention of bridging the gap between theory and practice. They are: the 
bureaucratic politics model; political marketing; political entrepreneurship and political 
brokerage; political communication and symbolism management and; realist-constructivism. 
  Therefore, the theoretical building of this dissertation can be split into two bodies. 
The first is descriptive and the second one applied. Within the first one, the realist-
constructivist approach represents the theoretical baseline that runs transversally across the 
dissertation. Although apparently contradictory, realist-constructivist together allows the 
researcher and the reader to understand the decision-making processes versus the 
communication strategies deployed by political entrepreneurs, brokers and opportunists. 
Realism is at the base of political entrepreneurs’ objectives and strategies from a strategic and 
decisional point of view. However, in order to get the desired outcomes they have to 
orchestrate political communication campaigns and strategies to gather the consensus from 
active and representative stakeholders as well as the public opinion.  
 In order to underpin this initial theoretical approach the author has selected the 
bureaucratic political model, political marketing, political communication and symbolism 
management and political marketing. These frames act as complementary theoretical and 
methodological approaches that would allow to better understand how, by following realist 
objectives, political entrepreneurs construct the a new reality in order to get public consensus.  
 Second, political entrepreneurship and brokerage comply with the exigencies of 
finding a framework that can be applied to evaluating policies and to improving decision 
making processes. It also complements the precedent theories.  
 
2.1.1. The Bureaucratic Politics Model.  
Understanding decision-making processes in foreign policy has increasingly interested 
scholars since the 1960s. Since then three waves of scholarly work have dealt with it. The 
first of those developed by Neustadt who established the theoretical framework based on the 
observation that “presidential power is the power to persuade”.106  
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Following this theoretical approach as Rosati mentions, some other authors like 
Huntington, Schilling, Hilsman were also developing their understanding of how 
governments define their negotiations with other stakeholders, as well as their decision-
making processes.
107
 At this level, they have highlighted the correlation between the 
decision-making process and the bargaining process.  
During the second generation scholars led by Allison and Halperin concentrated on 
developing the initial proposals into a model of bureaucratic politics by systematizing the 
processes.
108
 Allison “solidified the bargaining nature of governmental policy into a decision-
making model”.109 Both Allison and Halperin, by studying some US operations during the 
Vietnam war in 1968, proposed the model that was finally called “bureaucratic politics”.110  
The third generation of scholarly work was again represented by Allison and 
Szanton.
111
 Steinbruner advanced these studies by applying the cognitive psychology 
approach to the analysis of political decision-making processes.
112
 Destler explained how 
organizational reform would be a valid framework to understand how governments define 
their foreign policy.
113
Summarizing, these authors developed further the initial ideas and 
hypotheses of the authors of the first and second generations.  
Theoretically speaking this model, applied to US foreign policy, was systematized by 
Rosati who structured it into four main propositions: 
1. “For any single issue, the executive branch of the government is composed of 
numerous individuals and organizations, with various differences in goals and 
objectives”.114 
2. “No preponderant individual or organization exists; the President, if involved, is 
merely one participant, although his influence may be the most powerful”.115 
3. “The final decision is a ‘political resultant’- the outcome of bargaining and 
compromise among the various participants”116 
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4. “A considerable gap usually exists between the formulated decision and its 
implementation”.117 
These four propositions do not fit with the profile presented and developed by countries 
like Spain or France with regards to their foreign policies and decision-making processes. 
Before explaining these concerns and lack of applicability for this dissertation, it should be 
noted that some other authors have questioned the applicability of this model in other 
contexts.  
Despite the initial consensus shared by political scientists, sociologists and historians 
over the three aforementioned waves, since the 1970s the model has started to be criticized.
118
 
Among all the criticism there are at least three that should be taken into consideration for the 
purposes of this dissertation. Pelmutter and Rosati have specified that the model failed to 
consider broader issues related to international affairs.
119
 
Hollis, Smith, Permutter and Steiner have criticized the model as mostly presenting a 
mechanic nature without bearing in mind that the most relevant issue would have been to 
define the basis to understand the model as a dynamic process as Kaarbo has pointed out.
120
 
Finally, Caldwell and Wagner have indicated that the model in not replicable beyond the 
original specific US case.
121
On top of these three elements, as Kaarbo mentions, the 
bureaucratic politics model places the president as the figure who is forced to bargain with 
his advisors and other institutional forces.
122
  
In considering the four aforementioned propositions defined by Rosati and bearing in 
mind mostly the Spanish and French case, the first two propositions do not apply. However 
the second and third might apply. Per proposition number 1, Spanish executive branches, 
especially during Felipe Gonzalez’s, Aznar’s or Zapatero’s governments, were not divided 
into numerous individuals or organizations defending different goals and objects.  
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On the contrary, they were very much aligned in pursuit common foreign policy 
objectives. Per the second proposition, the president in the cases under examination in this 
thesis played a fundamental role in defining foreign policy strategies and holding together the 
political and diplomatic forces.  
 The third proposition, however, describes well the way countries like Spain have 
been defining their strategies to gain diplomatic stature and influence and can be considered 
as a “political resultant” due to the compromise among involved stakeholders. The fourth 
element applies completely. As it is going to be demonstrated in chapters 5, 7 and 8, this is a 
fundamental part of this thesis. Normally it is possible to appreciate gaps between formulated 
decisions and implementations. This fourth proposition will be valuable to apply to the final 
Political entrepreneurs model. These elements and considerations make the classic 
bureaucratic politics model a partially inappropriate approach for this dissertation.  
Nevertheless, beyond the aforementioned criticism, some theoretical developments 
were inspired by this model and they can be applied in order to frame this thesis. Kaarbo has 
indicated that the bigger part of the existing research on the bureaucratic politics model has 
concentrated attention on the central importance of power. This is partially due to the fact that 
researchers are interested in understanding the dynamics of political decision making process, 
where decision makers, normally should be placed at the top of the organization.  
However, putting aside this important part of the literature she has studied and 
introduced the role of bureaucratic minorities.
123
 In her research she indicates that these 
apparently less important groups have an impact in defining foreign policy strategies.
124
 In 
effect, her research covers a gap explaining the nature and effects of asymmetrical power 
relations.
125
These relations are important for understanding, for instance, how Spain was able 
to develop foreign policy strategies through its European diplomacy. Therefore, per 
asymmetric power relations, this author considers that, for example, Spanish diplomacy in 
Europe was a minority –vertical minority – that played a fundamental role in defining and 
defending Spain’s interests and strategies in Europe.126 
The limitations of the bureaucratic politics model has raised issues over its suitability 
for this dissertation. The strongest criticism against this model is that it does not provide a 
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clear framework to understand how dynamic decision-making processes are structured and 
defined.  
Given that the objective of this dissertation is to provide further understanding of the 
dynamics of decision-making processes in foreign policy the theoretical framework provided 
by political entrepreneurship is more suitable, though even this will need to be adapted and 
reformulated to better meet the purposes of this dissertation.  
 
2.1.2. Political Marketing. 
Political marketing is one of the elements that operate at the baseline of the process the 
bureaucratic politics model fails to address and can help provide an understanding and 
systematization of these operations. Over the last decade, a number of studies have 
increasingly tried to understand how to apply marketing to politics and political decision-
making processes. Newman and Scammell are good examples of those who have been 
building on older examples like Kotler, Sidney, Tucker or Carman, all of whom proposed the 
universal application of marketing rules.
127
  
More recently, in 2008, Lees-Marshment has formulated a number of questions that 
are relevant to discussing these connections and to evaluate the practical and ethical impacts 
of such an approach: What does political marketing mean for political leadership? “Is not 
political marketing manipulative and only concerned with manufacturing images?” and “how 
can business concepts be applicable to an area traditionally seen as concerned with ideology 
and value?”128 
Beyond these questions, it would also be important to understand the mechanics of 
such political marketing and how political actors –termed here political entrepreneurs and 
brokers – design and have designed their strategies to “sell” political and diplomatic 
“products” aimed at gathering political consensus and politico-economic influence. 
Therefore, technically speaking, and in order to systematize the marketing, selling and 
implementation processes, the analysis of how language has been used will be very relevant 
to understanding the principles of this political marketing. For the purposes of achieving this 
objective, and anticipating what is going to be explained in the methodological section, , this 
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thesis will apply the framework provided by Corpus Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA).  
 
2.1.3. Political Entrepreneurship. 
The concept of political marketing can be more understandable, operationally speaking, by 
introducing the concept of a political entrepreneur. According to Christopoulos, political 
entrepreneurs are similar to economic entrepreneurs given that they share “intellectual ability, 
good knowledge of their domain, team building skills, reputation, extensive networks, 
strategic vision and tenacity”.129 However, the differences, he argues, are related to the fact of 
“having a different incentive structure in attempting to control or exercise political power”.130 
The other important operational element that is common to political entrepreneurs is that they 
are network-dependents and this implies that their “ability for political action is network- 
contingent”.131  
 As stated by Van der Steen and Gronewegen the literature on policy entrepreneurship 
“is still in its infancy”.132 The practical and theoretical understanding has been studied by 
Kingdom who elaborated the Policy Streams Approach.
133
 Kingdon explains policy design 
and formation as the product of the interaction between three streams: The problem stream, 
the policy stream and the politics stream.
134
 The first element, the problem stream is related 
to public affairs requiring attention. As Guldbrandsson and Fossum have stressed “some 
conditions are not even defined as problems until there is something to do about it, i.e. there 
is a solution (a policy) available and recognized by the politicians”.135  
Second, the policy stream refers to proposals aimed at inciting changes. According to 
Guldbrandsson and Fossum, “before a problem can reach the decision agenda, decision 
makers must be given at least on alternative solution, worked out and ready to put in place”136 
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Third, the politics stream is related to political issues, changes of public opinion or 
administration amongst other factors. 
Normally these three streams evolve independently and are not necessarily linked. 
However, when a given problem has been recognized, a partial or total solution for it has 
been defined and the political environment welcomes changes a policy window appears.
137
 
This process facilitates the understanding of public policymaking. As Kingdon has noted, this 
system can be conceptualized as a set of processes: First, setting an agenda; second, 
specifying alternatives for such agenda; third, an authoritative choosing process evaluating 
the existing alternatives and fourth, the implementation of the decision or the law.
138
 
Prior to  all this Polsby has added a fundamental preparatory process that is important 
to assess in order to understand better the mechanisms and the possible failures or strengths 
of a given agenda setting, policy or political process: Policy initiation. It is defined as “the 
politics of inventing, winnowing and finding and gaining adherents for policy alternatives 
before they are made part of a ‘program’”.139 Roberts and Kings have elaborated an 
interesting taxonomy that partially explains the characteristics of public entrepreneurs.
140
 
 Advocacy of new ideas and development of innovative proposals.  
 Define and reframe existing problems.  
 Search for political alternatives.  
 Brokering the new ideas and proposals among a number of representative political or 
policy actors.  
 Mobilizing public opinion through strategies of political communication and public 
speech.  
 Helping to set the decision-making agenda.  
With regards to the functional aspects of public entrepreneurs, Roberts and King have 
identified 4 central stages:  
 Creation: An innovative idea is developed and starts to emerge.  
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 Design: The innovative concept is perfected and is encapsulated into a formal 
statement or proposal.  
 Implementation: The new concept or idea has been theoretically approved and is 
tested to constitute a new initiative or programme.  
 Institutionalization: The idea becomes an established practice and is not any longer 
considered as something innovative.
141
 
For the purposes of this dissertation it is important to note that these four functional 
and procedural stages developed by Roberts and King are going to be used as a framework to 
analyse, understand and explain the process that political entrepreneurs and brokers have 
used to design and implement Euro-Mediterranean politics. The virtue of this model is 
justified by the fact that it is measurable, replicable and empirically re-testable either in 
different socio-political and cultural contexts or in considering different issues and political 
problems.  The last two propositions that can be applicable from the bureaucratic politics 
model developed by Rosati and the characteristics and features of the bureaucratic minorities 
studied by Kaarbo can be embedded to better describe the entire dynamic process.  
Nevertheless, even though these four stages provide the most valid framework to 
achieve the objectives of this thesis, this model is not entirely satisfactory and it has to be 
further developed. The four stages –creation, design, implementation and institutionalization- 
are relevant to analyse how the process evolves since the inception to the institutionalization. 
However, it analyses a linear process and does not consider the possibility of understanding 
this process as a cycle.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is central to understand the consequences of 
such policies and mechanisms beyond the linear description proposed by this framework. The 
framework can be completed by introducing a fifth variable: Evaluation. By integrating this 
factor, it will be possible to analyse an entire cycle. This final vision will be provided in the 
conclusions. Therefore this design will allow for a dynamic framework that will permit to 
study and explain these dynamic processes. In considering these elements, in the conclusions, 
this dissertation will propose the Political Entrepreneurship Cycle (PEC).  
 
2.1.4. Political Brokers.  
Traditionally, brokers are defined as middle-men mediating between buyers and sellers.  This 
concept can be applied to policy and decision-making processes. However, the literature on 
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political brokers is ample, diffused and not always clear. It started to develop during the 
1950’s.  Pye studied the role of political brokers in non-Western societies.142  He defined 
political brokers as those “seeking first to differentiate special interests within the society so 
as to be better able to aggregate those interests as a propagandist basis. The political broker 
tries to satisfy the largest possible number of people by discovering how their particular 
interests can be brought together and adjusted to each other”.143  
According to this description political brokers provide “a common symbolism by 
aggregating the separate interests of people”.144 From this point of view, symbolism 
management will represent one of the most relevant actions of both political brokers and 
entrepreneurs. These two definitions will be applied in this thesis for the purposes of 
explaining the role of political brokers as entrepreneurs.  
Over the 1970s and the 1980s authors like Valenzuela, Barbaro, and Smith applied a 
very similar understanding of political brokers by focusing their analysis on local, regional 
and national politics.
145
 In the 1980s Mann researched the role of brokers as entrepreneurs.
146
 
As it has been stated before, political entrepreneurs and brokers have to be differentiated, 
even though their roles can be interactive and can overlap operationally.  
 Since the 2000s a new wave of scholarly works on political brokers has been 
developing. Beyond the negative features –manipulation- offered by aforementioned works, 
Pielke wrote about the potential positive impact of “honest brokers”.147 However, this 
positive approach is not shared by most authors focused on understanding how political 
brokers manipulate and manage common or scattered needs to get the desired consensus even 
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2.1.4.1.The Mediterranean as a Political Window for Political Entrepreneurs and Brokers. 
Bicchi does not differentiate between the roles and characteristics of entrepreneurs and 
brokers. Therefore it should be necessary to disentangle this conceptual problem. She has 
suggested that looking at entrepreneurial states as brokers would help to understand these 
dynamics. In fact, as she has stressed, “once a policy window exists and a policy entrepreneur 
acts on it, the third factor that leads to development of European foreign policy making is the 
interaction among member states and EC/EU institutions”.   
This argument is very pragmatic and explains well the role of the state as a broker. 
However, an initial critical point that may arise is related to the consistency and coherence of 
such speculative proposals beyond this pragmatism. In other words, to what extent the states 
acting as brokers – as the middle point between decision makers and “political buyers” – are 
conscious of an issue like political responsibility and the potential negative impacts and 
collateral damages of such policies? Which kind of reward would they expect from this 
transaction? What about the sustainability of such proposals that entail the mobilization of 
important financial resources and hopes? This thesis will address these questions in the 
course of subsequent chapters as there is a noticeable gap in the literature in terms of research 
dealing with foreign policy and bilateral relations from this perspective.   
In considering these facts, this dissertation will focus on differentiating when a 
political actor should be denominated as a political entrepreneur or as a political broker –or 
both simultaneously. It will also explain how a political entrepreneur or broker is able to 
define a strategy to gather other’s interest to join proposals. In order to understand 
operationally this objective, the thesis will explain how political entrepreneurs or brokers 
design, adapt and modify their political speech to gain consensus by understanding changing 
contexts and scenarios.  In accepting that there might be two or more political entrepreneurs 
or brokers competing for the same political window such as in this case, Spain and France, 
the thesis will discuss and assess the mechanisms and strategies used by both competitors for 
attracting consensus.  
This point will help explain how alliances have been built and to what extent, beyond 
the fact of attracting consensus within the short and the medium term, political entrepreneurs 
or brokers considered the possible consequences and sustainability of their proposals within 
the medium and long term. Political entrepreneurs appear more far-sighted than political 
brokers who are more prone to concentrate their energies on the short term. 
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As Tsoukalis has mentioned, the EEC started to be interested in putting into effect the 
“Global Mediterranean Policy” (GMP) in response to some major politico-economic events 
that impacted significantly on EEC-Mediterranean relations.
149
 For instance, the oil crisis of 
1973 brought more relative power to the Arab oil-producing members of OPEC, in turn 
“provoking also a shift in the balance of power towards the south”.150 The establishment of 
the Euro-Arab Dialogue from 1975 onward marked a very important milestone despite the 
initial hesitations among EEC members, oil producing countries and southern countries.
151
 
However, as with the Barcelona Process two decades later the GMP was mostly limited to 
economic measures as it has been explained above.
152
 
This approach is useful in explaining how economic, market and strategic interests 
drove and have been driving Euro-Mediterranean relations and why the Mediterranean was, 
and is, considered as a political window or opportunity for political entrepreneurs and 
brokers. Per northern and southern Mediterranean relations the author understands mostly 
Portugal, France, Spain and Italy – and later Malta and Greece-. Whereas that for southern 
Mediterranean countries, the author is considering mostly the Maghreb - Morocco, Tunisia, 
Algeria, Libya- and to some extent also Egypt, even though this country represents the part of 
the Mashrek, the eastern part of the Arab world.  
 In analysing the 1970s, the EEC was already very interested in the Mediterranean due 
to both economic and trade objectives. By 1974, the 9.4 per cent of EEC exports went to 
Mediterranean countries.
153
 The years 1975, 1976 and 1977 were very active in terms of the 
signing of trade agreements between the EEC and Mediterranean countries.
154
 The focus on 
economics as well as the treatment of the 17 participating Mediterranean countries as a 
homogeneous bloc was a mistake.
155
 Arguably, as will be addressed later in this thesis, this 
same mistake was repeated in the EMP from 1995 onward. Moreover, northern 
Mediterranean countries –such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, France- differed from Maghreb 
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countries in political terms as according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, they were 
eligible for full membership with the EEC and “this has a definite influence on the attitudes 
and policies of both sides”.156 
This structural problem was not solved with the EMP and the same restrictions were 
present during the Barcelona Process and parallel and subsequent initiatives as explained 
previously. In considering Europe-Arab relations, the question of attitudes represents 
probably the most important element that may allow or block any attempt of implementing 
sustainable policies.   
This statement is central to this thesis. In considering Euro-Mediterranean politics and 
in assessing how political entrepreneurs and brokers –and opportunists- have been designing 
policies and mechanisms to increase their diplomatic and political power, it is important to 
understand how asymmetric politico-economic relations operate. The relationship between 
southern European countries –Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and later Malta and Greece- and 
Maghreb countries are a clear example of asymmetry. In analysing how political 
entrepreneurs operate and in bearing in mind the four stages described above –creation, 
design, implementation and institutionalization –it is implicitly assumed that political 
entrepreneurs prioritise their self-interest and design policy proposals according to their 
objectives. However, the introduction of the evaluation of the PEC model will help us to 
understand the degree of consistency, coherence and political responsibility vis-à-vis 
Southern Mediterranean partners.  
This evaluation component of the PEC model assesses to what extent attitudes 
deployed by dominant political partners, lobbies or political entrepreneurs have really 
considered the interests and needs of Maghreb partners –and to a certain point Mashrek 
partners like Egypt- or if, on the contrary, their needs have been used and manipulated to 
impose EU’s ambitions and objectives. The evaluation component therefore analyses the 
issue of political responsibility, coherence and consistency that is not implicit in the four 
stages that were presented in the original model by Roberts and King.  
The issue of responsibility would establish the difference between political 
entrepreneurs, political brokers and opportunists. From this point of view, political 
entrepreneurs and brokers would be those who integrate in their proposals an ethical concern 
aimed at producing and generating win-win solutions. Whereas political opportunists are 
those who design policies and mechanisms aiming at fulfilling and accomplishing their own 
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objectives by manipulating and by speculating on others’ needs. The theoretical 
differentiation of both concepts, are related to the principles that characterize industrial and 
financial capitalism and how the market power is understood and applied to a wide array of 




With regards to networks, coalitions and the implementation of new political projects 
and policies within the Mediterranean, Bicchi has pointed out that “the most effective policy 
entrepreneurship has come from a state member, state or from a coalition of actors guided by 
a member state”.158 This concept is important for understanding the development and 
evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean political and diplomatic realm, as well as Franco-
Spanish engagement and competition in the region.  
 
2.1.5. Political Communication and Sensitive Issues.  
This thesis concentrates its attention on how Spain and France have been leading the 
processes of developing the base of the current Euro-Mediterranean policies. The Euro-
Mediterranean region raises certain challenges for policy makers. Political brokers or 
entrepreneurs have to evaluate and identify how these economic, social and cultural 
challenges may affect their proposals and therefore they have to adapt their communication 
strategies in order, first to identify the correct political window or opportunity, and second to 
convey the message aimed at gathering political consensus.  
Within the Mediterranean sphere and especially considering EU-Maghreb relations, 
sensitive problems like migration flows, security, crime, religion and labour define already 
potential political windows or opportunities to be developed by political brokers and 
entrepreneurs. But these categories also carry risks of altering North-South relations due to 
misconceptions generated by entrepreneurs or brokers when they design their communication 
strategies.  
Theoretically speaking, a political entrepreneur would act and communicate 
responsibly and would try to use these sensitive issues to promote positive changes and win-
win solutions. Whereas political brokers –if they are not understood highlighting their 
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potential positive virtues- would speculate with these sensitive issues in order to achieve 
short-term objectives that would entail unilateral benefits.  
In considering these comments, research on the influence and impact of the mass 
media on shaping social processes and politics has increased over the years. As has been 
noted by Meyer, it is difficult to imagine another phenomenon shaping societies in such a 
profound, irreversible and intensive way.
159
 It would be possible to classify these studies in 
three main ways.  
The first involves the ways the public sphere has been impacted on and transformed 
by the evolution of the media and Internet and Communication Technologies (ICTs); this is 
how public communication has been affected by the influence of the media as Dahlgren and 
Sparks and Curran and Seaton had shown.
160
 The second approach addresses the connections 
between the political sphere and the media. Here, the media is not just the interpretation of 




Other various studies regarding the impact of the media on shaping the political 
sphere constitute a third identifiable dimension. They contribute to understanding relations 
between media and politics.  These studies by Stanton and Meyer, amongst others, cover a 
topic that can be described as media democracy.
162
 
 Although it would be possible to find interconnections among these three approaches, 
and this author does not dismiss the claims in any, the main theoretical approach considered 
in this research is rooted in the second one – the relationship between the political sphere and 
the media. In short, it would be possible to consider political communication as a vector of 
the media impacting on public opinion and constructing consent without social or political 
responsibility.  
Over recent years, studies on political communication and public opinion addressing 
sensitive issues such as migration, security, terrorism or environmental security have gained 
momentum. In the United States, for instance, Cook considers that the media might be 
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considered a political institution.
163
 This basically means that the media could have the 
capacity to govern. Surely, these forms of governing, while being very efficient, go beyond 
the traditional ways of ruling. Adopting the same rationale, Graber, McQuail and Norris do 
not find deep differences between the politics of news and the news of politics.
164
 At a 
pragmatic level politics and the media work together as agent and shadow. 
 Entman’s work assesses how the media has played a fundamental role in the 
projection of power within the framework of American foreign policy.
165
 Andersen studies 
the relationship between the media and war during the twentieth century.
166
 Experts on the 
impact of the media on public opinion, like Iyengar and McGrady have set their sights on 
“protecting” the citizenry from these trends.167 By accepting the connections between media 
and politics, it is possible to make the case that governing or acting as a political entrepreneur 




Very similar theoretical approaches can be found in Europe. For instance, Statham 
demonstrated that media communication and political communication have been a central 
argument in making the European Union’s scope of legitimacy understandable.169 Similar 
lines of research have been recently developed by Triandafylliou, Wodala and 
Krzyzamowski.
170
 They demonstrate the intimate connection between the role of the media 
and political communication and the construction of a European public sphere.  In the 
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2.1.5.1. Welfare and Immigration Policies.  
 
Western Europe is a case that deserves particular attention given that this dissertation focuses 
on this area.  Southern European countries, such as Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta and 
Greece, have to deal with a number of problems relating to international migration flows 
from the southern Mediterranean. In the beginning of the 1990s, some like Siune and 
Treutzschler studied the existence of “media politics” in Western Europe.172 Recent studies 
on the same region conducted by Ellinas have demonstrated that far-right parties from these 
countries are using the media to spread extremist, nationalistic and racist discourses.
173
  
For any western country, individually speaking, as well as for the European Union as 
a whole, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees are portrayed as a danger to the protection 
of the “national identity” and the welfare state system. This phenomenon has been studied by 
Huysmans. France, during the 2
nd
 Empire (1852-1870), used the concept of Ètat-Providence 
and Germany, during the 2
nd
 Reich (1871), used the idea of Wohlfahrsstaat, but the idea of 
the welfare state, a concept in its modern sense, that was coined during the World War II, 
most likely by William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, has obtained a value which needs 
defending, and which was shaped at the same time as the European Union was established.  
That is why the European Union has elevated the migratory question to that of 
security. This explains why the EU communitarized migration policies with the Amsterdam 
Treaty (AT) in 1997, even though, as Hammar has shown, massive scepticism prevails 
around the degree of Europeanization of those policies.
174
 
Thus, the idea of a welfare state is very much rooted in European culture—despite its 
regional variations—and any potential threat which might jeopardize its continuity constitutes 
a very profitable excuse, politically speaking, to gain consensus and to maintain a certain 
social cohesion and balance. Hence, beyond an economic approach, this researcher is very 
much inclined to do a cultural-symbolic discourse and interpretation of this problem. Weiner 
wrote that the unwillingness of states to open borders transcends economic considerations.
175
 
The rationale behind these political decisions are much more bound up with the fact that it 
“ensures” that an influx of migrants (economic migrants, refugees or asylum seekers) may 
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generate xenophobic sentiments and trigger conflicts between natives and migrants and, as a 
consequence, increase the appeal of right-wing political groups.  
To what extent is this true? For instance, migratory policies in Spain have been much 
more damaging for immigrants during Zapatero’s socialist government than during Aznar’s 
conservative presidency. Thus, it is possible to repeat, that we face a socio-political realm 
where symbols and values are at stake and the subsequent political communication has been, 
and will remain, focused on managing these symbols and values through the generation of 
‘branded concepts’, or widely accepted paradigms, such as the migration-security nexus.  
 
2.1.5.2. Migration, Media and Public Opinion.  
 
The case of migration highlights that current political communication is more strongly 
affected by the management of ‘branded concepts’ than in the past, and this might be related 
to the attempt to intentionally dislocate or change existing social norms and conventions as a 
way of gaining influence and dominance. The essence of this conflict resides in the will and 
necessity of artificially, though in a seemingly natural process, and paradoxically creating 
situations of imbalance –an unsettled cultural model –where precarious social balance has 
been achieved.  
This alternation of balanced and imbalanced contexts justifies the very action of 
current politics, where priming “branded concepts” is just a strategy to survive and to project 
power as long as possible. By using this theoretical approach, this research will address the 
French and Spanish paradigms of political communication on the migration-security issue, 
which they used in order to gain international presence and project power. This approach is 
central because as it is going to be demonstrated in chapter 6, migration related issues have 
been the contextual elements that have challenged the consistency and coherence –and 
therefore the sustainability – of the policies, initiatives and mechanisms championed by both 
Spain and France.  
 The interests of Spain and France across the Mediterranean and chiefly, on its western 
side, are naturally determined by their geographical location. Due to this and the historical 
predisposition towards the constitution of empires, it is important to study their ways and 
strategies of projecting power by implementing and developing a number of formal and 
informal institutions. In doing so, as has been outlined above, this thesis analyses the 
evolution of their political dialectics over the last few decades, their political narratives, their 
public policies and their diplomatic actions and reactions by concentrating attention on those 
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transversal issues which have played, and which are playing, a decisive role in the region, 
such as international migration and security-related issues. It will be demonstrated in chapter 
6 that by controlling and leading political communication on sensitive issues – migration and 
security –the perception of power, its projection and its materialization in terms of regional 
influence, has been decisive.   
Media influence on public opinion regarding sensitive issues such as migration and 
security in the Euro-Mediterranean area has been studied with a focus on North Africa and 
central Europe.
176
 Zapata and Lorite have concentrated their studies on the Spanish case.
177
 
Tailleur and Blion have concentrated their studies on France.
178
 More generally, although still 
roughly addressing these issues, it would be interesting to underline the pioneering work done 
by King and Wood.
179
 More recently, a collection of essays edited by Sabry continues this 
line of research.
180
 It is also important to mention Mattelart’s research on media, migration 
and transnationalism.
181
  All show that by accepting a bi-directional correlation between 
politics and media, we can carefully analyse ideas, values, myths, beliefs, images and 
stereotypes.  
 
2.1.6. Symbolism Management. 
A major task of this thesis is to assess the situation of political communication, public 
opinion, policy-making processes and political coherence within semi-democratic contexts. 
Normally, sets of values, beliefs and “absolute” truths are imposed from birth. That provokes 
an outcome: our mind-set is shaped first to believe. After that, we are encouraged to think. 
This dichotomy is applicable, afterwards, to socio-political behaviour. Firstly, those ideas, 
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values and sets of beliefs are imposed top-down and then societies are required to follow 
democratic and tolerant patterns. It would be possible to believe that this contradiction may 
be hidden, as Bauman has noted, behind our conflicts which are an open battle between the 
old and the new, between “we” and the “others” and between “our” universal truths and 
“their” dubious convictions.182 This is something that is definable as “symbolism 
management”.  
Symbols can be seen as the genetic information of cultures. They define main cultural 
features and predispose certain collective and individual behaviours. Symbols are 
informational units that can be managed. Cultures aim at preserving those informational units 
and by doing so they tend to maintain an acknowledged and shared purity standard. 
Mutations can occur—they can even be modified artificially—but the main features remain.  
 “Symbolism management” acquires higher relevance when contexts or uncontrollable 
situations jeopardize a culture’s “purity standards”. This happens when their defining factors 
are contested or their authoritative dimensions are not respected. To sum up, within a 
conservative or progressive environment, symbols are manipulated for achieving consensus 
and for attaining outcomes. All reasons and points of view can be justified by the concept of 
‘symbolism management’ and its role within different cultural environments.  
The idea of culture that this thesis addresses follows Swidler’s research on the role of 
culture on social action. This makes it is possible to understand better the hypothesis and 
specific objectives examined in this work.
183
 This thesis does not assume that “culture shapes 
action by supplying ultimate ends or values toward which action is directed, thus making 
values the central causal element of culture”.184 This vision would undermine Weberian and 
Parsonian’s traditional visions regarding the impact of culture on action.185   
The vision of culture Swidler offers is structured on three levels. Firstly, it proposes 
“an image of culture as a ‘tool-kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views which people 
may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems”.186 This idea is 
essential to understanding the aforementioned idea of “symbolism management”. This 
coincides with the second strand of the argument, in which Swidler states that in order to 
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understand culture’s causal effects it is necessary to focus on ‘strategies of action’, which are 
“persistent ways of ordering action through the time”.187 Thirdly, she does not observe 
culture’s causal dimension and significance in defining ends of actions, but “in providing 
cultural components that are used to construct strategies of action”.188  
What it is interesting in Swidler’s approach are her two descriptive models of culture 
that are intrinsically related to the three steps stated earlier. The first one refers to the settled 
culture, the second one to the unsettled culture. The first model, for settled cultures, shows 
that strategies are guided by traditions and common sense. This model shows that, in the 
short-term, these strategies have weak direct control over action and refine and reinforce 
habits. In the long term, it provides resources for constructing strategies of action.
189
 If one 
considers the unsettled model of culture, we see that strategies are guided by ideology. In the 
short term, strategies have strong control over action and teach new modes of action. In the 
long-term, new strategies of action are created.
190
  
It is important to note that when one considers the unsettled model of culture we 
describe contexts in which diverse ideological activisms compete to organize new paths of 
action and gain dominance. When describing these models, one should note that the common 
denominator of this dissertation’s hypothesis, lies exactly on this point: The media and public 
discourse deployed by diplomatic brokers engaged in generating subsequent episodes of 
unsettled culture to impose certain realities and project power.  
The idea of “symbolism management” is the very central force behind this 
“unsettling”. What this dissertation aims to suggest is that an unsettled model of culture can 
be manufactured and, by manufacturing it, it is possible to gain dominance or engage in a 
fight for dominance. This research aims to demonstrate exactly this point by examining how 
France and Spain, as brokers, managed information regarding sensitive issues such as 
migration and security to gain international influence and stature—basically by creating 
models of unsettled culture.  
 
2.1.7. Realist Constructivism.  
Linked to the aforementioned points this thesis explores how states have been acting as 
political and diplomatic entrepreneurs and brokers –and opportunists- in order to achieve 
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greater diplomatic influence on the one hand and to address national interests on the other 
hand. In convincing other political and institutional stakeholders, political brokers and 
entrepreneurs have to start defining a particular communication strategy to convince and 
persuade them about the importance of their proposal. A successful communication strategy 
and rhetoric has to shape an existing common imaginary and construct a new one based on 
common values, needs and objectives. Beside this, they have to make sure that this 
communication strategy and speech remains linked to their permanent national interests and 
the defence of their objectives.   
 In considering Euro-Mediterranean politics, it is possible to identify that this approach 
follows a cyclical pattern. First countries –political entrepreneurs and brokers – like Spain 
and France have had to design and develop a communication strategy to shape and re-
construct the common imaginary in order to gather consensus and after that implement and 
institutionalise the new policy. Second, once the EU has agreed to follow up with the 
proposal, and given that Euro-Mediterranean proposals entailed the participation of southern 
Mediterranean countries, the EU has had to convince European public opinion and southern 
Mediterranean countries of the pertinence of the new policy in order to adhere to the 
proposal.  
As it is going to be demonstrated in successive chapters, political brokers and 
entrepreneurs as well the EU have very clear economic and security related objectives. 
However, at a rhetorical level, and to sell the proposal, it has been necessary to integrate 
more social and cultural elements to broaden appeal. This strategy permitted the construction 
of a new politico-diplomatic imaginary on one hand, and the pursuance and achievement of 
domestic interests and objectives on the other.  
 Theoretically speaking these strategies have to be explained by adopting a mixed 
approach. First, an approach based upon the prioritization of security related issues suggests a 
realist framework. Within the international system, the first priority of states is to survive as 
Waltz and the defensive realists suggest.
 191
 However, in considering political entrepreneurs 
and brokers, they mostly aim at maximizing their relative power following an “offensive” 
realism.
192
  Not being great powers political entrepreneurs and brokers would pursue an 
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expansionist policy of increasing diplomatic and political weight in an international context- 
“when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the cost”.193 
Nevertheless these approaches do not fully explain the process of how political 
entrepreneurs and brokers define their strategies. Therefore they are partially useful to 
understand how this process affects, or determines, foreign policy decision-making systems. 
In fact, as Waltz has stated, there is a difference between international politics and foreign 
policy.
194
  That is why a more comprehensive and multidimensional theoretical approach is 
needed to explain these processes. 
 One answer can be offered by the post-realist approach.
195
 As has been stated earlier, 
communication strategies and public speech are fundamental parts of the methods used both 
by political entrepreneurs and brokers. As well as realism, post-realism accepts both logic 
and facts. Hariman and Beer characterize post-realism as an approach that by adopting a 
“linguistic turn …emphasizes narrative as an important means of persuasion. Post-realism 
relies on criticism and the formulation of alternatives. It involves deconstruction and 
reconstruction. Finally, post-realism combines strategy and ethics, power and prudence, 
cultural context and interpretation, and persuasion and psychology”.196 
These characteristics are relevant to explain and understand how political brokers and 
entrepreneurs behave, plan, lobby and execute. Therefore post-realism constitutes a good 
bridge between realism and other theoretical frameworks that focus their attention on socio-
cultural and political processes like constructivism.  
Realism, as Brown has argued, has dominated IR theories, but constructivism is increasingly 
developing as an oppositional theoretical framework.
197
 Barkin states that constructivism has 
been considered as a theory opposing realism.
198
 Rooted in the philosophical and sociological 
tradition, constructivism was applied to IR theory within the context of the end of the Cold 
War. Greenwood Onuf considered that states –and therefore political entrepreneurs and 
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brokers – act equally as individuals and live in a “world of our making”.199 Therefore social, 
and political facts and power relations are constructed.  
Wendt developed this discourse further in discussing the social construction of power 
politics, a central element of realism.
200
  These initial discussions were further developed and 
paved the way for a more consistent constructivist approach within IR theories. It was 
consolidated as a stronger critic of realism where it was stressed that according to the 
constructivist approach structure is constructed by social practice.
201
  
Following a similar theoretical framework, as Copeland has discussed, realism has 
been missing the “intersubjectively shared ideas that shape behaviour by constituting the 
identities and interests of actors”.202  The application of this framework was not immediately 
adopted to explain how Europe has and is being constructed and integrated.
203
  The works of 
Delanty, Christiansen, Knud and Wiener, started to focus more on the social construction of 
Europe.
204
 For them, “crucial aspects of the integration process –polity formation through 
rules and norms, the transformation of identities, the role of ideas and the uses of language –
are thereby opened up to systematic inquiry”.205  
Considering Europe as a collective construction, language and discourse play a very 
important role in defining new values and new socio-cultural and political paradigms.
206
  
Language, rhetoric, narratives and their evolution over time define communicational 
strategies of political entrepreneurs and brokers. They aim at re-shaping realities and 
collective perceptions in order to attain their political objectives. From this point of view, 
language and communication strategies are the vehicle to transmit new ideas and construct 
new collective imaginaries.  This approach is not far away from radical constructivism. This 
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 Bearing in mind the characteristics of political brokers and entrepreneurs and aiming 
at better understanding and explaining how they behave and implement different strategies, it 
is evident that some theoretical aspects commented on above are useful.  
 Realism and constructivism might appear as contradictory theoretical frameworks, 
according to Jackson and Nexon.
208
 However, a combination of both approaches helps us to 
understand and explain how these political entrepreneurs and brokers behave. Some authors 
have aimed at combining these two theories, but Barkin was the first to successfully offer a 
consistent bridge between them.
209
  As he claims, constructivist epistemology and classical 
realist theory are compatible. He argues  “not that constructivism is necessarily realist, but 
that constructivist research is as compatible with a realist worldview as with any other. 
Having a realist constructivism could prove useful in IR theory beyond clarifying 
methodological debates, including helping to specify the relationship between the study of 
power in international politics and the study of international relations as a social 
construction”.210 
In suggesting this, Barkin defines constructivism as a cluster of research methods and 
tools,
211
 “a set of assumptions about how to study world politics, rather than a set of 
assumptions about how politics work”.212  In these terms, this thesis considers a realist-
constructivist approach.  
 
2.2. Originality 
This research attempts to fill the existing gap in the current literature and looks to use the 
linked theoretical approaches examined above, in order to provide an understanding of how 
Spain and France have been acting as political entrepreneurs or brokers in both designing and 
managing Euro-Mediterranean politics and diplomacy. The research will show how both 
France and Spain have taken advantage of historical, cultural, sociological, political and 
economic elements and have been deploying a certain political communication and 
diplomatic strategy that has been manipulated in order to gather political and diplomatic 
consensus on one hand, and in order to gain diplomatic influence both on the EU and on the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region on the other hand.   
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The migration-security nexus will be integrated in order to understand how Spain and 
France’s mechanisms and strategies have been rooted in mobilising sensitive issues that 
affect public opinion’s reactions without taking into consideration the consequences of those 
policies and initiatives for southern Mediterranean countries. This factor has not been 
considered or integrated into previous research.  
As such, this thesis will demonstrate why this element is essential to understanding 
these political processes, their weaknesses, inconsistencies and potential strengths.  
This research also offers a long-term analysis that allows a better understanding of 
political, diplomatic and socio-economic trends, mechanisms and processes. 
Methodologically speaking, and in terms of content, the research adds value to the literature  
due to the following:  
1)  Interviews with level French and Spanish actors who have shaped and developed 
these policies and mechanisms in their professional roles.  
2) The application of innovative methodological tools such as Corpus Linguistics 
(CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse how political 
entrepreneurs or brokers have been developing the political discourse and 
communication strategies in order to, on one hand, identify political 
opportunities/needs and on the other hand to see how they have been designing, 
managing and institutionalizing policies; how public opinion has been reacting to 
these communication strategies in order to understand the consistency and 
sustainability of these policies or proposals from a contextual point of view.  
3) The application and combination of these methodological tools associated to the 
discussed theoretical framework offered by the literature on political 
entrepreneurs, allows for both a theoretical and methodological advancements. 
Theoretically speaking, in the conclusions, the dissertation proposes the Political 
Entrepreneur Cycle (PEC) which represents an effort to understand how the action 
of political entrepreneurs or brokers does not stop or end with the 
institutionalization of a policy, but with the evaluation, within the short, medium 








The methodology used for this dissertation complies with the exigencies of the required 
interdisciplinary approach. This research has taken a mixed approach, including both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. Most of the analysis presented in this dissertation is 
based upon a qualitative approach. However, quantitative analysis was also used when 




This thesis uses multiple methods of data collection and analysis.
213
 It follows the concept of 
triangulation developed by Webb et Al. and Denzin among others. This builds on Campbell 
and Fiske’s work also.214 As Mathison notes “through triangulating we expect various data 
sources and methods to lead to a singular proposition about the phenomenon being 




 Data triangulation: Refers to the variety of data used for a single study. 
 Methodological triangulation: Uses a wide array of methods to address the same 
problem. It includes the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
 Investigator triangulation: It compares data collected by other researchers and it 
allows one to compare how ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ of the studied research problem 
are related to it. 
 Theory triangulation: Uses a range of theoretical models and approaches to better 
understand and proof the validity of gathered data.  
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As King, Horrocks and Mathison have shown, there exists a debate on the pros and 
cons of using triangulation.
217
  Patton defends triangulation in order to avoid certain risks 
related to the use of individualized methods.
218
  Even though, using triangulation as Mays and 
Pope have stressed, does not guarantee that the data gathered by using different methods can 
be easily integrated in order to show a unified outcome or result.
219
  Nevertheless, as Patton 
has written the strength of triangulation derives from its suitability to discern “when and why 
there are differences”.220 
In these terms, triangulation is a valuable technique to proof correlations, 
consistencies and inconsistencies related to this research’s main and specific objectives. 
Methodologically speaking this research has been structured into three correlated and 
transversal layers. The first layer corresponds to the analysis of secondary sources. The 
second layer corresponds to the use of interviews. The third layer assesses primary sources. 
Triangulation has been used within each layer and across all three layers in order to better test 
and proof the initial hypotheses and approaches suggested in the initial sections.  
 
3.1.2. Corpus Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis.  
Given that this dissertation aims at analysing how political entrepreneurs and brokers have 
been designing and managing Euro-Mediterranean politics, it is important to give special 
attention to the use of language and the rhetorical strategies these stakeholders have been 
following to achieve their objectives. This approach is fundamental to understanding, the 
processes, dynamics and mechanisms of policy design and management, and on the other 
hand, how these processes and mechanisms can be evaluated through 1) the evolution of the 
socio-economic context and 2) the reaction of the public opinion to them. 
 In order to analyse how political and diplomatic entrepreneurs or brokers 
conceptualize, plan, define and implement their proposals and projects, content analysis is a 
crucial research method. Content analysis is defined by Holsten as “any technique for making 
inferences by systematically and objectively identifying special characteristics of 
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messages”.221 In terms of political or diplomatic projects, agenda setting and general or 
specific interventions, it is important for the researcher to assess three components: the 
message and the formulation of the message, the sender and the intended audience.  
That said, and in order to achieve positive outcomes, it is important to know the 
targeted audience and understand how to reach and motivate it in order to gather the desired 
consensus. As Kolbe and Burnett note, content analysis is “an observational research method 
that is used to systematically evaluate the symbolic content of all forms of recorded 
communications”.222 For this research, it is vital that one can assess, through content analysis, 
the way symbols are communicated and portrayed to defend the necessity of implementing a 
common Euro-Mediterranean policy, as well as the way one should deal with the threats and 
probable dangers related to EU-MENA (Middle East and North Africa) relations in order to 
achieve increased diplomatic stature and influence. 
 The way that diplomats and politicians have framed Euro-Mediterranean affairs is 
linked to their management style.. As Semetko and Valkenburg have stressed, alongside 
content analysis and agenda-setting research, framing analysis “shares (…) a focus on the 
relationships between public policy issues in the news and the public perceptions of these 
issues”.223 
  In choosing the most appropriate methodology to study these objectives the author has 
been guided by two principles: innovation and pertinence. Innovation here is understood as 
the identification of a methodological gap in the existing scholarly literature. Pertinence is 
understood as the most suitable and efficient methodological tool or approach to achieve the 
objectives formulated before.  
None of the aforementioned works summarized in the literature review have devoted 
attention to the linguistic component and therefore, the explanation of the processes and 
mechanisms of policy-making and evaluation are neither complete nor satisfactory. The 
mechanisms and strategies to design and manage Euro-Mediterranean politics have been 
mostly based upon a linguistic construction aimed at 1) gathering political consensus to 
support potential initiatives and 2) to determine and condition the support, directly or 
indirectly, of the public opinion in order to justify these policies.  
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These two elements come together and explain the theoretical approach selected for 
this thesis. A realist approach is used linguistically to justify the pertinence of certain 
policies. Whereas a more socio-constructivist approach has to be defined as well to gather 
consensus, to manipulate public opinion in order to achieve non-mutable national or 
international –individual or clusters- interests and objectives. 
 In order to analyse these strategies, apparently contradictory theoretical frameworks 
and practices and, on the other hand, propose a complementary methodology which will work 
jointly with the following tools and methods, the author has decided to use corpus linguistics 
(CL) and critical discourse analysis (CDA). This methodological framework will be essential 
to characterize, differentiate and define the strategies and behaviours deployed by political 
entrepreneurs and brokers. It will also help us to understand 1) the mechanisms of agenda 
setting 2) the long-term analysis of political communication strategies on sensitive issues, 3) 
the behaviour of public opinion according to different contexts and, 4) the policy-evaluation 
process necessary to understand the PEC.  
 
3.1.2.1.Corpus Linguistics.  
CL is a recently developed discipline that attracts increasing attention among linguists.
224
As 
Biber, Conrad and Reppen mention, studies of language have been classified into two areas: 
studies of structure and studies of use.
225
 CL emphasises language use and therefore it is 
possible to investigate the ways speakers, writers or in this case, politicians and diplomats, 
have been exploiting “the resources of their language”. 226 
For the purposes of this thesis and in order to understand and analyse how political 
entrepreneurs and brokers define their communication and political strategies within the 
short, medium and long term it is important to discover patterns of use within these 
timeframes. However, the discovery and analysis of these patterns of use have to be 
consistent, otherwise the results will be merely intuitions or anecdotal, and therefore, neither 
methodologically correct nor useful. MacEnery and Wilson highlight that a corpus is in 
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principle “any collection of more than one text”.227  However, and this is relevant to our 
understanding of the dynamics of CL, Butler has mentioned that a corpus differs completely 
from any collection of texts or an archive because they are not necessarily ordered.
228
 
  Nevertheless, as Biber, Conrad and Reppen remind us, it is important to “analyse a 
large amount of language collected from many speakers to make sure that we are not basing 
conclusions on a few speakers’ idiosyncrasies.”229  Unlike nowadays, until recently and due 
to the absence of adequate software to analyse large series of data, this methodological 
problem, and therefore proper analysis was impossible to elaborate on..
230
 
Tognini-Bonelli indicates that CL helps explore theories and hypotheses and 
according to the results it is possible to validate, refute or refine them.
231
  Baker mentions that 
“large corpora allow researchers to find evidence of rare or unusual cases of language, as well 
as shedding light on very frequent phenomena”.232  The application of this approach and 
methodology is then particularly useful in the fields of political science and international 
relations, given that CL allows the implementation of a methodology that permits the use of a 
precise quantitative-qualitative tool to proof right or wrong certain assumptions that 
otherwise would be difficult to demonstrate.  
Given that nowadays many of the available documents are published on the internet, 
Kilgarrif and Grefenstette have coined the concept of Web as a corpus.
233
  Even though for 
this dissertation this concept does not fit, the totality of corpus analysed have been 
downloaded from databases published in internet. This methodology has been already studied 
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3.1.2.2.Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).  
CDA has been widely used to study and understand the connections between discourse, 
power and society. As Khan and Ghazali have highlighted, one of the most relevant 
characteristics of CDA “is that it is more about what happens in society rather than what 
should or could have happened”.235  In that sense it is important to note the important socio-
political dimension CDA entails. Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak have stressed that CDA 
is “a problem-oriented interdisciplinary research movement, subsuming a variety of 
approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agenda. What 
unites them is a shared interest in the semiotic dimensions of power, injustice, abuse and 
political-economic or cultural change in society”.236   
The fact of accepting that CDA is a problem-oriented interdisciplinary approach 
welcoming and integrating different theoretical models and research methods, represents an 
important advantage for the purposes of this dissertation, interested as it is in assessing how 
political entrepreneurs or brokers have dealt with issues such as power, injustice or political 
opportunism versus social benefit of socio-political sustainability.  
Therefore, practically speaking this approach reinforces the importance of collecting 
data from the real rather than the fictional world. This characteristic makes this method very 
appropriate to study and understand the connections, within the short, medium and long run, 
between society, political structures and the struggles for change, because one of the most 
accessible kinds of data available is political speeches and statements.
237
 
Nevertheless, CDA has been traditionally used and approached by analysing either 
single texts or a small number of texts as a way of examining the usage of specific classes of 
words. But discourse is not just texts or classes of text, it is also ways of thinking about 
something. Therefore, and considering the objectives of this dissertation, this approach 
explains the communication strategies political entrepreneurs and brokers have used to 
establish a new social thinking on sensitive issues in order to achieve the pre-established 
political objectives. 
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3.1.2.3.CL and CDA as Complementary Approaches.  
Since the mid-1990s some authors have attempted to integrate these complementary 
approaches, 
238
 and this has expressed itself in the growth of scholarly works on the area in 
the last decade. 
239
Most have focused on methodological issues. However, one of the first 
studies combining CL and CDA published in 2005 did deal with politics by providing an 
analysis of the discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press.
240
 
Nevertheless, even though the aforementioned studies have been trying to harmonize 
both methodologies, the usage of them has been unbalanced and they have been privileging 
CL over CDA or vice-versa.  Despite this trend it is important to harmonize the use of both in 
order to get more satisfactory results. Charles et al. mention that CDA “prioritizes whole 
texts and their cultural context, identifying patterns that extend across sentences and 
paragraphs” whereas “CL tends to use techniques that decontextualize individual texts and 
focuses on recurrent patternings of small-scale items such as words and phrases”.241 
For the purpose of this dissertation the contextualization of public speech is 
fundamental. Otherwise it would be impossible to demonstrate how political entrepreneurs 
and brokers have been designing, defining, lobbying, changing  and implementing their 
communication strategies over time by reading socio-economic and political needs and 
opportunities. Therefore, the combination of CL and CDA will be used simultaneously and 
overlap as a tool or methodology, rather than a theoretical framework, to better explain the 
main objective of this dissertation.
242
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3.1.2.4. Software and Samples.  
In order to apply the methodological principles explained above the selected samples are 
fundamental in order to be consistent and achieve this thesis’s objectives. Technically 
speaking two main software solutions are used for this kind of qualitative/quantitative 
analysis: Nvivo and AntConc. Both solutions offer basically the same functions, however the 
author has selected AntConc because it is more user-friendly and more intuitive.  
Technically speaking both software solutions also entail certain limitations with regards to 
web-based corpora and how they can be adapted to be used.  Pdf files have to be converted 
into Txt. format in order to make them readable and analysable. However, scanned 
documents converted into Pdf documents cannot be used with these programmes and it would 
be necessary to transcribe them. This problem was encountered when the author was creating 
the data base of relevant corpora. These limitations will be addressed subsequently. 
In the previous section it was mentioned that a corpus has to be ordered and has to be 
consistent in order to proceed with its analysis. Technically speaking, ordering materials to 
create a corpus entails a very strict codification. Coding pieces of texts to create a consistent 
corpora is fundamental. In using software solutions if the texts are not coded accordingly it is 
difficult to analyse the results chronologically.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, after selecting the type of documents to be 
converted into a corpus, the codification was mainly elaborated chronologically because one 
of the main purposes of this research is to show how public speech and communication 
strategies have been changing over time.  
The main corpora and analysed documents include:  
 The conclusions of the presidency, Council of Europe: The author has selected 
this corpus because it developed over a long period of time. The data is available 
online from 1975 to 2013. However, the Pdf files convertible into Txt formats 
were only available from 1992 onward. Nevertheless, 1992 represents an 
important landmark as the serious diplomatic talks towards the creation and the 
institutionalization of the Barcelona Process were developed from that time. 
Therefore the corpus analysed covers the period 1992-2013. This timeframe 
allows 1) analysis of how the Council of Europe has been prioritizing its political 
interests, 2) assessment of how member states have been communicating them 3) 
an understanding of how changing political agendas can be contextualized and 
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adapted according to challenging politic, economic and social contexts and, 4) an 
evaluation of the progression, accomplishment or failure of proposed policies and 
mechanisms.  
 Eurobarometer, European Commission:  One of the most relevant issues is how 
European public opinion has been interpreting and reacting to the public speech 
and proposed policies and mechanisms. The available, consistent and aggregated 
data for the EU starts from 1999. The period considered for this dissertation 
covers 1999 to 2013. Nevertheless, the variation of national reports is important 
and the data for some concerned Mediterranean countries start in 1999 whereas 
some other countries such as Malta start in 2004.  
 Interviews and political speeches: CL and CDA has been also applied to a 
miscellanea of political speeches and interviews conducted by the author in order 
to understand how and why policymakers have been deploying their 
communication strategies. 
 
3.2. Primary Sources and Secondary Works.  
Primary sources used for this dissertation correspond basically to sets of statistical data 
needed to understand socio-economic, political and diplomatic behaviour. In that sense the 
Eurobarometer produced by the European Commission was very relevant to the analysis of 
the EU’s public opinion with regards to sensitive issues like migration, security, terrorism, 
unemployment and crime. This thesis has also used material provided by national statistical 
services to understand the connection between economics, demographics and development. 
The European Commission archive, partially available online, was also valuable as were 
some original documents provided by a number of the interviewees.  
 With regards to secondary works – it has been necessary to identify the most relevant 
scholarship in order to develop a theoretical background and to provide a political and 
historical setting; to identify gaps or barely assessed elements in the existing literature; to 
identify how scholars and politicians have defended or criticised policies and sensitive 







Twenty face to face interviews were conducted by this author between March 2010 and 
November 2012 for this dissertation.  The author has interviewed key actors in order to 
further address issues and elements that have not been properly assessed by other means. 
Currently, the number of studies using interviews or directly interacting with elites are quite 
rare as Ostrander has mentioned.
243
 As Clarks notes, one of the most relevant reasons for an 
interest in elites is due to the fact that scholars should analyse the behaviour of those decision 
makers “more closely and unlike other methods interviews have a strong emphasis on 
intimacy between the researcher and interviewee”.244 
Nevertheless, getting access to these elites represents a number of initial obstacles. 
Methodologically speaking, as Mikecz says, “interviewing elites represents unique 
methodological problems when compared with non-elite interviews”.245 
Included amongst these initial challenges and problems are:  
 Identifying those actors who played an important role in designing the current Euro-
Mediterranean political and socio-economic scenario.  
 Gaining access to key politicians and diplomatic representatives that had an active 
role in the 1980s and 1990s but that were already retired when this research was 
conducted.  
 Once those potential interviewees were identified all logistic aspects had to be defined 
and prepared following an accurate and precise calendar because the author had to 
travel several times to Madrid, Barcelona, Paris, Brussels, Rabat and Geneva.  
Gaining access to political elites is difficult and success depends “a great deal on 
serendipity, social networks as well as particular circumstances” as McDowell points out.246 
As Mikecz stresses, the three relevant aspects that have to be perfectly integrated and fixed in 
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Of these three factors, gaining access is the most crucial and pressing element that 
may lead to a successful research interacting with elites as Shenton and Hayter have 
highlighted.
248
 The strategy for gaining access to these elites was staggered and started from 
the periphery going slowly to the centre.  The first objective was gaining access to the 
contacts of influential political journalists and political spokespersons. This initial phase was 
concluded successfully by contacting, one of the most influential Spanish political journalists 
as well as Javier Solana’s former spokesperson, Cristina Gallach. They facilitated a dense 
network of contacts that were decisive for this research.  
The second part of the strategy consisted of contacting the apparently most accessible 
personalities that could provide access to higher levels. Once representatives of this second 
circle were interviewed they were asked to facilitate further contacts at a higher level.  
Operatively and logistically speaking the author encountered a number of problems: 
 The geographical dispersion of interviewees between Switzerland, France, Belgium, 
Spain and Morocco.  
 The follow up with potential interviewees. Sometimes after agreeing to be 
interviewed many were not available immediately or needed long notice due to 
travels and other commitments.  
 In the cases where the interviewee showed immediate availability the author had to 
organise very quick international trips.  
The literature related to interviewing as a data collection technique in political science 
is wide ranging. Pridham, Ball, Lillecker, Peabody et Al., and Harvey and McEvoy have 
applied this research method to interview politicians and elites alike.
249
 Methodologically 
speaking, there are three major strands to interviews: Standardized or structured; 
unstandardized or informal and; semi standardized or semi-structured.
250
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The chosen interview design used for this research was semi-structured. As Drever 
points out, in using semi-structured interviews, the researcher “sets up a general structure by 
deciding in advance the ground to be covered and the main questions to be asked. The 
detailed structure is left to be worked out during the interview, and the person being 
interviewed has a fair degree of freedom in what to talk about, how much to say and how to 
express it”.251  
Semi-structured interviews are also suitable for small-scale research like this with a 
small number of respondents (n=20).
252
 Also as Barribal and While have highlighted, semi-
structured interviews are relevant for this type of study because they help to explore 




As Brink has stressed, in studies where the use of semi-structured interviews is 
important, the research process has to be at the same time valid and reliable in order to attain 
credibility.
254
 In that sense, the interview preparation with elites is fundamental. This research 
followed the method set out by Goldstein and Lilleker who have stressed the importance of 
explaining the whole project to the potential interviewee, pointing out which points or aspects 
would be expected from him or her in advance.
255
 Within the semi-structured interview, the 
“funnel” method highlighted by Pridham, starting with general questions and continuing with 




In adopting the semi-structured interview methodology, the interaction between 
interviewer and interviewee was a dialogical process as Bakhtin has defined it. This builds on 
Berg’s dramaturgical model.257 In order to foster mutual engagement and develop a more 
stimulating communicational exchange, the dramaturgical model is a combination of what 
Douglas has defined as “creative interviewing” and what Holstein and Gubrium have 
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conceptualized as “active interviewing”.258 In pursuing the main issues of discussion pre-
defined during the design phase, the interviews took the form of dialogue. This allowed for 
the development of an exchange of information and knowledge production alike. This 
methodology has allowed both discussion and reflection about policies, contexts, situations 
and feelings.  
3.2.1.1.Recording and Transcribing.  
As Peabody et. Al. have explained, there are three main methods to record an interview: 
Relying on the memory; taking thorough notes during the interview and; using a tape 
recorder after asking for permission making sure that those sections where the interviewee 
requires to be off the record, are completely deleted.
259
 This researcher opted for using a 
mixed approach.  
Almost all listed interviews were recorded with a simple recording device from the 
beginning to the end of the conversations. Some interviewees preferred not being recorded. 
All the conversations had a maximum duration of 60 minutes. Fogg and Wightman have 
studied the use of speech recognition technology both for recording and transcribing.
260
  
However, in order to avoid any technological problem, this researcher opted for a 
solid analogic recorder that has been used for over 100 interviews in the past without 
presenting problems. Transcribing the interviews may present some problems as has been 
stated by Wellard and McKenna.
261
  All the interviews have been accurately transcribed, 
word by word. All the interviewees accepted to be recorded without hesitation. The 
permission for being recorded was asked in the introductory contact mail explaining the 
scope and the objectives of the interview. Aside from the recording, the researcher also took 
notes, highlighting crucial passages.  
Each transcription was also elaborated after the interviews in order to keep in mind 
contextual, conceptual, situational and relational elements. Those intangible elements are 
crucial for a correct understanding that may be jeopardised by delaying the transcription for 
several days or weeks. All the interviews are presented in an annex at the end of the 
dissertation. They are transcribed in the original language. Only those passages that are 
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relevant for the research and that have been integrated within the main text have been 
translated into English. This has been done to preserve accurately both meaning and 
contextualization without adding or eliminating extra elements. These quotes have not been 
integrated in the text, and are stand alone. The reason behind this strategy is because the 
language and the concepts used by these elites is important to understand better their 
judgement, opinion and feelings. Techniques of content analysis have also been used to 
understand and explain their messages.  
3.3.  Description of Thesis. 
Chapter 4 analyses, after some necessary historical considerations, the socio-political and 
economic performance of Spain and France since the end of WWII. Chronologically 
speaking, this chapter will be developed up to the year 1985 when Spain was ratified as a 
member of the European Economic Community (EEC). In so doing, this chapter examines 
how France and Spain engaged up until this new beginning in their bilateral and multilateral 
relations.  
 Chapter 5 analyses French responses to Spanish EEC membership. It asks whether  
France believed that Spain deserved entry on the terms it received and whether France felt 
that Spain’s ambitions inside the EEC would be dangerous for the French objective of 
political leadership in the region? Such fears were well founded as President Felipe Gonzalez 
was a key element in pushing Spain towards a new political and diplomatic dimension.  
This international resurgence of Spain will be analysed by focusing on the period 
between 1985 and 1995. This was a decade of profound change in international politics. The 
bipolar balance collapsed, the consensus increasingly revolved around the acceptance of 
liberal democratic theories and migratory movements started to reach very high levels, 
similar to the rates experienced between the last two decades of the nineteenth century and 
World War I.  
This chapter analyses the mechanisms and the strategies Spain followed during, what 
at that time was defined as, “the great gallop”. This was the period when Felipe Gonzalez 
invested huge efforts in diplomatic lobbying in order to gain political and diplomatic stature 
by identifying a number of political windows and opportunities. 
Chapter 6 analyses, by using a long-term comparative approach, the major role that 
migration related issues have played in influencing EU-Maghreb relations and in terms of 
stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region.  France and Spain, due to their geographical 
positions and regional standing played a key role in this debate. The Euro-Mediterranean 
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region progressively began to gain relevance in this context and, obviously, national and 
international interests oriented their sights on the Mediterranean basin. 
Chapter 7 examines the Aznar period between 1996 and 2004. This presidency 
coincided with and drove forward attempts to develop and consolidate the Barcelona Process. 
Aznar’s government was very conscious of the role Spain needed to play in the international 
arena. An obsession with projecting international power reached its peak when Aznar 
endorsed Washington’s Iraq policy in 2002-03, along with the United Kingdom and a handful 
of other countries.  
While González’s government developed good relations with Maghreb countries, 
especially Morocco, Spanish international politics changed dramatically with Aznar. He had 
no interest in strengthening links with this area and, because of some of his policies, the 
possibilities of interacting positively with the southern Mediterranean were seriously 
hampered. Parallel to this, migration-related issues gathered momentum and topped the 
government’s domestic political agenda as migration increasingly came to be viewed in terms 
of criminality, terrorism and unemployment.  
Chapter 8 analyses José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero’s presidency from 2004 to 2012, 
and examines its implications and impact on Euro-Mediterranean politics. The chapter 
assesses how and why Zapatero wanted and needed to transform Spain’s foreign policy in 
order to place Spain once more at the centre of the EU decision-making process. This chapter 
answers one key question: To what extent was Zapatero able to return Spain as a key 
interlocutor between the West and the Arab world? How was this political strategy defined? 
To what extent did the “dialogue of civilizations” initiative serve Spanish ambitions and 
objectives? How consistent was Zapatero’s foreign policy within Spanish foreign policy over 
the medium and long term past? How did France react to these policies?  
Chapter 9 examines these issues during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy in France 
between 2007 and 2012.  For obvious reasons, this chapter starts before the presidential 
elections of 2007.  Already in 2005 during the mandate of Dominique de Villepin as France’s 
prime minister, Sarkozy, acting as Minister of Interior, exerted a zero tolerance policy to 
repress riots among second-generation immigrants in urban areas.  
Many representatives from left-wing parties believed that Sarkozy destroyed his 
chances in the presidential elections as a result of this crackdown. They were wrong. The 
chapter analyses this reality and also examines Sarkozy’s sponsorship of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM), in particular its implications both for European – mostly in terms of 
the rivalry with Spain – and non-European stakeholders. 
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Throughout this thesis takes into consideration the most relevant variables that are 
important to understand how political entrepreneurs or brokers, depending on each particular 
case, have been creating, designing, implementing and institutionalising their political 
strategies and mechanism in order to gather international support and achieve greater 
diplomatic influence. The dissertation concludes that rhetorically speaking it would be 
possible to consider, within the short term, that all studied governments behaved and justified 
their political communication strategies following the characteristics of political 
entrepreneurs and brokers. However, in considering the medium and long run, almost of them 
have been acting as political opportunists speculating on international threats and existing 









CHAPTER 4  
 
UNDERSTANDING FRANCO-SPANISH RELATIONS 
The Historical Manufacture of Symbols and Myths 
 
Analysing Franco-Spanish competition, cooperation or relations from a Braudelian 
perspective would first imply explaining how and when these countries started to share a 
space where common interests came under political, diplomatic and economic dispute. This 
chapter aims at providing the historical background that allows a better understanding of the 
subsequent chapters. It will assess the historical competition between Spain and France; the 
features of their colonial and post-colonial processes, focusing mainly on the Maghreb; their 
socio-economic and political developments in order to understand France’s superiority 
towards Spain; and their international projections and relations from 1970s onwards. These 
points will facilitate a better understanding of Franco-Spanish relations and their connections, 
competition and cooperation within the European space as well as within their interaction 
mostly with Maghreb countries.   
 The reader may appreciate an imbalance related to the periods that this chapter is 
taking into consideration with regards to Spain’s and France’s interests and experiences in 
North Africa. Both France’s and Spain’s key developments in the Maghreb have not been 
following the same speed and rhythm. For the purposes of this dissertation the researcher has 
concentrated its attention on those key periods that marked the future of Spain’s and France’s 
involvement in the Maghreb. First, the Spanish struggles with Morocco. Second and 
considering France, its post WWII period because on one hand, since 1946 France tried to 
retain fiercely its colonies after the humiliation of the war, by deploying an idea of new 
France, and on the other hand the post-colonial processes and the war with Algeria that 
originated a new period in approaching Franco-Maghreb relations.  
 
4.1.France and Spain: Sharing Spaces, Competing for the future.  
 
It is necessary to stress that both Spain and France were both neighbours and empires. This is 
important to note because it shapes mentalities and cultures, feeds myths and symbolism, and 
sets long-lasting prejudices. Their imperial ambitions coincided and occurred during a period 
in which the world started to change and when globalization acquired its first identifiable 
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manifestations. These, according to Ferrer were an increase in work productivity and a new 
global world order.
262
   
These two conditions coincided with the beginning of the early modern age.  As such, 
it is possible to say that this was the moment in which embryonic nation-states started to 
define their positions and to show their expansive ambitions.  
During this period-from 1492 onwards-, it is possible to observe that these first waves 
of globalization –the mobility of ideas and people –started to shape international relations. 
Within this framework, it is possible to assume that globalization can be understood as a 
product of imperialist models of international government and an extended bureaucracy as 
Eisendstadt has stressed.
263
 During this period, especially during the first three quarters of the 
sixteenth century, Spain with apparent ease effortlessly expanded its influence beyond the 
ocean through a process of territorial expansion.
264
This territorial expansion expanded from 
the Philippines to Latin America.  
 The Spanish talent was, according to Ortega y Gasset, a talent of imperative 
character. It was neither a theoretical knowledge nor a rich fantasy. It was also not a 
contagious and deeply religious emotion.
265
 Continuing with the Gassetian point of view, 
Spaniards combined -until the second decade of Phillipe II's reign-1560s- the two main 
elements of the art of commanding: persuasiveness and force.
266
  
Until this time, Spain was able to maintain a certain level of order and unity. Its status 
as the main architect of the Counter Reformation probably gave the country enough “moral” 
authority to justify its existence and its influential role.
267
   This order and unity may have 
been the main elements that permitted Spain to extend its boundaries.
268
 Hence, Spain 
jumped from the darkness of the early middle age to the bright lights of the early modern age.  
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Having said this, as Lynch
269 
has noted, Spanish history is the history of great missed 
opportunities
270




This tendency continued until 1808.
272
 The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, marking the 
end of the Thirty’s Year War, created the first modern diplomatic congress and inaugurated a 
new international order, which lasted until traditional empires collapsed after WWII. This 
order was based on the principles of national sovereignty as Philpott has underlined.
273
  
Just eleven years after the Peace of Westphalia, Spain and France declared the end of 
hostilities with the singing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. The price of these political 
manoeuvres was high for Spain and very beneficial for France,
274
 which subsequently 
became the undisputed hegemonic power in Europe.  
French pre-eminence in European affairs has particular importance because it came 
during a period in which international relations started to redefine world politics as Ruggie 
has shown. This had a decisive impact in the constitution of the new political order after 
WWII.
275
 In considering the above historical currents, one can make the case that France led 
changes in two fundamental moments of modern and contemporary history.  
Conversely, Spain's influence in international politics started to wane during the 
nineteenth century. During this period Spain fell behind other European countries in a 
number of key areas including demographics, industrial development, the financial system 
and the process of decolonization. The Spanish industrial revolution started one century after 
it had begun in many parts of Europe.  As Tortella has shown, Spain experienced very limited 
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growth during the nineteenth century, as the population fell in number
276
and modern 





4.2.Spain and North Africa: Flirting Tragically with Morocco.  
 
The ties of France and Spain to the Mediterranean and North Africa have been noted and 
explained by a considerable number of authors. Braudel’s work is perhaps the most 
influential and widely read.
278
 Hegel, despite standing accused of eurocentrism, was 
convinced that, for historic reasons, North Africa and Southern Europe should be part of the 
same geopolitical, cultural and economic area.
279
 
In 1906, in response to discussions at the conference of Algeciras, the Morocco’s ruler 
granted colonial control over a good part of the country to France and Spain.
280
 Nonetheless, 
the Spanish presence in Morocco was much more in the role as a sub-protectorate under 
French control. 
Further French dominance of North Africa crystallized in 1912 with the Treaty of Fez. 
Thanks to the Franco-Spanish Treaty -27 November 1912-, France conceded to Spain a 
conflictive and poor territory-Rif region- in the North of Morocco. Despite the lack of 
economic, strategic or political interest represented by this area, Spain, spurred on by 
frustrations and delusions of grandeur, started a misguided occupation and ensuing war.
281
 In 
1913, Spain created the Protectorate of Tetuan, and that provoked immediate reactions from 
the local population against the Spanish occupation since then.
282
However the Moroccan-
Spanish conflict did not escalated immediately because Spain stop occupying more territories 
during the period of the WWI. Otherwise, this would have originated parallel conflicts 
between Spain and other European powers.
283
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Internally speaking, the 1917 economic crisis was devastating for Spain and it was 
soon followed by the post-war crisis of 1919-1923. According to Carr, from 1898 to 1923 
Spain experienced a period of degeneration and disintegration.
284
 During the same period, 
1919-1923, the Spanish situation in Morocco was disastrous for its foreign policy. From 1919 
to 1920 a number of operations aiming at stabilizing the area politically and socially shed 
some light to think about a successful pacification. However, in July 1921 the Spanish troops 
were annihilated by the local Moroccan –Berber- forces leaded by Abd El-Krim, during the 
battle –disaster as Spanish historians prefer to define it- of Annual.285Ortega y Gasset 
accurately portrayed Spain's image after the Battle of Annual as incompetent and weak.
286
The 
consequences of this incompetency provoked that from 1921 to 1926 Abd El-Krim and his 
troops created and managed the Republic of the Rif.
287
Spain at that time passed from being a 
constitutional regime to a dictatorship after General Primo de Rivera toppled the previous 
democratic system in 1923. 
As Desmond has mentioned, “across the Straits, the problem of the protectorate had 
become more embarrassing than ever”.288The Moroccan issue topped both national and 
international agendas in Spain, to the point, that the new dictator, José Antonio Primo de 
Rivera, in 1924, one year after acceding to power, transferred his headquarters to Tetuan.
289
It 
was actually General Primo de Rivera, who was behind the preparation of the disembarkation 
at the Alhucema bay in 1925. This successful –amphibious- operation was a Franco-Spanish 
joint initiative after the attack of Adb El-Krim to a zone of the French protectorate.
290
This 
military collaboration pacified the Rif in 1926 and by 1927 Abd El-Krim was finally 
defeated.  
The war against Morocco was one of the major causes of strong political and social 
problems in Spain and resulted, between 1917 and 1923 in 23 complete and 30 partial 
governmental crises. This national and military strategy ultimately culminated in the Spanish 
Civil War.
291
In fact, the Spanish Civil war that started in 1936, ensuing the uprising of the 
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troops under the command of Francisco Franco Bahamonde. As Balfour has mentioned, the 
Spanish military troops deployed in Morocco adopted a particular nature and code of conduct 
with regards to Spanish politics. They became a “politically interventionist caste” able to 
overthrown the existing and legal republic.
292
  
This misguided war had historical consequences of relevance to this study. Many in 
Spain thought that by losing a presence in North Africa, specifically in Morocco, the country 
would be very vulnerable on the geo-strategic level.  Cánovas del Castillo, a moderate, shared 
the Hegelian vision regarding the links between North Africa and Spain by stating that the 
Spanish southern borders were situated in the Atlas mountains. From this angle, North Africa 
played an important geographical and symbolic role in the Spanish socio-political imaginary. 
Even worse, it was widely believed that Spain’s credibility as an international power was 
linked to a strong status in the Maghreb. As Romanones put it, “Morocco was for Spain the 
last opportunity for maintaining its position in the European concert”.293  
France, for obvious reasons, was very aware of this and successfully prevented Spain 
maintaining a strong position in the region: France’s dominance was symbolised by the 
dominance of the French over the Spanish language in the region. With the exceptions of 
Tangier and Larache, French became the prevailing language across whole Maghreb. 
  
4.3.Post-Civil War Aftermath: Spanish Socio-Economic, Political 
Underdevelopment and International Isolation. 
Morocco would continue to be very important for Spanish politics. With limited resources, 
energy and ability General Franco deployed his military offensive to gain power and rule for 
the next forty years from Morocco. Certainly the context of the WWII somehow favoured 
some successful events within the short term due to the fact that both France and Spain at the 
end left Morocco in 1956 right after its independence. For instance, when France was 
defeated in 1940 by Germany, Franco aiming at occupying French territories in Morocco 
took over Tangier without the consent or support of Italy or Germany.  This action shows 
Franco’s interest in the region.294 The answer of France during this occupation was the 
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The occupation of Tangier lasted until 1945. Despite these attempts and after a 
bloody civil war Spain entered into a dark period where international politics were 
completely ignored and where the country lost any kind of international presence and respect 
while France started to recover its preeminent position within the international 
arena.
296
However, despite this episode, during the 1950s it was possible to witness some 
collaboration between Spain and France. As a matter of fact during 1957 France and Spain 
had talks to cooperate against a potential insurrection in the Sahara, Ifni or Mauritania.
297
 
None of these collaborations happened and Spain continued to lose presence and influence in 
the region. In 1969 Morocco recovered Ifni and in 1975 the Spanish presence in Morocco –
putting aside Ceuta and Melilla- vanished completely. This time, and against the Spanish 
interests, neo-elected French president Valéry Giscard D’Estaing supported the Green March 
in order to return the Spanish Sahara to Morocco. On one hand, Giscard did not have any 
appreciation for Spain as it is going to be demonstrated in the next chapter and on the other 
hand France maintained its economic interests in Morocco.
298
 
In considering this framework, immediately after the Civil War, Franco’s priorities 
were to consolidate his control over the country despite the economic, political and social 
cost. During the 1940s, Spain’s productivity never once matched pre-war levels.299 
Externally, Spain was also completely isolated during the first decade of dictatorship.   
During the transitional decade of the 1950s, there was economic growth due to some 
foreign direct investments and the import of those capital goods that were indispensable for 
infrastructure construction, specifically, and most notably, the development of the electric 
sector, which was the industrial sector which supported Spanish economic and industrial 
growth from the 1950s onward.
300
During this period, industrial production doubled and 
employment increased. Living standards in urban areas started to improve dramatically and 
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the rural drift began to seriously hit peripheral regions.
301
 In just one decade, from 1951 to 
1962, the peasant population shrunk by 13.21 per cent.
302
  
 At the same time, Spanish demographic growth amounted to 1.2 per cent per annum 
and labour demand increased as well. By the end of the 1950s, Spanish industry was unable 
to absorb more labour and could not accommodate the incessant waves of peasants arriving to 
industrial regions such as the Basque Country or Catalonia. In order to solve this Spain 




From that point in time onwards, Spain became a net export of labour meeting the 
demand of economies like those of France and Switzerland needed labour and the Spanish 
surplus was channelled into these systems by way of regulated migration. From an economic 
perspective, as Zelinsky-based econometric models
304
 demonstrate, these migratory flows 
used had a direct consequence for economic growth in recipient countries.
305
  
According to official figures provided by the Spanish Institute for Emigration (IEE, 
2009), between 1959 and 1973, 1.066,440 Spaniards migrated to European countries. That 
figure represents roughly 71 per cent of total immigrants in the entire period.
306
 Although 
Spain had previously witnessed some periods of emigration, this was the first time that the 
country had opted for a circular migration system as a matter of policy.
307
  Agreements 
between the IEE and some European countries –primarily France, Switzerland and Germany 
and secondarily The Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom-, enabled Spanish 
immigrants to gain one-year work permits.
308
  
However, the IEE was unable to entirely control these migration flows. Many 
migrated irregularly and some estimate that 1.500,000 is a more realistic figure for the total 
number of migrants over the period under discussion.
309
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France was the preferred country for Spanish migrants during that period. In France 
alone, by 1968 103,892 Spanish immigrants out of a total of 607,000 arrived through the 
IEE.
310
  Proximity and socio-economic conditions explain this. Spanish migration to France 
has been richly documented by Rubio, Parra Luna, Babiano and Fernández.
311
At that time, 
France was experiencing very strong economic growth but the population did not increased at 
the same rate. The French National Office of Immigration decided to allow 1.450,000 
immigrants from Mediterranean countries –Spain, Italy as well as from Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia-.  
Young people and families benefited from these generous immigration policies. A 
residence permit was awarded to those who held a work contract and, after 5 years of 
residence in the country, French citizenship might be granted. Successive waves of migrants 
over the 1960s and the 1970s represented 3 per cent of the active French population and 1.35 
per cent of the total population. 
In this context the French indigenous population developed a sense of superiority 
towards those countries dependant on migration for economic stability and these feelings 
continued over subsequent decades. Similar manifestations of contemporary immigrants’ 
cultural associations were diffused among Spanish communities. For instance, Spanish 




This reality underlines the point that during this period Spain was very much viewed 
as a developing country by the international community. Overcoming this view was not easy 
and the process to change perceptions took several decades until Spain, a destination country 
for migrants, with massive flows from Latin America, North Africa and Eastern European 
countries. When this happened, ironically, Spanish’s perceptions and policies regarding 
immigrants echoed those held by destination countries such as France or Switzerland three 
decades earlier.  
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4.4.France in the post- WWII era. 
Immediately after the end of WWII, France started to consider how to project power in 
Europe and the rest of the world. The Marshall Plan began to lay the first bricks of economic 
rebirth as did its membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).   
Going beyond some revisionist approaches regarding the impact of the Marshall Plan 
in Europe
313
 it is possible to agree with Milward who has argued that France came out on top 
of US plans for a reconstructed Europe through the allocation of aid.
314
 Arguably a 
miscalculation given that post-war Europe emerged as a protectionist regional block under 
French leadership. 
Charles de Gaulle, who presided a provisional government, established the Fourth 
Republic –from 1948 to 1958-as a symbol that represented the beginning of a new era and a 
period where the accumulation of governmental experience allowed to arrive to a more 
dynamic and efficient fifth republic.
315
 Nevertheless, at the same time, the decolonization 
processes in Vietnam and Algeria was a bitter experience for the colonizers, but opened new 
opportunities in those countries.
316
 
After France’s severe humiliation in 1940 at the hands of Germany, the power of the 
metropolis lost credibility in their colonies and its political authority crumbled. Tunisia, 
Indochina and Algeria all experienced this.
317
 Although the concept of ‘empire’ was 
substituted by the idea of French Union in 1946, Paris fiercely attempted to retain its colonies 
by imposing a dramatic decolonization process.  
The reactive approach to colonies was contradicted by a very proactive approach to 
Europe. Since Robert Schuman’s discourse in 1950, France become one of the engines of the 
newly formed EEC with Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium.  
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Reflecting on Schuman`s declaration -9 May 1950-, France played a decisive role in 
creating the firsts steps towards a united Europe.
318
Using both CL and Discourse Analysis it 
is possible to clearly see how France was portrayed as a power destined to lead this politico-
economic and socio-cultural project. On one hand, the word “France” was repeated 5 times 
out of 955 words tokens -0.52 per cent-. This ranks “France” at the 27th position of most 
frequently repeated words –the ensuing word is “Germany”. The declaration does not 
mention other countries, however the word “Europe” ranked at place 16th with 8 hits and 
“Member” at place 23rd with 6 hits. The contextualization of the word “France” within the 
text is as follows:  
Table 1. Schuman Discourse 1950 
“In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, 
France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace” 
“The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old 
opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these 
two countries” 
“The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France 
and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” 
“By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will 
bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization 
of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of 
peace” 
“The Authority’s decisions will be enforceable in France, Germany and other member 
countries” 
Source: EU Documents.  
The word “France” is strategically placed within the text. It is used there where a clear 
decision making process or a leading situation is required. It is clear that this process should 
be guided and agreed mostly by France and Germany whereas the description of other 
countries as “member countries” gives a very ambiguous definition of power sharing. This 
declaration, inspired by Jean Monnet, had a very clear aim - to create a bilateral economic 
union between France and Germany in order to produce and to manage jointly coal and steel 
production. By cooperating in the production of coal and steel, they hoped to reduce the 
possibilities of a new European war.  
By controlling this production under the excuse of an economic reason, France was 
acting “not only on hope, but also on fear. European integration was not only reconciliation, 
but also an exorcism of Germany”.319  
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 This fear and distrust was constantly present and preceded WWII going back to the 
defeat of France during the war of 1870 and the subsequent foundation of the German Empire 
one year later.
320
 Since 1898, Franco-German relationships were the reflex of an inverted 
mirror, where envy, antipathy and fear were main driving factors in creating a myth which 
would become part of future national heritages in both nations as Nolan has written.
321
Such 
feelings have continued up to the present time.  In 1999, Philippe Delmas wrote a book on the 
next war with Germany.
322
  
 As Cole has pointed out, France, after WWII, was one of the most rural economies of 
the western nations.
323
 A quarter of the population worked in agriculture. Despite this and the 
challenges of decolonization, inflation, strikes, and governmental instability France led 
Europe.  This was more to do with external factors. Germany had been defeated, Italy did not 
have the capacity and the United Kingdom lacked the political will.  
  The European Coal and Steel Commission (ECSC) was ratified by the Paris Treaty in 
1951.
324
 This treaty was the first agreement in following the principles of supra-nationalism.  
After this first step, this community would embrace the participation of other partners to 
create a federation where capitals, people and merchandise would circulate freely.
325
 
 The Schuman Plan pursued, first of all, an economic union rather than a purely political 
joint initiative. Realistically speaking, given the complexity and the cultural and social 
differences in the region, it is difficult to imagine another kind of union besides the economic 
one. Thus, as will be assessed subsequently, as soon as particular or nationally specific 
problems arise, episodes of evident fracture also appear. Migratory issues are among these 
causes of rupture and discontinuity in the European political programme. This is going to be 
explained and justified in chapter 6.  
Between 1945 and 1973, France experienced the strongest economic expansion in its 
history. These three decades were defined by Fourastié as the Trente Glorieuses.
326
 This 
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sustained growth was very unique in economic history because, within this period of time, the 
French economy grew at an average annual rate of 5.9 per cent.   
Foreign labour was not irrelevant to this progress.  Vitally, Algerians played an 
important role in boosting the French economy, as they met the demand for cheap labour in 
the period between 1947 and 1962,
327





4.5.De Gaulle’s Narrative and the Construction of a New Idea of France. 
Without de Gaulle’s leadership, events may have evolved very differently.  De Gaulle’s 
political communication was greatly influenced by a sense of historic predestination.  As 
Gordon points out, his discourses were the founding narrative of the post-war French 
republic.
329
 He realized that only through evocative rhetoric could the country achieve 
international respect and the place it in the world its history demanded.  This was evident 
from the beginning of his career, when as the youngest general, on June 18 1940 he 
proclaimed: “Quoi qu’il arrive, la flame de la résistance française ne doit pas s’ énteindre et 
ne s’ éteindra pas”.330  Just one day earlier, Marshal Pétain had said that France would 
surrender. This defiant call to arms was the beginning of a public discourse dedicated to 
constructing France as a leading country, even, as Lacouture has described it, a “Europe 
Tricolore”.331 
De Gaulle was obsessed with the construction of a united France where the energies 
of all French citizens were focused on making the country a leading player.  As his discourse 
of Bayeux on 16 June 1946, demonstrates, the role of the state was to forge a “new” 
France.
332
  This quasi-mystical attempt to unite the country required all citizens to put their 
energies into service for the country. In fact, using CL and Discourse Analysis it is possible 
to see that the word “nous/we” is ranked 17th being repeated 27 times out of 978 words types.  
The idea of “togetherness” was also very evident in the discourse pronounced in 
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Strasbourg almost one year after on the 7 April 1947.
333
 This aspect of “togetherness” is very 
evident in his discourse by quantifying the content. The word “nous/we” appears ranked in 
the 6
th
 position. It was repeated 67 times out of 1.042 words types -6.42 per cent-. Following 
this trend, De Gaulle used as well 30 times the word “notre/our” –ranked 17th-.  
Another interesting aspect of this discourse is that De Gaulle uses very often the verb 
“est/is”. This verb is ranked in the 16th position being mentioned with a frequency of 31 
times. However De Gaulle uses “is” to show a clear image of present and how within this 
contexts all French citizens and himself–nous/we- are embarked in the same project: a real 
project not an imaginary or an abstract one. It is also possible to appreciate that this idea of 
common project is even more important than the word “France”. Without this civic gluing 
element the concept of France would not exist and a “new” France would not be possible.  
All the patriotic and nationalistic appeals to grandeur, in the service of a united nation, 
were reinforced and accompanied by some of the most advanced public policies of the epoch.  
The most notable domestic examples include the decision of the government of the Fourth 
Republic to create social security in 1945 and the SMIC (Guaranteed Minimum Wage) in 
1950.
334
 These measures ensured a higher degree of social cohesion, appropriation and 
identification to the idea of a “new” France.  
The De Gaullian discourse was “designed” to build up a nation that had lost its self-
identity and pride at the beginning of WWII. French successes from the end of WWII until 
1973 can be explained by a number of factors: the lack of other leading players in a 
profoundly damaged post-war Europe; the existence of a bipolar international order where the 
US and the USSR tried to control the new international sphere; the conviction of the French 
leader who was obsessed with the idea of France’s historic responsibility and greatness; the 
successful strategy of taking advantage of the Marshall Plan without being controlled by the 
US; a favourable economic cycle;  a public narrative where citizens were situated in the 
centre of a vertically –by De Gaulle- steered action and project335; and the support of a 
country which believed in their own capacity to achieve a glorious future.  
By the 1960s, France was already playing a consistently significant role in the 
international system.  The projection of French power was being assertively demonstrated.  
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This was particularly the case when France vetoed the British attempt to join the EEC first in 
1963.  In 1967, France again said that it would veto Britain’s application, threatening in the 
process the end of the Community if the other five founding members opposed the French 
stance. This demonstration of power was effective until the end of the Trente Glorieuses. 
Only when De Gaulle left power in April 1969, the veto was lifted and after negotiations, on 
the 1 January 1973, the United Kingdom became a full member of the EEC.  
De Gaulle believed in his role as the champion of the principles of France, a country, 
created “in the name not just of the French citizen, but of all mankind”.336  Through his 
political discourse, on both a local/national and international and global level, De Gaulle 




This civic virtue simultaneously expresses trust and cooperation in the citizenry 
towards accomplishing a common objective. This is what Putnam called social capital.
338
 
Probably the most essential driving element when it comes to collective socio-political and 
cultural projects. It brings up a question, raised by Connors, as to the roles of ethos, pathos 
and logos played in the de Gaullian narrative?
339
  
The articulation of this social capital through his public discourse used a number of 
phenomena which had crucial importance, such as trust, credibility, virtue, emotions, feelings 
and passions.
340Words and expressions like “mission”, “responsibility”, “humanizing power”, 
“interest of mankind” certainly do not deal with logos.  
As Gottweis stresses, any communication combines three constitutive elements: ethos, 
pathos, logos.
341
 Therefore, the speaker decides the proportion of those ingredients depending 
on the objectives.  Following Caron, it is possible to differentiate a number of argumentative 
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performativity or argumentative orientation models.
342
  De Gaulle, in order to articulate his 
idea of a “new” France, employed the ethno-centric performance where the speaker is 
supposed to adopt the role of an authority.  
This model was, however, affected by a very emotional and quasi-mythical discourse.  
This is the case not only in the beginning, but later also.  By developing an ethno-centric 
discursive performance, De Gaulle was able to convince the masses since ethos functions 
with trust, respect, honesty, credibility, authority and benevolence. After first using this 
discursive approach, pathos –which operates through empathy, sympathy and sensibilities –
did the rest.  
One episode perfectly demonstrates the importance of political communication and its 
links with emotions, myths, prejudices, frustrations and illusions. It is also the episode that 
connects France directly to the Mediterranean context –the decolonization process. This 
integrates and exemplifies all these elements and it is important to reflect on it in order to 
better address the hypothesis of this manuscript and understand the future events with which 
France has had to manage and cope.  
 
4.6.France and the Algerian Question 
As stated previously, the moral and spiritual reconstruction of France was accompanied by 
great changes in the productive and service sectors of the economy.  A highly ruralized 
country started to witness modernization that permitted increased productivity.  The 
conditions of the peasants improved, notably due to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
introduced by the EEC in 1962.
343
 French industry was concentrated, internationalized and 
modernized to make it more competitive once the EEC internal market totally opened and 
GATT entered into force in 1948.  
But this growth was not free of costs.  It was accompanied by parallel social 
challenges.  Notably, migration has always been intertwined with economic growth. Between 
1945 and 1973, the material reconstruction of this ideal France was made possible, in part, by 
immigrants.
344
 Subsequently, during economic recession on a global scale following the oil 
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crisis of 1973, immigration was officially suspended and restrictive policies introduced.  The 
majority of these migrants came from the Maghreb, especially from Algeria.  They were 
easily summoned because of the colonial links between France and Algeria, but this 
migration provoked deep socio-political and economic problems.  
For France, after its humiliation during WWII and the decline of its international 
stature, retaining Algeria was a question of imperial pride.
345
 It is possible to argue that the 
French-Algerian conflict during the era of decolonization and between 1954 and 1962 was 
unnecessary. It did, however, belong to a process of identity reconstruction and the French 
population was not convinced of the merits of abandoning its North African colony.  As late 
as 1958, a poll demonstrated that 52 per cent of the French population wanted integration 
whereas just 41 per cent agreed with Algerian independence.
346
 
These concerns were much more troublesome for the French elite than for the masses.  
They did not easily accept the fact of losing Algeria, which was something symbolic and 
related to losing the historic imperial ethos. This is relevant when it comes to EU foreign 
formation where elites are much more concerned than the masses in creating new systems of 
control to exert influence by stabilizing EU-MENA relations for EU’s benefit and interest.  
Though France did not have a strong economic interest in Algeria, as Smith 
recognizes, there was a “common perception” inside the political elite regarding colonial 
issues.
347
  That is why both the Algerian war and the decolonization process were so 
damaging for both societies.  Emotional attachments with the past were combined with a 
pervasive Jacobean tradition of citizenship very much related to those inspirational discourses 
of de Gaulle where France was called to an international mission of disseminating its highest 
values: its civilization.   
As Sorum has stressed, the “Jacobean nationalism differed for other forms of 
nationalism in the intensity of its missionary zeal”.348 French intellectuals were not immune 
to this socio-politic convulsion. A few months after the war began Claude Bourdett published 
an article in L’Observateur entitled “Y-a-t-il une Gestapo Algérienne”.349  In this article, he 
explained and denounced the methods used by the French army against Algerian insurgents.  
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At that time, words such as Gestapo or Nazi were not used lightly.  French public opinion 
reacted to that because they could not accept such a comparison. Some other leading 
intellectuals such as Sartre, Beauvoir and Camus also expressed highly critical views.
350
    
It is possible to argue that the political system of the Fourth Republic did not help in 
properly managing this situation.  In twelve years from 1946 to 1958, 22 different 
governments where in place.  That explains both the fragility of the political system and the 
difficulties inherent in developing a coherent colonial policy regarding Algeria and, to a 
lesser extent, Indochina.  The international image of France started to rapidly decline and on 
4 June 1958, during an allocution in Algiers, De Gaulle, who was clearly conscious about this 
delicate context and the possible aftermaths, declared that from that time onward he 
considered French and Algerian population as the same one and the same category of citizens 
with the same rights and obligations.
 351
 He personified the discourse by saying “Yes, myself, 
De Gaulle (…) open the doors to reconciliation”. He finished by saying that in that very night 
he understood how beautiful, grand and generous was France.
352 
 
By focusing on expressions such as “yes, myself, de Gaulle, to them, I open the doors 
of the reconciliation”, it is possible to observe, yet again, the extent that he was completely 
convinced of his role as the saviour of France.
353
  His role and style, even today, are 
considered quasi-mythical.
354
  However, this declaration of intention did not achieve the 
results he expected.  It neither resolved the Algerian conflict nor improved the French image 
in the international sphere.   
In 1959, the UN discussed Algeria and British Commonwealth countries aligned 
against France.
355
 De Gaulle realized that the crisis in Algeria was damaging France’s image 
across the world and generating strong criticism at home by opinion-makers.  On 5 October 
1958, France became a semi-presidential republic and de Gaulle shifted to more of an 
executive role with his authority totally legitimized.  
The Algerian resistance against the French regime was organised around the Front the 
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Liberation Nationale (FLN) in November 1954 under the auspices of the Revolutionary 
Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA).
356
Its armed section during the war was the Armée 
de Libération Nationale (ALN). By 1956 mostly all the Algerian nationalistic factions 
gathered and joint the FLN. That socio-political and military momentum was decisive to 
make more efficient their struggles for the independence.  The war situation worsen over the 
years to come and by 1960, civil riots in Algiers -the revolt of the barricades- underscored 
just how complex and visceral the Algerian conflict was. 
357
 The same year, Melun’s talks 
with the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) failed.
358 
  
On 19 December 1960, the United Nations recognized Algeria’s right to independence 
and military and diplomatic action intensified.  Through complicated negotiations, on 18 
March, the cease-fire opened the door to the signing of the Evian accords and the long 
awaited end of the war.
 359
 On 1 July 1961, Algerians voted overwhelmingly in favour of 
independence. Two days later the French government ratified the decision. Despite these 
outcomes, conflicts and social consequences did not stop.  The Pieds Noirs – Nearly 900.000 
French, European and Jewish residents had to flee from Algeria in 1962 after the declaration 
of independence- left a post-colonial legacy that served as a constant reminder to France of 
the complexity of managing “immigration” over decades to come.360  
This historical perspective is important for the subsequent analysis of the dynamics 
between Spain and France from the 1970s onward, especially when Spain’s application for 
EEC membership came to the fore. The next chapter explores, first, Spanish ambitions to join 
the EEC as well as French reactions in the context of the historical, cultural, political and 
economic developments that had gone before. Second, it explains the political and diplomatic 
processes that pushed Spain to become a political entrepreneur.  
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CHAPTER 5  
SPAIN AND THE GREAT GALLOP: STRATEGIES OF A POLITICAL 
ENTREPRENEUR 
 
This chapter will explain how Spain transitioned -from the 1960s to mid-1980s- from a role 
of proto-entrepreneur to a role of political entrepreneur or broker. Spain’s struggles and 
challenges to access the EEC were important. Strong European countries like France, Italy or   
Belgium among others, deployed intense political and communication campaigns to abort 
Spain’s attempts to join the union.  To what extent was France's dubious conviction regarding 
Spanish entry to the EEC justifiable?  Did France think that Spain constituted a menace for 
French ambitions within European politics?  Would Spain be able to maintain a durable 
socio-economic and political profile over the decades to come?  Which were the main 
difficulties and obstacles Spain must overcome in order to converge with its European 
partners?  Given its socio-political, economic and institutional backlog and considering that 
Spain would attain international stature, what price must Spain pay to reach its goals?  
Finally, how could Spain manage old myths, prejudices and open wounds and set up a 
credible and consistent agenda for the years to come?  
 
5.1. Spain’s European Ambitions and the French Response. 
Spanish ambitions to enter the EEC date back to practically to establishment of the European 
Community as Spain started to have more contact with Europe. The same day as the signing 
of the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC, 25 March, the first group of Spanish migrant 
workers departed to Belgium.
361
 The diplomatic offensive to gain EEC status started in the 
early 1960s at the time of the Economic Stabilization Plan, which followed a period when the 
Spanish economy started to emerge from the endemic crisis.  Still a dictatorship, at this time 
EEC entry was not possible. Due to this reason, all member states staunchly opposed Spanish 
ambitions to become part of the EEC. As it is going to be explained later, France was the 
most reluctant and less supporting country to Spanish ambitions. This attitude was a political 
constant almost until 1985 when Spain accessed to the EEC.  
 By 1960, the Spanish government had initiated early diplomatic attempts to court the 
EEC. On the 9 December 1960, Spain’s ambassador to Brussels, Count of Casa Miranda, 
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presented his credentials to the president of the Commission of the EEC, Walter Hallstein. 
This act represented a declaration of intent. Two years later, on the 9
 
January 1962, Spain 
applied to become a member of the EEC in a letter addressed to the president of the EEC, 
Maurice Couve de Murville.  
The original version of the letter was written by Fernando María Castiella, the Spanish 
minister of foreign affairs in Spanish rather than French, the diplomatic language of the time. 




“I have the pleasure of requesting, in the name of my Government, the opening of 
negotiations aiming at examining the possible engagement of my country with the 
EEC in the way most suitable to reciprocal interests.”  
 
Subsequently, the Spanish minister justified his country’s candidacy by enumerating a 
number of relevant elements ranging from historic and economic to the political.
363
He stated 
that Spain was a country with strong European vocation. A characteristic that has been 
demonstrated over the history and therefore, by joining the EEC, Spain could demonstrate its 
commitment towards the construction of Europe.  
 Paragraph four underlines one of the most important elements behind the French 
negative reaction against the Spanish request for accession to the EEC: The issue of 
agriculture. Even though this issue will addressed subsequently, it is important to note here 






March 1962, Couve de Murville acknowledged receipt of the letter, without 
indicating any kind of interest or encouragement regarding the Spanish proposal.
 365
  Italy’s 
Corriere della Sera soon after published an article warning that Spain’s application to 
become a fully-fledged member of the EEC caused surprise, pleasure and perplexity in 
Brussels because member states did not expect such proposal.
366
 For one, Belgium’s highly 
regarded foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak, a long-time critic of the Spanish dictatorship 
was appalled.
367
He was also president-in-office of the EEC. Also in 1962, the Courrier 
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Socialiste Européen was also commenting on Spain’s proposal, defining it as something 
intolerable that might endanger the future and defence of democratic values because it was a 
fascist regime and “le fascism est un crime”.368 
After these episodes, in 1964 a second letter in French, Count of Casa Miranda, 
conveyed a message to the EEC emphasizing the fact that Spain had already started to 
liberalise its economy.
 369
  Nevertheless, this argument ignored the dictatorship factor and 




After four months, Spaak, responded the request. His answer underlined the fact that 
the EEC might be willing to open contact with the Spanish government in order to analyse 
the economic problems that were affecting the Spanish economy.
371
 A somewhat deflating 
response for the Spanish considering that part of the objective had been to showcase the 
progress that Spain had made economically in preceding years.  
 Despite this general lack of appreciation, the Swiss press expressed their concerns 
with regards to these blockages coming mostly from France, Belgium and Italy, saying that in 
recognising this hesitation, the European integration should be considered a long-term 
process where the regimes might vanish and the people would remain.
372
 
Over 1965, Spain carried on with its purposes of integration. Following a very similar 
rhetoric and political argumentation as the one exposed above, the Embassy of Spain to Paris 
elaborated a document justifying and explaining again the reasons why Spain should access 
the EEC. It was highlighted the new Europeanist fashion of Spain’s foreign policy since 
Castiella took over the Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1957. Within this letter it is 
important to stress how Spain started to show its ambitions to lead, somehow, international 
politics despite the international ostracism. The Spanish diplomacy mentioned their proposal 
to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (UNCD) to organize a World conference 
for non-nuclear countries in order to contribute to the alleviation of the problems the world 
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was facing at that time.
373
The document also mentioned that for the European project it 
would be important to have a partner with very good relations with Latin American republics 
and the Arab World.
374
 As it is going to be shown later, these two vectors –Latin America 
and the Arab World- were the two geographical and cultural elements that Spain would 
continue selling to the EU over the decades to come, in order to get more diplomatic stature 
and international weight. The democratic and civilising rhetoric deployed by these proto 
political entrepreneurs to convince the European public opinion focused on: The Spain-USA 
agreements signed in 1953 and renewed in 1963 as something that was defined “by the World 
press as true alliance”; The role of Spain would play in order to “contribute to the defence of 
a free World” and following its universal vocation devoted “to the defence of Occident”.375  
 
5.2. Trying to Build a New Image.  
Over the next number of Spain looked to project an image of political, social and economic 
rebirth and cohesion. In July 1969, Franco in preparation for the inevitable Spanish 
democratic transition named Juan Carlos of Bourbon, Prince of Spain. The international 
community greeted this, as well as other, move towards transition with suspicion. The 
Community did, however, sign a preferential trade agreement with Spain in the context of the 
accession of three northern European countries in 1973 –Denmark, United Kingdom and 
Ireland. This was followed by the signing of an additional protocol to that agreement.
376
  
Just one month before Franco’s death in 1975, EEC foreign ministers, along with 
Pope Paul VI, Olaf Palme of Sweden and the Mexican president Luis Echevarría, condemned 
the lack of respect for human rights displayed in the execution of one ETA (Euskadi ta’ 
Askatasuna; Bask Country and Freedom) member, Angel Otaegui, and three FRAP (Frente 
Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota; Revolutionary Front Anti-Fascist and Patriot) 
members, José Luis Sánchez, Ramón García and Humberto Baena.
377
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Following Franco’s death Spain faced a crossroads as the military, reactionary 
supporters of Franco, reformers and democrats all wondered what the future held. Juan 
Carlos I, was crowned on the 22 November 1975, just one day after Franco’s death. The new 
King, had been chosen by Franco and during his coronation he paid tribute to the late 
leader.
378
 Despite the view of some authors such as Share,
379
 Franco’s legacy would remain, 
as McDonough, Barnes and Pina  have shown, more polarizing that does the democratic 




In 1976 the Council of Europe via resolution 640 (1976) 1, guaranteed the support to 






December 1976, the 27
th
 Congress of the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español; Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) was celebrated in Madrid. At that time the PSOE 
was not still recognised as a legal political organization. Two years before, in 1974, while 
still in exile, the PSOE at its 26
th
 Congress, elected Felipe González as Secretary-General.
382
  
Two years on, and celebrating the first meeting in Spain after the dictatorship, 
González and his party now had the support of the main European socialist politicians such as 
Willy Brandt and Olof Palme. González proposed a new political direction more in line with 
social democracy and away from traditional socialism and Marxism that characterized the 
past of the party. Within a year, the PSOE was already the official opposition force with the 
29.2 per cent of popular support.  
The transition period to democracy was very vibrant. On 26 July 1977 Spanish 
president Adolfo Suarez wrote three different letters to the EEC applying to become a 
member of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), the EAEC (European Atomic 
Energy Community) and the EEC.
383
 On the same day, probably as a political gesture to 
block Spanish intentions, the French government sent a memorandum to the EEC claiming 
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Spain was not mentioned directly in the memorandum. But it was clear that France’s 
fears regarding the entry of countries with the potential to be economic competitors. But the 
moderate tone of this letter was not shared by all.  In very emotional language, the French 
communist party published an article in L’Humanité criticising and opposing stridently the 





July 1977 the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, Marcelino Oreja, submitted 
the official Spanish candidacy to the EEC. The responses were not immediate. The French 
preoccupation remained agriculture.
386
 As La Libre Belgique noted in December 1978 Spain 
was no longer simply a holiday destination. By some indicators (in this case those published 
by the OSCE) the tenth most industrialised country in the world.
387
 




 The document 
was detailed and subdivided into six main categories: Industry, agriculture, fisheries, social 
issues, regional aspects and external relations. Point 53 expressed clearly the ‘scale and 
complexity of the problems arising from Spain's accession’.389 By the time negotiations 
began in early 1979, senior European officials from president of the Council, Jean François-
Poncet
390
and Roy Jenkins, the president of the European Commission expressed satisfaction 
but emphasised the need for the move to democracy to continue.
391
 
5.3. French Reactions. 
As explained briefly above, France opposed Spanish accession to the EEC more than almost 
any other European party as far back as the 1960s. Fears of Spain making the economic 
situation worse in terms of continent-wide downturn as well as a concerns over an imbalance 
caused by an Iberian entry was summed to the fear that the membership could trigger a flood 
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of migrant labour. In late
 
July 1977, the French Communist Party expressed its most harsh 
opposition to the accession of Spain (as well as Greece and Portugal).
392
 
This echoed somewhat the official French view. On 31 August 1977, Spanish 
president Adolfo Suarez visited the French Élysée Palace. His host, the French president 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaign –known for his lack of sympathies towards Spain-, was clear that 
his country would not sacrifice its position in Mediterranean agriculture.
393
 One month later, 
on 20
 
September 1977, Jean Taittinger, French secretary of state for foreign affairs, made a 
similar point at a meeting of the EEC Council of Ministers.
394
  
As mentioned above, Portugal and Greece were also negotiating their accession to the 
EEC at the time but the Spanish issue was much more a preoccupation of France and the rest 
of the member states. It was, as The Guardian, noted “the biggest competitive threat to the 
Mediterranean farmers of Italy and the South of France”.395 It was also the biggest country to 
be considered for membership since the UK in 1973, though unlike the UK it was a net 
recipient not provider of funds. France in her approach towards the Spanish potential 
accession was mixing political, economic and emotional concerns alike. As it has been 
mentioned in the precedent chapter, a long shared history plagued mostly by conflict and 
rivalry generated an aversion that used politico-economic excuses to defend national 
interests.  




November 1979 a meeting in Madrid was convened in which the nine Spanish ambassadors 
to EEC countries discussed the issue.  It was chaired by Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja 
and President Adolfo Suarez.
 396
 The goal of the meeting was to assess the political and 
economic relationship between Spain and the EEC countries. One month later Marcelino 
Oreja conceded an interview in La Libre Belgique that the meeting confirmed the fear that 
Spain had a number of difficulties to overcome across Europe.
397
  
During the first part of 1980 France took over the EEC Council Presidency and due to 
the French Communist’s Party opposition against the Spanish accession there was some 
concern that this might be a setback for Spanish hopes. But overall, Oreja was of the opinion 
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that the general political will in the EEC supported Spanish entry as the “preconditions” put 
forward by the French opposition “seem to us unacceptable and do not, of course, reflect a 
truly European view of Community integration.”398 
5.4. Amateur Government Paving the Road for the Next Steps.  
Following Franco’s death institution and state building, communication systems, civil 
society, and external engagement had to be constructed from scratch. As one of the most 
authoritative political journalists in Spain, Fernando Jauregui, put it “It was clearly an epoch 
of impressive activity. It was a moment of hectic activity where everybody had to learn”.399 
 This first period of accommodation lasted exactly two years after Franco’s death from 
November 1975 to June 1977, the time of the first constituent elections. Notable as the first 
time Spaniards voted for the first new parliament after 40 years of dictatorship. Despite its 
democratic credentials, the first government was institutionally very weak.  As Jauregui put 
it, “That govern was mainly based on interpersonal relations. I remember when Suarez won 
the elections, there was a journalist –Pedro Calvo Hernando- who greeted the new President 
saying, Bastard! to which Suarez replied, Pedro, I remind you that now I am the new 
President.” 400 
 In 1982, the socialist Felipe González won the elections and replaced Suárez. His 
government set a new standard for the way post-transition Spain was governed and there was 
a new focus on projecting external power. The role played by González in this was vital. As 
Jauregui explained in an interview with this author,  
 
“Adolfo Suarez abroad represented a kind of the Spanish Evo Morales. Someone 
coming from Franco’s ranks. Someone who did not speak foreign languages. 
Someone who never left Spain in his life. González was a guy coming from the 
Socialist International, substituting the mythical Yopis. González was legitimized by 
the history of socialism.”401 
 
For instance González looked to strengthen relations with Latin America, Spain's most 
natural partner.  His foreign minister, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, was a socialist who was 
successful in improving the Spanish image in Europe that.as Jauregui recalled, was still 
distrusted and looked down on across Europe.
402
 













 This government had to deal with a very heavy past and with scarce political training 
and experience. This past was dragged by new enthusiastic politicians. As Jauregui said 
during the personal interview, when he was travelling across with the president Suarez “we 
were despised people. Spain was a model for Latin America, but regarding Europe we were 
very badly considered.”403 
 However the negotiations to access the EEC were still very long, excessively long. 
West Germany was the key supporter for entry inside the EEC. In an interview with this 
author, Carlos Westendorp -who was a senior negotiator for Spanish accession to the EEC 
and Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1995-1996-, recognised that: “The Germans 
were our main allies. Germany said that it was not possible that a Spanish soldier would 
defend us in the NATO whereas we deny the entrance of Spain to the EEC.” 404 As 
Westendorp acknowledged during the personal interview, after all the efforts, it was the 
referendum for the NATO the element that unblocked all the process of accession.
405
 
The negotiations were finalised and signed in June 1985. At that time Spain had a 
voice, but no vote until full accession on 1
 
January 1986. The era of, as González put it the 
“Great Gallopade”, was here.  Spain could now define its identity, its role and its strategy in 
Europe and beyond. After achieving these complicated outcomes, Spain was ready to become 
a political entrepreneur or broker and therefore, it was vital to design a political and 
diplomatic strategy to gather greater European consensus –especially from the strongest 
member states like Germany- and pursue its ambitions: The baseline of this political and 
diplomatic strategy was the Latin America and the Mediterranean, the two traditional 
historical cards Spain could play. 
 
5.5. A Political Entrepreneur Looking for a Strategy. 
From 1985 onward Spain deployed an important political and diplomatic strategy to gain 
influence in European politics in order to become a middle power. However, it is necessary to 
examine the extent that Spain was a political entrepreneur and to ask how Spain developed its 
entrepreneurial plan in the pursuit of its interests. Another relevant question is whether or not 
Spain encountered opposition from other southern Mediterranean countries – potential 
competitors or partners- such as France or Italy and how northern European countries viewed 
these developments.  
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Richard Gillespie has written that “Spain has undoubtedly played a major role in 
persuading Europe that the problems of North Africa are European, and not merely southern 
European problems”.406 Similarly, Soler i Lecha has pointed out that the Europeanization of 
Spain’s foreign policy was the clear consequence of to the attempt to transfer its problems to 
the EU.
407
 However, Soler i Lecha does agree with Gillespie that Spain looked to use the EU 
–in particular its economic and financial resources – in the service of its foreign policy needs, 
at the same time, making consistent diplomatic efforts to become the interpreter and the 
spokesperson of European’s interests in the Southern Mediterranean.408  
Derisbourg goes further. The “key of its influence” he has argued “has been [Spain’s] 
ability to marry national interests with those of other partners, notably France, and to 
exchange policy support with major northern EU member states, especially Germany-”.409 
As Gillespie has pointed out, Spain’s prominence provoked within the short term, 
“occasional rivalry” with France, a traditional Mediterranean power. However this has been 
contested by some actors interviewed for this research as will be demonstrated later in 
chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9. 
Nevertheless, this possible rivalry within the medium and long term transformed this 
competitive behaviour into a more cooperative attitude in order to work together to persuade 
Europe about the need of developing a consistent Mediterranean policy.
410
  
The leading role of Spain in developing a new Euro-Mediterranean policy in the 
context of Europe’s evolving realist-security approach cannot be debated. In this Spain was 
able, as Bicchi incisively notes, to identify a “Mediterranean political window”. This began to 
be an issue of increasing interest in the earliest post-dictatorship period at a national level 
between 1982 and 1984, when Spain re-launched bilateral relations with southern 
Mediterranean countries. However, this was a foreign policy strategy that was inherited from 
the “internationalist” approach Spain tried to sell to Europe from 1957 onward as it has been 
mentioned above. Despite this political heritage that was mostly focusing on a national scale, 
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Spain’s activism shifted from the national sphere to the international arena between 1989 and 
1992.
 411
   
 
5.6. The Spanish “Gallopade”: Looking for International Recognizance.  
Spain’s accession to the EEC ended decades of isolation, though the country was still 
considered an underdeveloped country.
412
 Now Spain had the opportunity to demonstrate its 
potential to the rest of Europe, especially those countries that expressed scepticism that the 
new member would have an important role to play in the Community. The Spanish (and 
Portuguese) entry into the EEC in 1986 came at a moment of Euro-optimism.  
As has been pointed out by Westendorp, “Spain and Portugal promoted a new 
dynamic … where Spain was always in the vanguard [of Europe]” and were they brought 
with them special relations with Latin America, North Africa and the Southern 
Mediterranean”.413 As Ambassador Navarro, -who currently is the Spanish Ambassador to 
Morocco, he has worked on European issues occupying top positions in Brussels since 1985 
and he was named Secretary of State to the European Union in 2004- has explained over his 
interview for this research, Latin America did not exist for the EEC until Spanish entry. 
There was only one EEC outpost on the continent, in Santiago, Chile, that was moved to 
Caracas, Venezuela after 1973. Even by 1986 the EEC invested the same resources in Togo 
as it did in the whole Latin America, which had non-preferential status.
414
 The potential 
contribution of Spain to the EEC was very clear: building up relations with Latin America.  
The role of Felipe González in leading this new political agenda, as well as in promoting 
Spain’s new Mediterranean policy –and Latin America-, is widely accepted.415 
González was central to Spain’s growing standing inside Europe and inspired the new 
diplomatic team –a team that enjoy both ability and agency to propose policies- Spain sent to 
Brussels. Eneko Landaburu, former director general of foreign affairs of the European 
Commission noted in an interview for this thesis that by 1986 many Europeans were saying, 
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“Look at these Spaniards! They are doing really well!”416 Landaburu continued that González 
always told him that “We are not going there to beg, we are going there to work with the 
others, to build Europe.”417 
  González sent his most talented and trusted officials to Brussels: Abel Matutes, Anna 
Terrón, José Borrell, José María Gil Robles, Pedro Solbes, Loyola de Palacios or Javier 
Solana, among others.
 418
 People who left an important mark in Europe. They were tasked 
with building up Spanish influence. As Ambassador Landaburu recalled that González 
‘insisted’ that Spain received the post of Direction General of Regional Policy, a key role in 
the development of the common market and the social and economic cohesion. González 
insisted very much to get the Direction General of Regional Policy. His close relationship 
with Commission President Jacques Delors aided in this task.”419 
 
5.7. The Mediterranean Card.  
Carlos Westendorp has acknowledged that the Mediterranean was always a priority for Spain 
as it was believed very much that the region could contribute to the increase in Spain’s 
relevance.”420Andreu Claret, Executive Director of the Anna Lindh Foundation –The 
Mediterranean platform integrating 43 states and embedded within the Euromed (Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership)-has explained during a personal interview for this research, that 
the vision of Felipe Gonzalez’s and his senior officials towards the Mediterranean was 
decisive for the evolving European approach to the region and was responsible for the 
attempt of the Community to “transform risks in opportunities”.421 
 In other words, the importance that Spain attached to the Mediterranean was soon 
adopted by Europe primarily due to the “entrepreneurial” activity of the Spanish government. 
The actual Spanish role, in terms of the influence of regional politicians in this process, has 
not previously been addressed properly in the scholarly literature. On the list of Spanish 
politicians occupying relevant roles in the European Commission over the last two decades 
and a half, is interesting to note that many of them are from Catalonia. This is not a 
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coincidence. Catalonia as a regional power within Spain played a very important role in 
pushing for developing intensively Euro-Mediterranean policies. A fact was later recognised 
in the launch of the Barcelona Process.  
The former president of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol can be probably considered among the 
main political entrepreneurs of the Spain’s Mediterranean political and diplomatic initiatives 
and policies. Andreu Claret has stated that it was Pujol’s intervention that enabled Gonzalez 
to situate Spain at the centre of Europe’s Mediterranean agenda.422 During an interview for 
this thesis Pujol –former president of the Catalonian government between explained that the 
commitment of the Government of Catalonia (La Generalitat) towards the Mediterranean 
was, due to historical, geographical, economic and political factors. Pujol reminded that 
Catalonia was the only region in Spain that belonged to the Carolingian empire and on top of 
that its permanent trade relations with the Mediterranean over the centuries have shaped this 
European and Mediterranean identity. Pujol continued, “Hence, as Catalans and Generalitat” 
he explained, “we firstly disseminated this message throughout European institutions and 
then lobbied the Spanish government to work for that.”423 
 From 1987 onward, Pujol’s objective was to make the Mediterranean an issue of 
importance for Europe’s least inclined nations. He was a key figure in organising conferences 
in places like Stockholm that promoted the idea that the Mediterranean constituted 
“potentially, a Euro-region”.424 The conference was held at the Grand Hôtel, Stockholm the 5 
November 1987. After an historical introduction about the importance of the Mediterranean 
over the centuries, Pujol developed the central point of his conference by saying: “The 
Mediterranean is not losing positions any longer, on the contrary, is recovered. It is not a 
passive area anymore. Today is a region full of initiative and creativity. It is an area that 
progresses, a lot.” 425  
 González, who was also convinced about the necessity of selling the Mediterranean 
to Europe found a very important and creative ally in Catalonia that combined to offer two 
complementary Europeanisms
426
-the Spanish and the Catalan. Evidence of the 
entrepreneurial action on this issues is seen in Pujol’s explanation that  “The Mediterranean 
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policy of Felipe González, I think, it was his idea, however, what is true is that I went many 
times to speak with him to stress the fact that Spain should have a Mediterranean policy”.427  
It is important to stress that Spain was not alone in this Mediterranean venture. 
Countries such as France, Morocco, Portugal and Algeria also demonstrated a commitment to 
this issue.
428
Italy ably supported Spanish initiatives.
429
 As has been acknowledged by Claret 
the relationship between Spanish foreign minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos and his Italian 
counterpart Gianni De Michelis was very close during the presidency of Giulio Andreotti 
between July 1989 and June 1992.
 430
 
It was in these years that the first benefits of the earlier Spanish efforts to take a lead 
on Euro-Mediterranean policy, started to be seen.
431
 By this time the importance of the 
Mediterranean was being promoted by deploying a realist public discourse in the immediate 
post-Cold War era. New dangers and threats had to be publicised in order to attract 
international attention.
432
 The Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean 
(CSCM) was convened in this context. Philosophically this was inspired by the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which opened in Helsinki on the 3 July 1973. 
But its immediate roots can be traced back to the efforts of De Michelis in 1989
433
 and 
the success of Spain in conceptualizing it in response to the weaknesses inherent in both the 
existing European Mediterranean Policy and the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) that 
had been developed by Abel Matutes during 1989-1990 as it has been explained in the 
introduction.
434
Mediterranean politics so far –the existing political mechanisms and 
structures- as well as the European action towards Southern Mediterranean countries 
concentrated their attention mostly on trade related issues. The end of the 1980s with a new 
global international dynamics demanded a different political, economic, communicational 
and diplomatic approach, whether elements such as the understanding among cultures should 
be the key factor underpinning sustainable Euro-MENA relations.  
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In considering this initial period pre-Barcelona Process, Italy’s diplomatic energy on 
this front lasted until 1992, when De Michelis concluded his time as a minister.
435
 Until the 
end of the 1980s and at this stage, the continuous formulation of policies towards the 
Mediterranean based on  a “security-cooperative” formula to be applied in the Southern 
Mediterranean has been assessed by Calleja as a “premature remedy for a region which now 
neither as a bridge nor it is a divide (…) It is simply a vacuum”.436  
Spain intended to fill this vacuum with an innovative discourse and a new political 
and diplomatic breath. There were four central elements to this vacuum filling 1) the 
European attitude towards the Mediterranean, 2) the need to develop a consistent 
communicative strategy that could justify further political actions, 3) the capacity to articulate 
the specific politic objectives within the short, medium and long term and 4) a consistent 
political discourse on bilateral and multilateral levels with regards to the implementation of 
policies.  
In these terms the three pillars of Euro-Mediterranean relations from the time of the 
CSCM were: political-security, economic and socio-cultural.
437
 These would subsequently 
form the basis of the three baskets of the Barcelona Process.  
In this sense Felipe González had the intuition, identified the political window, 
lobbied with the strongest country, Germany, by deepening his friendship with Helmut Kohl 
and strengthening strategically his links with Jacques Delors, president of the European 
Commission at the time. Abel Matutes, -a member of the European Commission since 1986 
and Spain’s minister of foreign affairs between 1996 and 2000 during the government of José 
María Aznar- played a vital role in building ties to Delors. As Matutes explained during an 
interview for this thesis:  
 
“The Mediterranean issue was very clear to Felipe González since the first day. I had 
the occasion of sharing all his ideas, and after my first mandate I asked him to help to 
me to convince Delors to give me the responsibility over the Mediterranean, Latin 
America, Asia and the relations North-South. He helped me with efficacy and 
honesty. At that time, we had the occasion of specifying a lot the contents of the 
policy that I wanted to develop in the Mediterranean and the role of González was 
crucial”.438 
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In this context the reactions of other regional powers like France should not be 
forgotten. France opposed strongly Spanish entry into the EEC. It distrusted and opposed 
Spanish attempts to take the lead on a new Mediterranean policy, once it was inside the 
Community. However, there were subtleties to this dynamic. The CSCM was an ambitious 
Spanish diplomatic attempt to assert itself in the Mediterranean. It was, as noted above, a 
premature attempt that failed due to a number of factors:  regional realities such as the 
ongoing failure to find Arab-Israeli peace and the ongoing tensions in the Persian Gulf; the 
opposition of some key partners such as the US, the UK and The Netherlands; Germany’s 
reluctance to engage with the Mediterranean in a period of immense change in Eastern 
Europe and on its borders.
439
 For its part, France at that time France was developing a more 
modest diplomatic plan to cope with challenges and opportunities in the Western 
Mediterranean. With this in mind, France expressed, what Valle Simón and Holmes have 
described as a “non-negative” attitude towards the CSCM.440 
 
5.8.The French Attitude  
It was in the Western Mediterranean that both Spain and France had their most significant 
investment in the region. Jordi Pujol has gone so far as to argue that Spain should have 
limited its focus to this area and it is arguable that the failure to do so had dramatic and 
negative long term impacts on the failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. As Pujol 
put in:   
 “I always said that Spain should not get involved in the whole Mediterranean, only in 
the Western Mediterranean, from Malta to here. From Malta to here we are someone, 
from Malta towards the East we are nobody. Neither Italy nor France, even France is a 
nobody, that is for the north-Americans”.441  
 
One conclusion from this is that this explains France’s lack of interest in stamping is 
authority on Europe’s Mediterranean policy from 1989 onwards. But in truth, as Pujol noted 
in an interview for this thesis, though France distanced itself from a desire to take a lead in 
the Mediterranean at the end of the Cold War it did work behind the scenes to take any 
opportunity to extend and consolidate its power base in the region. For example, following 
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the fall of the Berlin Wall, France pressed hard to take over the Mediterranean –Sixth Fleet- 
Command from the US.
442  
It is in these terms that one should examine the French push in the Western 
Mediterranean at this time. President Mitterrand first proposed the idea of the 5+5 group in 
the early 1980s. This idea was re-launched by presidents Bettino Craxi and Felipe González 
during the second half of the 1980s involving five countries from the South-Western 
Mediterranean and five from the North-Western Mediterranean.
443
 The 5+5 group meeting 
was held in Rome in 1990. Nevertheless, contextual political elements such as the Gulf War –
from August 1990 to February 1991- and the Lockerbie affair –from 1988 to 1992 and 
onward- impeded it smooth development and the dialogue among parts has been blocked due 
to these disputes. On one hand the First Gulf War generated new tensions between the Arab 
world and Western stakeholders in creating the basis of mutual distrust for future diplomatic 
developments. Following this aspect, Telhami has studied how the Arab public opinion 




 On the other hand, the Lockerbie affair stopped the political and economic inclusion 
of Libya in times of strong economic crisis –and further political dialogue- due to the 
economic embargo issued in March 1992 by the Security Council of the UN –resolution 748- 
in response to the Libyan attack to a Pan Am flight in 1988.
445
 After this event Libya was 
defined as a terrorist state. As Mortimer has stressed, this politic and diplomatic issue not 
only affected Libyan-Western relations, but the stability of the entire Maghreb and existing 
partnerships like the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) established in 1992.
446
  
Disputes between Maghreb countries such as Algeria and Morocco, as well as 
rivalries between France and Spain for the leadership of this initiative also limited its 
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 In an interview for this thesis Ambassador Eneko Landaburu –
EU Ambassador to Morocco and former Director General for External Relations of the EU, 
from 2003 to 2009 among other positions- responded to a question on this issue in the 
following terms: “Tensions between France and Spain and Italy existed because France 
wanted more focus on the Western Mediterranean, and Spain and Italy [wanted] a broader 
approach”.448 
With regards to the apparent disinterest of France for leading the Mediterranean 
policy during the late 1980s and 1990s, it is possible to say, again in the spirit of that political 
pragmatism, that Mitterrand, especially between 1988 and 1995, was very much interested in 
blocking the potential German domination over France. Mitterrand was a leading driver of 
the Treaty on European Union in 1991, which contributed to establish a central European 
banking system along with a unified foreign policy and a shared currency partly at least to 





5.9.Spain: Achieving Objectives.  
Spain’s first attempts to promote a Mediterranean policy served as tests that confirmed that 
“political windows” can be opened and developed once the leading “political entrepreneur” 
enjoys the support of the largest number of partners or the economically strongest partners. 
These first attempts also saw Spain beginning to market the Mediterranean to Europe. The 
Madrid Conference on the Arab-Israeli peace process that commenced on 30
 
October 1991 
acknowledged the potential role of Spain in Mediterranean politics, even though as has been 
noted by Gillespie, the Spanish role was reduced to that of mere organizer.
450
 Even leaving 
the side the symbolism of the Madrid venue had an important psychological importance, it is 
also true that Spain was more than a mere organizer at Madrid. Spain had earned the trust of 
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Washington to organize, host and oversee this complex and historic meeting. As Carlos 
Westendorp recalls:  
 
“The fact is that when [James] Baker –when George Bush was still president- asked 
Paco Fernández Ordóñez, Spain’s minister of foreign affairs between 1985 to1992, to 
organize a conference in Madrid we were in Seville. I saw Paco holding the phone and 
with a very worried face he tells me: ‘It was Baker, he is asking me to organize the 
conference in Madrid on Middle Eastern issues because he trusts us.’ And Paco 
Fernández Ordóñez who had a very strong sense of goal, accepted immediately and 
this was important. It brought more credibility with the US and with the world, 
because, first of all, it was not easy at all to convince Israelis and Syrians to come”451 
 
The role of Spain under Felipe González as a legitimate and influential interlocutor 
between the West and the Middle East started to be recognised. This resonates in the current 
era. Prior to the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, González was asked to act as a 
negotiator with the Qaddafi’s regime.452  One reason the Libyan leader trusted González 
because in 1986 he had refused the US to use the Spanish airspace to attack Qaddafi.
453
 
Along with rising credibility in the early 1990s came another even more important 
development – German support for Spanish plans to develop its Mediterranean policy. As 
Westendorp points out, first of all Spain was rewarded by Germany for “being a loyal partner 





5.10. Spain Sells the Mediterranean: A Threatening Political Discourse.  
By 1992 the political discourse regarding Euro-Maghreb relations started to be more present 
in the EC’s agenda.  This can be explained in significant part by the Spanish interest in 
attracting Community’s attention to its southern border. As both Spanish Euro Commissioner 
Abel Matutes and Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, stated in 1992: 
“The Maghreb is truly a time bomb. The Community cannot remain indifferent”.456 
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 These statements were delivered during the European Council meeting in Lisbon, 26-
27 June 1992. By using this emotional language, Spain was consciously trying to attract 
attention to the issue amongst its partners in Europe. All the more so when this was combined 
with diplomatic efforts to reduce the importance of the problems of Eastern Europe compared 
to those in North Africa, which was truly a “vulnerable frontier.”457 
The question that this raises is the extent that Spain had enough symbolic power to 
drive home this message inside the Community? At that time, as has been suggested by 
Fontela, the EC was facing a choice between two hypothetical scenarios of action –variable 
geometry or co-development. The concept of variable geometry was considered at the Lisbon 
meeting. It refers to a method that promotes differentiated integration. This concept accepts 
that there exist sets of irreconcilable elements among partners that make permanent 
separation inevitable.
458
 The more idealistic concept for a way forward is co-development. 
This idea postulates the view that relationships among partners are designed to overcome 
differences in order to create win-win solutions.  
The main problem regarding the Maghreb is that in that area there are two 
contradictory streams: Westernization and Islamization. The former looks to steer Maghreb 
economies towards the open markets democratic values and respect for fundamental human 
rights. Fontela has argued that in these terms the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) created on 7 
February 1992 was a sign of westernization because they tried to follow the example of 
Western economic and trade integration.
459
  Others have disagreed with this assessment due 
to the fact that given that Maghreb economies are not complementary this integration would 
have opened the doors to both more regional competitiveness and economic and industrial 
efficiency and to the possible solutions of regional disputes and conflicts.
460
  
Arguably, since the 1960s of all the initiatives regarding EEC-EU relations with 
southern Mediterranean countries, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) –or Barcelona 
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Process- has been the most significant in terms of looking to increase co-operation among 
EU-MENA partners. Over this period of time, it is also true that four generations of 
commercial and trade agreements were signed between the EEC and southern Mediterranean 
countries since 1969 to 1996.
461
  Over this period, France was the strongest country 
projecting power in North Africa and due to this, it was reasonably to understand that also 
France was actively engaged in supporting Spanish or Italian proposals aiming at launching 
and establishing the EMP. 
In order to see how the efforts mostly from Spain and Italy –and to a lesser extent 
France- impacted Europe’s foreign policies and political plans in order to focus more on the 
Southern frontier, it is important to assess the texts emanated from the meetings of the 
European councils. In using the CL approach, it would have been desired to have access to 
the data since 1985. However the materials ready to be used start in 1993. Therefore the 
conclusions of the presidency of the European Council that are going to be used for this 
purpose start in 1993. The texts that have been analyzed belong to the councils of: 
Copenhagen and Brussels –1993-, Corfu and Essen – 1994-, Cannes and Madrid 
(extraordinary) 1995.  
The variables that are going to be used in order to understand how the penetration of 
certain concepts into the European public speech and political agenda have been evolving 
from 1993 to 1995 with the establishment of the Barcelona Process are the next ones: 
Mediterranean, migration, security, Arab/Muslim, Terrorism and Racism. The graphic 
number 1 shows this evolution.  
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Graphic (1) European Councils, Conclusions of the Presidency. 
 
 Source: European Commission. Elaborated by the author.  
As the graphic number 1 shows, the concept “Mediterranean” was not present until 
1994 in the European Council celebrated in Corfu. Until then it is possible to say that the 
“entrepreneurial” activities developed by countries such as Spain or Italy were trying to lobby 
and to convince European stakeholders about the necessity of designing and developing a 
comprehensive Mediterranean policy. From then onward, this European interest towards the 
Mediterranean was publicly acknowledged, and therefore it is possible to appreciate the 
consistent growth as the Council was approaching the date of establishment of the Barcelona 
Process in 1995.  
The drop between Cannes 1995 and Madrid 1995 is due to the fact that the council 
celebrated in Madrid was an extraordinary one, and therefore also the amount of pages of the 
document is shorter. Beyond this technical aspect, it is also interesting to note how the 
concept “Security” has been the constantly present –and before- since 1993 as European 
security at large is obviously the most relevant concern. Nevertheless, it is also interesting to 
see how since the concept Mediterranean started to be present in the political agenda, security 
related issues increased as well.  
This correlation underpins the EU’s hypothesis, affirmed during a personal interview 
with Abel Matutes–the aforementioned dilemma between the co-operation and variable 
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countries would reduce the incentives to migrate and therefore, by improving the general 
socio-economic conditions Europe would be safer.
462
 
Apart from the EU’s political rhetoric that has been tried to sell the EMP as a win-win 
situation by deploying a liberal discourse, the real intentions behind the partnership is fully 
rooted in a neo-realist approach where the defense of European interests are fundamental as it 
is going to be demonstrated in chapters 7,8 and 9. In observing this hypothesis it is possible 
to appreciate the differences between political entrepreneurs, political “brokers”, and 
opportunists. Whereas, political entrepreneurs and brokers would define their strategies 
following a real and non-speculative win-win scenario, political opportunists would identify 
opportunities and design their modus operandi following unilateral benefits by speculating 
about their real intentions.  
Completing this picture is also possible to appreciate how the variables “Racism”, 
“Migration” and “Terrorism” increased also from 1995. This represents a growing political 
interest on these three variables considering the new environment of globalization which 
entails also trasnational risks and uncertainties. These initial elements will constitute the most 
relevant political and diplomatic concerns and challenges the EU will have to face and deal 
with, especially from 11 September 2001 onward.  
The use of the CL approach offers valuable insights to understand discover hidden 
aspects of the public speech that are important to better evaluate the outcomes of political 
proposals and initiatives.  In considering the aforementioned corpora and in analyzing the list 
of most repeated words –out of 5.164 word types-, it is possible to see that within the top-15 
results there are two verbs: Be (ranked 12 with 768 repetitions) and Will (ranked 15 with 630 
repetitions). In searching for the concordance between these two verbs most of times the 
formula “will be” was used 174 times. These next verb represented in the world list is “is” 
ranked 21 with 431 hits. These elements clearly show that the usage of this political language 
is projected towards the future and it is mostly characterized by a declaration of intentions 
and political will and not necessarily driven by a clear sense of accomplishment. Assessing 
these political communication strategies and resources are relevant to understand whether 
these political initiatives and projects are mostly based on a “productive” –political 
entrepreneurs and brokers- approach or on a “speculative” one –political opportunists-.  
Therefore, France, Italy and Spain were the main countries advocating a change of 
politics in the Euro-Mediterranean region. As it has been shown above, it was evident in 1994 
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during the Corfu and Essen European Council Summits.
463
 As the Bulletin of the European 
Community Nº6/1994 summed up decisions made at the Council of Corfu that had been 
backed by Spain, France and Italy:  
 
“In the field of external relations, the European Council confirmed its commitment to 
the development of existing links with the Mediterranean countries and to the peace 
process in the Middle East and stressed the importance of the European Agreements 
with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (…) The European Council confirms 
the importance it attaches to the close links already existing with its Mediterranean 
partners and its wish to develop them still further so that the Mediterranean area may 
become an area of cooperation guaranteeing peace, security, stability and well-
being”.464 
 
Here is possible to see the initial fruits of this diplomatic offensive to re-direct the 
EU’s political efforts southwards. The same document noted that the importance of 
constructing the Algeria-Morocco-EU gas pipeline as a priority. Considering the importance 
of energy resources for the future of Europe, the Maghreb-Europe Gas pipeline (MEG) was 
originally proposed in 1963 by a consortium of French companies even though more 
structured proposals were developed during the 1970s following Spanish, Italian and 
Algerian interests.
465
Whereas the Transmed project began in 1983 to provide gas to Italy 
thanks to ENI the Italian “strong and politically mobilized company”.466Spain was not able to 
achieve its objectives for the creation of a national project until 1990s because both the 
government and its national gas company Enagas were not influential and strong enough.
467
  
The fact of highlighting the priority of developing the MEG –lately named Pedro Duran 
Farell pipeline- in this document reveals the positive outcomes achieved by Spain as a raising 
political actor from 1985 to 1995. The construction of the MEG began in 1996.  
At Essen in December 1994 – Jacques Delors’ last council as president of the 
Commission, - the Mediterranean issue was again raised as a priority.
468
 “Ensuing the lasting 
peace and stability of the European continent and neighboring regions” necessitated, the 
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council meeting argued, “preparing for the future accession of the associated countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and developing in parallel the special relationship of the Union 
to its other neighbors particularly the Mediterranean countries”.469 
 The emphasis on “parallel” and “other” in this statement reflects the still secondary 
interest in Southern Europe. The ongoing dominant view that eastern and central Europe was 
a natural part of the European project unlike those states in the Mediterranean who may never 
be fully incorporated into Europe, like Morocco. However in evaluating the consistency and 
coherency of potential win-win policies and diplomatic projects this heterogeneous 
aggregation should happen, otherwise, any integration project that does not consider this 
dimension is doomed to fail.  
In an interview on Spanish television in 1984, King Hassan II of Morocco was asked 
to explain his recent declaration that “Morocco was at least, as European as Greece and (….) 
should be fully-fledged member of the EEC.” 470 
For King Hassan II it appeared that membership of the EEC was primarily a matter of 
political will. According to him the entire Maghreb was entitled to become associated to the 
EEC because that region, without any doubt, “is the base of the Mediterranean. It is the hinge 
between Europe and Africa toward the South of the Sahara. I believe that Europe should not 
let this occasion escape. But in any case, this proposal should not surprise to anyone. At an 
institutional level, at a constitutional level, at a geographical level is not an eyesore the fact of 
asking about being a fully-fledged member of the European Union”.471 
In the same interview, when asked about the role of Spain and whether Spanish 
accession was troubling to Morocco, Hassan II replied:  
 
“First of all. Spain is a neighbor country. If its accession to the EEC is useful I wish 
that this accession should been done as soon as possible. Because it is a neighbor 
country, and a friend. But, if Spain shares the same feelings as Morocco at a bilateral 
level, I believe that Spain will do everything to avoid its accession affecting Morocco. 
I believe that this is a bilateral problem and not only a European problem”472 
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Spain’s strategy to achieve greater diplomatic influence by playing the North African 
card was successful and overcame the resistances from Northern European countries that 
were more interested due to geo-strategic reasons in Eastern European countries. The 
establishment of the EMP or Barcelona Process was the material proof of such success. 
However, is it possible to consider Spain a political entrepreneur, a political broker or an 
opportunist? Despite Spain’s interests in Morocco, it is possible to say that Spain was not 
really interested in defending the “mutual interests” expressed above by Hassan II. Spain had 
an instrumental interest in selling in selling southern Mediterranean problems as European 
problems as Gillespie has suggested.  
The next chapter will assess and shed light on the role Spain played as a political 
broker.  In order to proof that it is important to analyze the most important and relevant issue 
that has challenged the consistency and coherence of the policies issued in the Mediterranean: 
the migratory issue. From the rhetorical point of view, Spain and aligned stakeholders used a 
very realistic approach –the propagandistic strategy –when they wanted to sell the 
Mediterranean. Subsequently, a liberal approach was developed as the Barcelona started to 
come to fruition. The migratory issue will demonstrate the dialectical and practical 
disconnections and lack of consistency between the period when the Mediterranean and 
Mediterranean problems started to be sold as a “diplomatic good” for attracting consensus 
and funds on one hand, and the focus on it marked the moment when the EU started to 




CHAPTER  6  
MIGRATION, SECURITY AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EURO-
MEDITERRANEAN REGION 
Challenging Political Entrepreneurs and Brokers  
 
Migratory movements are essential to understand history and the way societies, political 
structures, economic relations and cultural patterns have been challenged and modified. It is 
possible to say that migration and mobility itself, represents the most representative and 
single socio-political, economic and cultural phenomena modifying and challenging contexts. 
Therefore, understanding its transforming power is crucial to explain: How politicians, 
political entrepreneurs and brokers deal with it; how it does affect political communication 
strategies; how public opinion reacts, digests and accommodates political messages and 
information; as well as understanding the role of migration political management in 
exacerbating or moderating existing conflicts or cultural cleavages.  
 There is strong scholarly evidence supporting the fundamental role of migration and 
mobility in setting and impacting agenda setting. As it has been explained in chapter 2 where 
it has been discussed political communication and sensitive issues –mostly immigration- 
political entrepreneurs and brokers- have found in immigration the most profitable 
opportunity to gather public opinion’s consensus.  
In considering the American case, Brown studied how the voting behavior was 
conditioned by the ways politicians successfully used immigration as a central message of 
their campaigns.
473
 Pojmann assessed the linkages between migration and political activism 
in Europe highlighting the fact that immigration generates intense debates at every level of 
society and that “the media, policy makers, and politicians have entered into a discourse that 
examines immigration from seemingly every possible angle.”474  
Richmond studied the consequences of post-industrialism, globalization forces and 
international migration in boosting racial conflicts and reviving ethnic nationalism.
475
Betz 
and and Swank have acknowledged that globalization processes and forces contribute to the 
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electoral success of new far-right movements across Western Europe.
476
This vision has been 
also shared by Castles and Davidson in acknowledging that globalization represents one of 
the most challenging forces in questioning the meaning and the boundaries of citizenship and 
participation. That is why immigration related issues represent a strong opportunity window 




The interest in discussing migratory related issues as an opportunity structure 
approach for politicians –including political entrepreneurs and brokers- was studied by 
Koopmans and Statham.
478
Following a similar approach, Arzheimer and Carter have also 
confirmed that migration related issues represent a central part of political opportunity 
structures leaded by right-wing extremist parties –political entrepreneurs-.479This view has 
been confirmed for Western European countries by authors like Lubbers, Gjsbert and 
Scheepers, while they studied voting behavior and political strategies developed by extreme 
right-wing parties in Europe.
480
 
Summarizing the common grounds share by these scholars, Knigge stressed that 
increasing levels of immigration associated with raising levels of public dissatisfaction with 
existing political contexts and regimes, significantly facilitate right-wing extremism.
481
These 
studies validate this hypothesis by testing it from 1984 to 1993 and from 2002 onward.  
The success of right-wind political parties in identifying political opportunities is 
related with their capacity of managing collective fears. In line with the aforementioned 
authors, Huysmans considers that immigration related issues represent the most 
representative element paying back huge dividends to political entrepreneurs.  
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Immigration being manipulated by political entrepreneurs and brokers, especially 
from far-wing factions, defines the contours of “existential politics” by “administering 
inclusion and exclusion”.482 
Mudde coincides with this thesis and brings it further by considering that immigration 
has been a catalyst for most of contemporary extreme right parties.
483
He has even defined this 
theory as the “single-issue party thesis”.484The author of this dissertation shares this point of 
view considering that migration related issues are key to understand the limitations, 
inconsistencies and probably the failure of policies and mechanism used to promote a new 
strategy for the Mediterranean. This is due to the fact that primordially, those policies and 
mechanisms are communicational strategies that may allow or block Euro-Mediterranean 
dialogue and understanding. Migration related issues are very sensitive and within Euro-
Mediterranean dialogue a wrong communicational strategy may lead to blocking more 
technical mechanisms and prevent the success of complex political and diplomatic 
interactions.  
Euro-Mediterranean policies and mechanisms had to deal with a fundamental 
contradiction. On one hand, the EU wanted to develop mechanisms to enhance trade relations 
and improve living standards in North African countries considering that this hypothesis 
would have contributed to limit and control immigration flows. In fact, as it is going to be 
demonstrated below, the only specific date that was contained in the documents of the EMP 
was 2010, moment where the FTA between the EU and North Africa would have entered into 
force. On the other hand EU immigration policies became increasingly restrictive from 2002  
 This approach shows the mercantilist standpoint promoted by the EU, whereas 
rhetorically speaking, the EU’s discourse was addressing the importance of fostering the 
Mediterranean dialogue.  Being politically coherent, for the success of every economic 
integration process, it is necessary to consider free movement of people as well. This 
contradiction represents the major failure point of the EMP as it is going to be demonstrated 
in this chapter.  
 In considering the traditional trade theory developed by Heckscher-Ohlin, both free 
trade and free migration are equivalent measures and elements of economic integration.
485
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However as Wellisch and Walz have demonstrated, this theory does not correspond to the 
choices of industrialized countries that prefer free trade over free migration.
486
In line with 
this evidence, Schiff has demonstrated that free trade is preferred to free movement, because 
the later generates attachments “with those with whom they share social capital, including 
norms, language, customs, values and culture”.487Bearing in mind Euro-Mediterranean 
politics, these approaches are even more evident and significant as the divide between North 
Africa and the EU is the deepest in the world in terms of income, industrial development and 
institutional sophistication. On top of that immigration rates -as it is going to be demonstrated 
throughout this chapter- have been the most crucial aspect defining EU-Maghreb relations.  
As de Haas recognizes, “persistent and increasing migration from and through North 
Africa has put relations with European countries under considerable stress. In particular the 
EU has attempted to ‘externalize’ its restrictive e immigration policies through putting 
Maghreb states under pressure to adopt restrictive immigration laws and regulations and to 
intensify –joint- border controls”.488  
This artificial and intentional construction of a “buffer zone” in North Africa belongs 
to the EU’s policy of entering into association agreements with Maghreb countries with the 
intention of creating a free trade area by 2010. These mechanisms were driven by a belief in 
the hypothesis –following a neo-liberal approach- that an open economy would not only 
reduce incentives for migration but also foster democracy, democratic peace as well as 
sustainable socio-economic changes in those countries.  
However, it is arguable that this hypothesis is incorrect and did not take into account 
other factors such as the communication processes between more and less industrialized 
countries, policy coherence and consistency, and a real understanding of persistent socio-
economic challenges.  According to the Zelinky’s model, also known as “migration hump”, 
the improvement of socio-economic conditions would stimulate more migration within the 
short and medium term.
489
  
 The initial diplomatic and communicational strategies to set up the objectives of an 
Euro-Mediterranean dialogue coincided, as shown previously chapter five, with increasing 
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migration flows on one hand and, on the other hand, with the development of the EU in a 
context of international globalization. This mixed phenomenon raised both directly and 
indirectly discussions on the traditional concept of nation-state and its sovereignty.
490
As 
Balibar, Wallerstein and Sassen have highlighted, these challenging scenarios based on 
discussing core issues like citizenship and nationality have forced political agendas to 




As it has been demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the initial diplomatic 
movements to develop Euro-Mediterranean comprehensive policies were based on a 
threatening communication strategy influenced by thinking on the risks that a less 
industrialized region like the North-African would represent for Europe. Subsequently, the 
theoretical justification of such policies shifted orientation and win-win situations –
rhetorically speaking- were structured and designed in order to achieve a better understanding 
between European and Arab neighbors.  
The success of these policies and rhetoric argumentations, therefore, were linked to 
three main theoretical and operational aspects: the understanding of long-standing 
problematic issues -such as socio-economic underdevelopment, security, post-colonialism, 
human mobility and more industrialized-less industrialized labor dynamics; the consistency 
of such policies and the degree of commitment of key decision makers and stakeholders; the 
course of parallel and complicated political situations like the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
aftermaths of the 9/11 and the global economic crisis.  
The 1990s were years of political and socio-cultural experimentation within the realm 
posed by the post-cold war scenario. These experimentations were framed and challenged by  
migration, security, and socio-economic development related issues.  All them increasingly 
challenged Euro-Mediterranean relations, policies, diplomatic mechanisms and 
communicational processes. As it is going to be demonstrated in chapters 7, 8 and 9, these 
issues topped EU’s political agenda as well as European public concerns. It was also the 
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decade when Euro-Mediterranean politics were broadly defined and implemented following 
the theoretical and practical avenues defined by the Barcelona Process also called EMP.   
This chapter aims at assessing two interrelated aspects. First the most representative 
elements that have had to address these challenges and how they have been challenging Euro-
Mediterranean politics and diplomatic action within the short, medium and long term. 
Second, how the EU’s initial hypotheses and objectives have clashed and thus contradicted 
both with the development of such elements and with the particular interests of certain 
nations that have shifted and changed their policies and priorities due to economic, social and 
political difficulties. The second objective is going to be demonstrated by analyzing 
European public speech and its influence is shaping European public opinion. This objective 
will also address and  show how the EU’s rhetoric in favor of the Euro-Mediterranean 
dialogue has clashed and has being challenged by national right-wing parties that have 
pushed EU member states’ public opinion towards more intolerant stances during the 1990’s 




6.1. General Migratory Trends. 
The percentage of international migrants as part of global population rose from 2.2 percent in 
1970 to 2.9 percent in 2005.
493
 However, over the same period, the concentration of 
international migration in OECD countries rose from 4.5 percent to 8.3 percent.
494
 Net 
migration from outside OECD to OECD countries from 1956 to 1976 amounted to 790,000 




According to UN and International Organization of Migration (IOM) estimates, the 
number of international migrants moved shifted from 150 million in 2000 to 214 million in 
2012.
496
 These figures raise two fundamental questions that must be answered in order to 
understand possible manipulations, and inconsistencies with existing policies and generally 
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accepted assumptions: Are politicians and the media over-stating this problem? Does 
irregular migration really threaten the state’s sovereignty and security, or are these worries 
hugely exaggerated?
497
Along with these two initial questions, one should also ask how this 
phenomenon affects the Euro-Mediterranean region?  
 
 6.1.1. Migration in the Mediterranean.  
The Mediterranean, as a central pivot for Europe, North Africa and the Middle East 
constitutes one of the most dynamic regions in the entire world in relation to labor migration 
flows.
498
 This dynamism is particularly evident in the Maghreb region. North African 
countries, mainly Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria have become some of the most active 
exporters of labor to Europe as De Haas and Skeldon have shown.
499
  
Spanish and French colonization and decolonization philosophy differs in the case of 
North Africa from other types, such as British decolonization. Whereas the Anglo-Saxon 
model established the British Commonwealth, Mediterranean decolonization models in North 
Africa were violent and damaging to all parties.  This explains why both France and Spain 
were reluctant to allow “former” dependent countries to become sovereign states.500  
 The French presence in North Africa especially in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria 
since the mid-nineteenth century laid the first bricks of the constant interconnection among 
these countries. Algeria was the country that suffered this linkage more than the others as 
Naylor has studied.
501
 The Algerian French protectorate was established in 1830 and 
incorporated into the French state. The Moroccan French protectorate started in 1881 and the 
Tunisian in 1912. During the first half of the twentieth century the French labor market had 
high demand during WWI and WWII as Muus and Bidwell have analyzed.
502
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 After WWII migration from the Maghreb to France continued until 1968 as noted in 
chapter four. Following the country’s move to independence in 1962, Algerians were allowed 
to move freely between France and Algeria.
503
 This helped France to sustain and shore up its 
economic and industrial boom until 1973. During the Algerian war between 1954 and 1962, 
Moroccans workers filled the gap left by Algerians.
504
  
Broadly speaking during the first decade of post-colonialism between 1962 and 1973, 
Maghreb countries participated in the Euro-Mediterranean migration.
505
 This notably 
occurred in Belgium, The Netherlands and the German Democratic Republic (GDR),
506
 were 
“guest workers”, -also known as “gastarbeiter”-507agreements were introduced.  
Despite the formal channels in which this circular economic migration occurred, 
especially during the first years of the 1960s, irregular migration accompanied the regular 
process. This system was designed to promote and encourage circular migration but the 
majority of migrants were entitled with permanent residence permits through legalization 
campaigns in 1975 in The Netherlands and Belgium and in 1981-1982 in France.
508
 That is 
why it is difficult to estimate the exact number of migrants who moved over this decade. 
 The 1973 oil crisis and the global economic downturn that followed impacted 
severely on migration into industrial Europe, a main victim of the rapid rise in the oil price 
during the mid-1970s.  Since then, European migration policies have been linked to the 
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The subsequent period of economic and industrial stagnation generated an increasing 
structural unemployment leading to a reduction of the demand of the traditional immigrant 
labor. As De Haas points out, large number North African immigrants stayed permanently as 
visa restrictions pushed immigrants to remain in receiving countries.
510
 
This cause-effect approach might be at the root of the failure to manage migration, 
and are also (as subsequent chapters will address), potentially, at least in part, the reason for 
the common linkage of migration with other issues such as security, terrorism, criminality or 
unemployment.  
 The effects of the raising of oil prices provoked varied responses in the Maghreb. As 
an oil producer, Algeria was able to take advantage of the new situation for resetting relations 
with France.
511
 The government of Houari Boumédiène –in office between 1965 to  
1976- suspended immigration agreements with France because he considered emigration and 
those policies as “a form of post-colonial dependence”.512  
On the other hand, as De Haas also argues that other North African countries suffered 
much more intensively from the 1973 oil crisis. Moroccan immigration in Europe grew 
steadily since 1972 due to family reunification, family formation, new labor migration and 
undocumented migration. According to official figures, the number of Moroccan immigrants 
rose from 300,000 in 1972 to nearly 2.7 million by 2005. France was the top recipient with 1 
million Moroccans, followed by Spain, 500,000, Italy, 350.000, Belgium, 350,000, The 
Netherlands 325,000 and Germany, 108.000.
513
 The same trend can be witnessed for the 
Tunisian population. According to Gammoudi the Tunisian population abroad doubled 
between 1977 and 1992 and between 1987 and 2007.
514
 By 2007 France was the main 
destination for both Tunisian and Algerian migrants with 54.5 percent of Tunisians in Europe 
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France’s colonial past and current economic power explain this but so does its cultural 
links. Spain, on the other hand, was not such an attractive prospect for much of the same 
period due to decades of economic stagnation, political dictatorship and institutional and 
democratic under-development. From the early 1980s onward as Spain moved from being a 
sending to a receiving country from migrants this all changed.   
Seventy percent of the immigrants coming from the Maghreb came to Spain between 
1980 and 1990 as González Yanci and López García and Berriane have shown.
516
 Moroccans 
and Algerians migrated to Spain more than Tunisians. This new wave of immigrants from the 
Maghreb was defined by one of the most notable Spanish experts on migration as “the return 
of the Moors”.517  
These trends have been replicated all over the Mediterranean. The graphics below 
show the evolution of the migrant population in Europe and in the Mediterranean area, for 4 
countries: Spain, France, Italy and Malta. This first graph show how international migration 
evolved between 1990 and 2010. The Spanish case has been the most dramatic given its 
growth from 2000 onwards, whereas France has been experiencing a very discreet rise 
although until 2004 it still led regarding the number of international migrants as a percentage 
of the population. With the exception of France, the country with largest labor migration, the 
inflexion point for the other Mediterranean countries began between 2000 and 2005. As it is 
possible to appreciate in the graphic number 2, between 2005-2005 Spain overcame France 
with regards to the international migrants as a percentage of the national population.   
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Graph. (2) International Migrants as a Percentage of the Population 
 
 
Source: UN. Elaborated by the author. 
 
In the following graphic number 3, one can observe the annual change of the migrant 
stock in Southern European countries. Clearly, Spain has experienced again a very sharp 
growth between 2000 and 2005, whereas in Italy and Malta this growth has been much more 
reduced. The French case is almost irrelevant due to the fact of its long tradition attracting 
labor over the treinte glorieuses.  
 




Source: UN. Elaborated by the author. 
 
Going beyond the Mediterranean rim, the following two graphics focus on Europe. 




























and 2005. From 1990 to 2010 the percentage of migrants as a percentage of the population in 
Europe grew from 7 percent to 10 percent. These two following graphics number 4 and 5  
evidence the notable differences between the Mediterranean Europe and northern European 
countries as the aggregated values are much lower than the others displayed before. 
Therefore, these differential trends justify the fact that southern European countries like 
Spain, France and Italy have been acting as political entrepreneurs and brokers. They have 
been naturally raising awareness of these increasing flows and the potential risks they would 
entail for the entire European security.  
 
Graph (4) Annual Rate of Change of the Migrant Stock % in Europe 
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 Source: UN. Elaborated by the author. 
 
Graph (5) International Migrants as a Percentage of the Population in Europe.  
 
 





























6.2. Gambling on the Needs and Problems of Southern Mediterranean Countries.  
 
The EU was created and developed to increase the economic power of member states and this 
economic interest established the ground for future political and diplomatic initiatives. 
Understanding this is fundamental to understanding how Euro-Mediterranean politics have 
evolved from 1995 onward.  
The decade following the end of the Cold War was characterized by a certain 
optimism that was translated into a common European agreement upon a number of issues of 
common interest.
518
 The definition of a new World Order aside the opportunities to develop 
creative political, economic and diplomatic mechanisms to occupy privileged positions 
within this new scenario were very apparent. As Calleya has stressed, “the growth of regional 
arrangements since the end of the Cold War is partly due to the fact that great powers and 
regional powers welcomed the opportunity to participate in collective security and 
cooperative frameworks in which the costs of foreign policy actions are shared among several 
actors.”519 
This wave of agreements was characterized by a rhetoric that used expressions like 
“north-south dialogue”, “win-win solutions”, “socio-economic development” or “increasing 
mutual security”. These concepts were diplomatic mantras to sell new strategies to create new 
balances and new mechanisms intended to consolidate control of southern Mediterranean 
countries including the Maghreb and the Mashrek. Through the CL approach this is going to 
be demonstrated in analyzing EU’s public speech.  
Within this period the following were created: the 5+5 Initiative, the Council of the 
Mediterranean launched by the Maltese government, the Mediterranean Forum initiated by 
the Egyptian government, the Italian-Spanish proposal to flesh out the CSCM, the AMU and 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process) led by the EU in 1995.
520
 
The Barcelona Process was intended to breathe new life into the Euro-Mediterranean 
relationship by increasing the collaborative aspect of the relationship, boosting democratic 
promotion, upholding human rights, safeguarding regional security and developing economic 
partnerships. Regional initiatives and multilateralism were also encouraged in an attempt to 
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At a communicational level, the political discourse surrounding this was optimistic, 
committed and proactive. However, some pessimistic voices were raised. Authors like 
Khader, have been criticising Euro-Mediterranean policies and mechanisms due to their lack 
of consistency, coherence and the attempt to verticalize Euro-Mediterranean 
relations.
522




 In fact, as it has been also mentioned in the precedent chapter, it was evident the 
deployment of a double discourse from the EU since the first attempts of gathering 
communitarian consensus on one hand and the post-1995 political and diplomatic 
developments on the other hand. Probably this communicational dichotomy was the seed of 
the future failure. This contradictory and inconsistent public discourse has contributed to 
enhance and reinforce an existing feeling of fear and mistrust within the entire Mediterranean 
region.
524
This will be demonstrated by analyzing European public discourse with regards to 
migration relations issues.  
The details of the Barcelona Process in the three areas of politics and security; 
economic and financial issues and social, cultural and human aspects have been widely 
examined.
525
 However, in the context of a communicative strategy on the Mediterranean, the 
security aspect was fundamental to gathering communitarian consensus. As Rudolph 
mentions, this security-focused on discourse found much support amongst states whose 
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6.3. Trying to Manage Migration: The Fundamental Gap.  
None of the three baskets in the Barcelona process considered the migratory issue despite its 
centrality to the stability of the entire region. From 1995 to 1999 the European situation with 
regards to migration issues changed dramatically. From 1999 to 2004, and especially from 
the time of the al-Qaeda attacks on the US in September 2011 (the 9/11 attacks) migration 
and security were indefectibly associated. As the former Spanish secretary of state Anna 
Terron mentioned prior to the European Council of Tampere in 1999 there was no common 
immigration policy for Europe and Spain played a very important role in developing the 




In fact, over this period Spain played a fundamental role in leading the EU on 
developing its migratory policies. Terrón mentioned during an interview for this thesis, Spain 
was able to identify this trend because “we came from this migratory experience and I think 
that we realized quicker than the rest of the EU that there was an intense migratory problem 
coming.  Everything was very visible and on top of that the conscious of Spanish people to 
migration issues started to awake at that time”.528 
The preparation of the Council of Tampere served precisely to create the mechanisms 
and the concept of a unified European migratory policy. During the Council of Tampere 
meeting, four intertwined factors were revealed as critical for the future sustainability of the 
Euro-Mediterranean region as a project: first, a common EU asylum and migration policy; 
second, a genuine European area of justice; third, a union-wide fight against crime; and 
fourth, stronger external action.
529
 These measures stressed the importance of managing, in a 
coordinated way, both existing and future migratory flows, especially points 22, 23 and 
24.
530
Point 23, highlighted the European commitment in fighting against illegal migration.  
That encouraged the development and implementation of a communitarian legislation to 
sanction serious crimes.
531
 Point 24, stressed the importance of Euro-Mediterranean 
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 Mainly point 22 highlights that: “the European Council stresses the need for more efficient management of 
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cooperation in managing and controlling migration flows, an issue that reveals European 
worries and desires to increase domestic security.
532
 
From this point onwards it was possible to detect migration related issues shifting 
from the domain of low politics to the sphere of high politics. This approach acquired 
political justification and social acceptance after the 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, the 
migration-security nexus was institutionalized. As Thieux puts it the idea of multilateralism 
in the “idealistic” public discourse, reverted to the earlier model of the dangers of bilateral 
proximity.
533
As Anna Terron explained in her interview for this thesis:  
 
“In considering both the sphere of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
policies and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) realm, we lived since many years 
ago, I would say, from mid-1990s, with a very strong tension between the fear and the 
need of closing and managing the Euro-Mediterranean space and migratory flows 
with other criteria more linked to foreign policy, cooperation and development.”534 
 
Following Tampere, the migratory issue continued to rise in importance within the EU 
political space jeopardizing the possibilities of developing a consistent and holistic Euro-
Mediterranean approach. In 2003, and in parallel to the Barcelona Process, the European 




The internal consistency of this Mediterranean project had much to do with the 
consistency of the interaction between previous policies and mechanisms set in the region. 
On the other hand, the Hague Program (2004-2009) was an EU attempt to strengthen 
freedom, security and justice. It gave continuity to the points that were previously established 
during the European Council in Tampere. It described a master plan divided into 10 main 
points. Four of those 10 points were related to migration issues.
536
 This underlined the 
centrality of migratory related issues within the European political debate. Adding to this, on 
3 October 2005, FRONTEX (the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States of the EU) became operational. 
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FRONTEX aimed at providing an “integral global response” against the roots, dynamics and 
consequences posed by illegal migration within the Mediterranean.
537
 
As Neal and Lutterbeck have argued, these mechanisms defined the pathway to the 
securitization of migration management policies.
538
 As a consequence, this more pragmatic 
and security-related approach provoked mistrust and misunderstanding among the EU’s 
Mediterranean partners.  
From this point only the necessary social, cultural and intercultural communication 
reforms were secondary objectives or even excuses to exert control and boost cooperation 
with Southern Mediterranean regimes on the issues of migration and illegal immigration 
control, the war against terrorism and drug and human trafficking.
539
  
Between 1995 and 2005, the economic gap between the EU and its Mediterranean 
neighbors had widened and this caused virtually uncontrollable migratory movements.
540
 So 
much so, in fact that it was now possible to argue that migration related issues represented an 
indicator of the ineffectiveness of multilateral political projects dealing with unbalanced 
economies sharing a very proximate and conflicted geographical space.  
 
6.4. Migration and the Economic Cycle: Triggering National Fears, Evidencing 
Multilateral Deficiencies.  
The extent that multilateral projects like those launched by the EU in relation to the 
Mediterranean are endangered by possible economic slowdowns is an important question. 
Solimano argues that “international migration is like a barometer of economic and societal 
conditions in home countries with respect to the rest of the world”.541 There is some historical 
evidence that corroborate this link between migration and variations in the economic cycle. 
The global economic crisis that began in 2008 can be compared with the two other major 
crises of the twentieth Century in 1907-1908 and 1929-1935. Those crises were preceded by 
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a sustained and optimistic period of buoyancy in terms of credit growth and low risk 
premiums; by periods of speculation driven by a fictitious feeling of financial euphoria.  
By considering the two earlier crises, it is certainly possible to observe that both 
resulted in socio-political and economic policies aimed at closing societies, stoking 
nationalist fires, and rejecting earlier internationalist engagement. Of course, those political 
and social measures affected directly big numbers of migrants.  
As Khalid Koser has pointed out, the same occurred systematically in response to 
other, more limited economic crises such as the Oil Crisis, 1973, the Asian financial crisis 




However, in contradiction to what occurred in the two previous global crises, the 
current crisis did not impact on international migration in the predicted way. As Koser has 
pointed out, the last global economic slowdown “did not last long enough to disrupt 
migration plans that were already prepared before it began; the underlying forces that drive 
contemporary migration are not only economic, and in any case are so powerful that they are 
relatively immune to economic cycles and policy interventions.”543 
Another example that would underpin these suggestions and that stresses the fact that 
international migration cannot be simply stopped or punished is related to the changing of 
routes followed by migrants. In the period between January and September 2010, FRONTEX 
reported a notable reduction in illegal migration on the Central Mediterranean Route. In Italy 
it was down 65 percent and in Malta, 98 percent.  The Western Mediterranean Route saw a 
reduction in Spain of 20 percent. The Western Africa Route saw a reduction in the Canary 
Islands by 99 percent and the Central Eastern European Route saw a reduction of 24 percent 
in the Western Balkans.   
However, over the same period, irregular migration increased by 369 percent on the 
Eastern Mediterranean Route along the Greek-Turkey land border.
544
 Preventive measures on 
other routes had pushed migrants to find more accessible entry points.
545
 This is a common 
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occurrence, but the fact that it happened in this specific way does challenge, partially at least, 
the hypothesis that links migration to the economic cycle. The reason is that Greece during 
2010 was experiencing the worst economic and financial crisis within the euro-zone and was 
hardly a destination of choice for would-be economic migrants.  Of course, Greece may well 
have appealed to many of these migrants as a transit destination, but it is less clear how much 
time they would have to wait before feeling able to attempt to move to other European 
country. 
 
6.5. Migration and Public Opinion: National Politics Challenging International 
Projects.   
 
Migration is seen and used by political forces and political entrepreneurs, across the political 
spectrum.
546
 In more industrialized countries, public opinion overwhelmingly subscribes to 
the idea that migration is triggered by extreme poverty. This can cause feelings of 
compassion and sympathy for migrants when immigration is very present in the public’s 
everyday consciousness.  However, such feelings diminish as soon as “visible migrants” 
become noticeable.  The difference between “visible” and “invisible” migrants is related to 
phenotypic and cultural issues. The fear being that these people escaping from their 
homelands will take local jobs and will jeopardize the welfare system and cultural identity. 
While such views are linked to long time notions of the nation state, as Castles and Miller 
have studied,
547




During a EUROMESCO meeting in Sharm-el-Sheikh in 2007, Egyptian ambassador 
Gamal Bayoumi criticized European stakeholders because they were trying to develop an 
economic dialogue, favorable to EU interests, whereas at the same time, the EU was 
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European governments and political parties have been deploying intense and 
increasing anti-immigration campaigns. As it is going to be demonstrated in chapters 8 and 9, 
anti-immigrant and anti-Islam behavior and political campaigns intensified from 2006 
onwards. In the Netherlands after Pym Fortuyn’s assassination –anti-immigrant and 
nationalist politician- Geert Wilders identified a political window to become a political 
broker and opportunist establishing the Party for Freedom, focusing its attention on anti-
migrant and anti-Islam discourses.
550
  For instance Spain in 2007 launched ads in Africa in 
order to discourage emigrants.
551
 
In Switzerland, SVP (Scheweizerische Volkspartei) headed by Christoph Blocher and 
first political force since 1999, deployed intense anti-immigrant political campaigns since 
2007. The proposed referendums failed –to expulse foreigners committing crime, against free 
circulation and against the promotion of democratic naturalizations- however SVP 
inseminated a strong anti-immigrant sentiment within the country.
552
Following a similar 
trend, during 2009 Italian extreme right-wing party Lega Nord started to prepare a video 
game aiming at sinking boats. The Spanish version was also prepared by a PP member in 
Catalonia.
553
These attitudes and political behavior were propelled by the rampant global 
financial crisis that was declared in 2008.  
Most of this political discourse and xenophobic attitudes has been targeting Islam and 
Muslim citizens. As it has been demonstrated by Pew Global Attitude Project in 2008, 
negative views against Muslim communities and groups increased between 2004 and 2008. 
These negative perceptions increased from 37 percent to 52 percent in Spain; 46 to 50 percent 




In 2003 Jacques Chirac launched a law approved by the parliament in 2004 banning 
the display of the Muslim veil, large Christian crosses and Jewish Kippa.
555
 This trend started 
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to consolidate from 2005 onward. In September 2005 Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten 
published the caricatures of Prophet Mohammad provoking intense debates on the limits of 
freedom of expression.
556
After this event reactions from the Muslim world ensued and what 
is more important, linked to the aspect of political responsibility, these reactions were easily 
predictable.
557
 So it is possible to assume that political entrepreneurs and brokers make out of 
differences and social turmoil a substantial political benefit. Similar political strategies 
playing the “Islam” card were played in Europe from then onward. As mentioned earlier 
Swiss SVP after developing an anti-immigrant political campaign focused on an anti-minaret 
campaign. This happened in 2009 and this time the referendum was successful.
558
 In 2010 
Austrian far-right wing party Freiheitlichen Partei Osterreich (FPO) launched a video game 




However, despite the aforementioned examples, it is true that opinions about either 
positive or negative impacts or migration are normally assumptions that are not visually 
demonstrated. For the purpose of identifying the most relevant risks endangering Euro-
Mediterranean relations the author designed for this dissertation a multivariable quantitative 
analysis to show how European public opinion reacted towards migration related issues over 
a period of almost 10 years. The hypothesis assumed that negative concepts such as terrorism, 
criminality, unemployment, security/securitization, are intentionally attached by political 
entrepreneurs to migration issues in order to influence public opinion.  
In terms of methodology data from Eurobarometer (EB) studies that monitor EU 
public opinion were used for the period between 1999 and 2011. 36 European reports and 52 
national reports –EB standards- from Spain, France, Italy and Malta were also sued due to 
their geographical exposure to southern Mediterranean migration and their role in lobbying, 
designing and managing Euro-Mediterranean policies. From 2002 to 2009 the author has 
consider the two Eurobarometers published every year –that’s why the years are double-, 
whereas from 2010 the Eurobarometer is only published once a year. 
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Five variables were considered: Migration, employment, security, crime and 
terrorism. These show potential correlations, convergences and manipulations linking public 
speech, political strategies and public opinion. In order to quantify these correlations the 
author took account of how many times these concepts appeared in those reports in order to 
estimate the importance they had for public opinion.  
In the Spanish case over the studied period until the second half of 2008, Spanish 
public opinion was reacting to specific political communication strategies and parties aiming 
at profiting from this sensitive issue. The graph number 6 shows that rising concerns on 
migration issues coincided with a peak in illegal immigration in 2006.
560
  
Within the following two years the situation did not improve notably due to the 
consequences of the economic crisis and more restrictive policies introduced by the 
Zapatero’s government.561Since 2008 within the context framed by the global economic 
crisis, migration and employment were the two most important concerns for Spanish public 
opinion. This demonstrates that political public speech and public opinion identified 
migration related issues and immigrants as one of the dangers and threats against native 
workers.  
 




  Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.  
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The Italian case shows slight variations, although some patterns remain similar. That 
confirms the general European trend on migration related issues. On one hand migration 
issues threefold by 2003 and until 2007 the importance of migration related issues decreased.  
This happened during the pre-global crisis period. However from 2007 to 2008 migration 
related issues topped the concerns of Italian public opinion primarily due to the political 
communication strategies of Italian conservative parties like the Lega Nord who used 




Even before this, since 2001, increasing levels of migration were being linked to 
rising crime rates.
564
 In particular, the arrival of masses of illegal migrants from North Africa 
to Lampedussa contributed to creating the image of an “invasion”, a word that has been 
widely used on populist political campaigns and mostly deployed by the Lega Nord and its 
leader Umberto Bossi. 
From 2008 to 2009 illegal migrants at Lampedussa fell from 34,000 to 6,588 irregular 
immigrants.
565
 But in 2011 the influx of illegal immigrants to Lampedussa skyrocketed as a 
consequence of the Libyan war, which led Italy to challenge the EU and raise the viability of 
the entire Schengen structure as will be discussed later.
566
This evolution is demonstrated in 
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Graph (7) Italy. Public Opinion.  
 
 
               Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.  
 
 The French case is similar though its migration history is different. France had a much 
more long standing tradition as a host country than Spain, Italy or Malta. However, despite 
this tradition, as Tränhardt has studied, political campaigns using migration to stir up 
xenophobia were already in use by political parties the end of the Cold War.
567
 As the graphic 
number 8 shows, like the Spanish and the Italian cases, 2003-2004 was a key period for rising 
fears over migration being used by politicians.  It is important to note that in 2005 the riots on 
the outskirts of Paris in highly populated migrant areas, in the words of Kott and Duprez, 
posed a potential open challenge to the French Republican model of citizenship.
568
 
 At that time Nicolas Sarkozy was minister of interior and initiated a “zero tolerance” 
policy.
569
 This coincided also with the French ban of headscarves in primary and secondary 
schools in a country where the 10 percent of the population is Muslim. From this time 
onward the political and social debate has been very polarized and has challenged the 
relationship between liberal values and religious freedom in a secular country.
570
 
 At the same time populist anti-immigration rhetoric was also deployed by French 
politicians like Jean Marie Le Pen, leader of far-right National Front.
571
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Graph. (8) France. Public Opinion.  
 
 Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.  
 
The Maltese case is also relevant due to a number of factors. On one hand the 
country’s geographical situation placed the island very close to the North African shore. 
Linked to that the Malta accession to the EU in 2004 made the country much more attractive 
for those migrants looking to reach the EU. As Lutterbeck had shown in 2002, this “small 
frontier island” had already started to be viewed as a destination for seaborne illegal 
immigration.
572
As the graph below, number 9, highlights, migration has remained the second 
most important concern after employment for Maltese public opinion over the period under 
review. As Sammut has shown, the institutional influence of the media has played a major 
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Graph (9) Malta. Public Opinion.  
 
Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.  
 
The following graph number 10 shows that on the one hand French public opinion has 
reacted differently to immigration issues due to its long-standing tradition as a receiving 
country. However in comparing Italy, Spain and Malta it is possible to appreciate a particular 
correlation, leaving aside the 2008 Italian elections. This convergence is due to the fact that 
both Italy and Malta share the same geographical space and therefore they have to deal on 
equal basis against illegal migration coming from North-Africa.  
 
Graph (10) Compared migration, Spain, Italy, France and Malta 
. 
 
              Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.  































                The following graphic number 11 represents the clearest picture showing how 
European public opinion has been shaped by political entrepreneurs and brokers in 
associating factors such as migration, crime, terrorism and security. The data confirms the 
hypothesis presented above that employment behaves independently and can be understood 
as an independent variable. This variable remains the most relevant for the public opinion and 
does not varies easily even over periods of good economic prospects. However, in 
considering the other four variables –migration, crime, security and terrorism- there is almost 
a linear convergence among them especially between the years 2007 and 2009. Political 
parties or brokers were very capable of acting irresponsibly in deploying political 
communications intended to make these convergences possible.  As a consequence, European 
public opinion assimilated those images and claims and this generated a very particular social 
image, which in turn fuelled a hostile politico-cultural environment that has affected the 
entire Euro-Mediterranean building project.  
 
Graph (11) Aggregated European Union. 
 
 
 Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.  
 
 
The following graph number 12 shows a different perspective of the precedent one by 
highlighting how the trend lines –migration, security, crime and terrorism- tend to converge 












































































































































Graph (12): Trend lines. Europe. 
 
Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.  
 
Ivarsflaten has studied right-wing populist strategies to gain political support in seven 
western European countries by 2002, a time when migration issues started to top European 
concerns. He demonstrated that “no populist right party performed well in elections around 
2002 without mobilizing grievances over immigration. (…) only the appeal on the 
immigration issue unites all successful populist right parties”.574 
Over the following period this trend intensified as it has been also mentioned earlier. 
For instance in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections the EU swung to the right due to 
these increasing concerns. As Van Spanje, this was in part explained by a contagion effect 
among parties keen to be seen as holding an anti-immigration position that they believed to 
be popular with voters. As Van Spanje stresses, this contagion effect is not restricted to far-
right wing parties but involve the entire political system “without entering governments.”575 
In reality European political parties of all almost all ideological persuasions have been 
very active in identifying a profitable electoral opportunity in taking a stand against migration 
in general and against Muslim migration in particular.
576
 This general political trend that has 
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been focusing on national politics had an international impact weakening international 
mechanisms and policies aiming at increasing Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and cooperation. 
This is central to understand how Euro-Mediterranean politics at large, have been 
undermined by political movements and local policies.  
Given all this, the migration issue is the key and most representative variable to 
understand when examining the extent that EU multilateral projects or programs aimed at 
increasing Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and mutual relations suffer at the feet of national 
political interests.  
Without a mutually agreed and positive common migration policy neither free trade 
nor economic development projects are viable in the long term. The following chapters will 
examine the Mediterranean ambitions and projects of Aznar, Zapatero and Sarkozy in the 





LIGHTS AND SHADOWS 
The Assertion of Spanish Leadership in the International Arena during the Aznar Era, 
1996-2004 
 
Assessing José María Aznar’s foreign policy in general, and in regard to the Mediterranean in 
particular, requires reflection on the origins and ethos of the Partido Popular (PP).
577
 The PP 
was re-founded in 1989 out of the original Alianza Popular (AP), which was itself created in 
1976 by a constellation of former Franquist ministers and headed by former minister of 
Information and Tourism (1962-1969) and vice-president (1975-1976) Manuel Fraga 
Iribarne. As such, it can be defined as a federation of 7 proto-parties intent on 
developing a conservative or right wing political discourse in the context of the country’s 
democratic transition. This required as a priority a re-constitution of Spanish identity. This 
meant that during the 1980’s foreign policy did not top the AP’s political agenda. Instead, the 




 As stated previously in chapter 5, due to its socialist character the PSOE was very 
much influenced by the international dimension as socialism and internationalism can often 
be, and in this case were, two sides of the same coin. On the other hand, the PP which was re-
founded as a unique party in 1989 to contest and counterbalance the majority of the PSOE, 
inherited the same philosophical approaches of AP with regards to engagement in the 
domestic and foreign spheres. The PSOE had engagement in the international arena in its 
blood. The AP and PP were the products of an introspective domestic and nationalistic 
political approach. As Jiménez Redondo has pointed out, the hegemony of the PSOE over 
three legislatures and the lack of a real political choice until the early 1990s limited the 
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7.1. Discussing the Paternity of Spain’s Foreign Policy.  
It is possible to argue that the PP did not accept explicitly the PSOE’s dominance of Spain’s 
foreign policy after the transitional period between 1975 and 1978. As noted by Fernández
580
, 
the PP regularly argued that the foundations of Spain’s foreign policy was not conceived by 
the PSOE but by the previous Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD).
581
 This was the very 
clear message published in the PP’s government programme of 1993. The section devoted to 
foreign policy started with this statement: “The greatest merit of the foreign policy of 
socialist governments have made was the adoption of approaches that were not originally 




It is interesting to note, however, that in 1993 and through its government programme 




After that, came Latin America, the Maghreb and Equatorial Guinea.
585
 Though the 
first –Latin America – was classified as the priority, the Maghreb was also important as it 
was defined as an ‘area of conflict [with] extraordinary potential’. The goal was to establish 
‘preferential agreements’ with the region both through bilateral engagement and through the 
EEC.
586
 Bearing in mind this strategy of ‘preferential agreements’ it is possible to appreciate 
the mercantilist and business-driven approach deployed by the PP’s leaders. 
This approach to foreign affairs corresponded with that of the PSOE.  However, 
Aznar in 1992 also argued that the Maghreb raised the problems of “massive emigration, 
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economic and commercial dependence and unavoidable security concerns”.587At that time 
and since 1989 –after being the president of the Regional Government of Castile and León 
from 1987 to 1989- José María Aznar was already the PP’s leader and therefore he headed up 
the political opposition against the PSOE until he won the elections in 1996.
588
  
These arguments were reinforced by the rise of the so-called “Islamic decade” 
between 1980 and 1990 following the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) in 
municipal elections in Algeria in 1990.
589
In response, some alarmist and arguably extreme 
comments emanated from analysts affiliated to the PP. For instance, Rafael L. Bardají, who 
since 1989 had headed up international affairs at the Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos 
(GEES)
590
 –he was also the former Executive Advisor of the Spain’s Ministry of Defence 
during the PP governments, from 1994 to 2004- wrote that since the end of the Cold War, the 
threats from Southern Mediterranean countries included nuclear proliferation, social 




This argument, coming as it did following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, led 
to a new strategy intended to identify new political windows by political entrepreneurs -or 
opportunists- willing to play a leading role in international politics.  
However, by using a more moderate language and a more proactive and comprehensive 
approach, the architect of the new Renovated Mediterranean Policy, Abel Matutes attempted 
to promote an increase in living standards and the overall development in the South that 
transcended the alarmist discourse and potential threats. From 1988-89 onwards, Matutes had 
attempted to propose and to implement the Renovated Mediterranean Policy. It was adopted 
by the European Union in 1990 precisely to avoid and to correct the inefficiencies of the old 
Mediterranean policy and it culminated in the work of Manuel Marin and the launch the  in 
the course Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995.
592
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In this regard, Matutes commented in the course of an interview for this thesis that 
intercultural dialogue was considered as important as aid, as this allowed Spain to present 
itself as a valid interlocutor with the Southern Mediterranean countries and the Middle East:  
“In speaking about the EU’s Mediterranean Policy, I was in charge of redesigning, or 
designing to be more precise, the new Mediterranean Policy. On one hand it looked to 
improve financial protocols and support. On the other hand, it tried to help not only on 
financial level, but also to help them to create more wealth in their countries. I mean, develop 
more their potential. In order to do so, it was crucial to involve them in trade and provide 
them with commercial opportunities” 593 
This declaration is certainly aligned with one of the two hypothesis explained in the 
precedent chapter of co-operating with southern Mediterranean countries versus developing 
asymmetric relations. However, as it has been demonstrated, within the long term this liberal 
public speech was a rhetoric resource that was useful to launch the basis of the EMP. Beyond 
this rhetoric baseline, existing strong geo-strategic and politico-economic interests prevailed 
and Northern Mediterranean countries focused on neo-realist approach where the 
strengthening of European security played the most fundamental role.  
In any case this co-operative and comprehensive ‘selling strategy’ played out well in 
the short and medium term. It was important to attract also the interest of Southern 
Mediterranean countries. Therefore, the new emphasis on Euro-Mediterranean political 
dialogue represented a fundamental element. Since 1986 onward, Spain’s influence over 
Morocco increased notably despite the traditional political frictions such as Western Sahara 




Considering an economic point of view, Morocco over the 1980’s was also more 
communicative both with Spain and Europe thanks to the establishment of an economic 
reform. Along with this economic reform and the Spanish increasing role as influential –
neighbouring- stakeholder, there were signed bilateral agreements such as; the Framework 
Agreement on Economic and Financial Cooperation -1988-; the Agreement on the Mutual 
Promotion and Protection of Investments -1989-; the Treaty of Friendship, Good 
                                                          
593
 Cited interview with Abel Matutes.  
594
 Ferrer-Gallardo, X. (2008): The Spanish-Moroccan Border Complex: Processes of Geopolitical, Functional 
and Symbolic Rebordering. Political Geography. Vol. 27. Issue 3. Pp. 301-321.  
153 
 
Neighbourhood and Cooperation -1991-; and in 1996, just after the launch of the EMP, the 
Agreement on Economic and Financial Cooperation.
595
 
However, as it has been discussed before, these agreements and political will to 
increase bilateral co-operation –and the liberal and inclusive rhetoric strategy used during the 
“selling process” of the EMP- had to face the challenges imposed by the migratory issue, 
where it is possible to appreciate that economic integration processes and mechanisms cannot 




  Nevertheless, highlighting the relevance and influence Spain exerted over Morocco 
over this process - and beyond bilateral episodes of understanding and misunderstanding- 
some Spanish politicians like Felipe González or Abel Matutes continued being influential 
even when they were not anymore part of the Spanish government. Matutes thinks that the 
dialogue that he had with Mohamed VI of Morocco during 2010-2011 played an important 
role in the evolution of the country’s new constitution.597 Matutes goes further and considers 
that this new constitution represented a clear benefit for Morocco and allowed the country to 
solve, or at least tackle, some of key problems that during the Arab Spring of 2011 
destabilised both Egypt and Tunisia. This idea is shared by Dalacoura.
598
 
In considering these facts, Matutes can be considered the key figure in developing the 
PSOE’s foreign policy with regards to the Euro-Mediterranean policy as well as the PP’s 
foreign policy from 1996 onwards. That is why, in considering these elements during the 
early 1990s, it is practically impossible to find a difference between the PSOE’s and the PP’s 
views in the foreign policy sphere.   
Leaving aside the paternity of Spain’s foreign policy in the first years of the 
democratic era, the new PP, after being in the opposition for 7 years, won the elections in 
1996 with a very tight margin. This victory followed the launch of the Barcelona Process. 
Prior to that, between 1982 and May 1996, under Felipe González Spain had looked to 
become a political entrepreneur in foreign policy but on a relatively modest level. An 
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approach that was fitting for a “newcomer” who was required to demonstrate its value and 
political seriousness by northern European partners like Germany.  
This modesty was expressed in a very telling and pragmatic phrase coined by 
Francisco Fernandez Ordoñez, Spanish foreign minister  in the crucial years between 1985 
and 1992: “In European politics, our position is defined very clearly: we have to take the 
fifth”.599 Was this the key of the Spain’s success in Europe between 1985 and 1995? 
Certainly, from 1982 to 1996 Spain successfully led on Euro-Mediterranean policy. In this 
sense Spain was the main political entrepreneur in selling the idea of the Mediterranean. This 
idea crystallized with the Barcelona Process, a political platform that raised doubts about its 
future almost since its inception due to the complex problems and ongoing conflicts present 
in the Mediterranean.
600
 The loss of momentum was a matter of fact and it became even more 
evident –and damaging for the future of the EMP- when Aznar, in the wake of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks developed a foreign policy that prioritised relation with Washington, over the 
interests of the EU and the Mediterranean.  
 
7.2.The baseline of Spain’s New Foreign Policy. 
Prior to its 1996 election victory the PP lacked of a clear profile in international affairs as 
stated above.
601
 Balfour states that the PP government followed a policy of continuity in 
relation to foreign policy.
602
 They had no proper training in international affairs. However, as 
Valencia points out, there were cases where they had relevant experience. There was a major 




Nevertheless, this was not fully evident during the early stages of the first PP 
government. From an operational point of view, the nomination of Miguel Ángel Moratinos 
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(PSOE) as the EU’s representative for the Arab-Israeli peace process from 1996 to 2003, 
placed Spain in a strong position to play a role in that key foreign policy issues.
604
 It is 
evident that the EU focused its attention on Moratinos, due to his regional knowledge and 
contribution to the development of PSOE’s foreign policy towards the Mediterranean.605  
This mandate confirmed Spain’s role in lobbying and working for a comprehensive 
Euro-Mediterranean policy. As Aoun stresses, over the 1990’s the EU has not played an 
influential role in managing the recurrent crises presented by the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.
606
However as Alpher has mentioned, Moratinos, already during the first year of his 
activity filled “the vacuum created by the stalemate in the process and the reduced activity of 
US mediator Deniss Ross”.607On the other hand, Moratinos’ nomination coincided as well 
with Jacques Chirac’s announcement of the new French foreign policy towards the Arab 
World aiming at “reversing France’s marginalization as a political player” in the region in 
order to become more influential.
608
 
Beyond these initial considerations, it is important, however, to describe, how, at a 
philosophical level the new government faced the challenge of developing Spain’s foreign 
policy. As Aznar’s personal advisor, Alberto Carnero has stated during a personal interview 
for this thesis:  
 
“If I should explain the PP’s foreign policy I would start by explaining the idea of 
Spain that had the President. Aznar said, we have the ambition of making out of Spain 
one of the best democracies in the world. I would frame this phrase to describe both 
his foreign and domestic policies. I am politician and diplomat and after many years I 
would say that those dimensions should not be differentiated. And I quote again the 
President when he says that there is no best foreign policy separate from a domestic 
policy”.609  
 
This same idea is defended by Abel Matutes who, in speaking to this author, stated 
that both Felipe González and José María Aznar shared this outlook:  
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“In foreign policy this is very clear. This was said always by Felipe and Aznar and I 
believe that generally speaking they practiced that. It is a state policy, of permanent 
interests that need being constant and permanent. If you go from one band to another 
by making a party policy you cannot achieve anything and at the end of the day that is 
the end of your foreign policy”.610 
 
This political framework and conceptualization expresses the main lines of Aznar’s 
visions for Spain’s foreign policy. This argument can be used to justify the PP’s lack of 
international projection in historic terms. That said, Aznar’s visions of international affairs 
were founded upon two principles. First, the consolidation of Spain as a respected medium 
sized power.
611
 Second, the intertwining of his foreign and domestic policies, because as it 
was expressed above, for Aznar the best foreign policy had to be and had to concur with a 
strong domestic policy, where permanent interests should not change.  
 
7.3.Aznar and the Mediterranean: The First Step.  
These two principles are a good starting point for analysing Aznar’s foreign policy. First, 
there were a number of continuities in Spain’s “foreign” policy during Aznar -Europe, Latin 
America, United States and the Mediterranean.
612
  
 Focusing on the Mediterranean, the 1996 PP electoral programme followed the spirit 
of the Barcelona declaration and was more liberal and cooperative compared to the outlook 
between 1988 and 1992 that defined the relationship in terms of potential threats. This new 
electoral programme focused instead on economic prosperity and stability; a new 
immigration policy adapted to the exigencies of the Schengen agreement –despite the 
challenges posed by an increasing migration flow-
613
; the promotion of human rights and 
fundamental liberties and the processes of political reform; attention to rising Islamic 
fundamentalism and the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict.
614
 In all of these areas one 
constant consideration was migration.  
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 There was a strong economic and realist approach behind this agenda. Like 
Barcelona, it was conceived in terms of a belief that the liberalization of the economy would 
accelerate regional development, reduce migration and mitigate potential risks derived from 
deep socio-economic cleavages, thus improving regional security.  
As discussed in chapter 5 this hypothesis proved wrong and represented the biggest 
obstacle to developing Euro-Mediterranean relations.  However, initially and theoretically 
speaking, the acceptance of this hypothesis by policy makers was a driving force as Matutes 
explains: 
 
“It is true that the financial protocols could have been larger, that the trade could have 
been more intense, and that a more integrative policy may have been wanted, of 
course, but beyond that, this ideas represented a big advancement, because those 
countries had a much lower life standard in the past”.615  
 
In these terms, Aznar, from the start of his government, was very interested in 
developing bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco. That explains why Aznar decided 
to visit Rabat on his first official visit on 27 May 1996 following his 3
 
March 1996 election 
victory. He had a meeting with King Hassan II and first Minister Abdellatif Filali.
616
 They 
discussed, among other issues, illegal immigration, fishing agreements, drugs trafficking, the 
Western Sahara question and the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla.  
As Andreu Claret explained during an interview for this thesis:  
“During the first mandate, Aznar governs in coalition, and that pact made possible a 
more moderate foreign policy. I spoke a lot with him (Aznar) on Mediterranean 
issues. When he was elected President he did what had to be done - visit Morocco. 
The first official trip has to be to Morocco. He saw immediately that the 
Mediterranean was very important. When politicians go to the Council each one 
speaks about what he or she has. So, Aznar, since the beginning sold and promoted 
the Mediterranean policy.”617 
 
In terms of strengthening collaboration and improving bilateral political relations with 
the Maghreb, the PP government concentrated its attention on three countries. The first was 
Morocco where the relations were consolidated with Mohammed VI after his accession to the 
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 As the level of internal violence in Algeria started to diminish at the end of 
1990s, Spain started also to look for increasing contacts.
619
 Third, as soon as Libya started to 
be integrated by the international community, Aznar’s government showed full political 
support for the process, support that was openly noticeable from September 2003 onwards. In 
fact, Aznar was the first western leader to visit Qadaffi once the UN ended the sanctions 
against Libya on 12 September 2003. Five days later, on 17
 
September 2003, Aznar visited 
Tripoli together with 28 Spanish entrepreneurs and businessmen.
620
 The making up of this 




 Despite the recognition of the strategic importance of the Maghreb and the 
Mediterranean during Aznar’s first term, scholars like Núnez Villaverde considered Spanish  
leadership on the Euro-Mediterranean level decreasing or even entering into a “hibernation 
period” following the Barcelona Process.622 Certainly the PP was unable to maintain the same 
diplomatic rhythm as the Gonzalez’s governments developed, because due to its political 
philosophy and practice the PSOE had a much greater internationalist approach whereas the 
PP historically speaking has been more rooted into domestic politics.  
 In order to analyse and to understand if the aforementioned “hibernation” of Euro-
Mediterranean related issues and diplomatic activity is correct, it is important to analyse EU’s 
political priorities. The CL approach is again used to examine the conclusions of the 
presidency of the Council of Europe. The studied period correspond to the first four years of 
Aznar’s government, 1996-2000. The same method and the same variables used in the case 
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exposed in the precedent chapter have been considered for consistency. This evolution is 
demonstrated in graphic number 13. 
 
Graph (13) European Councils, Conclusions of the Presidency. 
 
                   Source: European Council. Elaborated by the Author.  
 Quantitatively speaking and focusing on Mediterranean issues the 1996-2000 period  
is very different to the 1993-1995. The graphic above, number 13, shows that from 1996 to 
2000 –Lisbon council- the vibrant atmosphere experienced before the launch of the Barcelona 
process decreased notably. Per the variables migration, Arab/Muslim, Terrorism or Racism, 
they have also curved. However, within this apparent lack of activity in 1997, during the 
Amsterdam Council, three important Mediterranean ideas/projects were raised: the 
establishment of a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace, prosperity and stability; the 
project of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area; the positive attitude towards the 
signing of a Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement with the PLO.
623
 
These three elements represent by themselves the three most relevant objectives and 
obstacles any EU’s Euro-Mediterranean project has to face: without economic and politic 
stability in Southern –Maghreb- Mediterranean countries, security for EU members is very 
limited; the economic interests based on the creation of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
were decisive for EU’s politico, economic and geo-strategic objectives; any Euro-
                                                          
623
 European Council (1997): Conclusions of the Presidency. Amsterdam. Available at: 
















Mediterranean project –its success or failure- will be determined by the evolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how Western stakeholders mediate and deal with it.  
Over the examined years these three elements have constituted the permanent baseline 
of the European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean. Migration flows have been also a 
contextual variable that have determined the evolution of the EMP as well as its consistency 
and coherence within the long term. Already in the council celebrated in Vienna in 1998, it 
was discussed the necessity of developing a European migration strategy.
624
In this council it 
was also approved the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
625
As it is 
possible to see in the graphic, the variable security is the most relevant one, and all the 
policies and projects proposed by the European Council are designed to increase European 
security in order to control and reduce actual or potential threats.  
The Cologne council of 1999 represented a peak with regards to security issues. 
During this council it was mentioned the evolution of the tasks assigned to Moratinos as the 
special envoy to the Middle East. But most importantly it was intensively discussed the need 
of developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy following the agreements of the 
Council celebrated in Vienna.
626
Following the same trend, the Council celebrated in Helsinki 
in 1999 highlighted the importance of developing a common strategy for the Mediterranean, 
Eastern Europe and Western Balkans.
627
 
Bearing in mind Mediterranean issues is possible to confirm that 1996-1999 was in 
fact a period of low-middle intensity, where the accent was focused on discussing and 
implementing the mechanisms to create a common European security and defence policy. It 
is also possible to say that despite the interest of Northern European countries to support the 
European expansion towards the East, Mediterranean issues remained more important in the 
European agenda. In considering all the councils celebrated between 1996 and 2000 the 
variable Mediterranean was mentioned 101 times whereas Eastern-Europe was mentioned 35 
times.  
Nevertheless this period of relative “hibernation” should be better defined as a period 
of “realisation”. The 1996-2000 window represented the medium term where politicians and 
diplomats realised the real problems and difficulties to achieve the pre-defined –certainly 
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ambiguous- objectives described by the declaration of Barcelona. This “realisation” somehow 
paralysed the initial optimism deployed in 1995.  
As the graphic 13 shows, 2000 represented a clear landmark with regards to Euro-
Mediterranean issues. During the celebration of the Council of Santa María, it was expressed 
that the problems in the Middle East determine the entire Mediterranean project and therefore 
it would be necessary to adopt a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability.
628
After 
five years, the European Council stressed that “the EU will together with its Mediterranean 
partners undertake a comprehensive review of the Barcelona Process with the aim of 
reinvigorating the process and making it more action-oriented and results-driven”.629 
This important statement reveals that so far the EMP was not producing results beyond 
the political will expressed over the EMP’s conferences and therefore, not relevant outcomes 
had been achieved. During this conference it was also stressed the EU will in strengthening 
political and security related dialogue with Mediterranean partners, increasing co-operation 
with the AMU in order to stimulate south-south trade, as well as collaborating with Southern 
Mediterranean countries on the management of migration flows.
630
These three elements 
reveal again the interest of the EU in security and trade. The 2000’s deepened these trends 
and challenges as it is going to be explained in the next epigraphs.  
 
7.4.Aznar’s New Foreign Policy: Changing Methodology.  
Aznar’s victory in the March 2000 elections by an overwhelming majority allowed him to 
govern the country without relying on the support of nationalist groups.
631
 In his second start 
he began to adopt a more presidential approach to foreign policy which required Spain taking 
a stand on key international issues and no longer remaining silent or deferring to larger EU 
partners. Therefore, as Woodworth has mentioned Aznar thought that those who were not 
aligned with him were against democracy.
632
 This attitude was defined by Cebrián as 
“Democratic fundamentalism” and he interprets it as a “disease which the Spanish right 
suffers in an extreme form”.633 However, as the personal political advisor of Aznar –Alberto 
Carnero- says:  
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“The position of Spain was very comfortable, in the middle, trying to not disturb 
anyone. Aznar wanted to change this aspect very consciously. And to change that it 
was necessary to change the foreign policy…. I think that if one analyses those years, 
clearly, the political objective that provoked the change as that Aznar developed a 
foreign policy that had an impact on the domestic sphere. (…) Having said that, this 
denoted this ambition of becoming one of the best democracies in the world. Having 
an idea of Europe. Moving forward. To follow with the policies of the past. But with a 
different intensity and with ambition”.634  
 
This necessitated Aznar to design a more active and engaged public discourse that 
strategically speaking was aligned to the dominant western power, the US, even at the 
expense of the position of the EU. These presidential ambitions led to the creation of the 
Consejo de Política Exterior (Council of Foreign Policy, CPE). As Fernández Molina points 
out, the CPE was devoted to advising the president.
635
 Within this context, a new and 
fundamental change of status was experienced, designed and implemented through the Plan 
Estratégico de Acción Exterior (Strategic Plan of Foreign Action, PEAE).
636
 This was the 
instrument that changed Spain’s foreign policy. The PEAE was directed by Josep Piqué, 
foreign minister between 2000 and 2002. It was conceived as the tool for Spain to use to gain 
political influence, international stature and global prestige.  
Most of the interviewees –putting aside political inclinations or personal problems 
with Aznar- for this thesis are in agreement that that Aznar’s ambitions and the foreign policy 
approaches in which they were embodied and expressed damaged greatly the Euro-
Mediterranean policy developed by González. As Jordi Pujol put it:  
 
“First, I don’t know how he did it (Aznar), but he ruined totally relations with 
Morocco, both during the first and the second term. Second, he was not interested in 
Europe. He was interested in Europe for the cohesion funds. He doesn’t feel 
sympathy, neither for France nor for Germany. For France feels great antipathy. He 
despises Italy and then, he focuses on the United States and the United Kingdom 
because they go together and the Atlantic. Hence, the policy initiated by Felipe 
González was interrupted.”637 
 
As stated previously, implementing his ambitious policy required a regional and 
philosophical shift embodied in Aznar’s Atlanticist policy. Aznar’s political advisor, Alberto 
Carnero, during a personal interview for this thesis, justified this Atlantic policy on the 
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grounds that the Aznar government was very much conscious of the importance of the 
Mediterranean and that this was a motivation for deeper collaboration with the US during the 
late 1990s:  
“The first time that Spain and Aznar supported to the US was with Bill Clinton, when 
Saddam Hussein expelled UN observers. That was the first time, but what I would 
like to say is that, since the first moment, there was a very clear vision of making 
Spain a privileged partner of the US. And this strategy came from the transition, from 
the 1953 agreements
638, ratified with all the turbulences that we already know. (…) 
That was very important, also for the Mediterranean, because at the end of the day, if 
there exists a Mediterranean power, it is the US.”639 
 
Why the US is undoubtedly the major power in the eastern Mediterranean this is 
somewhat less obvious in the western part of the region where Washington’s capacity to 
influence the region by drawing on commercial, cultural, economic interests and a legitimate 
moral authority were less developed than in Israel and the Arab world.  It is arguable that 
Aznar miscalculated on this point when engaging the US for the interests of projecting 
Spanish influence in North Africa.  
 One can even argue that Aznar’s approach to foreign policy, especially during his 
second term, was a significant contribution to the failure of the Barcelona Process as Spain 
lost the previously acquired credibility as a main negotiator and as a recognised interlocutor 
between western countries and the Arab world.  It is also possible to argue that this Atlantic 
shift contributed to increase miscommunication and misunderstanding between European and 
Arab stakeholders. However, as it is going to be demonstrated later in this chapter, beyond 
any criticism against Aznar’s detachment from the Europe, the EU developed a very similar 
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7.5.Mutating Axels: The Atlantic-Mediterranean Approach.  
Good relations between Spain and the US did not happen as a direct consequence of the 9/11. 
The first official visit George W. Bush paid to Europe was to Spain in July 2001. One reason 
for this choice of destination was the US interest in increasing the NATO presence in Spain 
as well as boosting economic ties and consolidating their cooperation on Latin America.
640
 
During this visit Bush declared that it was important to work together in order to “prevent or 
solve regional conflicts, to eliminate barriers to free trade, to extend Europe’s zone of peace 
and stability (…) to meet new challenges to our security”.641 Bush decided to go first to Spain 
because as Carnero, during an interview for this thesis, has ruminated on this point:  
 
“Spain was a growing country. Spain enjoyed prestige, a dynamic economy, assumed 
more responsibilities with regards to some international questions. It started to 
participate to the NATO’s structural budget in 1997 and bit by bit, it was evident the 
….US started to see Spain as a privileged ally.”642 
 
Having said that, the Mediterranean element would become a crucial factor in the 
bilateral relationship just few months later, after 9/11. Aznar became something of a link to 
the region. One of the key activities in this context was the Foro Formentor (Formentor, 
Majorca, Spain). It represented a parallel initiative to the Barcelona Process. The Forum 
Formentor is very important in understanding Aznar’s vision of the Mediterranean and his 
view of the role Spain should play within this political and diplomatic environment, 
otherwise it would have not been necessary to create alternative platforms to an existing 
process. It also illuminates the “Mediterranean-Atlantic shift”, whereby Spain used its 
standing in the Mediterranean and the leverage that brought in the security sphere to make 
itself more attractive to the US.  
  It seems plausible that this Forum - especially after the 9/11- served strategically to 
re-launch Spain’s political influence not only in Europe, but on a global scale. In other words, 
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the Mediterranean was once more the political opportunity for Spain to show its relevance 
and crucial role as political stakeholder and entrepreneur. 
The Formentor Forum, was funded by Foundation Repsol YPF, the Spanish largest oil 
and gas multinational company. It started in 1999 and ended in 2006.
643
 Those who attended 
over its six years life included Tayip Erdogan, Hosni Mubarak, Simon Peres, Driss Yetú, 
Jorge Sampaio and Yasser Arafat.
644
 On one occasion during the third meeting 2001 -2
-
3 
November– Aznar and Mubarak met Arafat and Peres in the attempt of boosting the peace 
process in the Middle East.
645
  
 The third meeting of the Formentor Forum was the moment when José María Aznar 
announced his clear intention to re-launch the Barcelona Process and hence, to become again 
a policy entrepreneur by marketing and selling the Euro-Mediterranean issue. Aznar took 
advantage of President Bush’s first visit to Spain in July 2011 and the events of the 9/11 to 
develop this new Spanish strategy and foreign policy. His speech at the third Formentor 
Forum underlines this. He began by highlighting the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian peace 
talks. It was in this context, he argued, that it was “very important what happened here in 
Formentor. Because, evidently in my opinion, I think that this can be the beginning of a 
recovery of trust between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the Israeli 
government”.646 
 It is important to note how Aznar started this speech by stressing the importance of 
this Forum, and its location, by addressing the most sensitive political in the Mediterranean. 
Immediately after this introduction he spoke about the role of the Spain within the Euro-
Mediterranean politics, which, after 9/11 became global politics.  
 
“The second point I would like to make is that we want reinforce and re-launch in a 
very clear and decisive manner the Barcelona Process. I think, (…) that the Barcelona 
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Process in all its aspects, intercultural dialogue among civilizations, the economic 
aspect and its political aspect, it is worth re-launching toward the future (…)”647 
 
Here Aznar is arguing that Barcelona needs to be reconceived in the context of 9/11, 
which required that the security pillar play the crucial role.  As he subsequently argued:  
“From a political point of view, we have to increase, evidently our dialogue and to work 
clearly on the issues related to security, to arms, to the fight against terror for everybody. We 
have to create new financing instruments, because it has been demonstrated that the current 
mechanisms are not enough. And, we have to demonstrate, with our political dialogue, that 
we are not currently facing a clash among cultures, but we are in front of an operation, among 
very clear operations to end the terror in the world”.648  
His discourse and political purposes in adopting this approach were very much 
aligned/influenced by the tense political and diplomatic environment post 9/11 and by the 
rhetoric deployed by the Bush’s administration. To understand better Aznar’s intentions 
regarding the exploitation of this political window one should note that subsequently he 
described the: Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue as “one of the key 
aspects of our action and our presidency”.649 
The political and entrepreneurial strategy here seems to be clear – to build a 
“Mediterranean-Atlantic” approach to address key security issues emanating from the 
Mediterranean. As Carnero has explained to this author in an interview: “All the Arab world 
saw Spain as a guide and a channel to send the messages to the US. And this does not happen 
only in the Mediterranean, it happened also with Iran”.650 
Despite these political initiatives, justifications and declarations of intentions, Aznar’s 
relations with crucial strategic countries such as Morocco were not as strong as he desired. 
His presidential approach to foreign policy in his second term resulted in a quite nationalistic 
way of understanding foreign relations. This led to a worsening of relations with Spain’s 
most important southern neighbour, Morocco.   
Aznar did attempt to offer a welcome approach to Morocco. He visited the country in
 
May 2000, were he spoke positively in favour of better cooperation between the two 
countries.
651
 However following Mohammed VI’s accession to power in 1999 relations 
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deteriorated as tensions escalated. In April 2001, for example, there was a deep crisis 
between Rabat and Madrid over fishing negotiations with the EU.
652
 According to Andreu 
Claret, Aznar overreacted in his dealings with Morocco once relations started to worsen, a 
move that impacted negatively on perceptions of the Spanish leader, especially as there had 
always been “difficulties” with Morocco.”653 
 Tense bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco did not, however, stop Spain’s 
interest in developing and fostering a multilateral engagement with regards to Euro-
Mediterranean issues. As Barbé, Mestre and Soler i Lecha point out, both during the PP and 
the PSOE mandates there were two events that reconfirmed the interest and the engagement 
of the Spanish government and its diplomacy in the Barcelona Process.
 654
 In fact, in 2002, 
during the Spanish Presidency of the Council of Europe the international community assisted  
Spanish attempt to reactivate the Barcelona agenda.
655
  
The first event coincided with the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Valencia in 
April of 2002.
656
  The success of this conference was compromised by the escalation in 
violence between Israel and the Palestinians since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000 as 
well as by the evolving US plans to invade Iraq.
657
 However as Claret recognised during a 
personal interview for this thesis, this ministerial meeting was successful in establishing the 
Action Plan for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA)
658
 
and the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Between Cultures and Civilizations. 
The latter idea was the Anna Lindh Foundation. According to Claret, vice-president of this 
organisation, this was a key proposal that contradicts in some ways Aznar’s subsequent 
approach to foreign policy:  
 
“Various ministerial meetings were important, but the one held in Valencia was 
essential for the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation. And this is interesting 
because this is a Foundation to promote intercultural dialogue. It was finally created in 
2004 in Valencia as well, and it was the moderate reaction to the 9/11 events. I mean, 
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it was a reaction that said, let’s avoid the combat. Let’s look for the way of 
dialoguing, of understanding” 659 
 
It is possible to argue, as Soler i Lecha and Weltner-Puig have done, that the Spain’s 
image as a leading Mediterranean power was reinforced by the decisions taken at this 
meeting. 
660
Nevertheless, the presidential approach would ultimately be a cause of reduced 
Spanish political effectiveness in regard to the Barcelona process. Indeed, one can argue that 
the decline of Spain in the political sphere, as one of the leading political entrepreneurs of 
Euro-Mediterranean policy, brought about the wider decline in the Barcelona process. This 
situation was compounded from 2004 onwards by the implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that promoted bilateral relations and shifted away from a 
multilateral and multidimensional approach. 
The events of 9/11 marked a point of no return in Aznar’s foreign policy and ruled out 
any attempt to reformulate Euro-Mediterranean dialogue or politics. The last two years of his 
second term were decisive on this front. Tensions between Spain and Morocco that started in 
1999, and led to the retirement of the Moroccan ambassador to Madrid in 2001 and clashes 





July 2002. The Moroccan government set up base on the disputed island 
explaining that the presence there was needed to better control illegal immigration. However 
the tension with the Spanish government started straight away.  
This happened three months after the Valencia meeting and the response of the 
international community was illuminating. This is crucial to understanding how the dynamics 
between Spain and the EU had started to shift. The Spanish response to that event was 
massive and disproportionate and clear evidence of a new level of power projection. Both 
Commission president Romano Prodi and the Danish EU presidency urged Rabat to leave the 
island. Gillespie has considered that this avoidable conflict evidenced another failure of the 
CFSP and the lack of commitment both from the Spanish and Moroccan side to remain 
committed to the exigencies of the EMP.
661
 
This event can also be analysed from a different perspective that views Aznar’s 
political strategy, as driven by personal ambition, which in turned generated a negative 
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political response from European partners such as France and Germany. The consequences 
were negative. As Fernando Jaúregui explains:  
 
“They generate arrogance. Aznar thought that in a given moment Spain could 
dominate and lead Europe and he allied with the wrong people, against those countries 
that are Europe’s engine: France and Germany. And obviously, both France and 
Germany did not forget this movement.”662 
 
In effect, the Perejil affair highlighted the lack of support from the big European 
powers for Spain. It also highlighted, as it has been said above, the weaknesses in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy mechanism. Ultimately the US, in the form of 
secretary of state Colin Powell, had to intervene to mediate the clash.  This in turn marked a 
clear point when Aznar and his senior officials chose to move away from the European 
political sphere and establish a stronger alliance with the US.  As Cembreno points out, the 
relationship between France and Spain became more difficult and Aznar later accused 
Jacques Chirac of causing problems for Spain during the crisis.
663
  
However, according to Barreñada, Martín and Sanahuja and Iglesias Cavicchioli, the 
most relevant event that changed definitely the Aznar’s conception of foreign policy was 
9/11.
664
 Aznar’s political discourse started to be strongly influenced by the fight against 
terrorism a new “political window”, to be used to propel Spain to a leading global role.  
Strategically speaking the post 9/11 context was favourable to this approach. As Sistiaga has 
pointed out, from 2001-2002 the fight against the terrorism constituted the main pillar, of 
both Spain’s domestic and foreign policies.665This reminds us of and reinforces the point 
made above that for Aznar the best foreign policy was one that was also at the heart of 
domestic policy.  
It is arguable that Aznar’s own personal experience as a victim of a terrorist attack in 
1995, influenced this approach. Certainly the centrality of terrorism in his political discourse 
and diplomatic action was a constant from 2001 to 2004.   
In January 2002 during a speech setting out Spain’s EU presidency programme in 
Strasbourg, Aznar proposed to work to develop three main priorities: To design a response 
                                                          
662
 Interview cited with Fernando Jaúregui.  
663
 Op. Cit. Cembrero, I. (2006): P. 10.  
664
 Barreñada, I., Martín, I. and Sanahuja, J.A. (2004): L’Espagne et la Guerre en Iraq: Ruptures Dans la 
Politique Extérieure. Critique Internationale. Nº 23. Pp. 9-21; Iglesias Cavicchioli, M. (2007): A Period of 
Turbulent Change: Spanish-US Relations Since 2002. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International 
Relations. Vol. 8. Nº. 2. Pp. 1-17.  
665
 Sistiaga, G. (2003): “Terrorismo y Seguridad Internacional en Europa”. In Valle Gálvez, A. (Ed.): Los 
Nuevos Escenarios Internacionales y Europeos del Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales. BOE. 
Pp. 87-92.  
170 
 
against the terrorism; to create an area of greater economic prosperity to safeguard the 




From this perspective, his approach found a staunch supporter in US president George 
W. Bush who saw in Aznar “a firm combatant in the fight against terrorism”667 Both leaders 
believed that the future of the global peace depended upon the disarmament of Iraq and Bush 
claimed that Aznar was championing the battle against the post 9/11 threats at the UN, the 
EU and inside NATO.
668
 
Aznar’s decision to develop an increasingly presidential foreign policy, the alignment 
with Washington and the preoccupation with terrorism had negative effects in the medium 
term. Most importantly, it pushed Spain away from its past role as a valued interlocutor with 
the Arab world and from its tendency to see its foreign policy in terms of the interests of the 
EU’s common foreign policy. As Fernández Molina stated, if since the Spain’s accession to 
the EU, the socialist governments consolidated the relationship between the European 
dimensions and the Mediterranean, Aznar, oversaw the separation. In effect the triangular 





7.6. Aznar versus the EU? A Converging Attitude, Different Approaches. 
From 2001-2002 onwards, after 9/11 Aznar’s rhetoric integrated more the elements Islam and 
Arab world. However his most important rhetoric resource, his most important “product” as 
political broker, was terrorism. The graphic below, number 14, shows the number of articles 
where the selected variables are represented and they correspond to his entire political 
life.
670
Beyond the most representative geographical variables, it is possible to see how 
terrorism and global occupy both third and fourth position, whereas Arab/Islam are 
underrepresented.  
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Graph (14) José María Aznar, Discourses 1983-2013.  
 
    Source: www.jmaznar.es Elaborated by the author.  
 Aznar was convinced that his foreign policy would make Spain an international power 
of the first rank. Over his second mandate his speech towards Islam and the Arab world was 
moderated. During his first visit to Egypt in 2000 he mentioned that the Arab, Islamic and 
Jewish heritage that is present in Spain’s history gives the opportunity to Spain to become a 
mediator with the Arab world.
671
During his official trip to Iran in 2000 he even said that 
“Hezbollah is a movement, a Lebanese stream (…) that it is fighting for the country’s 
freedom, with a lot of sacrifices and, in reality, it is the symbol of the Lebanese resistance 
against their occupants”.672 
After 9/11 his discourse immediately started to be aligned towards the theses –fight on 
global terror- defended by the Bush administration. This context represented the best 
opportunity for Aznar as a political broker to launch his foreign policy despite the lack of 
consensus from most of European countries, including Spain. In October 2001, he explained 
to the Congress of Deputies that Spain decided to join the US in Afghanistan because after 
9/11 “it has been created a new alliance of countries, sharing a consensus without precedents 
in contemporary history: active consensus against the terrorism”.673He also stated that the 
                                                          
671
 Nafie, I. (2000): “Interview to José María Aznar”. Al Ahram. Available at: 
http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/01162A1162.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013) 
672
 Aznar, J.M. (2000): Discourse. Official Visit to Iran. Available at: 
http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/01045A1045.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013) 
673
 Aznar, J.M. (2001): Speech, Congress of Deputies. 18 October. Available at: 
http://www.jmaznar.es/file_upload/discursos/pdfs/01250A1250.pdf (Retrieved 1 August 2013)  















“Islam practiced by those fanatics, is an historic invention (…) and this battle is not against 
Islam”.674Therefore it is clear that Aznar splits up and does not generalise –at least 
rhetorically speaking- over the concepts of terrorism and Islam. This idea was repeated in 
Madrid during Mubarak’s official visit to Spain one month later when he said that “Spain was 
not in conflict neither with Islam nor with among cultures”.675 However, it is clear how he 
tries to convince the deputies by arguing that the new diplomatic alliance has not precedent in 
the contemporary history, what places Aznar –he wants to place himself- in a central position 
within this new historical moment.  
As Bush’s foreign policy started to be more focused on the weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) owned by Saddam Hussein, Aznar was more convince about his support 
to the US and his support was the strongest in history as Iglesias-Cavicchioli has stated.
676
 
One of the most relevant events of this period was represented by the Azores Summit where 
Bush, Blair and Aznar –and Portuguese President José Manuel Durao Barroso- launched an 
ultimatum to Iraq quoting UN resolutions 1441, 1483 and 1511. This summit can be also 
assessed as an ultimatum to Iraq but also to the UN. Within this context, Aznar expressed that 
“this transatlantic link, this Atlantic solidarity has been always, it is, and it has to continue 
being, to my mind, a great European commitment”.677Aznar places Europe at the centre of 
this statement complaining for the lack of support to his foreign policy.  
Spain’s president was aware of both this lack of European and Spanish support. In the 
same intervention he mentioned that they knew that the international public opinion was very 
worried about these developments, however “we also know very well our responsibilities and 
our obligations”.678It is clear that Aznar was defying the international public opinion. In line 
with this example during a personal interview for this thesis with Fernando Jaúregui he said:  
 
“During a lunch with him –Aznar- I asked: The 85 per cent of the Spanish public 
opinion is against the intervention in Iraq. How do you dare to maintain that policy? 
Aznar replied: It is characteristic of the statesman to defy the public opinion when is 
convenient.”679 
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 In questioning this challenging and provocative attitude towards both the international 
and the Spanish public opinion, some months later -after the killing of seven Spanish soldiers 
in Iraq- Aznar had to explain to the Spanish Deputies Congress -2 December 2003- his 
political stances and manipulative political communication strategies, especially once it was 
also demonstrated that WMD did not exist.
680
 In defending his postures, he stated that we 
“are defending the international peace and the international security and also combating a 
network of international terrorist. They are threatening our lives and liberties. The withdrawal 
cannot be an option to terrorism”.681  
 Analyses on this speech have been also conducted by van Dijk, Pujante and Morales 
López.
682
 According to the last two authors Aznar developed his speech following three 
ideological meanings. First, terrorism represents a global threat and within this global threat 
is possible to place ETA as well. Second, Spanish support to the US is embedded in a 
universal mission. Third, “the PP government has the clearest insight into our destiny as a 
nation” –the nationalistic vision-.683In fact, Aznar was very much interested in defending his 
posture because he focused mostly on internal security matters –due to his nationalistic 
approach- and the fight against ETA. That is why Aznar was very interested in getting the US 
support and acknowledgement of ETA as an international terrorist organization.  
 Aznar’s foreign policy strategy was characterized by a number of inconsistencies and 
contradictions, as well as political opportunism and incoherence. While in office he 
repeatedly argued that his policies challenged such failings. In a speech in Washington in 
2003, for example, he said:  “I think that the political action, the coherence and maybe, or 
surely, responsibility, do not always trigger applause; but they are, at the end of the day, the 
elements that create trust within the citizens to whom is commended the task of governing 
and adopting decisions”.684Aznar was convinced that over his eight years in office he was 
able to create an economically strong country and a respected medium size power within the 
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international realm, although this does not mean that Spain became a leading international 
player.  
The Mediterranean and North Africa occupied fourth place on Aznar’s list of foreign 
policy priorities going into the 2004 elections behind Europe, Latin America and the US and 
transatlantic relations.  Officials working in the Mediterranean at the time were not 
impressed.
685
 As EU Ambassador to Morocco Eneko Landaburu explained in an interview for 
this thesis: 
 
“For me Aznar’s policy was very negative for Spain’s interests. Aznar and his people 
were not committed to Europe. They are Spanish nationalists, and they believe that, 
all of a sudden, when the things change economically and they go well, they think that 
they can play a new role alone within the international community being a privileged 
ally of the US. And of course, at the end of the day they consider Europe as simply a 
source of structural funds to ensure the development.”686 
 
Ambassador Landaburu added that in Europe, Spain under Aznar was increasingly not 
considered as a partner. It was, at least by some, viewed as nationalistic, anti-French and not 
truly European. Another interpretation is that under Aznar Spain, or at least the Spanish right 
wing, regained its own ideology, history and identity. This however, may well be the Spain 
that fears other Europeans, refused to trust liberal ideas and placed its interests alongside 
those of the US under George W. Bush.  For all these reasons, Ambassador Landaburu 
argues, Spain lost significant influence.
687
 
Consistent and coherent public discourse and political actions and policies constitute 
the fundamental pillars of international dialogue, especially a dialogue maintained between 
stakeholders separated by cultural, religious, demographic, economic and political factors. 
The strategy developed by Aznar deepened the initial inconsistencies that existed in the past. 
He did so by accentuating a type of political entrepreneurship focused on the fight against 
terrorism and building up ties with a US administration deeply distrusted in Europe, the Arab 
world and North Africa.  
However, it results also necessary to explain and understand if this European 
disagreement towards Aznar’s foreign policy is completely justified. To be justified the EU 
would have to follow a different and more integrative approach with regards to its foreign 
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policy especially focusing on Mediterranean issues. Following the CL approach and 
searching for the same variables as in the precedent case the next graphic number 15 has been 
produced. This graphic considers Aznar’s second mandate and covers the period 2001-2004.  
 
Graph (15): European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency 
 
Source: European Council. Elaborated by the Author.  
 As the graphic number 15 shows, over this period beyond the security issue that 
remains the most important concern, there are also two variables that were not especially 
relevant during the last period 1996-2000: terrorism and migration. The aftermaths of the 
9/11 provoked these reactions. During the council of Laeken in 2001, it was already 
commented the necessity to start managing migration flows in order to control illegal 
migration and crime as well as the need of strengthening the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice in a context in which “religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism 
are on increase, and regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment still provide a constant 
seedbed for them”.688This statement marked the trend to follow in the successive years.  
 During the Council celebrated in Seville in 2002, it was said that terrorism was a “real 
challenge for Europe and the world and poses a threat on our security and our 
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stability”.689Therefore it was highlighted the importance of strengthening the contribution of 
the CFSP and the ESDP in order to fight against this European and global threat.
690
 
 Variables like Muslims, Islam or Arabs were not present over the last period of study. 
However over this period these variables were raised several times, linking them to security, 
migration or terrorism beyond the traditional Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Already during the 
extraordinary European Council celebrated in Brussels in 2001 it was mentioned that the 
European Council “needs to combat any nationalistic, racist or xenophobic drift, just as it 
rejects any terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world.”691 
The linkage between Muslims/Arabs and terrorism/security was integrated then within 
the European public discourse of this period. In 2002 during the second meeting celebrated in 
Brussels, Iran and its nuclear plan was related to terrorism and its relations with the rest of the 
Middle East.
692
In order to face and to deal with this problem from 2003 to 2004 it was 
stressed the importance of “deepen the dialogue and collaboration in all fields with the Arab 
and Islamic worlds”.693 
 The lack of tangible results provided by the EMP since its inception in 1995 urged the 
EU to invent new and parallel mechanisms to deal with these challenges. Within this context 
in 2003 it was proposed the Wider Europe New Neighbourhood Initiative –afterwards ENP- 
that originally was supposed to reinforce the activities developed by the EMP.
694
 
 Migration represents the other relevant variable given that the migratory flows from 
Southern Mediterranean countries skyrocketed within this context of increasing 
“securitization” as it has been explained in chapter four. In spite of the successful Euro-
Mediterranean conferences of Naples, Palermo, Venice and Rome -2003- during the third 
Council celebrated in 2003 in Brussels, it was raised the question of the adoption of “the 
mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating third countries against illegal migration” 
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following the principles implemented by the European Security Strategy, and taking into 
account the existing policies and programmes of the EMP and the ENP.
695
 
Over 2004, as it is possible to see in the graphic, migration, terrorism and security 
related issues were the correlated variables that topped European Council’s agenda. Within 
this context during the 1
st
 Council celebrated in Brussels that year, it was raised the question 
of the necessity of implementing a strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East.
696
 During the 3
rd
 Council celebrated in 2004 the correlation between security 
and migration was definitely evident. It was proposed to intensify the cooperation and 




 As it is possible to say the variables used and correlated by Aznar and his foreign 
policy and EU’s public speech and approaches did not differ strongly. Both kept the same 
tone and approach towards Southern Mediterranean countries and linked security problems. 
Therefore, it is true that Aznar tried to follow his own political strategy beyond the European 
circles, however, both the objectives and the philosophy was almost the same. 
 
7.7. Aznar’s Strong Political Stances and the End of his Mandate.  
 
Gustavo de Arístegui, a Spanish diplomat affiliated to the PP has made the point that it was 
important to increase the international cooperation and promote stability, prosperity and 
freedom in the Islamic world in general and especially in neighbouring countries. And the 
way to do so should be through cooperation and dialogue.
698
Aznar as a political broker was 
also interested in using the Centrist Democrat International (CDI) –evolution of the Christian 
Democrat International (CDI) - as a platform to increase this dialogue and to overcome the 
idea of war of civilizations or religions. During the CDI international conference celebrated 
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in June 2003 Aznar said: “Is it possible to say that we have already overcame the threat the 
Islamic world posed to the Western world?”699 
However, it is not possible to increase cooperation and dialogue if the basis of such 
communication is bound up with the securitization and criminalization of the migration issue. 
The consequence was a notable isolation of Spain from the EU’s political objectives and 
policies and the weakening of the mechanisms that allowed in the past a more fluent 
communication with the Arab world specially after supporting the invasion of Iraq and after 
being aligned with the US. However, Aznar tried to defend several times that his foreign 
policy did not isolated Spain. 
 In fact in 2003 he stated that he was proud that Spain was not living isolated because 
the real isolation would come through “some socialist and communist proposals that bring 
straight away to an international isolation and straight away towards the confrontation against 
our allies in the international world.”700 
As Fernando Jaúregui said during a personal interview with regards to the foreign 
policy towards North Africa and the Middle East: (Aznar) “destroyed everything that was 
built in the past”.701  This view is also shared by Keating. 702 Aznar’s attitudes and foreign 
policy defined him as a political broker. As a politician who speculated deploying a political 
communication strategy defined to achieve his objectives rather than constructing an 
environment of co-operation and social peace.  
 The Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004 confirmed that Aznar’s foreign policy 
provoked reactions from the radical Islamist rim.
703
  Soon after the PP lost the elections 
because Aznar kept on confirming stubbornly that ETA was responsible for the attack. The 
US immediately rejected this hypothesis.
704
Despite these episodes Aznar during a seminar 
held in Siena in July 2004 –four months after the elections- said: “I believed in the role of 
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Spain as an active and constructive nation within the international realm and I did whatever I 
could over the eight years of government to achieve that. And I think that in part I achieved 
it. I equally believed that the transatlantic link was the backbone of our security and 
prosperity and I did as much as I could to reinforce it”.705 
After his mandate Aznar became more outspoken with regards to the Arab and 
Muslim world. In 2006 he spoke at the Hudson Institute in Washington. In assessing Pope 
Benedict XVI’s latest considerations on violence and Islam, he said that “Muslims should 
apologize for occupying Spain for 800 years and an UN-backed programme to encourage 
dialogue between them and West is stupid. (…) it is them or it is us. There is no middle 
ground”.706This confirmed his real nationalistic and catholic-rooted stances towards Islam. 
Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero replaced him as Spanish leader. One of his primary tasks was 
reactivating the previous Spanish role as a bridge between Europe and Southern 
Mediterranean countries.  
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ZAPATERO’s ATTEMPT to REPOSITION SPAIN IN THE MEDITERRAEAN 
 
Following the, 2004 Spanish elections, the PSOE after 8 years in opposition, were now back 
in power. The new government critiqued the PP for breaking the “Política de Estado” in the 
realm of foreign affairs while in office.
707
 During his inaugural speech Zapatero, talked about 
re-developing a foreign policy where all major political forces would share the same 
objectives and approach.
708
 Even though he recognised that Spain’s new time could not start 
from scratch but taking advantage of a shared political experience that has evolved over 
different phases.
709
However Catalan party Convergència i Unió (CiU) in September 2004 
criticized Zapatero’s political stances by saying that it seemed that he wanted to establish a 
“new transition”.710 A second transition that, as Woodworth has mentioned, he seemed to be 
unaware “of the legacy of the first transition”.711 
It was now a priority for Spain to return to its central role in European affairs. In fact 
PSOE’s five political axes were represented by: a renewed public life; a foreign policy 
characterized by a European and Europeanist vision; economic development supported by 
education, research and innovation; new social policies and; development and expansion of 
civil and political rights and equality.
712
Aznar may have attacked González for begging from 
Europe in 1992 but was Spain’s support for German reunification that won his government 
the support of Germany in its foreign policy approach and in its effort to become one of the 
biggest beneficiaries of the EU cohesion fund.
713
 
The bombings in Madrid represented the extremist response to a foreign policy that 
increasingly developed a more public speech slanted to US’s foreign policy theses. In his 
inaugural speech, Zapatero stressed the fact that Aznar`s decisions in foreign policy were 
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wrong in issues that affected Spain’s coexistence and progress.714 In analysing Zapatero’s 
discourse it is important to note that his speech started mentioning the Madrid bombings and 
the victims. Beyond the contextual importance of this event, the bombings represented the 
material evidence of Aznar’s mistakes and the issue of terrorism topped again Spain’s 
political agenda. In his discourse, Zapatero mentioned 18 times the variable terrorism 
whereas another important issue such as democracy was mentioned 4 times.  Now, following 
his accession to power in March 2004, Zapatero looked to return to the mandate of Felipe 
González following a legacy of “dialogue, respect, pluralism, tolerance and transparency”.715 
As Gillespie and Youngs have noted, by the early 1990s Spanish foreign policy 
interests were channelled and pursued overwhelmingly through Europe.
716
 The success of this 
depended on Spain’s ability to sell its particular geographic interests.717 As has been stressed 
by Viñas and Pollack and Hunter
718
  North Africa and by extension, the Mediterranean 
represented an essential part of that tradition.  
But following the Aznar era, the environment was especially challenging with regards 
to the reactivation of the Spain’s role in the Mediterranean. The new socialist government 
had to face a very peculiar political, social, cultural and economic context. An unknown 
leader lacking charisma, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero faced a tough task in re-asserting 
Spain’s position as global political entrepreneur.  
 
8.1. Back to the Mediterranean. Back to the Roots.  
In 2004, Spain’s new foreign minister, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, an expert on Middle East 
and Mediterranean issues looked to develop a new foreign policy to rebuild the consensual 
role that he believed Spain had lost during the Aznar era.
719
 In considering the Aznar era 
Moratinos stressed that:  
 
“Spain during the last 25 years, knew how to develop [a genuine State policy] through 
a integrative spirit, understanding that all decisions in the foreign policy ambit are 
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rooted on internal reasons, and, by adopting them, revert to the ambit of domestic 
policy. A responsible government should know what it wants and what is in the 
interests of its country; only on this basis is it possible to develop a coherent foreign 
policy, solid and ambitious”.720 
 
Though some argued that Moratinos was not a strong supporter of the EU, the first 
step towards this was the rapprochement with the EU.
721
  Without this initial movement it 
would not be possible to propose and legitimize complex policies and mechanisms. 
Moreover, it was required to achieve both political consensus and support and the financial 
means to develop new policies focused on Spain’s diplomatic and politic interests. This was 
the same strategy Felipe González followed from 1986 onward. First Europe. Second, the 
identification of a political window that would benefit national interests. Third, an action of 
political lobbying in order to get political and diplomatic support and financial means to 
increase diplomatic power and presence. 
Strategically speaking, following this return to Europe, so to speak, was the need to 
identify a political window that would benefit national interests. This included a new 
relationship with the US based on the principle of sovereign equality, as set out in the 1988 
Cooperation Agreement. However, Zapatero’s distant approach towards the US marked one 
of his most important U-turns with regards to Aznar’s foreign policy. As Cavicchioli has 
mentioned, Zapatero was the first Spanish prime minister in the thirty years of democracy 
that has not had any summit with an American president over the first years of mandate.
722
As 
Woodworth mentioned Zapatero was very interested in taking Spain out from “that 
photograph in the Azores”.723In April 2004 Zapatero ordered Spain’s Minister of Defence 
José Bono to withdraw Spanish troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible.
724
 Nevertheless, 
Zapatero had to pay the price of placing Spain away from the US. US government, press and 
public opinion ignored Zapatero in numerous times.
725
 
Moratinos also elaborated on relations with Latin America and the Middle East and 
the Mediterranean.  Moratinos appointment as foreign minister had confirmed Spanish 
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intentions with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western Sahara conflict, and Iraq. His 
approach, like that of his prime minister, was based on dialogue, negotiation, cooperation. On 
the other hand, the new Spanish foreign policy with the US changed its views as far as 
Jauregui pointed out, Moratinos has been a diplomat concentrated on the Palestinian side, not 
on the Israeli one.
726
 
In Zapatero’s inaugural address in office he noted his desire to place dialogue, 
understanding and respect to other’s opinions at the centre of his foreign policy. “I am willing 
to make this the legislature of dialogue, understanding and, the meeting (…) In the 
Mediterranean we have to recover the objective of the dialogue, the understanding and 
cooperation present in the declaration of Barcelona”.727 In considering his priorities, Zapatero 
explained in an interview for this thesis that:   
 
“Improving relations with Morocco was an important objective that I established for 
our foreign policy towards the Mediterranean. Since then, relations with Rabat have 
been acquiring greater specific weight, covering all the fields and permeating all the 
sectors integrating a strategic relation of neighbourhood. This spans from tight 
cooperation on issues such as the fight against the illegal immigration or the terrorism, 
to economic relations and Euro-Mediterranean co-operation”.728 
 
Here it is possible to see that the conception and political postures with regards to the 
Maghreb as a whole and to Morocco in particular, marked the most evident difference 
between the PP and the PSOE. Actually approaches to the Western Sahara issue were 
probably where the strongest differences between the PP and the PSOE lay. In effect, as 
Fernández Molina recognises, the accession of the PSOE to power coincided with a moment 
where Morocco addressed the proposals of former US secretary of state James Baker –Plan 
Baker II-, which had been approved by the UN Security Council on 31 July 2003.
729
  
The PSOE supported new plans put forward by Rabat. These plans would guarantee 
the independence of the Western Sahara territory under Moroccan sovereignty. While the 
proposal covered socio-cultural aspects that were common to past Spanish approaches to the 
problem, the Spanish embrace was viewed in some quarters as evidence of the abandonment 
                                                          
726
 Cited interview with Fernando Jauregui.  
727





 Personal interview with José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Madrid, 28 January 2011.  
729
 Op. Cit. Fernandez Molina, I. (2003): P. 66. For the Plan Baker II is important to see: Ludena, J. (2003): El 
Plan Baker II: ¿Solución Para el Sahara Occidental? Papeles de Cuestiones Internacionales. Nº84. Pp. 121-127; 




of the traditional Spanish position on this sensitive issue.
730
 Ruiz Miguel, for example, argued 
that it would be prejudicial to Spain’s national interests as it would be the legitimisation of  
independence for the Western Sahara.
731
 
As mentioned previously according to Bardají and Portero, who were clearly 
criticising the new PSOE government’s Moroccan policy,732 the PP was more interested in 
developing commercial relations with Algeria.
733
 This policy unbalanced regional dynamics 
and created more complex situations and misunderstandings between Madrid and Rabat.   
Zapatero came to power at the same time as the Barcelona Process reached its tenth 
anniversary.  As President Zapatero stated during a personal interview:  
 
“When I acceded to the Presidency, I felt a very wide support from Europe, and in 
general from the whole international sphere. We were conscious of the weight and 
influence of Spain, and I perceived that it would be possible to reinforce Spain’s role 
as global actor (…) The European policy towards the Mediterranean shows Spanish 
efforts to establish the bases in order to create a space of peace, security and 
prosperity between both rims. This approach was defined in 1995 with the signature 
of the Barcelona Declaration, that illuminated the Euro-Mediterranean Association. 
Spain was central in this process and continued being crucial for the construction of 
the institutional architecture of the Euro-Mediterranean Association until the creation 
of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008”.734 
 
There are few politicians or diplomats who would openly criticise the Barcelona 
process. Ambassador Navarro described it as a multidimensional political programme that 
deserves praise on a number of levels, notably as the ‘only place’ where Israel and Syria sat 
together.
735
 Ambassador Landaburu, speaking more pragmatically acknowledged that: 
  
“We made many mistakes, very big mistakes. One of these mistakes was that we 
believed that we could develop a dialogue with these Arab countries, from region to 
region without taking into consideration the internal fractures that exist in these 
countries. Another mistake is that we did not took into consideration the radical 
influence in the conflict between Israel and Palestine.”736 
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As has been already mentioned, the Barcelona process was based on the conviction 
that a neo-liberal economic and trade model would trigger off long-term socio-political and 
cultural transformations to the benefit of Euro-Mediterranean relations. However, as Bassols 
pointed out, the key point of the Barcelona process was the creation of the Mediterranean free 
trade area by 2010 was the only exact date that was present in the Barcelona declaration.
737
 
This target date was very important for the EC because, as Bassols has highlighted during an 
interview for this thesis, Europe had very strong commercial policy but “today if we would 
have proposed the same, Southern Mediterranean partners would not have accepted”.738 
While this objective –the economic one- was partly the reason for the weakness of the 
process, it is debatable whether Aznar’s political shift towards the Atlantic during his second 
term deserves the majority blame for this. According to Ambassador Eneko Landaburu: “I 
don’t think so. I mean, the strength we had was not important enough to leave a gap in case 
of disappearing”.739 On top of this Spain’s priorities did not cause the divisions within the 
Mediterranean countries that made progress on the Barcelona front so difficult.  
 On the other hand and putting aside the technical difficulties of the Barcelona 
Process, the ENP was conceptualized between 2002 and 2004 but it was implemented in 
2007, and highlighted some contradictions in the Euro-Mediterranean Policy’s philosophical 
and practical pillars. Nevertheless as Ambassador Landaburu stressed, “we luckily had the 
capacity of launching and developing the ENP. Because at least that has allowed us to 
maintain certain contact with southern Mediterranean partners”.740 As Barbé, Mestres and 
Soler have stressed, within this period of time both the PP and the PSOE had two splendid 




As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Aznar had a very good opportunity during the 
Valencia conference in 2002 to showcase Spanish diplomatic power.
742
  In Barcelona in 2005 
the PSOE hosted a celebration of the Euro-Mediterranean Summit that reflected its goal to 
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“re-launch the Barcelona Process with strength and determination”.743 The PSOE also wanted 




 Zapatero also wanted to use the Euro-Mediterranean Summit to show Europe, and his 
PP critics, that he had a vision for Spain and a vision for Spain in the international arena. In 
fact what the PP criticised more of Zapatero’s foreign policy was his vision of Spain.745 As 
Carnero has stated, Zapatero did not have a clear idea of which kind of Spain he wanted to 




  These initial diplomatic efforts began to be rewarded during the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial meeting held in The Hague in 2004. During this conference, 2005 was chosen as 
the “Year of the Mediterranean”.747 The Barcelona meeting the following year, attended by 
leading figures from of almost all the EU members, was the main event celebrating this.   
However as Barbé, Mestres and Soler i Lecha have noted, the majority of the Southern 
Mediterranean members did not send top level representatives.
748
 However, the 2005 
Barcelona conference was intended first and foremost, from a Spanish perspective, to gain 
support from the UK, who held the EU presidency between June and December. This came at 




The UK wanted initially to preside over a low key presidency. However, Prime 
Minister Blair, in June 2005, ultimately presented himself as the saviour of the EU in its time 
of crisis. This was important for Zapatero’s purposes. Blair’s public support for an early 
Turkish accession into the EU and his wider approach to the Mediterranean was very much in 
line with Zapatero’s approach. The British leader declared that the accession of Turkey to the 
EU would be clear proof that “Europe is committed not just in word but indeed to a Europe of 
diverse races, cultures and religions, all bound together by common rules and a sense of 
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human solidarity and mutual respect”.750This request represents the cornerstone of any Euro-
Mediterranean policy or mechanism. If rhetoric is not ensued by concrete facts –measurable 
facts within the sort, medium and long term that involve and empower southern 
Mediterranean countries beyond European interests- these policies and projects are doomed 
to fail.  
This UK leadership was important for Zapatero’s purposes. The Turkish accession 
was actually very much criticised long time ago by France. As Leparmentier and Zecchini 
remind, Valerie Giscard D’Estaing, manifested that the Turkish accession to the EU would 
mean the end of the EU.
751
 France, on the contrary did not share the same vision. Chirac did 
not follow the extremist vision of D’Estaing and reluctantly said that the French population 
should be call to decide upon referendum.
752
 Zapatero also considered that an earlier 




Zapatero started to develop his foreign policy from where Felipe González decided to 
act: the Mediterranean. At this time it was suggested that Spain should be leading 
Mediterranean politics as Germany was leading Eastern politics.
754
 Once the Mediterranean 
political window was definitely re-identified as the opportunity to increase Spain’s 
diplomatic stature, it was necessary to formalise this ambition with a concrete mechanism. 
 
8.2.The Alliance of Civilizations: Building On the Sand.  
Contextual elements such as increasing influx of migrants from Southern Mediterranean 
countries or the threat of terrorism of Islamic matrix among others provided Zapatero a good 
starting point to design and justify Spain’s own entrepreneurial proposal.  Diplomatically 
speaking a number of initiatives started to develop in the aftermaths of the 9/11. On one hand, 
the UN defined 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. As Dallmayr has put it, 
these initiatives somehow tried to raise awareness on the consequences of an unstoppable 
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globalization process and related consequences on global social justice and inequality.
755
 In 
November 2001 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution aiming at developing the 
Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations. Article 6 of 56/6 resolution highlighted 
that “governments shall promote, encourage and facilitate dialogue among civilizations”.756 
This article opened the path for political entrepreneurs willing to fill that gap. 
However within the short run there was not an immediate response from any particular 
western government aiming at covering this political opportunity. In February 2002 it was 
held in Istanbul the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)-EU joint initiative. Despite the 
nature of the meeting –designed to enhance intercultural dialogue- governmental 
representatives from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Kuwait and Lebanon openly criticized the US for their 
unilateral efforts in defending homeland interests and its hegemony and Israel for the 
Palestinian question.
757
These manifestations are the evidence of the challenges any initiative 
aiming at fostering intercultural communication and dialogue has to face. 
 This initiative celebrated in Turkey opened the path for a new phase of Turkish 
foreign policy. As Balci and Mis have highlighted from 2002 onward, new Turkish 
government administered by Justice and Development Party (JDP) and headed up by Prime 
Minister Tayyip Erdogan, was interested in accelerating Turkish presence in the world. This 
new attitude represented a major turning point for Turkey’s both domestic and foreign 
policy.
758
 The JDP’s “non-confrontational and consensus-seeking” approach was relevant for 
the domestic realm and for international politics alike.
759
This approach was publicised and 
spread by Erdogan since the beginning of his mandate.
760Erdogan’s approach to become one 
of the fulcrums of intercultural dialogue summarizes a political strategy that would have 
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The post 9/11 international context, the interest of Turkey in getting greater 
international integration by bridging the existing cultural and political gap and the interest of 
Spain for developing its Mediterranean card announced and justified a Spanish-Turkish joint 
initiative.  
One of his first Zapatero’s initiatives a political entrepreneur was his proposal of a 
project to the UN General Assembly -24 September 2004- named “Alliance of Civilizations”. 
As it has been noted by Balci, Zapatero’s concept of “alliance” evolved from the concept of 
“dialogue” that was the central idea from 9/11 onwards. Conversely it was according to 
Barreñada, an initiative that, though sharing the same theoretical background, challenged 
Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis.762 
 However as Balci mentions, the idea of “alliance” entails the acceptance of “clash” 
and the potential survival of such an initiative would depend on the continuation of such a 
“clash” of civilizations, otherwise it would not make sense. As Zank has suggested the 
concept cooperation of civilizations would have entailed a more proactive and less belligerent 
approach.
763
 Nevertheless the idea of clash –more sellable politically speaking- was shared 
both by Zapatero and Erdogan.
764
As a matter of fact, Zapatero very timely announced this 
concept of “alliance of civilizations” right after the Madrid bombings as a way to combat 
terrorism.  
This means that Zapatero reacted like an opportunist and used the concept “alliance” 
ambivalently: as a means to fight terrorism at a domestic level and to reach international 
audience as well. This rhetoric strategy using terrorism as a variable to get political and 
diplomatic consensus, recognition and influence was also used by Aznar as we demonstrated 
in the precedent chapter. Therefore it is possible to say that Zapatero despite his interest in 
detaching his foreign policy from Aznar recurred to very similar strategies as a political 
broker.  
Technically speaking, Zapatero’s speech at the United Nations followed a very 
understandable rhetoric. Before presenting his proposal he focused his attention on the threat 
posed by international and national terrorism. He mentioned 11 times the variable terrorism 
within his discourse. After that he linked the variables terrorism-security with an alliance 
between the western and the Arab-Muslim world. Therefore he was narrowing the idea of 
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alliance of civilizations and targeting Western societies versus Islam. None other religion or 
civilization was mentioned. Hence the concept of “alliance of civilizations” was not 
appropriate from a philosophical and practical point of view. On 13 June 2005, Turkish Prime 




As shown above, French disenchantment towards the EU allowed Spain to identify a 
new political window by re-launching its EU and global leadership via Mediterranean-related 
issues. In these terms the “Alliance of Civilizations” can be considered one of Spain’s most 
successful foreign policy projects within the short and medium term.
766
  
In promoting this, Spain was attempting once again to play the role of political broker. 
However from an organizational point of view, this initiative was neither carefully planned 
nor strategically developed. The PSOE’s electoral programme did not mention it for instance 
and it has been suggested that this initiative was originally formulated during a flight over the 
Atlantic a few hours before the UN meeting in New York.
767
 
If it was improvised this would reveal one of the most relevant features of Zapatero’s 
government and both policy making and decision making processes. This improvisation has 
been harshly criticized members of FAES, the PP’s think-tank. Borrowing the expression 
coined by Spanish journalist Miguez attacked Zapatero’s diplomacy as the “diplomacy of the 
smile”.768  
So, the argument went, the PSOE’s foreign policy would align national interests to the 
EU’s global objectives; would go beyond the defence of national sovereignty and the national 
dignity; reject the expansion of the “liberal democracy” because its principles were not 
universal; the “democratic fundamentalism” incarnated by the US model would represent the 
main triggering factor of terrorism around the world.
769
 Abstraction and relativism seem to be 
the main ingredients of such diplomacy.  
After presenting the idea very abstractly, The Alliance of Civilizations would operate 
on three main pillars: anti-terror cooperation, addressing economic inequalities and cultural 
dialogue. These priorities were set out in a more structured way in 2006 when they were 
published in a report written by a high level group established under the AoC.  
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The whole document skirts around the idea of the emergence of Islamic extremism.
770
 
All the other pillars such as cultural dialogue, or the measures to improve socio-economic 
cleavages were justified as a means to fight against the potential threat of Islamist terrorism. 
The Spanish newspaper El País reported on how the Spanish government in 2004, following 
the Madrid bombings, had wanted also to propose the renovation of the national pact on 
international terrorism including cooperation with Muslim countries.
771
The interesting 
element of this document is that it stressed the necessity of eliminating the link between 
Islam and terrorism. This trend ensued over the coming years and by 2009 Spanish Ministry 
of Defence published a document titled: “From the Clash of Cultures to the Alliance of 
Civilizations: New Contributions for the Security in the Mediterranean”.772 
All these aspects shaped and determined the impreciseness and blandness of the 
Alliance of Civilizations. Interestingly, Zapatero’s proposal was not far away from Franco’s 
approach with regards to the Arab world. In fact, during the dictatorship, Franco was very 
much trying to establish diplomatic relations with the Arab world by claiming a sort of shared 
lineage and history.
773
In fact, during the years of the international isolation Franco developed 
a sort of cultural diplomacy through the “Hispano-Arab brotherhood”.774Regardless these 
historical reminiscences and similitudes it is important now to assess the consistency and 
political seriousness of Zapatero and his government as political brokers in presenting and 
managing this proposal.  
 
8.3. A Political Broker Managing an Abstract Political Opportunity.  
Henry Kamen dissects the Alliance proposal by analysing three important vectors. They are 
vital to understanding how a political entrepreneur or broker should identify a political 
window and opportunity and, after that, determine a conceptual and material strategy to 
achieve objectives within the short, medium and long term. The questions Kamen ask are 
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with whom and with what is the Alliance constituted? Who should finance this project and 
how? And ending by interrogating on the conceptual, historical and ideological flaws and 
inconsistencies of the proposal.
775
  
On the first point, Zapatero was not interested in -either conceptually or practically-  
exporting to the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East “obsolete” concepts such as 
women rights, freedom of speech, liberal democracy or religious freedom. This cultural 
relativist approach looked to avoid the “imposition” of certain values and norms that are 
constituent features of Western democracies as a way of fostering dialogue.  
The opposite would block any potential dialogue according to Zapatero’s approach. 
However, to what extent this hypothesis would work? Is it possible to say that this approach 
was naïf? Probably it would be more dangerous and would have entailed more risks and 
failures than benefits. Actually in the aforementioned working paper published by the 
Spanish Ministry of Defence, Sánz Roldán by quoting scholar Pedro Martínez Montávez, 
concurred with an idea that is anchored to the dependency theory. He considered that the 
origin of the problems with the Islamic-Arab contemporary world today is the European 
colonialist expansion that entered in those geographic spaces without understanding what 
existed there over the centuries. That generated strong traumas, some of them not solved, like 




However, it is practically impossible to ensure a solid alliance between partners 
through dialogue and mutual understanding alone unless essential political, philosophical and 
ideological elements are shared. The events of the Arab uprising have demonstrated that 
Zapatero’s hypothesis was wrong. Ambassador Eneko Landaburu addressed this point during 
a personal interview:  
 
“It was tacitly accepted in Europe that these southern countries were going directly 
towards a political and religious radicalism. What we had to do was maintaining and 
supporting stabilization policies and that explains the EU’s help to Ben Ali, Mubarak 
and others’ regimes. We supported dictators because they ensured us a certain 
security, because they controlled migration flows and terrorism. And, of course, we 
did not check closely what they were doing with their citizens. This is the 
realpolitik.”777 
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In Strasburg, on 27
 
January 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE) acknowledged this failing: “Europe also has its share of responsibility since 
it failed to condemn the nature of the regimes, preferring to take advantage of its apparent 
stability to carry out its business”.778 These two episodes confirm the conceptual, 
organizational and strategic failure of initiatives such as the Alliance for Civilizations.  
Funding requirements were also key for the success of the Alliance of Civilizations.  
For this, it is essential to map potential stakeholders and “investors” who eventually are going 
to fund the proposal. But money alone, while it can help to establish and maintain short-term 
stability in an area, does not necessarily bring substantial or sustained change.  
This second aspect is intrinsically related to the first element discussed above. 
Elaborating a congruent concept and project is crucial before starting mapping potential 
stakeholders and “investors” who eventually are going to fund the proposal. Initially, the first 
Muslim country to adhere to Zapatero’s proposal was Mongolia, country that was clearly 
interested in attracting the attention from the West.
779
 
There are some other alliances or associations that are well funded, such as the Arab 
League, which existence depends greatly on US funds.
780
 Since 9/11 the US has been 
strengthening financial collaboration with Middle Eastern governments aiming at exporting 
democratic values and norms. As Dalacoura mentions, the USAID increased aid to this 
region from 2001 and by 2002. Colin Powell launched the Middle East Partnership (MEPI) -
2002- in order to support this approach.
781
 Within this same context also the US planned to 
create a free trade area in the region by assuming that an economic liberalization would allow 
a better implementation of democratic values and practices.
782
 These alliances can work 
within the short term normally, thanks to political will, funds, and someone promising to 
follow and respect certain common principles and values and a set of protocols. However it 
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has been demonstrated how –i.e. Arab spring, African ODA783- even with millionaire figures, 
socio-economic and political changes are very often doomed to fail. The money can help to 
establish and maintain –“buy”- stability in an area, but not necessarily provoking neither 
substantial nor sustained and enduring changes.  
Kamen was not sure about how Zapatero could ensure enough financial resources to 
bolster his initiative. However as is going to be shown Zapatero was able to do so. 
Nevertheless, probably a better question then would be; once the diplomatic and financial 
support has been achieved, how is going to be used those resources? According to that it is 
fundamental to set the precise criterions that should be guaranteeing the efficiency and 
sustainability of the project. These aspects are related to the capacity or incapacity of 
managing a complex programme by achieving short, medium and long run objectives. This is 
going to be discussed later. However a question that could be asked is: to what extent 
Zapatero and his supporters were interested in effectively solving the existing problems and 
threats –Islamist terrorism- through the hypothesis of increasing dialogue and mutual 
understanding? Or, was it enough to try “buying” the aforementioned stability and the 
“obedience” from Southern countries? These questions are answered in the following 
epigraph. 
 
8.4. Lack of Clarity and a Fainted Strategy: Missed Opportunities?  
 
Zapatero was able to gain enough funds to support his initiative. The question then was how 
were those resources going to be used? The organizational model of any project should be 
defined by a clear strategy. This is only possible if the political entrepreneur leading the 
project has identified clearly the political window or opportunity. On top of that it is 
important that the political broker leading the proposal remains being interested in developing 
the mechanism forward within the medium and long term. However, from its initial inception 
the Alliance proposal lacked this coherence and consistency. Linked to this, Zapatero, as 
Balci has mentioned, lost his motivation in the “alliance” over the three years after the 
bombings because “the lesser the clash threatens to spread in his country, the lesser Spain 
needs the Alliance”.784 
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This comment would reinforce the idea role of political broker. However the PSOE’s 
2008-2011 electoral program shown a different approach. The second section of the program 
was dedicated to foreign affairs under the title “A stronger Spain within a fairer 
world”.785The sequence of priorities –the top five ones- presented by the PSOE was as 
follows: Alliance of Civilizations for peace and protection of human rights; co-operation and 
development; Latin America; transatlantic relations; promotion of peace, democracy and 
development in the Mediterranean.
786
 This means that the flagship of Zapatero’s foreign 
policy remained the AoC. 
 Using CL to analyse relevant variables of the proposed program it is possible to 
appreciate that policy development at different levels, cooperation and security were the 
some of the most representative variables and this is shown in graphic 16. That expresses the 
priorities and approach the PSOE wanted to communicate to the voters. A second layer 
would be integrated by issues such as migration, human rights, future and terrorism whereas 
AoC was mentioned more times than the word crisis –element that is almost as quoted as 
radical Islam-. This is meaningful especially considering that from 2008 onward Spain started 
to suffer the consequences of a rampant –global and national- economic and financial crisis. 
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Graph (16) PSOE 2008-2011 Electoral Program 
 
  Source: PSOE Electoral Program. Elaborated by the Author.  
 Considering this renewed interest in the AoC as the main diplomatic mechanism to 
propel Spain’s role in international politics, it is important to assess how the initiative was 
managed from 2008 onward. Zapatero’s second mandate would have been important for the 
consolidation of the AoC.  
 The first AoC Global Forum was celebrated in Madrid in January 2008.
788
 In April 
2009 a second forum has held in Istanbul.
789
 In analysing the reports produced after these two 
summits it is possible to say, that according to what it was said before, the AoC was an 
initiative that bipolarised –since the beginning and over its consolidation phase- the concept 
of “civilizations”. The tension Western/Islam worlds is evident. As the graphic number 17 
shows, among the selected variables “religion” represents the most quoted concept. The 
variables “muslim”, “Islam” and “Arab” are also relevant and superior when compared with 
some other potential competitors such as “hindus” “jews” “protestants” or “catholics”. It is 
also relevant to appreciate how geographical factors place the initiative very close to Europe, 
whereas the US plays a marginal role in contributing to the AoC. Therefore it is possible to 
define the AoC as a Eurocentric initiative that has assumed and incorporated the concept of 
clash of civilizations.  
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Graph (17) AoC Madrid 2008-Istambul 2009. 
 
  Source: UNAOC Reports, Madrid and Istanbul. Elaborated by the Author.  
 As the precedent comments and graphic number 17 suggest, the AoC was not 
conceived neither as global alliance nor as an inclusive mechanism. This biased and 
asymmetric approach –especially over the period of consolidation- endangered the 
sustainability of the proposal. As Lachmann has stressed, the “universalistic outlook of such 
efforts is challenged by the essential place of states, the singling out of tensions between the 
‘West’ and the ‘Muslim world’ which points to exclusionary tendencies, and the reliance on 
security references to favour stakeholdership by international actors in the community-
building attempt”.790 
In assuming these institutional and organisational limitations, the selection process of 
new members and supporters can deepen existing unbalances especially if they contribute to 
potentially increase this asymmetry. Over 2008 and 2009 Spanish diplomacy played a very 
important role in attracting political and diplomatic supporters. These efforts contributed to 
the creation of the AoC group of friends.
791
 This group grew up to 136 members by 
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Within this strategic effort of project building Spain and involved partners worked to 
achieve a greater recognisance. In November 2009 the UN approved resolution 64/14 
supporting the activities of the alliance.
793
 Another important partner, the US joined AoC’s 
Group of Friends by May 2010 under Obama’s administration. This association accompanied 
Obama’s first steps in foreign policy focused on the rapprochement between Western and 
Muslim Worlds. His political and diplomatic stances towards the achievement of this 
objective were expressed during his speech –“A new beginning”-in Cairo on 4 June 2009.794 
As it has been said above, within AoC’s phase of consolidation choosing controversial 
partners might entail miscommunication consequences and therefore potential failures. For 
instance, some Israeli media players considered that Obama was joining a “pro-Muslim” 
association.
795
 However, considering the ethos of the Alliance and its peculiarities the most 
controversial partner was NATO.  
In April 2009, Zapatero offered NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
the AoC as a platform to help reduce conflict and strengthen coexistence.
796
 This offer did not 
take into account the impact such a NATO role would have in damaging the possibility of 
strengthening dialogue between “different” civilizations.797  
The NATO had both interests and experiences in the Mediterranean. In 1994 NATO 
established its Mediterranean Dialogue. This originally included Jordan, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Israel, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. This initiative was a clear example of the 
organisation’s attempt to find a political role after the end of the Cold War. Continuing with 
the focus on the Mediterranean, in 2001 –after 9/11- the NATO activated the Operation 
Active Endeavour to fight against terrorism.
798
 Following this trend of institutional 
innovation and identity renovation on 2009 – organization’s Sixtieth anniversary- during the 
                                                          
792
 MAEC (2013): Alianza de Civilizaciones. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Spain. Available at: 
http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/NacionesUnidas/Paginas/AlianzaCivilizacio
nes.aspx (Retrieved 10 June 2013) 
793
 UN (2009): Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly. A/Res/64/14. Available at: 
http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/2009/65.pdf (Retrieved 10 June 2013) 
794
 Obama, B.H. (2009): A New Beginning. Speech in Cairo. 4 June. The White House. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/presidents-speech-cairo-a-new-beginning (Retrieved 13 
November 2012) 
795
 Levi Julian, H. (2010): US Joins Pro-Muslim ‘Alliance of Civilizations’. Arutz Sheva. 20 May. Available at: 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/137610#.UiOkKT-rxzc (Retrieved 13 November 2012) 
796
 Anon. (2009): Zapatero Ofrece que la Alianza de las Civilizaciones Colabore con la OTAN Para Reducir 





 Sjursen, M. (2004): On the Identity of NATO. International Affairs. Vol. 80. Pp. 687-703.  
798
 Mayer, S. (2011): “Die NATO Nach Dem 11. September: Aufgoben, Strategien und Institutionelles Design” 
In Jäger, T. (Ed.): Die Welt Nach 9/11. University of Bremen. Pp. 489-507.  
199 
 
NATO summit held in Strassburg/Khel, the heads of state and government adopted the new 
Declaration on Alliance Security.
799
 
Strategically speaking it is possible to say that Zapatero’s invitation to NATO would 
help to damage any existing pillar or possibility to strengthen dialogue between “different” 
civilizations. Seems to be certain that the NATO over the last years has been trying to find a 
new identity or a justification to exist as Sjursen points out.
800
 As has been arguing authors 
like Williams and Newmann
801
 NATO has been trying to become a security community. This 
opinion is also shared by Gheciu. She expresses serious doubts, however, about the NATO’s 
real possibilities to become an agent of socialization.
802
  
However, this reorientation, this seek of a new identity, cannot eliminate its history. 
As Sjursen has argued, the attempt to define NATO as an association or community of liberal 
democratic values and norms is problematic.
803
Within the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, these historical and institutional contradictions have become increasingly evident. As 
has been acknowledged by Razoux, despite NATO’s increasing activity in the Mediterranean, 
its institutional and organizational image remains negative.
804
 
Zapatero’s belief that NATO was a legitimate partner in the Alliance project shows 
that he failed to identify a proper political stakeholder to support his agenda in the 
Mediterranean. This damaged Zapatero’s credibility in the Mediterranean as a leader and 
interlocutor between the Arab and the western worlds. As a direct consequence, the Alliance 
of Civilizations suffered from this lack of leadership.  
By 2009 Spain had to face a contradictory and worrying scenario. On one hand, when 
the global economic crisis started to hit, Zapatero failed to fully acknowledge the dimensions 
and scope of the economic crisis.
805
 But at the same time Spain was a participant at the G20 
meeting in London, the NATO summit, the EU-US meeting held in Prague and the second 
meeting of the AoC celebrated in Istanbul where it served as co-president.
806
 As former 
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foreign minister Moratinos acknowledged, the country had re-established its standing and this 
“represents a historic moment in the role of Spain’s international relations, without precedent 
in our contemporary history”.807 
From 2004 to 2008, according to Moratinos, Spain’s foreign policy and strategy was 
the removed the unilateralism that characterized Aznar’s style of governing. Moratinos 
believed that Zapatero understood that the new international order of the twenty first century 
required multilateralism and a global approach to the most pressing issues.
808
 
This culminated in the AoC, a multilateral formula that placed Spain at the heart of 
the international system. However both Spain’s and Zapatero’s image and reputation as 
international players were delicate. On one hand new migration dynamics and the way Spain 
started to manage them, rapidly demonstrated the inconsistency between Zapatero’s 
international speech and more pressing national demands. The increasing securitization of 
migration related issues promoted a fiscal and punishing image within Southern 
Mediterranean countries.
809
This hostile image was spread throughout the EU as well as long 
as countries such as France, the Netherlands, UK and Germany failed their integration 
processes and started to experience xenophobic sentiments against migrants as Zapata 
Barrero and Witte have studied.
810
 These facts were especially salient since the beginning of 
the global economic crisis.
811
  
Therefore both the economic crisis –with the sharp and intense deterioration of the 
labour market-
812
 and new migration policies started darkening Spain’s immediate future as a 
successful Euro-Mediterranean leader. In considering this context Spain started to face a very 
delicate situation. On one hand Spain in behaving as an entrepreneur and broker used 
migration related issues as one of the most important leverages to get support from the EU 
and attain greater diplomatic influence. Spain achieved success within the short and medium 
term. But on the other hand, once Spain had to implement restrictive migration policies from 
2006 onward –and therefore abandon an inclusive and progressive rhetoric- Spain started to 
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be targeted by Southern Mediterranean countries as a hostile government. This diminished 
Spain’s negotiation power and diplomatic ability.  
This loss of credibility - from a Southern point of view- was also replicated at a 
European level once Spain demonstrated its incapacity to manage the financial crisis. On one 
hand as Guillen has demonstrated it is true that Spain over its economic and industrial growth 
period –from 1995 to 2005- gained also international stature.813On the other hand, and despite 
good economic and financial contexts, Spain had always to fight against a historical and 
enduring image problem.  As Guillen stresses that the “remarkable economic progress of the 
1990s and early 2000’s has not yet fully erased the perception of decadence, relative 
backwardness and exoticism”.814 
Within this context and diplomatic environment, in 2010, Spain acceded to the EU 
presidency. During this period the intention remained constant – using an international 
diplomatic role to increase prestige by engaging with global priorities in the service of 
national interests and priorities. In other words, the role of the political entrepreneur and 
broker in promoting self-interest needs to do so by embracing multilateral concerns. This is 
arguably the very root of the failure of multilateral diplomacy and mechanisms.  
Spain’s intentions for becoming a regional leader is clear and all national efforts to 
lead euro-Mediterranean politics where in a way threatened by the initiative launched by 
Sarkozy, the UfM. As it was said before, when Sarkozy presented the proposal Spain started 
to be nationally and internationally weakened.  However the Spanish official discourse 
insisted in situating the UfM inside the broader framework of the Barcelona process. This is a 
rhetoric attempt of fortifying Spain’s dominance within the Euro-Mediterranean politics:  
 
“With regards to the Mediterranean, Spain will lead a needed and urgent debate to 
consolidate a Euro-Mediterranean area as a space of peace, prosperity and progress 
throughout the development of the Barcelona process that frames the proposal 
Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”.815 
 
This paragraph insists in the factor of Spanish leadership within a process that should 
be designed to delineate the areas of cooperation. How possible is cooperation when a 
particular or individual government or group of governments design their diplomatic strategy 
in order to reinforce their international dominance? Leadership and cooperation are two 
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vectors that can work together when national interests are put aside. When this condition is 
not respected the future of diplomatic strategies and multilateral mechanisms and policies 
may be doomed to fail in the medium and short term. The communicational component that 
is present in this model tends to be vertical, excluding and restricted to specific priority 
elements the dominant player wants to develop according to the agenda. This model does not 
enhance cooperation but aims at creating or reinforcing –even unconsciously- systems of 
dependence. 
  
8.5.European Reactions.  
In applying the CL approach and in selecting the same variables studied in precedent chapters 
it is important to see how the European Council has been translating the worries and the 
political priorities of EU member states and how political brokers and entrepreneurs have 
been impacting and shaping European politics and decision-making processes. The graphic 
below, number 18, shows the period of Zapatero’s first mandate.  
 
Graph. (18) European Councils, Conclusions of the Presidency. 
 
                  Source: European Council. Elaborated by the Author.  
This graphic number 18 shows that for the studied period of time there are three main 
variables that stick out from the other ones: security, migration and Mediterranean. In 
considering this period, it is clear that terrorism, even though, it remains an important topic 
over 2005, its presence within the official texts curbs. However it is important to note how 













This trend confirms the evolution of this variable over the period of time studied in 
precedence, 2001-2004. Therefore, this trend reinforces this dissertation’s hypothesis which 
has considered that migration related issues represent the most important political and 
diplomatic factor that allows understanding the challenges and failures of both EU public 
speech and diplomatic communication strategies. 
As it has been stated above, 2005 represented the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona 
Process. Within the framework of this review, the EU approved the report on the 
implementation of the Strategic Partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean Region 
and the Middle East.
816
 In considering the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East for the interests of the EU this partnership –based on the interim report of 2004 
that was mentioned earlier- aimed at strengthening all the mechanisms and policies supported 
by the Barcelona Process and the ENP.
817
At a rhetorical level there are a number of 
interesting elements that have to be analysed. This partnership insists in the idea of designing 
policies and mechanisms reinforcing the “principles of joint ownership and partnership”.818 
Technically speaking joint ownership is the fundamental aspect that might guarantee 
win-win scenarios. However it would also entail the existence of control and accountability 
systems to allow a reciprocal evaluation. In any case, due to the strong institutional 
development of European partners and the opposite structure in southern Mediterranean 
countries, this symmetric approach cannot be possible. Therefore the achievement of these 
win-win or co-operative scenarios is doomed to fail. This stronger political consensus and 
diplomatic structure in the EU, allowed at least the discussion -during the 7
th
 Euro-
Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in 2005- on “joint conclusions to be adopted for the 
first time, on the need to promote political and social reforms in the partners countries”.819In 
the conclusions published after this conference it was said that “its vast potential is far from 
being exhausted and sets the objectives for many years to come”.820Although the potential of 
these policies remained very vague from an operational-managerial point of view considering 
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that the only exact –and measurable date- was 2010 when it was supposed to create the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area.  
On the other hand, in the same conclusions, this concept of “joint conclusions” was 
restricted to a paper presented by southern Mediterranean countries where they were 
exposing their diplomatic stances and desires.
821
After the problems and challenges posed by 
an increasing southern migration towards Europe or by the Middle East peace process among 
others, the mentioned phase of “realisation” advised diplomats to consider dialogue among 
partners as the baseline of the futures Euro-Mediterranean project. The graphic number 19 
shows that at a rhetorical level, the European Council placed dialogue before economic, 
trading or security objectives.  
 
Graph (19): Strategic Partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
 
 Source: Strategic Partnership EU-Med-ME. Elaborated by the Author.  
 Despite this apparent –rhetoric- convincement to strengthen dialogue among partners, 
the migratory issue remains very sensitive as it was explained in chapter 6. Especially when 
according to the graphic and the contents of these European councils the variables migration 
and security –European security- are imbricated. This element represents the basic failure of 
the symmetric proposal based on the reinforcement of the feeling of co-ownership.   
 During the third 2005 Council it was also adopted the five year work programme and a 
code of conduct on countering-terrorism. This programme established the medium term 
objectives in the fields of political and security partnership –first priority-; sustainable 
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economic growth and reform; education and socio-cultural exchanges; migration, social 
integration; justice and security.
822
It was also highlighted the need of developing a consistent 
global approach to migration and it was planned that for 2006 it was necessary to hold the 
Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting focusing on migration issues.  
 Following the same line –and clashing with the rhetoric betting for a Euro-
Mediterranean dialogue- it was also discussed the Mediterranean Coastal Patrol Network –the 
Mediterranean Surveillance System- named FRONTEX.
823
During the second Council 
celebrated in 2006, it was linked “organised crime, corruption, illegal migration and 
terrorism”.824It was also stressed that cooperation on migration it was an important part of 
EU’s Neighbourhood Policy.825During the third 2006 council it was highlighted that 
migration represented challenges and opportunities and that it represented one of the “major 
priorities of the EU at the start of the 21
st
 Century”.826 
 During the third council of 2007 it was expressed that the “council calls for better 
coordination between migration and integration policies. In the context of the 2008 year of 
Intercultural Dialogue”.827This statement is contradictory and clashes against the increasing 
securitization and criminalization of migratory issues. Integration policies cannot be fully 
develop within an environment of restriction and securitization, because as it has been 
demonstrated in chapter 4, public opinion reacts negatively against migrants –and therefore it 
blocks potential integration processes- when political communication strategies use migration 
as a political opportunity.  
After showing how Spain during Zapatero’s mandates tried to continue working along 
the same lines to remain a relevant international player, both national and international 
dynamics challenged the hypotheses and policies defended by Spain as a political 
entrepreneur and broker. Spain identified this moment of weakness and Sarkozy was ready to 
take over the Euro-Mediterranean leadership. The next, and final, chapter explores how 
Sarkozy developed his Mediterranean project and assesses how Spain, in losing part of the 
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diplomatic capacity weakened by strategic and managerial errors had to accommodate and re-





THE PRESIDENCY OF NICOLAS SARKOZY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 
 Frustrated Ambitions, Failed Leadership 
 
9.1. Jacques Chirac’s Foreign Policy and the Arab World. 
Analysing Sarkozy’s political and diplomatic engagement in the Mediterranean requires a 
brief review of President Jacques Chirac’s political initiative with regards to French and 
Euro-Mediterranean relations. During his period as France’s Prime Minister -1974 to 1976- 
he demonstrated a clear enthusiasm to promote the Politique Arab de France (PAF).
828
  
Chirac’s presidency -1995 to 2007- covered important years for the development of a 
communitarian Mediterranean policy. As Guitta points out, Chirac inherited a strong pro-
Arab foreign policy.
829




Even though as Gerecht and Schmitt have demonstrated, Chirac during his second 
mandate –from 2002 to 2007- differed from De Gaulle is showing a more proactive attitude 
towards the US.
831
 Putting aside this comment, Chirac immediately after taking office aimed 
at boosting further French-Arab relations by implementing a new politique arabe. Chirac 
wanted to reverse François Mitterrand’s partial lack of engagement within the Mediterranean 
and the Arab World.
832In fact during Mitterrand’s mandate France’s foreign policy developed 
more its European side and marginalised the relations with the Arab World. On one hand, 
that attitude provoked the obsolescence France’s foreign policy towards the Middle East –
especially during his second mandate from 1988 to 1995-and did not allow France’s full 
engagement in the design of the new Euro-Mediterranean project.
833
 
 As soon as Chirac announced his intentions to further develop French-Arab relations, 
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Arab leaders welcomed his decision.
834
 This announcement was pronounced at the University 
of Cairo in April 1996 during an official trip to Lebanon and Egypt. Chirac mentioned that a 
new French-Arab policy should be developed because at that time in France there were 
already four million Muslims. On the other hand, Chirac, taking advantage of the 
developments promoted by the Barcelona Process assured that France’s engagement in the 
region should be shared also with EU institutions, mechanisms and political actors.
835
This 
attitude revealed France’s interest in repositioning the country as a Euro-Mediterranean 
political and diplomatic leader after the socialist hiatus.  
 However beyond these rhetoric aspects, the question that remained was: how did 
Chirac plan to re-launch France’s politique arab? Strategically speaking, as Wood has noted, 
it is clear that Chirac wanted to reverse France’s marginalization. As a part of this strategy, 
Chirac also wanted to play an important and leading role in contributing to the solution of the 
Middle East peace process.
836
 But the fulfilment of his goals depended upon US’s interests in 
the area, so the best possible alliance had to be developed together with the EU.
837
 This 
position between powers was already tested and experienced by France between 1970 and 
1974 within the context of the oil crisis.
838
 However even though Chirac supported EU’s 
initiatives towards the Mediterranean, he wanted to take advantage of the previous economic 
and cultural influence within the region. The Élysée deployed a strategy that could be defined 
as entrepreneurial and industrial diplomacy. This is not the same as being political or 
diplomatic entrepreneur.  
By entrepreneurial and industrial diplomacy the author means the inner-national 
impulse –bilateral- one given single country works out in order to achieve greater regional 
influence through economic and trade relations. This attitude does not seek photo-
opportunities. This attitude is not guided by visual effects but by a productive and tangible 
approach that aims at developing long-term collaborations. 
 During Chirac’s first mandate –from 1995 to 2002- France reached the top three 
among trade partners within the Arab World.
839
 This position has been consolidated over the 
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next decade. By 2012-2013 France was number one trade partner –imports- in Morocco, 
Tunisia; second trade partner in Morocco –exports-, Algeria –imports-, Libya –exports-.840 
That demonstrates French economic influence in North Africa. Nevertheless this intense 
entrepreneurial and industrial diplomacy was not articulated or architected to increase 
France’s leadership in boosting EU’s Mediterranean policy. It basically remained as a 
national effort addressing French national interests.   
 As Telhani has studied through a survey, among Arab countries President Chirac was 
one of the most admired leaders.
841
 Within the same survey references to Spain or any 
Spanish President were inexistent.  However, beyond a charming attitude and a sporadic 
activism, Aeschiman and Boltanski have defined Chirac as a leader who has understood very 
well on-going transformations within the Arab World. But at the same time, he has been 
showing incapacity to overcome a diplomatic inefficiency that has generated immobility and 
lack of concrete results.
842
These two authors concurred with the fact that at the end, beyond 
the PAF’s potential, Chirac’s politique arabe, has been reduced to a particular “vendetta” 
against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. This tense relation with Damascus impeded a fluid 
integration of Syria within the Euro-Mediterranean process. Therefore, this fact added 
complications to a process that was already damaged by these complicated regional and 
international relations. Nevertheless, if France wanted to play a more active and leading role 
within the Euro-Mediterranean process relations with Syria had to be solved. The next 
France’s president –Nicolas Sarkozy- had to change strategy and include Syria within his 
agenda if he wanted to gain leadership.
843
 
Against this background France had a chance to recover its Mediterranean diplomatic 
ambitions within a context of institutional decadence. Decadence shared by the limited results 
provided by Chirac’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, on one hand, and by the quasi-
failure of the Barcelona Process on the other hand. All this framed by increasing migration 
flows from Southern Mediterranean countries and the beginning of the global financial crisis.  
The 2007 French presidential campaign seemed very much to focus on domestic 
problems rather than foreign policy. But as the Spanish case has shown there is often a fine 
line between how issues – such as migration or terrorism – are located in the domestic and 
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foreign spheres.  
France, for example, with the highest number of immigrants of Muslim origin in 
Europe - Seven million, from 1995 to 2007 this number increased of three million- knows 
this better than most.  So did Nicolas Sarkozy. When Chirac was elected as President in 1995 
he defended the new PAF considering also French -Muslim population. However, the 
acceleration of migration flows experienced by Europe since the 2000s, started to challenge 
this pro-migrant rhetoric. As Minister of Interior –under Chirac’s presidency- Sarkozy 
demonstrated a zero-tolerance policy in tackling riots by second and third generations of 
immigrants in Rouen, Aubervilliers, Sein-S. Denis, Rennes, Dijon, Nice and Marseille. 
 Many on the left of the political spectrum believed that his actions during this period 
destroyed his chances in the 2007 election. Others such as US diplomats based in Paris 
thought foreign policy would not matter in the election. In a cable from the US Embassy in 
Paris back to Washington it was noted that “foreign policy has not and probably will not play 
a prominent role in the French presidential election campaign, and neither Nicolas Sarkozy 
nor Segolene Royal has enunciated a fleshed out foreign policy vision”.844They were wrong. 
He won and in doing so highlighted that France’s domestic problems are often also its foreign 
policy problems.  
During their campaigns both Sarkozy and his socialist opponent Royal engaged in 
political discourse very similar to that of de Gaulle’s. Both emphasized human rights and 
democratization as a way of restoring France to its proper international standing and 
underlined its “universal mission” on a global stage. Despite the rhetoric, it needs to be 
assessed just how much, following his victory was Sarkozy genuinely interested in these 
issues and especially in how they related to the Mediterranean?  
 
9.2.Sarkozy and the Mediterranean Window: Launching the Mediterranean Union. 
The relationship between Sarkozy and the Mediterranean became evident during 2005 when 
in a speech in Morocco he commented on the possibility of creating a Mediterranean 
Union.
845
 However, it was not until two years later when Sarkozy was elected president that 
he launched his Mediterranean program. As Romain Nadal, an adviser to the French 
president, noted during an interview for this thesis, while Sarkozy was interior minister he 
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worked closely with Spanish officials and leaders in the area of counter-terrorism.
846
 Whether 
this continued  once Sarkozy came up with his personal Mediterranean project is an 
interesting issue examined below.  
 During his presidential campaign, in Toulon in February 2007, Sarkozy announced his 
intention to launch a “Mediterranean Union”.  He raised this objective in the context of 
ending the “lack of hope” in contemporary France, where there is no certainty about itself, its 
“identity, its role, its future”.847 Indeed, within nine sentences Sarkozy used the word “hope” 
six times. As Balfour has mentioned there was also a strong post-colonial component to 
Sarkozy’s words.848 “In Toulon, I came to tell the French that their future is here, in the 
Mediterranean. Here where everything has began (…)”.849In using the CL approach it is 
possible to appreciate in the graphic number 20, that Sarkozy was -quantitatively speaking 
considering both ranking and frequency- articulating his speech in a very precise way: first 
putting first himself as the agent of change; second mentioning “we” including and involving 
French citizens within this new process: third, incorporating within the process the 
“Mediterranean” as the chosen element to boost this change being; four “France” the country 
to be responsible for it; five, placing “Europe” in a secondary position. 
 
Graph (20) Sarkozy, Discourse Toulon. 2007. 
 
  Source: Sarkozy’s complete discourse, Toulon, 2007.  
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 Undoubtedly, this rhetoric was mainly an electoral strategy directed to address some 
French problems. As Gillespie has noted there were also a number of economic and 
commercial interests behind Sarkozy’s proposal.850 In three interviews for this thesis, with 
Monica Frassoni, co-spoke person of the Green Party in Brussels and Paolo Bergamaschi and 
Michelle Rieu, Green party foreign policy advisors, it was noted that Sarkozy’s interest was 
in part making France into the main supplier and provider of nuclear energy technology and 
infrastructure in the Southern Mediterranean in general and in Libya in particular.
851
  
 In fact during June 2007, one month after being elected as president, Sarkozy visited 
Tripoli on an official visit to meet with Colonel Qaddafi. Sarkozy described this as an attempt 
to ”help Libya to come back to the international order”.852 However the trip also had strong 
political, strategic and economic connotations. As Le Figaro noted, it was during this trip that 
French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner and his Libyan counterpart, Abderrahmane 
Chalgham, signed a “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Civilian 
Nuclear Applications”, and a number of parallel agreements on defense and security. 
Subsequently commercial agreements were signed to develop civilian nuclear energy.
 853
  
  This relationship with Libya was representative of Sarkozy’s development as a political 
entrepreneur in the Mediterranean by providing a “brilliant and aggressive foreign policy to 
satisfy the French and pull them out of depression”.854 Some argued his plans for the 
Mediterranean would be a “duplication” of the EU.855 If this proposal intended, as Jamet 
hypothesized,
856
  to be a more regional “Union” from a conceptual point of view, any 
envisaged process of regional integration would have been much more difficult than a union 
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among European partners.   
This explains the badly planned diplomatic and political strategy Sarkozy deployed. 
This chapter intends to demonstrate that this proposal from its inception to its partial 
implementation was an unnecessary political initiative. First, it showed a lack of 
understanding with regards to the socio-economic needs and obstacles of the broader 
Southern Mediterranean. Second, those who wanted to lead this project, like Spain, Italy and 
France demonstrated a lack of willingness to develop a flexible approach to the development 
of the project. Third, the willingness of some EU Member States to provide EU-taxpayer 
funds on a poorly thought out project. Fourth, the lack of political responsibility in 
negotiating with dictatorial regimes in the Mediterranean countries.  
 These issues raise an important question as to what exactly was the strategic objective 
of Sarkozy’s Mediterranean project? As Nadal put it in an interview for this thesis:  
 
“I think that he did it very à la Sarkozy. With egocentrism (…) The main difficulty at 
the Elysèe at that time is that the one who brings up and pushes this project is Henry 
Guaino, who conceptualized it with Jean-Louis Guigou. Henry Guaino is very anti-
European, and he considers this project as an alternative project to the Barcelona 
Process, not as an occasion to modernise it. Because of this approach there was a very 
strong fight at the Elysèe between Guaino and Jean Davide Levitte, diplomatic 
advisor”.857 
 
 According to this view there was a divide between Sarkozy’s senior advisors and 
according to Nadal, these tensions impacted negatively on this project from the beginning.
858
 
According to Guigou – founder and general delegate of the Institute de Prospective 
Économique du Monde Mediterranéen (IPEMED)-, also in an interview for this thesis, there 
was not a particular ideology driving Sarkozy’s actions: “Sarkozy did not prepare anything. It 
was a bomb. Like a terrorist…This is political terrorism. He scared, he was strong and he was 
malignant”.859Guigou’s strong statement against Guaino’s and Sarkozy’s proposal was 
justified by the strong work developed by Guigou and the IPEMED within the Mediterranean 
world since 2006. It is possible to say that many of the ideas taken by Guaino and Sarkozy 
were rooted in Guigou’s Mediterranean thought.  
 Sarkozy launched his proposal without taking into consideration any other potential 
partners. As Balfour and Schmid noted, “Paris has (…) begun seeking consensus ex post on 
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an idea that it did not discuss in advance with potential partners but now cannot afford to 
either drop or pursue in isolation”.860 This lack of strategy clashed with the EU’s interests in 
the area and challenged those countries like Spain and Italy playing an important role in 
leading the EMP. As Schumacher has also stated, Sarkozy underestimated the internal 
dynamics “that a bloated framework of 43 members which such different political, economic 
and socio-cultural backgrounds would generate.”861 
As some political commentators have stated, it seemed that Sarkozy was trying to 
consolidate his political credentials on a global level by acting as the diplomatic bridge 
between the North and the South of the Mediterranean.
862
 In doing this Sarkozy forgot or 
ignored the fact that the Mediterranean was a zone of common interest. As Daoud has stated, 
during his five years of leadership, part of the reason Sarkozy failed to “leverage 
appropriately and responsibly his country’s global leadership position as a major economic 
and military power”,863 was because he looked to take the lead in the Mediterranean alone. 
The EU did not wait to react against this manoeuvre.  
 
9.3.European Reactions.  
Sarkozy decision to engage unilaterally in the Mediterranean provoked severe responses from 
his EU partners and fuelled existing rivalries –economic and political – that did not help to 
develop a coordinated Euro-Mediterranean process.
864
It is important to bear in mind that 
economically speaking, as Guigou has mentioned, among European countries there is pure 
rivalry and therefore, spurring those geo-strategic and economic tensions would contribute to 
annihilate or weaken any socio-political initiative.
865
 
 Initially Sarkozy’s political discourse designed by Guaino was based both on emotion 
and nationalism. In strategic terms his first rhetorical approach was aimed at three specific 
objectives: 1) Criticizing any existing policy, 2) offering a new alternative and 3) opening a 
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new frame of multilateral relations in parallel to the EU but led by France.  
 In retrospect it is possible to say that the first objective was successful. Sarkozy actively 
criticised and disqualified the Barcelona Process during his official visit to Tunisia in April 
2008.
866
 However, Spain’s Secretary of State for the EU, Diego González Garrido reacted 
immediately and defended the Barcelona Process.
867
 
 As the director of the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMeD), Andreu 
Bassols has noted the second one –proposing an alternative- offered the possibility of 
achieving certain consensus.  However: “…this alternative did not work out with the Turkish 
who immediately received that discourse with great scepticism, and even with certain 
hostility. And I know that because few weeks after the discourse I was in Ankara and the 
message we got from the Ministry was very clear.” 868  
 The third objective did not succeed. That is why, according to Bassols, there was a 
desire to call it the Mediterranean Union from the start.
869
 However, this was a very 
ambitious name for a very underdeveloped organization. As such, the name chosen was the 
Union for the Mediterranean.
870
  
 European stakeholders did not welcome this specifically nationalistic proposal launched 
independently by Sarkozy. As ambassador Landaburu has stressed, Sarkozy’s proposal was 
unexpected in Spanish political and diplomatic circles.
871
 Former president of Catalonia Jordi 
Pujol also expressed this view: “Sarkozy had a political campaign where he never spoke 
about the Mediterranean. (…) I was amazed when during his first discourse after winning the 
elections he said that they would create a Mediterranean Union that would integrate North 
African countries and Europe.”872 Spanish diplomats found very difficult to accept the 
proposal.  
Sarkozy lobbied hard across Europe and as ambassador Landaburu highlights: “They 
did not dare to oppose against Sarkozy. And there, there was also a pact of Southern countries 
against the Eurocrats and Germany, a pact that France wanted to avoid. ”873Having said that 
                                                          
866
 Marti Font, J.M. (2008): “Sarkozy Descalifica el Proceso de Barcelona de la Unión Europea”. El País. 1 
May. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/2008/05/01/internacional/1209592805_850215.html (Retrieved 27 
October 2011) 
867
 González, M. (2008): “España Defiende de las Críticas de París el Proceso de Barcelona”. 2 May. Available 
at: http://elpais.com/diario/2008/05/02/internacional/1209679206_850215.html (Retrieved 27 October 2011) 
868
 Personal interview with IEMeD Director General Andreu Bassols. Barcelona, 27
 
October 2011.  
869
 Ibid.  
870
 Ibid.  
871
 Cited interview with Ambassador Eneko Landaburu.  
872
 Available at: http://www.support-sarkozy-france.com/nicolas_sarkozy/victory_speech.pdf (Retrieved 21
 
July 
2012). Cited interview with Pujol.  
873
 Ibid.  Op. Cit. Balfour, R. and Schmid, D. (2008): P. 1.  
216 
 
Spain did not react due to two reasons, first it had no other alternative proposals and second 
they were also happy to let Sarkozy “burn himself in the Mediterranean” .874On the other 
hand it is also true that this political and diplomatic storm helped to reposition the 
Mediterranean within the European agenda.  
However, Sarkozy was willing to cooperate because he wanted the initiative to 
succeed. In particular, he wanted the support of the larger northern European EU powers 
Germany and the UK “German Chancellor Angela Merkel, openly accused France of 
excluding non-Mediterranean countries in an attempt to sideline existing EU policies and 
hijack European funds to support French foreign policy initiatives”. The UK said that it 
“would not spend an extra penny on the project”.875 
  Smaller member states such as Portugal and Slovenia, both of whom held EU 
presidencies during this time were suspicious of the proposal as contradicting the EU’s own 
plans for the Mediterranean during their presidencies. The important Mediterranean 
stakeholders of Italy and Spain were also suspicious.  In June 2007, Sarkozy had a meeting 
with Romano Prodi in the Elysèe in order to try to get Italian support. But the proposal as it 
was presented was rejected immediately.
876
 
The context was very difficult as Echeverría states. This new ambiguous proposal 
should have to solve the problems that were not solved over the last twelve years. It seemed 
to be more a question of political will, idealism and illusion rather than political efficiency 
and realism. Summarizing, apart from internal opposition, Sarkozy’s proposal had to contend 
with deadlock in the Middle East peace process, differences over the potential accession of 
Turkey to the EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
 877
 According to Turkey’s 
Ambassador to the UN Oguz Demiralp who was interviewed for this thesis, Turkey viewed 
Sarkozy’s proposal as “a trap designed only for Turkey” so Turkey could be told “you have 
the Mediterranean Union, a virtual or fictitious entity, so, don’t try to come to the European 
Union. But at the end he had to change”.878 
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With these challenges Sarkozy realised that without the Spanish and the Italian 
support the proposal would sink. The French president organised a dinner with Zapatero in 
Rome in order to explain the proposal. Spanish foreign minister Moratinos supported the 
proposal because he believed  that it was in Spain’s interests to back the initiative in terms of 
Spain’s role within the overall Mediterranean process.879These strategic actions demonstrate 
how the French diplomacy had to react very actively in order to get the proposal afloat.  
As Bassols pointed out during the interview, Spain’s minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Miguel Ángel Moratinos went on board quickly as understood that it was in Spain’s interest 
to support this initiative in order to promote the advancement of the process, even though, 
probably, Moratinos not being a very convinced Europeanist, was mostly thinking about 
Spain’s role within the overall Mediterranean process. Nevertheless at a diplomatic level, the 
interest in pushing the proposal towards Europe was probably the most pragmatic option to 




From Moratinos’ perspective, Sarkozy’s proposal was an instrumental tool to 
overcome the problems the Barcelona Process faced in its attempt to construct a real Euro-
Mediterranean geopolitical space.
881
  In other words, its support was an attempt to transform 
and translate French moves into a specific action that should benefit all the stakeholders 
involved in the Euro-Mediterranean process.
882
  
On top of that it would not be prudent forgetting the global economic crisis that 
started to be widely recognised from 2008 onwards. This factor, has been contributing to 
deepen the difficulties of such a complex multilateral project on a number of vectors: a global 
economic crisis summed to a less Mediterranean approach makes more difficult the allocation 
of limited financial resources to develop required political projects; the bilateralism proposed 
by the ENP would also block a multilateral approach; as a consequence, the diminishing 
interest in the Mediterranean linked to the difficult global economic situation would 
constitute one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome by the project, beyond any kind of 
political willing or particular/national geopolitical or geostrategic interest.  
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9.4.Europeanizing the Project: Rebuilding Trust.  
On the 5
 
December 2007 a summit met to discuss Mediterranean issues. Both Prodi and 
Zapatero offered political support to Sarkozy if the new proposal was integrated into existing 
EU mechanisms and objectives and if it complemented the existing EMP. Later that month,  
on the 20 December 2007, the presidents of Italy, France and Spain met in Rome . They 
released a statement –L’Appel de Rome- in support of the UfM describing it as a mechanism 
that would be at the heart of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the region. It also made the 
point that the Union should be established over the principle of co-operation but not over the 
principle of integration”.883 
Through this statement they also called for the first UfM meeting to be celebrated by 
2008. Nevertheless, this summit was also important given that it worked out as an event 
where Sarkozy, Prodi and Zapatero tried to rebuild the trust among them. As former French 
diplomat Denis Bauchard has stated, the potential success of this initiative was linked to three 
fundamental factors: trust among southern Mediterranean partners; trust among EU partners, 
and; a clear and specific method to implement the new mechanisms.
884
 
With this, Sarkozy’s proposal was being Europeanized. Nevertheless, Germany was 
still not entirely convinced that these changes were substantial enough. Merkel’s harsh 
criticism in 2008 was focused on her belief that the project was not compatible with existing 
EU mechanisms, objectives and policies.
885
 
This Franco-German tension made the role played by Spain and Italy more important 
but the key remained Franco-German agreement. That came during the  European Council on 
13 March 2008 and this was the moment when the proposal was finally Europeanized in full. 
This decision guaranteed, at least in principle, a sort of continuation between the 
Barcelona Process and the “new” concept related to a Union for the Mediterranean, which 
explains why it was re-baptised as the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” as 
Guillespie has pointed out.
886
  
Linking this new project to Barcelona made sense, as abandoning it would have given 
credence to those who believed that the whole Euro-Med process was a failure. Barcelona 
also provided the institutional framework and experience for the EU to deal with the 
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Mediterranean and despite internal differences within the EU, there was still a very big 
political, economic and strategic need to find a way of dealing with the region.  
In fact, this institutional and diplomatic interest can be justified at least for three main 
factors. First, despite existing contradictory versions with regards to the failure or the success 
of the Barcelona process, a “re-shaped” project would give the idea –to the public opinion 
mainly- that the new concept would polish and re-launch a worthy common project. Second, 
from a theoretical and accountable point of view, if it would be possible to say that the 
Barcelona Process failed since its conceptualization and inception, it had to be justified that 
all the financial and economic resources that were wasted underpinning all mechanisms 
launched by the Barcelona Process could not be simply stopped. Abandoning and closing the 
“Barcelona Process” chapter would have supported the ideas of those who thought that the 
overall experience failed.  
Considering this scenario, the EU would have been vulnerable and a serious 
evaluation should have been launched in order to look for responsibilities. Third, probably, 
considering the strategic needs of the EU with regards to Southern Mediterranean countries, 
the “new” project, at both rhetorical and practical levels would be very much needed to exert 
political, economic and diplomatic influence over the Southern Mediterranean rim.  
All three aspects are reflected in the European Parliament resolution issued of 5 June 
2008.
887
 Specifically interesting are the points where the resolution expresses its strategic 
concerns and its reflection upon the partial failure of the Barcelona Process: (A) “Whereas 
the Mediterranean region and the Middle East are of strategic importance to the EU and 
whereas there is a need for a Mediterranean policy based on solidarity, dialogue, cooperation 
and exchange, with a view to meeting common challenges and achieving the aim of creating 
an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity” and (D1). “Whereas the overall assessment 
of the Barcelona Process is that despite its insufficient achievements, compared to the initial 
objectives, it has potential which should be optimised…. Welcomes the above-mentioned 
Communication from the Commission entitled 'the Barcelona Process: Union for the 
Mediterranean', and shares the aim of this new initiative to give fresh political and practical 
impetus to the multilateral relations of the EU with its Mediterranean partners by upgrading 
the political level of relations, through greater co- ownership and enhanced sharing of 
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responsibilities, as well as by developing regional projects responding to the needs of citizens 
in the region”.888 
The Euro-Mediterranean summit held in Paris on 13 July 2008, may well have been, 
in the words of Turkey’s Ambassador Demiralp, a “good photo opportunity”.889 But it also 
revealed also some challenges that the new process faced.  The first was the Mediterranean 
partners Sarkozy had to deal with- Mubarak, Ben Ali, Assad. As Claret asked rhetorically in 
his interview for this thesis, “you had to wonder how you could build a future with these 
people. I understand the Realpolitik but we should say the things very clearly.”890  
It is true that since the Barcelona Process there was a principle of conditionality. 
However practically speaking, this principle was segregated to few declarations and the way 
of working was mainly bilateral. As Claret highlights, with the UfM it was introduced the 
issue of the positive conditionality, which seems to be more relevant. To his mind, this 
principle had to be applied much earlier, and, in addition to this, much more support to those 




Nevertheless, considering the partners involved in the project it was very difficult to 
ensure a neither continuity nor any substantial novelty with regards to a new process 
involving new objectives and mechanisms. Reflecting upon the possibilities of succeeding, as 
Gillespie states, a strong and honest analysis of the main failures of the Barcelona Process 
was not conducted.
892
 Therefore without any kind of evaluation or systematization of good or 
bad practices, the UfM was launched. But the problem was not simply the capacity or 
commitment of external partners. It is arguable that there has not been a real euro-
Mediterranean leader –neither Spain nor France- able to identify regional priorities, goals and 
mechanisms beyond particular national interests.   
As Balfour and Schmid have pointed out the Quai d’Orsay explored a number of 
options over the summer 2008 in order to define the geography of the new project. They 
examined whether it should be a Western Mediterranean approach or cover the whole 
Mediterranean including the Balkans or an enlarged option involving all EU member states 
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The first option was the most realistic as it did not have to address the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. It would also have allowed for the creation of an intermediate platform to negotiate -
prior to a wider Mediterranean approach. As Jordi Pujol noted in an interview for this thesis, 
the Western Mediterranean also had the advantage of not being a space dominated mostly by 
the US.
894
 The second and the third options were more ambitious, but past experience had 
underscored their propensity for failure. 
895
 




November 2008, organised 
under the EU French presidency and attended by foreign ministers was a key step in the 
process during which the Union idea broke its links from the Barcelona framework.
896
 
The Union now committed itself to the creation and the reinforcement of a common 
area of “peace, stability, security and shared prosperity, as well as full respect of democratic 
principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms and promotion of understanding between 
cultures and civilizations in the Euro-Mediterranean region”.897  
Present in this statement, as expected, is the classic EU rhetoric regarding the noble 
intentions and objectives of such a partnership. However, at the very same time, EU member 
states were operating in the opposite way in the pursuit of national interests and domestic 
agendas in the face of the  global economic crisis and the Arab uprisings of 2011 (known as 
the Arab Spring). Within the declaration of Marseille as the graph number 21 shows, there is 
continuity with the main driving elements that characterized the Barcelona Process. Both 
“dialogue” and “cooperation” represent the operational elements that act as common 
denominators, whereas the most important aspects are related to “trade”, “security”, 
“migration” and “economic” related issues, whereas “human rights” occupy a marginal 
position. This consistent trend shows that the same theoretical mistakes that provoked the 
partial failure of the EMP were repeated by the UfM.  
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 EU. (2008): Barcelona Process; Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference. Final Declaration. 










Graph. (21)  Declaration of Marseille. Variables.  
 
       Source: Declaration of Marseille. European Council. Elaborated by the Author. 
Leaving these considerations aside for the moment, it is worth noting that the 
Marseille document continued by setting out the main areas that the UfM should develop: 
“De-pollution of the Mediterranean, Maritime and Land Highways, Civil Protection, 
Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan, Higher Education and Research, Euro-
Mediterranean University and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative”.898  
It also noted the main obstacles the UfM faced in achieving this. Most were 
diplomatic and related to inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli tension and the relationship of Balkan 
countries and transnational entities like the League of Arab States in the process.
899
 
The declaration also addressed technical issues such as the operational mechanisms 
and the role of the co-presidency, senior officials, the joint permanent committee and the 
secretariat.
900
 The secretariat would have a technical role and political matters would be 




9.5.Initial reactions from the South  
Any project-building process such as the one set out in the UfM has to integrate all 
stakeholders from the start. The communicational process is crucial in order to ensure a sense 
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of ownership. The UfM, firstly a French-centric project and secondly a Euro-centric proposal, 
did not take this properly into account. Southern Mediterranean countries were informed 
direclty, or followed the events from a certain distance, but were not directly involved in 
discussions despite the lesson of Barcelona, where Arab countries became further removed 
from the process as it developed. 
902
 
 In specifically analysing the process of discussion and implementation of the UfM it is 
possible to say that Southern Mediterranean countries were not considered in the negotiation 
process. In fact, given that the process had to be Europeanized in order for it to be accepted 
by Sarkozy’s EU partners, the initial priority was to include EU member states and 
stakeholders in early discussions. For their part, non-EU countries were informed about how 




 On top of this were all the traditional challenges to engaging the South in a viable way. 
The EU was very institutionalized, whereas southern states were very fragmented. Ongoing 
regional tensions between Morocco and Algeria for instance were an obstacle to progress. 





9.6.Spain becomes home to the UfM 
From a strategic point of view, establishing the UfM’s headquarters in Barcelona would give 
the impression of continuity with the Barcelona process and would reassure Spain of its 
importance in the making of Euro-Mediterranean policy. However, as Anna Terron declared 
during an interview for this thesis –former Spain’s Secretary of State and Spanish politician 
who was part of Moratinos’ team that negotiated this- Spain still had to “work a lot to get the 
secretariat”.905 
 These efforts were facilitated by French interests and desires. As Terron noted, though 
many felt that Marseille might be a candidate for the headquarters, “France is Paris. And 
something that is important for France cannot be based in Marseille.. A French diplomat 
would consider that establishing something in Marseille is downgrading the project”.906  
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 However according to confidential sources France had reasons, other than geography, 
for supporting Barcelona as a location.
 907
 France wanted was the UfM’s secretary to be based 
in Tunis with a French secretary-general. This approach would have given to France total 
control over the project. However, as Bassols acknowledged during an interview, EU partners 
would not have accepted a French secretary based in an Arab country.
908
 It had major 
political implications, all the more so in the context of Israel’s invasion of Gaza in December 
2008. This happened few months after the celebration of the summit held in Paris.  
 When this idea fell through and with Marseille ruled out the two alternatives for France 
were Malta and Spain.  As the more powerful candidate Spain won out because France, in the 
words of Bassols “wanted to avoid, in any case, the failure of this initiative. I think that the 
French diplomacy was behind this proposal with all the power and they demonstrated an 
important political will.”909 
 Speaking from a French perspective Nadal believes that it was good that Spain won this 
battle because a base in Tunisia would have collapsed during the Arab Spring that 
followed.
910
 Classified information expresses that in the beginning before the designation of a 
Moroccan secretary, Algeria opposed to that hypothesis.
911
 
 The start of the Barcelona-based secretariat was difficult. Its efforts were paralysed  the 
Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza. In June 2009, when discussions restarted there were further 
complications and planning was hampered further by the lack of poor objectives and poor 
coordination. Extra complications and disagreements delayed the start of the Secretary that at 
the end initiated during March 2010. All these institutional efforts to re-develop and revamp a 
Euro-Mediterranean policy were marked by lack of objectives, poor coordination, and it may 
seem that the entire proposal followed a hectic calendar that would represent a new total or 
partial failure. 
 
9.7.The benefits of the Union for the Mediterranean or for the South?  
The success or the failure of such a complex project as the UfM depends on the relationship 
between stakeholders involved. In this case there was a very asymmetric relationship –
                                                          
907
 Governmental sources. Reserved. The interviewees preferred not to be quoted. The information was obtained 
during two different interviews and both sources concurred with the same version of the facts.  
908
 Cited interview with Andreu Bassols.  
909
 Ibid.  
910
 Cited interview with Romain Nadal.  
911
 The informant preferred to remain anonymous.  
225 
 
culturally, economically, politically, socially, financially and institutionally. In these terms 
was the UfM presented as an opportunity for Southern Mediterranean countries? 
As the communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council noted in 2008 its main objective was to “enhance multilateral relations, 
increase co-ownership of the process and make it more visible to citizens. Now is time to 
inject more momentum into the Barcelona Process”.912 
The question of ownership or co-ownership is the most relevant and decisive aspect a 
complex project like the UfM should face. It is also the key element that can support or 
destroy the possibilities of a real partnership.
913
 By using very open and idealistic language, it 
was hoped that this partnership would ensure that “all dimensions of the process will be open 
to all participants on an equal footing”.914 But, what was meant by co-ownership? As Balfour 
has noted “the equality between states also depends on the distribution of political and 
economic power, which is by and large tilted in the EU’s favour, though the energy exporting 
countries of the South can exercise a great deal of leverage”.915  
Beyond the difficulties caused by traditional conflicts in the region (such as the Arab-
Israeli conflict), it is almost impossible to set a regional agenda, prioritize objectives, define 
the mechanisms to achieve goals and design common strategies when strong political barriers 
exist. On top of this there are also economic, politic, social and demographic differences that 
pose major problems. As Bocquillon, Confavreux and Voionmaa have explained, the 
Mediterranean, in all these ways, is not comparable with other regions in the world.
916
 
There has been little scholarly research examining how the southern Mediterranean 
states have perceived the methodological and rhetorical aspects of the UfM. Most of the 
analyses have come from European or western scholars. Gillespie tried to consider and 
discuss, partly, these southern responses but his analysis was brief.
917
 Gillespie –following a 
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similar rationale to that used by Kamen to assess the launch of the AoC
918
- stated that 
financial resources both from private and public sources would be one of the most evident 
obstacles the new proposal should face.
919
 However Khatib has produced interesting findings, 
albeit in a different context.
920
. For southern actors, Khatib argued, financial constraints were 




In these terms it is not surprising that the first Euro-Mediterranean Summit, planned 
for May 2010 had to be postponed to November and put off once more then until further 
notice due to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
The conflict blocked or modified as well the UfM’s launch of initiatives.922 The 
organisation’s first secretary-general, Jordan’s Ahmed Masa’deh, explained during an 
interview that UfM’s main objectives should be more economic and social rather than 
political.
923
 During a meeting in Brussels in November 2010, the UfM’s budget was reduced 
by a more than 60 per cent for 2011, to €6.2 million, of which €3 million was to be disbursed 
by the European Commission and the rest of funds via other mechanisms. The refusal as 
major EU players –Germany, the UK, to invest heavily in this process “this reflects the 
willingness and the orientation that the countries have”, as former UfM secretary-general 
Masa’deh stated.924 As Fernández points out, this lack of political was also reflected in the 




Water was one of the issues that from a practical point of view was vital to all 
southern partners to the UfM. This issue was meant to be discussed during the first 
ministerial meeting -2008- but it was postponed twice due to the tensions produced by the 
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 Political reasons blocked one of the most representative social 
programmes in the region.  NGOs and environmental groups like the World Wide Fund 
(WWF) expressed frustration over the repeated cancellation of the ministerial summit on the 
grounds that the UfM “represents a unique opportunity to face all the hottest environmental 
problems, like water management or the climate change.  
This opportunity should not be lost and for that reason the WWF asks to the UfM’s 
member states to progress and achieve results.”927 The political pressure the Arab-Israeli 
conflict exerts on any kind of Euro-Mediterranean initiative is huge. For instance in 2012, the 
Palestinian Contractors Union menaced UNICEF –the organization in charge of building the 
desalinization plant in the Gaza strip funded by the EU- to boycott the process because it was 




In operational terms, the lack of political will to overcome regional obstacles was 
evident from the beginning in terms of allocation of personnel. Six months after its 
establishment only 25 officials were in post (a quarter of the agreed total). Officials were 
even briefing the press that the organisation was “something completely conceptual, nothing 




 When the author visited the UfM headquarters in Barcelona for meetings with the 
Deputy Directors Ambassador Attard-Pirotta and Rafik Husseini on 24 January 2012, the 
building was quite empty and was hidden and isolated from the vibrant streets of Barcelona. 
This detail evidences the lack of integration of the UfM headquarters within the vibrant and 
vivid atmosphere of Barcelona. As Mr. Masa’deh highlighted, if Member States don’t send 
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their experts “who is going to do the job?”931On January 2011, after less than one year of 
sterile hope, the first Secretary General resigned.
932
According to an interview to AFP a 
UfM’s officer acknowledged that the organization “is something completely conceptual, 
nothing has passed to a practical level”.933 
 Aliboni and Ammor have asked, “What does the UfM really want to achieve: a more 
political, or a more developmental oriented agenda?”934 This fundamental question was also 
posed, though somewhat differently, in relation to the Barcelona Process. On both occasions, 
and in practical terms, the most satisfactory answer is that the political vision, shared both by 
EU and non-EU partners, is to maintain a status-quo by adopting a neo-realist approach.  
As Khatib has noted, one of his interviewees, from Tunisia, argued that “there are too 
many projects and too many speeches, sources for funding are rare and projects are the 
weakest link (…) there is a lot of rhetoric and much weakness on the ‘citizens/people 
dimension. At the end of the day there is little new in the UfM”935 
This negative perception amongst Mediterranean partners encapsulates the common 
tendency of southern officials attack the hypocrisy of the EU, blaming European 
stakeholders. This criticism is very understandable but it is also somewhat rhetorical and only 
tells part of the full story. The reality is that despite rhetoric many leaders of southern 
governments do not necessarily maximise the value or benefits of relations with the EU to 
push for policies that are not in the interests of the local population.  
As Spanish Ambassador to Morocco Alberto Navarro commented on the UfM that 
what the EMP attempted to do was very meritorious. However Sarkozy’s project so far did 
not produce any result:  
“In fact today I have been speaking with the Moroccan ambassador to the UfM, 
Amrani, who starts tomorrow acting as the Secretary General in Barcelona. I said to 
him that is necessary to initiate the UfM on the 6 or 7 aspects that are integrated in the 
process. It has to been done following a communitarian method. Doing things, small 
steps, and step by step you can do a lot. It is necessary to impulse projects in all the 
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proposed ambits. And I have told him that his legitimacy is going to be granted if he 
acts and if he works.”936  
Bearing these considerations in mind it is valuable to examine the actual projects that 
were underway as part of the UfM by late 2011. The following table number 2 compiled by 
the author shows these projects, the beneficiary countries, their status and the allocated 
budget.  
 
Table (2) Distribution and Status of UfM’s Projects, August 2012. 
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938
 and other sources.  
 This data demonstrates the limited action that the UfM had been engaged in terms of 
submission, evaluation, funding and execution of projects over this time period. In most of 
these there is not the available information about specific objectives, costs, and execution to 
make substantive assessments of their value. One of the most representative projects in terms 
of the large number of beneficiaries is the desalinization facility for the Gaza strip. It was 
costed at  US$455 million. But that is the exception rather than the norm. 
As Ambassador Cecilia Attard-Pirotta, UfM’s deputy secretary-general reflected in an 
interview for this thesis, between the Barcelona Process and the UfM: “The tangible results 
have been very little, but on the diplomatic front it has been acknowledged the importance of 
meeting”.939  
Despite such sentiments the actual practical role of the UfM does not appear to justify 
its existence.  Certainly, the impact of dissolving the UfM would not be high in 
developmental, economic, political and social terms across the Mediterranean.  
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 Personal interview with Ambassador Cecilia Attard-Pirotta, Deputy Secretary General, UfM. Barcelona, 24 
January 2012.  
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9.8.Europe and the Future of the UfM.  
EU’s political discourse helps to understand further UfM’s developments. In order to better 
understand and evaluate the evolution of the UfM it has been analysed again the conclusions 
of the European Council. For the purpose of this analysis it has been considered the period 
2009-2013.  As the graphic number 22 shows, after 2009 it is possible to appreciate a general 
trend where analysed variables curb their presence and frequency.  
 
Graph (22): European Council. Conclusions of the Presidency 2009-2013. 
 
 Source: European Council.  
 Overall the most cited variable remains “security”. However, in analysing possible 
correlations, the use of “security” within this period of time is not correlated to issues such as 
“terrorism”. There is a strong correlation between “security” and energy related issues. That 
reveals a special interest for ensuring the supply of energy to the EU. Conversely to what 
happened during the three “Mediterranean” waves -1994 to 1996, 1999 to 2000 and 2005-
2006- after the presentation and institutionalization of the UfM, explicit references to the 
“Mediterranean” were very scarce as the graphic 22 shows. “Migration”, “Mediterranean” 
and “Security” are also correlated within 2009, 2010 and 2011 but in a very slight way.  
 It is interesting to appreciate, however, how the variable “Arab” was proportionally 
high, especially from 2011-2012. This coincided with the Arab Spring and the role the Arab 
League should have to play to solve –or mediate- these uprisings. The tense and delicate 
episodes of the Arab uprising and aftermaths would have represented a golden opportunity –





































































































































































the UfM within this context were very limited. There is a reference in 2011 underlining the 




 Summarizing, European Council’s public speech confirms the decadence of the Euro-
Mediterranean process –UfM- and its potential as an agent to promote collaboration and 
cooperation between European and Southern Mediterranean countries. In analysing through 
the CL approach these conclusions, the Mediterranean lost political and diplomatic 
momentum. Therefore, political and diplomatic brokers and entrepreneurs like Spain and 
France sold the Mediterranean as a commodity to gain greater diplomatic stature within the 
EU, mostly pursuing short and medium term national interests.  
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10.1. Originality and Contribution to the Literature.  
 
As it has been detailed in the early part of this thesis, scholarly attempts to explain the 
processes involved in the creation, development, implementation, and management of Euro-
Mediterranean politics have been numerous. However most of them have taken a non-
interdisciplinary approach to understand these complex dynamics. Gillespie has been very 
prolific in explaining these complex processes and mechanisms. As part of his methodology 
he has also interviewed a good number of political and civil actors. Bicchi also looked to 
explain how Euro-Mediterranean politics were developed by introducing the concept of 
political entrepreneur. As part of her methodology she also interviewed a number of political 
and civil actors.  
Apart from these authors, as it has been explained in the literature review, some other 
scholars have tried to identify pros, cons, deficiencies and strengths linked to Euro-
Mediterranean politics. However, methodologically speaking, most of time, the analysis has 
been conducted on the basis of secondary sources and publications. 
Moreover, apart from experts in the fields of socio-linguistics and discourse analysis 
like Van Dijk, no one has used the methodological tools used in this thesis to explain how 
political brokers and entrepreneurs construct their communicational strategies, and how 
public opinion is shaped by them.  
The greater part of these works has been also concentrated on the description and 
analysis of these multilateral policies and mechanisms from a “foreign policy” point of view. 
Scholars have barely considered the importance of even national-domestic politics in the 
success or failure of such initiatives.  
Most authors dealing with this broad area have not focused enough attention on the 
evaluation of these policies. In order to propose a valid evaluation system it is important to 
use a wide number of methodological tools that will allow the researcher to understand –and 
explain and demonstrate – complex scenarios and dynamics, avoiding generalizations and 
speculation in the process.  
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This dissertation has attempted to cover the aforementioned conceptual, procedural 
and methodological gaps. In order to do so it has adopted a long-term, multivariable analysis 
that allows a better understanding of political, diplomatic and socio-economic trends, 
mechanisms and processes. Methodologically speaking, and in terms of content, the research 
adds value to the literature due to the following:  
 
  Interviews with key French and Spanish actors who have shaped and developed 
these policies and mechanisms in their professional roles.  
 The application of innovative methodological tools such as Corpus Linguistics 
(CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse how political 
entrepreneurs or brokers have been developing political discourse and 
communication strategies in order to, on the one hand, identify political 
opportunities/needs and on the other hand to see how they have been designing, 
managing and institutionalizing policies; how public opinion has been reacting to 
these communication strategies in order to understand the consistency and 
sustainability of these policies or proposals from a contextual point of view.  
 The application and combination of these methodological tools associated with the 
discussed theoretical framework offered by the literature on political 
entrepreneurs, allows for both theoretical and methodological advancements. 
Theoretically speaking, in the conclusions, the dissertation proposes the Political 
Entrepreneur Cycle (PEC) which represents a proposal to understand how the 
action of political entrepreneurs or brokers does not stop or end with the 
institutionalization of a policy, but with the evaluation, within the short, medium 
and long term, of such a policy on multiple levels.  
 This dissertation opens therefore a path to develop new studies aiming at 
providing a systematic and multivariable analysis of complex dynamics 
integrating European and MENA approaches aiming at reducing the existing 
asymmetries.  
 
10.2 Leaders and Their Characteristics. 
 
Spain and France historically coexisted with tension and rivalry due to their geographical 
situation, geo-strategic interests and ambitions. However, in contemporary times this long-
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standing rivalry was asymmetric as France was stronger politically, diplomatically and 
economically speaking.  
Since 1985-1986 Spain, as a small power, looked to re-define its diplomatic and 
foreign policy strategy in order to achieve greater diplomatic stature. President Felipe 
González, as both a political entrepreneur and broker, started to “sell” both Latin America 
and the Mediterranean.  
Political communication and lobbying strategies deployed by political entrepreneurs 
and brokers, as well as broader political and diplomatic institutions, were defined to construct 
a new socio-political imaginary and to gather political and public opinion’ consensus in order 
to achieve planned aims and objectives.  
Following on from this political entrepreneurs and brokers like Spain and France 
identified opportunities, designed projects and worked towards their institutionalization on 
the basis of a competitive and non-cooperative approach. Rhetorically speaking they sold 
Euro-Mediterranean problems as European problems, but the strongest interest behind this 
strategy was related to the defence and protection of national objectives. 
Political communication strategies deployed first by France or Spain and later by the 
EU were characterized by a double discourse. On one hand, once a political entrepreneur and 
broker identified a political window, in order to convince potential partners the “selling” and 
“marketing” discourse raised questions related to common European security issues. Once the 
policy was designed, in order to attract the consensus from Southern Mediterranean partners, 
the discourse was defined by the necessity of implementing win-win and cooperative 
mechanisms. However southern Mediterranean countries were not actively involved in the 
process of design and implementation. That generated an asymmetrical Euro-Mediterranean 
relation and encouraged economic and political dependency.  
The EU and national political entrepreneurs and brokers alike hypothesized that 
improving socio-economic standards – through trade, investments (FDI), development aid 
(ODA) - in southern Mediterranean countries, would reduce incentives to migrate. This, in 
turn would bring more security to Europe. This hypothesis proved wrong as an improvement 
of socio-economic standards in sending countries accelerated migration within the short and 
medium term.  
Beyond the aforementioned double discourse, that entailed an operational and 
instrumental dimension, European priorities continued to be European security, broadly 
understood, regional stability and increasing trade opportunities. Cultural, educational, socio-
economic projects remained relegated to a secondary position. In that sense changing socio-
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economic and political contexts –like the global economic crisis or increasing migration 
flows from Southern Mediterranean countries – compromised the continuity of those 
programmes and the consistency of the policies and mechanisms.  
In considering these changing contexts, along with economic issues, migration-
management policies and their evolution represent one of the most relevant aspects to analyse 
the consistency and coherence of multilateral and multicultural projects, policies and 
mechanisms.  
If political and trade interests and objectives are not accompanied by an integrative 
common migration policy, the sustainability of common projects, mechanisms and policies is 
weak and within the medium and long term they are doomed to fail.  
The EU’s international politics, policies, mechanisms and diplomacy are strictly 
bound to local, regional and national levels. The EU can design, institutionalize and 
implement policies and mechanisms but their overall performance will depend on how local, 
regional and national politics evolve and adapt according to changing scenarios on the 
ground.  
From 2006 onwards a more restrictive attitude towards migration, culminating in the  
 “criminalization” of the issue across Europe occurred. This increasing tendency of political 
parties to display negative attitudes towards migrants in general and against Muslim migrants 
in particular resulted in the deterioration of Euro-Mediterranean relations. This, in turn led to 
a progressive deterioration in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and confidence building and 
associated policies and mechanisms.   
Western leaders, political entrepreneurs and brokers, have been trying to find and 
support cooperative and collaborative regimes. In parallel, leaders from Southern 
Mediterranean countries have been playing that game in order to consolidate their leadership.  
Despite the number of Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, projects and mechanisms 
European partners did not show a commitment to choosing the right objectives and 
expectations for the challenges they faced. Therefore, at a managerial level, these policies 
have been ambiguous and scarcely productive. 
In line with this lack the EU’s political discourse was dominated by the term “will”. 
On one hand this connotates the political “will” needed to develop and build mechanisms and 
policies. On the other hand there is a notable absence of rhetoric formulas indicating 
accomplished strategies, policies or objectives. 
In these terms, this thesis has attempted to compare, understand how Spanish and 
French leaders have acted as entrepreneurs and brokers in creating, designing, implementing 
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and institutionalizing –also communicating- Euro-Mediterranean politics.  In order to do this 
it has developed 12 factors that are relevant to achieving these objectives. One of these 
factors is contextual, whereas the rest are transversal. The contextual factor is 
“Europeanism”. Transversal factors are: opportunism, individualism, originality, 
entrepreneurship, brokerage, consistency, negotiation, cooperative and competitive 
behaviour, analytic skills, charisma and, communication skills.  All are ranked on a scale 
from 1 to 5, with 1 being the minimum and 5 the maximum.  
 The graph below –number 23- shows the ideal representation of a political broker and 
entrepreneur. Nevertheless in applying this approach it is necessary to explain how 
“entrepreneurs”, “brokers” and “opportunists” are interpreted. In considering this graphic, 
“entrepreneurs” and “brokers” are defined by a positive connotation. Therefore, 
“entrepreneurs” and “brokers” would start new ideas and projects and broker them on the 
basis of socio-political and cultural responsibility.  
They would aim to produce sustainable change, establish win-win situations and 
pursue their objectives consistently and coherently. They would work towards the completion 
of short, mid and long term objectives.  
Conversely, “opportunists” are defined here by their short term-speculative behaviour. 
There are also two variables that have to be explained: cooperative and competitive 
behaviour. With regards to multilateral political projects involving heterogeneous partners, 
cooperative behaviour would be expected from political brokers and entrepreneurs. This 
behaviour would ensure the design, implementation, institutionalization and development of 
win-win political projects. A competitive behaviour would be linked to an “opportunist” 
approach that seeks to maximize individual gains. This attitude is counterproductive for the 
achievement of common strategic goals. The graphic number 23 displays the ideal image of a 













Graph. (23): Ideal Political Broker/Entrepreneur. 
 
 Source: Elaborated by the author.  
The graphic number 24 compares the political profiles of: Felipe González, José 
María Aznar, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and Nicolas Sarkozy. On this point it was not 
possible to gain access to more French senior politicians and diplomats that would have 
allowed a more balanced appraisal of Franco-Spanish competition and cooperation. With 
regards to Spanish politicians and diplomats, it is possible to appreciate a higher number of 
personalities affiliated to the PSOE. However, on the other hand politicians and diplomats 
from the PSOE were more involved than those affiliated to the PP in developing a Euro-



































Graph. (24): Leaders. Behaviour and Characteristics.  
 
 Source: Elaborated by the author.  
 In considering the four leaders, Felipe González is the one who is closer to the ideal 
of political entrepreneur and broker considering abovementioned comments and 
specifications. In line with this, González was the most consistent and coherent political 
entrepreneur in designing, negotiating and lobbying for creating a cooperative and European 
project that would also serve Spanish interests. This resulted in the launch of the Barcelona 
Process. 
Aznar and Sarkozy were typical examples of opportunists and individualists 
deploying a competitive and non-Europeanist attitude. Whereas Zapatero coincided more 
with González’s style. However he did not display the negotiating and communication skills 
or strong charisma of his predecessor as Spanish leader.  However, Sarkozy, Aznar and 
Zapatero all acted more like opportunists in terms of launching initiatives without ensuring 





























10.3 Political Entrepreneurship Cycle (PEC) 
 
The Political Entrepreneur Cycle (PEC) can be applied to a number of contexts where the 
role of political brokers, entrepreneurs and other kind of socio-political actors and agents has 
to be analysed. The PEC should be applied to a number of different socio-cultural, economic 
and political contexts in order to better identify transversal –constant- and contextual 
variables. From this point of view, next steps aimed at developing the PEC should focus on 
the elaboration of a replicable and scalable system –or a sort of metrics- to measure the five 
stages of the cycle. The PEC using the CL a CDA approach, will be useful to assess long 
cycles and micro-cycles alike. In considering both multilateral and bilateral political projects 
and mechanisms, the PCE will be also useful to determine political responsibilities and 
identify in advance potential failures. As was defined in the first section of this thesis, 
political entrepreneurs follow a four stage process to develop their interest and ambitions. 
This process is linear because it considers the creation, design, implementation and 
institutionalization of policies and mechanisms. However, this process should be circular not 
a mere linear description and figure number 1 shows.  
 
Figure (1). Political Entrepreneurship Cycle 
 
 









10.3.1 Creation.  
 
The creation of Euro-Mediterranean policies and mechanisms –from the EMP to the UfM–  
were led by political entrepreneurs and brokers, notably France and Spain, who had particular 
national interests. Beyond these political brokers and entrepreneurs were also interested in 
increasing their political and diplomatic stature and influence within the international system.  
During this first stage, political entrepreneurs and brokers lobbied massively with European 
partners –especially key ones like Germany- in order to gather the necessary support.  
 
10.3.2. Design.   
 
The stage of design did not correspond strictly to political entrepreneurs and brokers. The 
design stage entailed the Europeanization of the project. Within this stage small and medium 
powers like Spain tried to collaborate with major powers like Germany in order to get support 
and influence in the design process in the service of their own interests. During this stage 
both the debate on and the design of Euro-Mediterranean policies and mechanisms were 
mostly concentrated on the European side. Although these policies included the participation 
of southern Mediterranean countries, their involvement and participation were hardly 
considered. At the same time the planning and design was very abstract and was not 
considered in terms of clear short, medium or long term goals.  
 
10.3.3. Implementation.  
 
The implementation of these mechanisms and policies were problematic due to the above bad 
planning and design.  Once initiated these policies were inefficient and vulnerable to 
contextual socio-economic and political changes due to a lack of objectives and benchmarks. 
However, the division between northern and southern Mediterranean partners was also very 
apparent in this stage. This absence of multilateral coordination, horizontal communication 
and clear shared objectives and tasks contributed to the weak implementation that ended up 
with the failure of the processes within the medium and long term. In considering this stage, 
the political entrepreneurs and brokers that launched these projects and mechanisms did not 
actively engage in correcting these deficiencies. Therefore their role was secondary and 




10.3.4. Institutionalization.  
 
These common mechanisms were designed to defend EU’s interests and overall security. The 
institutionalization established the structure, the budget and the official procedures to put into 
motion the objectives and ideas developed over the previous stages. However, 
institutionalized mechanism to evaluate the fulfilment of objectives and milestones were not 
available. That contributed to generate more ambiguity and institutional weakness. On top of 
that, within this institutionalization, again, southern Mediterranean countries were not fully 
integrated. This occasioned the verticalization of communication processes.  
The decision-making processes were mostly concentrated on the EU side for two 
reasons. First it was easier to institutionalize these policies and mechanisms within the EU 
due to its higher socio-cultural, political and economic homogeneity. Second, southern 
Mediterranean countries were not organized around strong common institutional bodies and 
therefore their organizational and negotiation capacities were very limited. This prevented the 
possibility of solving problems and facing contextual challenges.  
 
10.3.5. Evaluation.  
 
Analysing the EU’s public speech is important in understanding how political brokers and 
entrepreneurs have been impacting and shaping the EU’s political agenda. With regards to 
Euro-Mediterranean politics the graph below –number 25- enables us to appreciate the cycle 
that started in 1992 and ended in 2013. One can see how relevant issues such as migration, 
Mediterranean, Security, Arab/Muslim, terrorism and racism, have all played a role over this 
period of time. This is reflected in graphic number 25.  
  Indeed, within this 20 years cycle it is possible to identify three micro-cycles. The 
first micro-cycle lasted between 1993 and 1996. That represented the inception and launch of 
the Barcelona process and within this first micro-cycle it is possible to appreciate the 
convergence of the topics security and Mediterranean. This reveals that the interest in 
developing this Euro-Mediterranean mechanism was mostly due to strict security issues and 
concerns.  
  The second micro-cycle spanned the period between 1999 and the beginning of 2002. 
Again the convergence between Mediterranean and security is evident, especially after the 
9/11 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. The third and last micro-cycle extended from 
2004 to 2008. Within this last micro-cycle the converging variables were: terrorism, 
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migration and security, whereas Mediterranean started to lost momentum. However, this 
micro-cycle coincided with the evaluation of the Barcelona process in 2005.  The last year of 
this micro-cycle, 2008, coincided both with the start of the global financial crisis and the 
launch of the UfM. The last part of the cycle between 2009 and 2013 shows that Euro-
Mediterranean politics declined and its presence within the EU’s public speech almost 
disappeared.  
  In analysing these factors it is possible to say that Euro-Mediterranean politics as a 
communitarian project failed. The three micro-cycles show the peaks where political 
entrepreneurs and brokers were more active. This also shows that there was political 
inconsistency and coherence. This trend also shows that political entrepreneurs and brokers 
were mostly interested in short-medium term results, rather than developing a consistent and 
cooperative –and responsible- political and diplomatic project.  
 
Graph. (25): Long-Term Comparative Analysis Council of Europe, Public Speech. 1993-2013 
 
 Source: European Council. Elaborated by the author.  
Connected to the graphic number 25, it is also important to understand how European 
public opinion integrated and understood the EU’s public speech. The analysed variables in 
this case were immigration, security, terrorism, crime and unemployment. Whereas 
unemployment played an independent role because in reality it is not linked to other 





























































































































































































coincides with the third micro-cycle presented above and it is represented in graphic number 
26.  
 
Graphic (26): Trend line. European Public Opinion, 1997-2011. 
 
Source: Eurobarometer. Elaborated by the author.  
 The connections between the EU’s public speech and EU public opinion crossover. 
This convergence is also important in evaluating why Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms and 
platforms failed. It is not possible to try to develop multilateral political, diplomatic, 
economic and socio-cultural projects and mechanisms involving heterogeneous stakeholders, 
while at local, regional and national levels, political brokers and entrepreneurs try to gather 
socio-political consensus manipulating sensitive variables such as migration, terrorism, 
security and crime that would contribute to generate mistrust and misunderstandings between 
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Fernando, cuándo comienzas a trabajar como periodista?  
En 1970. Mi primer trabajo fue en 1970. Entonces estudiaba periodismo y derecho al mismo 
tiempo. O sea que de esto hace más de cuarenta años.  
Que me puedes decir, aunque puede parecer  una paradoja hablar de comunicación política 
durante el franquismo, en un momento en el que quizá las libertades democráticas no estaban 
establecidas. Como se hacía en ese momento la comunicación política? Que restricciones 
reales había? 
Yo no tenía entonces contacto con la comunicación oficial. En realidad a nivel profesional 
1970 y 1971 no cuentan para mí. En 1972 comienzo a hacer lo que puedo. En 1974, es mi año 
de bautismo de fuego, porque volviendo yo del servicio militar, de las prácticas de milicias, el 
director de Firesa que era la oficina de prensa del movimiento, me ofrece irme a Lisboa, que 
estaba con cierta inestabilidad. Desde Marzo de 1974, se veía que en Portugal había 
inestabilidad. Naturalmente dije que sí y así me metí de hoz y coz en la Revolución de los 
Claveles.  
Esta fue una experiencia maravillosa para un chaval de 23 años. A esa edad no sabía lo que 
eran partidos políticos, no sabía lo que eran las instituciones, no sabía lo que era una 
comunicación democrática, no solo con los medios oficiales, sino con los medios privados. 
No existía nada de eso. Ni aquí, en España, ni en Portugal. Que era lo bueno de Portugal? 
Que tu veías como ellos también aprendían al mismo tiempo que nosotros.  
Así que mi primer contacto con el mundo de la comunicación oficial fue con Portugal. Es 
decir mi primer contacto instituciones-periodista comenzó allí. En España había lo que había. 
En ese caso tendrías que hablar con Joaquin Bardavío, que es un personaje clave. Bardavío 
era el jefe de prensa de Carrero Blanco, así que imagínate, lo más de lo más. Y estaba en el 
mismo edificio donde estaba Lopez Rodó. Estuvo en el Diario Madrid, etc.  
Entonces, yo, donde aprendo comunicación política, es en Portugal, en plena guerra. Y hay 
que tener en cuenta que en aquella época lo que pasaba en Portugal era importantísimo para 
España. En el primer verano que paso en Portugal, pasaron por mi casa 150 personas. Todo el 
mundo. Todos los amigos que uno tenía. Yo estaba más o menos conectado con la oposición, 
del partido comunista entonces, de modo que me vino a ver toda la clandestinidad. Porque 
date cuenta, de que lo que hacíamos los periodistas españoles en ese tiempo era resistencia. 
No estábamos por tanto en la comunicación oficial sino en la clandestinidad.  
En 1974, un año antes de que se muera Franco, empiezo a hacer comunicación política 
cuando vuelvo a Madrid y soy el responsable del suplemento político del Diario 
Informaciones. El Diario Informaciones era el único periódico liberal que había entonces en 
Madrid. Liberal con todas las comillas que quieras. Ese suplemento político que estaba 
dirigido por Guillermo Medina (que fue diputado por Jerez), sería un poco el embrión del 
pensamiento intelectual de lo que luego sería UCD. Obviamente en 1974 no existía UCD 
pero se estaba comenzando a montar y constituye un primer contacto que teníamos los 
periodistas con una oposición moderada. Los periodistas no estábamos en general en la 
oposición moderada, sino que estábamos del Partido Comunista hacia allá, porque PSOE 
tampoco había. Pero en Informaciones, gente como Guillermo Medina que estaba más en 
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áreas demo-cristianas, pues nos iba conectando a todos con la oposición posible, que luego 
dió paso a UCD.  
Entonces supongo que una vez que se muere Franco, la comunicación política por tanto, 
cambia totalmente, y la introducción de las libertades democráticas dentro del proceso 
de la transición creo que inaugurarían un momento también de entusiasmo para una 
gente que habíais estado en una situación de represión.  
Entusiasmo quizá no, pero si, desde luego, muchísima actividad. Es una época de actividad 
frenética en la que todos tenemos que aprender. Que todos aprendemos significa que el 
gobierno naciente que forma Adolfo Suárez, más los partidos que habían estado en la semi-
clandestinidad tolerada (el embrión de UCD) más la oposición verdadera, estaban 
aprendiendo como eran las relaciones instituciones-periodistas. Claro, aquí había que 
aprender a hacer democracia, que no sabía nadie, y los periodistas tampoco.  
En ese momento nos encontramos todos, periodistas, la oposición moderada (la transición) y 
la oposición real, estamos de alguna manera trabajando todos juntos. Esta historia no se ha 
contado así, pero es muy importante. Estábamos trabajando juntos por tanto para cimentar 
una democracia. Con restos de censura, con restos de autoritarismo, con maximalismos por 
parte de la oposición que no se habían quitado todavía y los periodistas que estábamos allí 
mirando todo esto.  
Y este periodo de acomodación cuánto dura?  
Esto dura exactamente dos años, desde noviembre del 75 (cuando se muere Franco y se 
produce la explosión –al día siguiente me detuvieron y como yo era periodista y la Guardia 
Civil tenía que demostrar que aquí todo estaba atado y bien atado porque venían algunas 
personalidades. Nos detuvieron a Juan Diego, a Aurora Bautista a María Luisa San José, etc, 
y nos tuvieron una noche detenidos junto a otros periodistas en las Salesas –yo entonces era 
dirigente de la Prensa Democrática, que no representaba nada de nada pero que armaba 
mucho ruido) Por tanto se inaugura un periodo de transición donde todos aprendemos a como 
funcionar hasta Junio del 77 que es cuando se producen las primeras elecciones, las 
constituyentes. Imagínate lo que es aquello, es la primera que votamos, es la primera vez que 
vemos un parlamento, porque yo a las cortes franquistas no había ido en mi vida.  
En Junio del 1977 ya empezamos a incorporarnos a lo que se puede definir como una cierta 
normalidad democrática. Date cuenta que aquello eran más relaciones personales que otra 
cosa; yo me acuerdo por ejemplo cuando Suárez gana aquellas elecciones, hay un periodista 
más veterano que yo, que se llama Pedro Calvo Hernando, quien esa mañana cuando se 
constituyen las cortes democráticas, llega a los pasillos de las cortes y le dice a Adolfo 
Suárez:  
-Cabrón!  
Y Suárez le responde: 
-Oye Pedro, te recuerdo que ahora soy el Presidente del gobierno.  
 
Con muy buen talante los dos, pero para que te des un poco cuenta de como eran las cosas. 
Muchos de nosotros, luego cuando llega Felipe González, llevábamos tal trayectoria de 
relaciones personales con los políticos, que nos es muy difícil después asimilar nuestro papel 
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real. Y si las relaciones eran tan personales durante la época de UCD con el PSOE esa 
tendencia se magnifica. Es que había periodistas que habían sido novias del vicepresidente 
del gobierno o de ministros. Entonces había que romper ese modelo amistoso. Se dio, pero 
con mucho tiempo. Y hay muchos periodistas que se pasan a la oposición de Felipe 
González, porque ellos creían que como habían viajado tanto con Felipe, se creían que iban a 
ser directamente Secretarios de Estado de Comunicación o ministros de no se que. Entonces 
cuando ven que no, se pasan a otras tesis más hostiles.  
Con todo este cambio el país entra en una transición democrática, en los que sí, es cierto 
que en los últimos años del franquismo, España también tiene una mayor proyección 
internacional, entre comillas, pero hablando prácticamente de política exterior  ¿cómo 
se proyecta España hacia el exterior y como es percibida y vista por otros países 
europeos como por ejemplo Francia, Italia, Alemania, dentro del contexto 
internacional?  
Lo que yo vivo cuando acompaño al Presidente del gobierno por diferentes sitios, es un 
desprecio absoluto, pero absoluto. Las relaciones con Valéry Giscard d’Estaing eran de una 
prepotencia y de una superioridad tremenda. Con respecto a Europa éramos una gente muy 
despreciada. Del año 77 al 82. Sin embargo en América Latina éramos ya un poco un modelo 
a seguir. España en ese sentido ha sido un modelo para América Latina, pero en Europa muy 
mal. Esa visión negativa duro hasta el 85 más o menos. Hasta el 85 aquello no andaba.  
Éramos como los que íbamos a tocar a la puerta de la Comunidad Económica Europea para 
pedir y esa era nuestra máxima aspiración. Porque hay que darse cuenta de que por ejemplo 
mi padre estaba en la oposición y era europeísta. Durante el franquismo ser europeísta era 
casi peor que ser comunista. Mi padre era un sénior de lo más demócrata (a lo Cánovas del 
Castillo).  
El 86 es un hito en todos los sentidos, pero hasta ese momento no sabíamos andar solos y 
estábamos despreciados por todas partes. No había canales de comunicación, los periodistas 
sabíamos muy poco. Sabíamos acompañar a los políticos o al rey, pero no teníamos canales 
de comunicación.  
Y esta ansia de España por subirse al carro de la Comunidad Económica Europea, 
¿cómo es vista según vosotros con relación a otros países, como por ejemplo Francia? 
Francia siempre nos ha despreciado hasta el año 1986 y creo que en el 86 también. La época 
de Giscard fue terrible. Con Mitterrand fue un poco mejor. En ese momento funcionaban las 
internacionales, y tú tienes que darte cuenta que el panorama era completamente distinto. La 
internacional socialista funcionaba. Había una internacional liberal que funcionaba más o 
menos y la internacional demo-cristiana funcionaba de puta madre. Y ahí estaban peleándose 
Unión Democrática y el PNV a muerte siempre, pero funcionaba.  
Pero España salía de la autarquía, coño. Estaba muy complicado que tuviéramos buenas 
relaciones con otros países que desconocíamos totalmente. Nosotros que sabíamos de los 
eurócratas, de Bruselas, etc.  
Entonces el rol de Felipe González en ese sentido es clave.  
Es clave. Clave. Porque Adolfo Suárez yo creo que hacia el exterior representaba un poco al 
Evo Morales de España, que salía de las filas del franquismo, que no hablaba idiomas, que no 
había salido de España. Felipe González es ya un tipo de una internacional, que sustituía al 
mítico Yopis. Pero González tenía la legitimidad histórica del socialismo. El año 1982 era 
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como un ruptura con el pasado, no radical, pero se comenzaba a intuir. En el 86 ya mejora 
mucho y a partir de entonces la trayectoria es completamente diferente.  
Supongo que sobre ese particular, los esfuerzos de Felipe González en el gobierno por 
llevar un poco de la mano a España hacia una esfera un poco más internacional habrán 
sido muy intensos.  
González es el que marca toda la diferencia aquí. Es el que da una cierta patina internacional 
a España. Es el que de alguna manera nos hace respetable por ahí. Es el que en América 
Latina entra a fondo, porque González es un hombre enormemente respetado en América 
Latina. O sea, que el cabalga el tigre de la nueva situación. Tiene un mal ministro de 
exteriores en principio que es Fernando Morán, porque venía lleno de dogmatismos y de 
ideas preconcebidas y quizá un infantil. A él le sucede un gran ministro de exteriores que es 
Francisco  Fernández Ordóñez, que es quien de alguna manera normaliza la situación de 
España. Porque Ordóñez representaba esa izquierda que tanto gusta a los europeos.  
Luego vino Javier Solana, que era otra cosa. Ya se comenzó a desarrollar una relación más 
normal con esa Europa que iba en sintonía con las ideas de Felipe González. Hoy ya no hay 
nada de eso, ya no hay ni internacionales, ni grandes ideas, González se ha vuelto un 
mercantilista. Entonces, en aquel momento del 1982 al 1986 aquí era la leche. En el año 1982 
al 90 si quieres. En el 92 España se convierte en un protagonista internacional haciendo muy 
bien lo de los quintos centenarios, la Expo de Sevilla. Y eso fue lo último que hizo bien 
Felipe González y ahí se acabó.  
¿Cómo valoras tú, por ejemplo, la incorporación de España a la OTAN? 
Ahí no quedaba más remedio, no? Esto es como lo de ahora. Si Merkel y Obama dicen que 
ustedes tienen que hacer el decretazo de esto o de lo otro, se hace y punto. El PSOE con 
mucho pragmatismo se dio cuenta de que tenía que hacer eso. Con mucho pragmatismo, un 
tipo muy olvidado, que aquí nadie hace caso, que es Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, decide que hay 
que entrar ahí. En ese momento a él le cae eso, y le dicen, hay que ir a la OTAN y él dice, 
pues a la OTAN. Yo creo que convenció a sus sucesores de que había que entrar en la OTAN. 
Les da los datos a sus sucesores que no tenían ni idea. Aquí la tragedia es que los primeros 
ministros cuando llegaban a la Moncloa por primera vez no tenían demasiada idea de las 
cosas.  En el libro de las memorias de Calvo Sotelo hay una anécdota muy buena, que llega el 
tío a la Moncloa al despacho que iba a ser suyo, y le dicen; esta es la caja de los secretos 
oficiales. No tenían ni la combinación de la caja fuerte ni nada, llaman al tipo que abría este 
tipo de cajas, por fin la abren, la gente que estaba allí miraba discretamente por la ventana, y 
mete la mano dentro y saca un papel. En el papel estaba escrita al combinación de la caja 
fuerte, no había nada más.  
El Estado estaba completamente desmembrado. No había tejido estatal. Yo conocí las 
Moncloas de Suárez y de González y eran de una debilidad extrema. Adolfo Suárez tenía allí 
a cuatro gatos. No era un palacio presidencial a la francesa, era una cosa reducidísima. Con 
González se comienza a fortalecer un poco la cosa, pero cuando él llega, no había nada. 
Felipe González solo tenía un par de secretarias, un individuo que se llama Eduardo Sotillos 
(que también te podría ayudar mucho en esto) que era el Secretario de Estado de 
Comunicación y poco más.  
La política de Felipe González por ejemplo en el Mediterráneo, especialmente en el 




Eso Felipe González lo hace muy bien. Yo creo que es de verdad cuando comenzamos a tener 
unas relaciones con Marruecos. A pesar de Hassan II, que no toleraba nada. Con Marruecos, 
el partido socialista tiene una cierta presencia desde hace muchos años y sigue funcionando. 
Se comenzó a meter gente allí, del CSID. El Coronel San Martín se dio cuenta de que había 
que tener muy controlado aquello y metieron militares, y además se notaba que eran 
militares. Metieron decenas de agentes. Entonces, la política mediterránea era la política con 
Marruecos. Argelia, Túnez, Mauritania desde luego no, Libia no existía, Egipto tampoco. En 
esos países no pintábamos nada. Solo era con Marruecos. Hay un tema que es muy 
importante y es el nacimiento de las televisiones privadas en España que tienen una enorme, 
una enorme difusión en Marruecos. La influencia de las televisiones privadas españolas en el 
norte de Marruecos es inmensa. Y creo que de eso se dio cuenta el gobierno de Felipe 
González y lo potenció bastante y lo hicieron bien.  
En general con Francisco Fernández Ordóñez hubo un servicio diplomático muy bueno. Se 
potenció mucho el servicio exterior hacia América Latina y los países Árabes y norte 
Africanos fundamentalmente. En Europa, no, en Europa estábamos comenzando a andar y en 
el resto del mundo no existíamos. (Cumbre Israel palestina, Madrid 1991). (También te puedo 
poner en contacto con algún embajador que te podría ayudar en estas cosas)  
Después del gobierno de González, 1995-1996, se comienza a cambiar. 
Esa es una época de una decadencia absoluta. Felipe González desde el año 1989 está 
yéndose. A una amiga mía que es Susana Olmo que estaba en la agencia Colpisa, en el 1989 
González le dice que se quiere ir en una entrevista que fue un escándalo. Entonces a partir de 
ahí yo diría que hay un momento de gran renacimiento y de gran esplendor que es el 92 a 
nivel exterior, que no interior, con continuas crisis y vaivenes económicos provocados por 
gente como Solchaga, pero yo te diría que desde el punto de vista exterior son momentos de 
gran relieve e importancia. Desde el 92 hasta el 96 estamos en una decadencia absoluta a 
todos los niveles, internos y externos. Al Rey no le puedes olvidar en esto. En esta época el 
Rey lo hace muy bien con el norte de África y con Marruecos especialmente, ya que es primo 
o algo así de Hassan, se hablan mucho por teléfono, que Hassan le habla con mucha 
confianza.  
Si te parece podemos pasar ahora al gobierno de José María Aznar a nivel de política 
interna y externa. ¿Cuáles son según tú las principales claves, las diferencias con el 
gobierno de González? 
Desde el punto de vista de la comunicación González puso ministros o ministrables en las 
relaciones con la prensa. Hablo de Javier Solana o de Rosa Conde, de Rubalcaba, de Sotillos 
que tenía la lacra de ser periodista. Aznar rompe todos esos moldes y pone a un chaval que 
había conocido en Valladolid que se llama Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, que es una especie de 
Maquiavelo de la comunicación y que monta unos moldes completamente diferentes de 
relación entre los periodistas y el mundo oficial y entre el Partido Popular y la Moncloa. De 
modo que pone un filtro tremendo. Pero es un filtro y a la vez un acicate porque es puro 
personalismo. Si te caes bien bien, si te caes mal mal y entonces ya está todo etiquetado. Y 
eso generó para siempre una nueva forma de hacer comunicación política: o sea, entre los 
periodistas y el mundo monclovita, oficial. Hasta entonces no se había producido este 
personalismo, era una cosa más horizontal y más relaciones personales.  
Esa horizontalidad seguramente favorecía un clima de mayor confianza, supongo, ¿no? 
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Claro, claro, date cuenta de que todos veníamos de la misma guerra. Hasta Felipe González 
todos veníamos de la guerra de trincheras contra el franquismo. Porque muchos periodistas 
tuvimos mucha relación con gente que luego fueron ministros; claro, habíamos conspirado 
juntos. Obviamente con Aznar eso se acaba. Ponen a un chico que tendría como 27 o 28 años, 
que era un redactor del Norte de Castilla y hacía deshacía. Y cuando digo que hacía y 
deshacía quiero decir que querían montar un conglomerado de prensa, de medios de 
comunicación para enfrentarse al poderío de El País. Ellos entendían que el mundo de Prisa 
era una fuerza muy pujante y que podía ir contra los intereses del Partido Popular, y entonces 
ellos tratan de contrarrestar eso a través de diferentes medios: Televisa de México, Onda 
Cero, pasando por El Mundo y por ABC, medios de provincias etc. Este conglomerado 
fracasa porque aquello era muy difícil de dirigir, pero sí, intentan hacerlo. Se podría decir que 
es fue el primer intento de hacerse con medios de comunicación desde el poder.  
En la época de los socialistas lo único que ocurrió fue el nacimiento de las televisiones 
privadas, al cual se habían opuesto inicialmente los socialistas por cierto. O sea, intentaron 
hacer grupos afines, pero todo salió como salió y de ninguna manera era una correa de 
transmisión. En tiempos de Aznar esto es la primera vez que se intenta y casi lo hacen.   
España es cierto que experimentó un gran avance con relación a lo que fue en la época 
franquista, se convierte en un país, con comillas o sin comillas, de primera línea 
internacional, o que al menos tiene un sitio en la escena internacional. ¿Se puede decir 
que España fue un gigante que se despertó? ¿Un gigante con pies de barro? 
Sí es verdad, pero digamos gigantito. Pero a ver, España en comparación con los países del 
norte de África y con los países de la Europa del este, obviamente era otra cosa. Era un país 
con una buena economía, con una industria muy sólida, en el turismo ya era una potencia 
mundial. Con Felipe González tuvimos un primer paso europeo, nos sentíamos ya europeos y 
tuvimos una increíble penetración en América Latina. Con Aznar eso se consumó. De pronto 
nos convertimos en los mayores inversores del mundo en casi todos los países de América 
Latina. No me lo creía ni yo. Y dos, la convergencia con Europa, que parecía algo imposible 
se consigue en tres años. De pronto nos encontramos con que nuestras cifras son parecidas a 
las de Europa, a nivel de PBI, de paro, de renta per cápita.  
Cómo hemos hecho esto? De dos maneras con Aznar: Privatizando las empresas públicas, de 
modo que si ahí no consigues un superávit del estado ya me dirás como se puede conseguir: 
Iberia, Repsol, Endesa… Fue una política de privatización durísima pero bien hecha. Pero 
bien hecho. Y 2, de alguna manera, y no se quién es el mago de esto, no lo se, alguien 
descubre de cómo beneficiarse de los fondos de cohesión de la Unión Europea.  Ahí debe 
haber un mago. De la noche a la mañana todos los fondos de cohesión vienen a España! 
Todas las carreteras que hay aquí las ha hecho Alemania. Por tanto, superávit del estado todo, 
porque se había vendido todo menos Enresa que es la nuclear. Supo cómo hacer la cosa con 
Europa, de modo que nos pusimos no en el pelotón de cabeza, pero no somos el pelotón de 
los torpes.  
Y cuando Europa va creciendo hacia el este incorporando países absolutamente lamentables, 
de pronto te das cuenta que España está ahí. Eso significa que Francia nos mira ya con otros 
ojos completamente diferentes y los italianos nos llaman los alemanes del sur de Europa. Qué 
ha ocurrido? No lo se, no se quien ha permitido dar ese salto. En el año 1995 estábamos muy 
desprestigiados por el tema de la corrupción, pero del año 1996, cuando llega este cabrón, al 
año 2000, esos 4 años que además son años de gobierno de pactos con los nacionalistas son 
unos años fantásticos y España da un salto increíble. Y en el 2000-2002 nos encontramos con 
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que nos miran con respeto en Europa, que el español de la maleta de cartón ya no existe. Son 
años también de esplendor de Europa. Con todo eso es cierto que se produce la figura de ese 
gigante que se despierta.  
A niveles de personas, de representaciones del gobierno, hemos hablado antes de los 
primeros momentos de la transición, en los que hay complejos de inferioridad, reales, 
sentidos. González lleva las cosas un poco más adelante y poco a poco, España comienza 
a ser más respetado internacionalmente. Cuando llega Aznar la percepción de España 
en el exterior es positiva; Aznar se encuentra con un país que es admirado fuera: 
¿Cómo reacciona Aznar a nivel de política exterior al comenzar a sentirse representante 
de un país respetado y que se está desarrollando? ¿Qué impactos tiene esta nueva 
coyuntura en la forma de proyectarse hacia el exterior?  
Los impactos son malos, claro. Son malos porque generan prepotencia. Aznar se cree en un 
momento determinado que va a liderar Europa y se alía con los polacos de extrema derecha y 
otros locos, contra los países que son los verdaderos motores de Europa, que son Francia y 
Alemania. Y claro, ni Francia ni España le perdonan este movimiento. Se alinea con un tipo 
como Bush frente a América Latina. Tuvo un encuentro fortísimo con Vicente Fox en un 
determinado momento, y América Latina tampoco se lo perdona .Quien se cree este tío que 
es? Y sobre todo hay un momento de prepotencia increíble; me acuerdo de un encuentro que 
tuve con Aznar en una comida con otros 4 periodistas, donde le pregunté (la boda principesca 
de la hija en el Escorial había sido la semana anterior):  
Jaúregui: -Cómo te atreves habiendo un 85% de los españoles que están en contra de la 
guerra de Iraq, como te atreves a mantener esa política? 
Aznar-Propio es del estadista saber desafiar a la opinión pública cuando conviene.  
Aquello me dejó impresionado. Dije, menudo personaje con el que estamos tratando. Este ya 
está completamente desnortado. Ese momento de auge en Europa y de auge de España en el 
mundo, al final es mal aprovechado y deriva en una prepotencia que no nos correspondía. 
 
Y que seguramente afeaba la imagen de España en sus relaciones internacionales.  
Totalmente. Eso sí que lo noté. Luego teníamos el problema siempre presente de ETA en el 
exterior. Y eso nos enfrentaba mucho como país a muchos países latinoamericanos. Hay un 
episodio tremendo cuando se pidió la extradición de 3 etarras, donde hay revueltas y 2 
muertos en Montevideo. Ese es un tema que tiene mucha importancia en la imagen de España 
en el exterior. Hay muchos medios de comunicación importantes que consideran a ETA un 
movimiento guerrillero, de liberación. El País Vasco está sojuzgado y eso, quieras o no, nos 
hace daño.  
El gobierno Aznar intenta -cuando está Mayor Oreja de interior- una lavada de imagen y de 
publicidad a través de todas las embajadas principales. No consiguió gran cosa pero lo intenta 
porque se da cuenta de que ese es un problema.  
Antes habíamos hablado del papel de España en el norte de África y en Marruecos 




Aznar destroza lo que se había hecho precedentemente. Lo destroza. Hay unas declaraciones 
de Piqué, (exteriores) completamente desafortunadas que indican que esto va en picado; y 
luego no te quiero decir nada con el episodio de la Isla Perejil. Un episodio chusco donde los 
haya, que da el ejemplo de dos países bananeros. En este momento (2002) la influencia del 
gobierno Aznar se ve que comenzaba a decaer claramente.  
En esta época Moratinos con su experiencia en el mundo árabe ¿es considerado? 
Aquí es considerado como un señor militante del PSOE, que está completamente centrado del 
lado de los palestinos y no de Israel y en este momento, España estaba más del lado de Israel 
que de los palestinos. Obviamente estábamos alineados con los Estados Unidos, de modo que 
creo que Moratinos en este momento no tiene ninguna influencia. Es un tipo conocido pero 
pasa por ser un individuo instalado en el buenísimo, a favor de los oprimidos, etc. En este 
momento es considerado como un militante. Tú sabes que la diplomacia española no es muy 
profesional. Los diplomáticos y embajadores que estaban en el otro lado se les castiga cuando 
llega el nuevo gobierno.  
Un tema sensible que se vivió intensamente fue el atentado del 11 M. Según tu visión, 
¿cómo fue la respuesta de un Aznar un poco desesperado por tratar de cargar las culpas 
a quien políticamente le podía beneficiar? 
Aznar en tres días perdió las elecciones.  Si se hubiera presentado él en vez de otro, su 
reacción con referencia a este atentado hubiera sido muy diferente. Pero ya no se presentaba 
él y le importaba un huevo que su sucesor perdiese. Porque ya las relaciones entre Aznar y 
Rajoy ya no eran buenas. Aznar se dejó llevar de sus peores demonios, porque Aznar como 
todo el mundo, la causalidad es menor que la causalidad muchas veces y siempre estamos 
pensando en teorías conspiratorias. Las relaciones personales son importantes en política y en 
ese momento, Aznar se dejó llevar por la soberbia. “A mí me han colado este gol, yo convoco 
la manifestación, yo pongo la pancarta, etc…”. Si Aznar en ese momento, los días 11,12,13 y 
14, tres días que cambiaron el mundo, hubiera convocado una manifestación unitaria, y le 
dice a Zapatero, vamos los dos encabezando la pancarta, qué pancarta hacemos Zapatero, la 
ponemos juntos; el PP hubiera ganado las elecciones. Seguro. Si no se hubiera empecinado en 
la tesis de ETA en la manipulación de los periodistas. Se echó constantemente paladas de 
tierra sobre la cabeza. Pero si eso no hubiera ocurrido, hubieran ganado las elecciones. La 
percepción de los españoles era que la opción Zapatero era muy floja, nadie sabía quién era. 
Era percibido como lo que luego ha demostrado si te digo la verdad.  
En general la primera legislatura de Aznar fue estupenda, pero la segunda fue fatal. Al 
principio tenía a los nacionalistas de su lado, y la verdad es que los nacionalistas siempre 
ayudan a que las cosas salgan bien. Cuando los tienes como el viento a favor ayudan mucho, 
si los tienen en contra, desayudan. Luego, en la segunda legislatura el tío ganó con mayoría 
absoluta, se ensoberbeció, casó a la niña en palacio, empezó a poner los pies sobre la mesa 
como Bush, etc…ya en este momento perdió el sentido del espacio y de la realidad.  
No se por qué se empeñaron en decir que había sido ETA cuando no había ningún indicio de 
que hubiera sido ETA. Además desde las primeras horas de la mañana había indicios que 
llevaban a otro lado. Pero habría que dejar aquí claro, que Aznar perdió él solito. A ver, 
Aznar, que es una persona a quien no tengo ninguna simpatía ni como individuo ni como 
político, te lo digo, dejó los números estupendos. Los números salían cojonudos, estupendos. 
El país, de cara al exterior era un país equivocado (aliado con el demonio Bush), pero 
potente. En su partido tenía todas las filas prietas, sin fisuras, pero eso sí, era enemigo a 
muerte de los nacionalistas, en Europa pensaban de él que era un cabrón que les había llevado 
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todos los fondos de cohesión y que ya lo pagaría caro. Así que estaba el germen de la 
autodestrucción. Pero cuando Zapatero llega a este país, este país es la leche en este 
momento. Es un país con superávit por todos los lados, modernizado a tope, donde empezaba 
el boom de la construcción, que ha dado tanto dinero a tantos, y que también ha jodido tanto 
medioambiente, etc…Pero desde el punto de vista económico, el país iba muy bien. Pero 
sumado a todo esto, luego Aznar pone como candidato a Rajoy, un tipo a quien no se le 
conoce muy bien, no tenía imagen y encima ocurre esto… 
Yo la sensación que he tenido con el gobierno de Zapatero es que el momento en el que 
las cosas han comenzado a marchar mal, en el momento en el que se ha perdido la 
inercia de las vacas gordas de la época de Aznar. ¿Tú como lo ves? 
No, creo que no. En la historia todo son péndulos. Péndulo de la prosperidad, péndulo de la 
miseria, péndulo de social-demócratas, péndulo de liberales, etc…Zapatero llegó con el 
péndulo estupendo, pero el péndulo se le ha ido a otro lado. Primero ha habido una crisis 
global. Han pasado muchas cosas. Segundo, el péndulo europeo se ha ido hacia los 
conservadores, ya no queda nadie. Y luego los propios errores que no han sido pocos.  
La figura de Zapatero a nivel internacional,  ¿Es una figura respetada? 
Yo creo que es una catástrofe. O sea, es un tipo simpático, cae bien. Es como Berlusconi, no 
no es verdad, Berlusconi tiene otras connotaciones. Pero Zapatero tiene cosas buenas; es un 
tipo honrado, es un tipo simpático, patriota, digan lo que digan, pero luego es un desacertado 
absoluto y luego es un ignorante tremendo. Es que claro, no puedes ser tan ignorante. El 
primer ministro de un país, de una potencia industrial del mundo no puede ser tan ignorante. 
Y sobre todo no puede estar diciendo primero que tu camisa es blanca y que luego es verde. 
Eso genera una inseguridad jurídica absoluta. Entonces las declaraciones de un primer 
ministro tienen que ser muy sólidas y las de Zapateros nunca lo son. Zapatero genera 
inseguridad jurídica y eso es lo que genera él.  
Algo de lo que tu dices hay. Ha administrado mal el capital, pero también hay una serie de 
factores que dificultan que ese capital pueda ser administrado en condiciones, las cosas como 
son. Y si hubiera estado otro primer ministro quizá no lo hubiera hecho mucho mejor, con la 
excepción de una cosa, y es que se ha dedicado a despilfarrar todo. Como tenía superávit, 
venga, 400 euros para todos, y a los discapacitados, la ley de tal y cual (que luego no la 
adopta), y a las señores que aborten tanto, y al emigrante que llegue, tanto. Y eso no nos los 
podíamos permitir.  
Ahora que has mencionado el tema de inmigración, esta es una cuestión capital.  
Sí, pero no con Zapatero, esto viene de antes. Hay un momento en el que hay un secretario 
general de inmigración, Enrique Fernández, que es cuando se ponen en marcha los “viajes 
Ecuador”. Es decir, al ecuatoriano que estaba aquí le pagabas el viaje de regreso, porque aquí 
ya no cabía y luego le pagabas el viaje de vuelta a España, cuando las cosas mejorasen. 
Entonces claro, un emigrante cuando iba al paro se iba a su país, se gastaba el dinero o se 
establecía allí o lo que fuese, y luego podía volver con un contrato de trabajo. Cuántos planes 
de inmigración se han hecho; 15? Luego nunca nos hemos dicho la verdad, de cuántos 
ilegales había, de cuántos entraban. No hemos sabido luchar con un problema que era serio, 
pero que al final no era tan serio, porque si te das cuenta, la inmigración es la que nos ha 
hecho crecer. Ha sido un factor de crecimiento muy importante durante la época de Aznar.  
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Los emigrantes colaboraban a la Seguridad Social de los españoles, todos los trabajos que los 
españoles instalados en el súper estado de bienestar no querían hacer, y el inmigrante de turno 
te llevaba la madre de paseo, y el jardín cuidado, etc. Vivíamos como los romanos con los 
esclavos y eso no puede ser, eso no se sustenta. Pero el estado de bienestar que tenía Europa 
no se sustenta en toda Europa. Ya ves lo que está pasando en Inglaterra. Es que el estado de 
bienestar como se entendía no se puede sustentar, porque estamos como en la caída del 
imperio romano. La caída del imperio romano tiene cantidad de paralelismos con lo que está 
ocurriendo ahora.  
Entonces a Zapatero, todo esto le ha pillado desprevenido, mal preparado, luego es un 
optimista antropológico y derrochador manirroto nato. Porque Zapatero nunca ha gestionado 
nada. Zapatero nunca ha tenido gestión sobre nada. Yo creo que su casa se la lleva Sonsoles. 
Claro, entonces, un tío que nunca ha tenido gestión sobre nada, ni experiencia de gestión, le 
metes de pronto a gestionar un país, como este.  
Este modelo de gobierno ¿cómo la comparas tú con un homólogo como Sarkozy como 
presidente de Francia? 
Francia ha sido el corazón de un imperio, pero siempre ha sido el corazón. El rol de Francia 
ha sido siempre diferente.  
Claro, esta visión imperial se ve muy bien nuevamente con Sarkozy con este nuevo 
intento de reconquistar el Mediterráneo, a partir de ser el impulsor de la Unión por el 
Mediterráneo, de la reformulación del proceso de Barcelona, etc… 
Pero es que eso siempre ha sido así. Nosotros nos creíamos que teníamos en Barcelona la 
capital del Mediterráneo. Eso una Maragallada. Pero eso no es verdad. Marsella pinta mucho 
más que Barcelona en cuanto a un rol en el Mediterráneo. Pero si es que Marruecos es 
francés, si Argelia es francesa, Túnez, es francés, es que Libia es francesa, es que Mauritania 
es francesa, y se habla francés, no español. En Marruecos solo se habla español en Larache y 
en Tánger. Pero no hemos tenido capacidad de penetración. Es que los franceses lo hacen 
muy bien, es que tienen una capacidad de hacer política exterior fantástica. Es que en Guinea 
Ecuatorial se habla francés y eso no es lógico. Los franceses nos han ganado por la mano 
todo. Pero si en el mediterráneo no hay ni un solo enclave que sea español.  
O sea, que las posibles aspiraciones de España para liderar la política euro-
mediterránea ¿pueden ser en cierto modo fuegos artificiales?  
Pero si es que no hay política euro-mediterránea de España. Con que enclaves? Chafarinas? 
Ha habido buenos embajadores, buenos intentos, nos hemos gastado dinero de la cooperación 
en Marruecos lo que no está escrito, pero para qué? Para nada. Además hay ahí 3 o 4 temas 
que nos enemistan con Marruecos irremisiblemente; Ceuta y Melilla, etc… 
Para finalizar, como ves el futuro de España a niveles interiores y a niveles exteriores.  
A nivel interior hemos perdido la gran oportunidad de oro de hacer un gobierno de gran 
coalición en el 2008. Ahí hemos perdido la oportunidad de oro. Esto no sería lo mismo, 
obviamente, tú te das cuenta, esto no sería lo mismo si tuviéramos un gobierno de gran 
coalición aquí. Como por ejemplo hay en el país vasco, más o menos. Si en vez de estar aquí 
dándonos de leches unos con otros nos hubiéramos puesto a trabajar esto no sería lo mismo. 
Hemos perdido esa oportunidad. Estos grandes acuerdos se tenían que haber hecho desde el 
2008, se están haciendo ahora, pero se tenía que haber comenzado a hacer mucho antes.  
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Se siguen haciendo grandes errores. Se han hecho dos presupuestos que no tienen nada que 
ver con la realidad y eso es muy grave. Los presupuestos del 2009 y los presupuestos del 
2010 son presupuestos que vamos. Como si yo te digo que ahora tienes un jersey de cuello de 
cisne. Es que nada tiene que ver con nada. Es tremendo. Eso tiene una influencia sobre el 
devenir interior del país, y claro, las críticas que hace Rajoy tiene mucha razón, pero es que 
Rajoy no logra romper la barrera del sonido. Por lo que ahora nos encontramos en un nivel de 
desconfianza del 75% de los españoles con respecto a su clase política. La percepción de que 
el tercer problema nacional después de la economía y el paro, es la clase política. Acojonante. 
El 75% no se fía del presidente del gobierno, 83% con respecto a Rajoy, no, y esa es la 
alternativa. Un nivel de pasotismo terrible. Hemos debilitado institucionalmente España hasta 
niveles incontenibles desde un punto de vista territorial, desde un punto de vista 
constitucional; esta constitución no vale. Nadie te lo dirá pero no vale. Fue una constitución 
que nació para salir de la dictadura pero no para sobrevivir 35 años después. Y encima hay un 
estado de nacional-pesimismo gravísimo. Porque si la economía como decía Keynes es un 
estado de espíritu, nuestro espíritu está muy mal… como no ganemos el mundial.  
Entonces desde el punto de vista interno, la situación actual es mala por la misma razón que 
en Argentina era también mala en la época del corralito. Porque el estado de espíritu de la 
gente era pésimo. Así que desde ese punto de vista no tenemos ninguna riqueza. Seguimos 
conservando estructura, pero el tejido productivo es malo. Antes se consumía la mitad del 
cemento de toda Europa y ahora eso ya no existe. Y antes vivíamos de ser un país de 
servicios y turismo y esa gallina de los huevos de oro la hemos matado. Claro, es que la gente 
ya no viene aquí a comprar una casa. Por qué? Porque no le hemos dado seguridad jurídica al 
inversor, ni siquiera al pequeño inversor. Esta inseguridad jurídica al inversor privado la 
hemos extendido al inversor público. El otro día un fondo de pensiones importante de 
Estados Unidos le mandó una carta a Zapatero diciéndole textualmente que habíamos 
invertido casi 33.000 millones de Euros en energías renovables y usted ahora nos cambia las 
reglas del juego de las energías renovables; qué hacemos ahora? Esa inseguridad jurídica a 
nivel individual y a nivel colectivo es lo peor que ha ocurrido.  
Entonces, paso devastador de este gobierno por el gobierno, valga la redundancia: 1) 
insuficiencias institucionales serias desde el punto de vista territorial, el estado de las 
autonomías que no funciona. Las relaciones entre comunidades autónomas no existen, hay 
una dispersión jurídica tremenda y esto de las 17 leyes de caza no es más que un banal 
ejemplo. Hay 17 leyes distintas para muchas cosas. Yo como empresario no me meto a 
invertir en otra comunidad autónoma porque todas las reglas del juego me han cambiado. 2) 
Hemos perdido la reputación exterior. Hemos dejado de ser los alemanes del sur de Europa 
para ser los griegos de Grecia. Y de esto no es solamente culpable el gobierno. También tiene 
la culpa la oposición. La oposición tampoco es fiable. La gente no dice que bien que va a 
venir Rajoy, eso no se lo oyes a nadie.  
El clima de pesimismo es absoluto. Y eso te lo dicen las encuestas donde los personajes más 
populares son personajes outsiders: Rosa Diez, Durán i Lleida, Gallardón, etc…gente que no 
va a llegar a la presidencia del gobierno nunca, pero que son los más populares. 3) De cara 
Europa ya verá. Analiza la presidencia Europea y ya verás. Europa de todas maneras es un 
barco a la deriva, ya veremos a ver a donde va. Lo que hacen en exteriores de Europa es muy 
jodido. La ampliación de Europa ha sido muy mala. Hemos metido peras con manzanas, 
churros con ovejas, se ha metido todo en el túrmix y salga lo que salga, y ha salido muy mal.  
Qué otros planos se pueden considerar aquí? En el plano objetivamente económico, no 
estamos tan mal. Lo que pasa es que si la economía es un estado de espíritu hay estamos muy 
298 
 
mal. Pero por los datos no estamos tan mal. Nuestra deuda está más o menos bien, tenemos 5 
millones de parados y vamos a tener más, pero eso es porque vamos a enfriar la economía, 
pero no es verdad. Porque tenemos un 25% de economía sumergida y con eso consigues 
amortiguar mucho los efectos sociales. De los 5 millones de parados debe haber 3 trabajando 
a pleno pulmón. Eso es bueno? Malo? Es injusto. Este probablemente es uno de los países 
más injustos de Europa y eso tendrá algún día su significación.  
Y luego hay un tema que a mí me preocupa mucho. Hay dos aspectos constitucionales, de 
inadecuación constitucional que son peligrosos: 1) El autonomías no funcionan. No somos un 
estado federal, ni confederal, ni un federalismo imperfecto como decía Maragall. Somos una 
amalgama de distintos intereses, de reyes, reyezuelos, etc…con un estado central muy débil. 
Y además el problema es que el siguiente también va a ser débil. Suponiendo que el siguiente 
fuera Rajoy, ese gobierno sería muy débil también. Eso constituye la desconfianza ciudadana.  
Y 2) la forma de Estado. Nunca se publican las encuestas sobre las conciencias monárquicas 
o republicanas de la gente. Y no se publican por algo. Una vez que desaparezca el actual jefe 
del estado, o abdique, que no va a abdicar, que va a pasar? Ya no quiero ni pensar, si 
ocurriese, que en práctica no puede ocurrir -por algunas razones ginecológicas- que Letizia 
tuviera un hijo, con ese artículo 57 de la constitución que tenemos. No quiero ni pensar. Pero 
como tenemos una clase política que nunca piensa a medio plazo, este artículo de la 
constitución se tenía que haber reformado hace tiempo, junto con otros. La constitución 
todavía habla del servicio militar obligatorio. Si miras el título 8 de la constitución verás. No 
tiene nada que ver con la realidad. Fue creado para descentralizar un estado, para el 
nacimiento del estado de las autonomías, pero no para 32 años después. Entonces a la 
constitución hay que darle un lavado de cara, urgentemente. Esto no lo asume nadie, y no lo 
asume nadie y tampoco lo dicen.  
Esto que ocurrió con el Estatut de Cataluña demostró que las costuras de la constitución se 
han quedado pequeñas, para lo que representa la realidad. La realidad es una realidad 
nacionalista en Cataluña y en el País Vasco, un poco menos en Galicia, y es una realidad en 
la que el Rey debe representar una cosa distinta al Shogun este tenemos ahí. Eso no puede 
ser.  
En realidad ha sido un país que ha osado crecer, que se ha atrevido a crecer y a 
convertirse en una potencia internacional pero con miedo a cambiar cuando hay que 
cambiar.  
En realidad hicimos un cambio radical en el año 1977, la primera transición. Pero es que 
ahora nos encontramos en una segunda transición y que ese cambio hay que hacerlo otra vez. 
Que ahora ya estamos creciditos y que ya no nos sirve la ropa de marinerito del 1978 y que la 
Constitución nuestra ni contempla el Internet, ni Europa, ni el Euro, ni nada, joder, ni las 17 
autonomías por cierto, ni la inadecuación del Senado, ni la circunscripción provincial (esta 
normativa electoral va a ser fuente de problemas gordos. No puede ser que si yo, votando a 
Izquierda Unida si lo fuese, necesitase 4 votos más que el PP o el PSOE para tener un escaño) 
etc… Hay docenas de cosas que obligarían a cambiar la constitución. Así que estamos 
favoreciendo alianzas contra natura.  
La conclusión que saco de todo esto es que para ser optimista, vivimos un período de grandes 
potencialidades. De esplendidas potencialidades para cambiar. Que venga un tío con huevos, 
(que no es el que viene) que diga que gane el mejor, vamos a hacer el gran consenso para 
arreglar 5 cosas. 4 en la Constitución y punto y acabaron los problemas. Afortunadamente 
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ETA se va a acabar. Pero se va a acabar por consunción, pero no porque que hayamos hecho 
nosotros nada por hacer que termine. Por pura vejez. 
 
 
ANNA TERRON Y CUSÍ. 
 
 
Me interesa mucho ver, desde un punto de vista oficial, pero también  personal, saber 
las experiencias que hayas podido tener tú, en un ambiente de retos. Porque desde que 
España entra en la Unión y sobre todo a partir del 1991-1992, sobre todo a partir de 
Amsterdam. Me gustaría saber desde tu experiencia como fueron esos primeros tiempos 
en los cuales se comenzaba a razonar en un modo nacional, pero también en un contexto 
internacional, cuáles eran y como se afrontaban estos iniciales retos, sobre todo 
relacionados con la inmigración.  
Yo empecé a trabajar este tema en el Parlamento Europeo en el 1994. Llegué precisamente en 
el lugar oportuno en el momento oportuno a la Comisión de Libertades Públicas y fui después 
portavoz por el Partido Socialista en la misma comisión. Es muy curioso, porque en España 
había poca conciencia sobre temas de inmigración. La conciencia que había en el ámbito de 
inmigraciones era reciente, tenía mucho que ver con la salida de españoles. Todavía en el 
1994 había entradas, pero todavía no había una preocupación política por este tema. Y con 
relación a la política europea sobre inmigración, no había nada. No existía nada. Era 
totalmente ajeno a todo. Era la época del tercer pilar.  
Recuerdo por un lado, y casi paralelamente, el aumento por el interés por parte de España en 
materia migratoria y el desarrollo de la política europea de migración, que fue a partir de la 
famosa comunicación de la Comisión 2000 de la Declaración del Fin de las políticas de 
inmigración 0 que fue muy controvertida y la verdad es que nosotros en ese debate incipiente 
estábamos en una situación un poco extraña. En realidad se seguía viendo lo que había sido la 
inmigración interna europea (Portugal, España, Grecia) y luego la segunda, digamos Turquía 
y Marruecos como posteriores pero seguían discutiendo todavía sobre lo que había sido 
todavía la existente política de inmigración. La clásica política de la inmigración y el post-
crisis de los años setenta con el cierre, etc.  
Y nosotros que veníamos de esta experiencia migratoria, creo que nos dábamos cuenta más 
rápidamente que ellos, de que había otro fenómeno de migración internacional muy 
importante. Y nos dábamos cuenta porque la llegada la teníamos ahí, en España. No porque 
tuviéramos más, porque Francia, Alemania, Holanda, Bélgica nos superaban por mucho. En 
España no había ese fenómeno de inmigración internacional, pero se estaba produciendo en 
un período muy corto y muy intenso. Era todo muy visible. Y además se estaba despertando 
la conciencia de los españoles en lo referente a la inmigración.  
Me acuerdo que en las reuniones preparatorias de la cumbre de Tampere (1999) antes de la 
comunicación. Fue un año antes que estábamos reunidos después de Amsterdam, la 
preparación de la cumbre con el Comisario Vitorino, me escribió Ricard Zapata de Barcelona 
– no no me escribió, escribió un artículo en La Vanguardia, hablando sobre política Europea 
de Inmigración. Yo me quedé alucinada y dije, mira no eres la única loca de tu ciudad que 
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estás haciendo esto. Le escribí emocionada. A partir de ahí tuvimos muy buena relación hasta 
ahora.  
Recuerdo esto. Era realmente muy extraño. De esta primera época, la presencia española en 
las políticas europeas de inmigración pasó de ser muy menor a adquirir un mayor peso. Y yo 
creo que en aquella época dimos un salto de ser un país que había elaborado una ley de 
inmigración casi por que la entrada en la Unión Europea la obligaba, porque había una 
preocupación en el norte de Europa por la extensión al extremo sur del estrecho y de las 
fronteras exteriores de la Unión, preocupación que para España era nula. Para nosotros en el 
momento de la entrada en la Unión Europea en el año 1986, la discusión sobre las fronteras 
exteriores de España no existían. Los marroquíes no tenían visado para pasar en España y no 
pasaba nada.  
Sí hubo esa primera ley de inmigración un poco causada por las exigencias de la Unión 
Europea. Yo pienso que dimos un salto muy importante a ser uno de los países que lideró una 
visión de las emigraciones internacionales tan distintas. La emigración del norte estaba muy 
vinculada a los flujos internos pero también a la cuestión de la emigración por razones 
humanitarias. Nosotros en España no teníamos nada de eso, nadie quería pedir asilo en 
España. Éramos un país con mayor tradición de producción de asilados que de recepción. Y 
claro, no habíamos tenido tiempo en absoluto de entrar en aspectos como la reagrupación 
familiar etc.  
Una cosa que de las que estás comentando que me parece muy interesante y que va al 
punto de lo que yo quisiera escribir, efectivamente, cuando España entra en la Unión en 
1986, el perfil que había mantenido después de tantos años de dictadura, como país 
subdesarrollado a nivel político, institucional, etc. Llega un momento en el que se tiene 
que hacer un hueco y ganarse una credibilidad también por parte de sus socios 
europeos. En la Reunión del Consejo de Europa de Lisboa en 1992, Abel Matutes dice, 
atención con el norte de África que lo que está sucediendo es una bomba de relojería, 
palabras textuales, y subraya el aspecto de la emigración. Entonces en el documento 
principal y en el anexo de las conclusiones la Unión Europea explica que hay unas áreas 
prioritarias donde hay que hacer una especial atención que son el este, el norte de 
África y el Medio Oriente. Obviamente el Medio Oriente mucho más relacionado con el 
tema del proceso de Paz de Israel, Palestina etc. Pero en el norte de África por razones 
demográficas se estaba preparando una bomba de relojería. Lo que has comentado tú. 
Ese papel español por individualizar un problema incipiente que va a ser muy 
importante y capital para el resto de las políticas de la Unión Europea.  
Claro. Lo que tú me estás diciendo es en dos vías, ¿no? Por un lado en la vía de las políticas 
de justicia interior, antiguo tercer pilar, que evoluciona muy rápidamente después de 
Amsterdam y que nosotros nos metemos en esta línea en una forma muy incipiente pero con 
una visión más clara como te decía. Y la otra línea por la que evoluciona eso es por la política 
mediterránea. La incipiente también política exterior de la Unión y la dimensión 
mediterránea. No era desde el punto de vista de la política exterior, no fue desde el principio 
la obsesión española. La obsesión de España y Portugal desde el principio del ingreso en la 
Unión Europea es el viraje de Europa hacia América Latina. Ahí nosotros sí que 
presionábamos mucho, porque la parte política exterior comunitaria que era más bien de 
cooperación al desarrollo existía estaba muy orientada a los países del Caribe y a las ex 
colonias del norte, pero no había una visión muy Europea hacia América Latina. Por lo que 
España presionó mucho ahí.  
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Pero, yo creo que nosotros nos dimos muy rápidamente de que tampoco había una dimensión 
mediterránea más allá de Oriente Medio y más allá de lo relacionado con la propia seguridad 
por parte de la Unión Europea y nosotros ahí teníamos un vecindario inmediato. Y ahí Abel 
Matutes comenzó la política Euro-Mediterránea que ha tenido sus altos y bajos y que estamos 
donde estamos para bien y para mal. El día 5 nos vamos a la toma de posesión del nuevo 
Secretario de la UPM a Barcelona, un marroquí, Jossef Amrani.  
Es curioso como esas dos líneas van confluyendo y separándose. Nosotros empezamos a 
preocuparnos por al inmigración mediterránea en ese momento y después va aumentando la 
preocupación. Preocupación compartida por otros países, aunque yo creo que es radicalmente 
diferente y eso es importante verlo. La posición de Francia respecto a Argelia, o la posición 
de España respecto a Marruecos por muy diferentes por mil razones; geopolíticas, históricas. 
Porque los comportamientos migratorios no son los mismos. Pero bueno, al final, a nosotros 
nos interesa esa visión mediterránea y ese pilar migratorio, y nos interesa sobre todo 
Marruecos. Que se haya bien o mal, tengo muchas dudas sobre todo el proceso. Tanto en el 
ámbito mediterráneo como en el ámbito de las políticas PESC como en el ámbito JAI, 
vivimos desde hace muchos años, por lo menos desde mitad de los noventa en una fortísima 
tensión entre el miedo y la necesidad de cierre y la gestión del espacio Euro-Mediterráneo y 
de las migraciones con otros criterios más vinculados a la política exterior, a la cooperación, 
al desarrollo. Seguimos viviendo de una forma muy dramática.  
Te lo juro. Los suecos y nosotros éramos los únicos que hablábamos de democratización en el 
norte de África. Lo demás….yo recuerdo como cayó un papel sobre la mesa del consejo que 
habían pactado los italianos con los mediterráneos una semana antes donde la primera frase 
era, si no literalmente, sí en espíritu, decía, se está produciendo en el norte de África, cambios 
que pueden traer efectos dramáticos para Europa. Nos levantamos los suecos y nosotros 
diciendo “se están produciendo cambios que pueden ser esperanzadores”.  
Es lo que nos pasó a nosotros en las Canarias en el 2006. En Canarias en 2006 se gestionó la 
llegada de 30.000 personas. No se acudió a España, no se acudió a Europa, repatriamos a 
muchos, etc. Bueno pero ya llegaremos a este tema.  
El punto interesante que has mencionado, ese rol español por identificar un problema 
incipiente que es el tema de la inmigración, y obviamente también que a nivel 
diplomático, a nivel de reuniones con los otros miembros de la Unión Europea, pudieron 
existir algunas reticencias por hacer pasar este mensaje. Por parte de otros miembros, 
pero por parte de Francia también particularmente?  
Yo creo que esto se circunscribe a esta tensión entre el refuerzo de las fronteras y la 
necesidad de establecer este marco, más amplio especialmente en el ámbito mediterráneo. 
Hay un elemento que creo que es interesante. España, sobre todo a partir del 2004, cuando ya 
se había producido la entrada masiva por decirlo así, asociado a unas condiciones de un 
mercado que reclaman mano de obra en condiciones económicas por debajo del precio. Lo 
cual además hace que haya una presión fuerte en España para el contrato de personas para el 
servicio doméstico, etc. Después de esta entrada fuerte en el 2004, yo creo que es interesante 
ver, como España y seguramente esto se gestó antes, es un país que ante los retos migratorios, 
lo que hace es pedir más a Europa. España al revés de lo que se sucede en el centro y en el 
norte de Europa, que hay básicamente reacciones de repliegue…yo recuerdo las discusiones 
desde el 1998 hasta hoy, que el número de entradas solo las pueden controlar los estados y la 
política migratoria es nacional, los Europeos son de mínimos, nunca avanzó ninguna de las 
propuestas de Tampere para construir un marco común migratorio. En cambio España ahí, tal 
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vez fue uno de los pocos países que no, que cuando tiene un problema en 2006, lo que hace 
es que se refuerce FRONTEX, que impide que haya una política comunitaria de inmigración 
que cree que la política exterior es básica en  materia de migraciones… 
Nosotros pusimos en marcha el Plan África, que África para España era una completa 
desconocida en materia de política exterior y de cooperación, al hilo de los eventos de 2006. 
Pero nosotros vimos que la única forma de gestionar el flujo de personas, en el siglo XXI era 
con más Europa y con más relación con los países de origen. Y esta es nuestra historia 
reciente con Marruecos y con el África subsahariana. Marruecos, puede ser más o menos 
complicado, porque nosotros con Marruecos tenemos todos los dossiers del mundo. La 
primera cosa que tenemos que hacer es reconocer que es nuestro vecino, y que por lo tanto 
tenemos una relación transfronteriza. La gente piensa que podemos hacer la misma política 
migratoria con Ecuador que con Marruecos y que la política migratoria es una, y que no tiene 
nada que ver con los factores geopolíticos. Las reglas que se imponen para América Latina, 
no tienen que funcionar necesariamente para tu entorno inmediato y para países que tienen 
una componente transfronteriza muy fuerte.  
Pero para todo el conjunto, España tiene ese rol –en algunos momentos de forma más 
evidente que en otros- pero muy fuertemente después del 2004, de ese Estado que no se 
repliega y dice vamos a organizar esto del ámbito Europeo y desde el ámbito de las relaciones 
internacionales.  
En el 2004 el papel de España en este sentido, buscando de alguna manera de levantar 
la conciencia sobre estas cuestiones que efectivamente cristaliza en el 2004, pero 
supongo que en el período precedente, supongo que fue un poco de lucha también por 
intentar hacer llegar un mensaje… 
Sí, hombre, muy muy orientado desde una visión muy conservadora, porque Aznar tenía una 
visión muy conservadora. Y como siempre las visiones muy conservadoras sobre la 
inmigración, produciendo esa paradoja liberal, por un lado es hiper tolerante con las fuerzas 
del mercado que exige mano de obra barata, y por el otro lado es hiper restrictiva en términos 
normativos y en términos retóricos y eso genera en general situaciones bastante explosivas. 
Pero es verdad que en aquella época, eso se fue gestando también desde este punto de vista. 
Yo recuerdo por ejemplo que en el Consejo Europeo de Sevilla, la propuesta de Aznar sobre 
la condicionalidad de la ayuda al desarrollo al control migratorio. Que además recuerdo 
perfectamente que cayó por la absoluta oposición entonces de Anna Lindh, que era la 
ministra de exteriores sueca que vetó la propuesta. Pero la propuesta Española era la de 
condicionar la ayuda a África al control migratorio.  
Nosotros la verdad es que hemos hecho después una cosa más sofisticada, que es decir, 
vamos a trabajar juntos en cooperación y en control migratorio, pero no vamos a condicionar, 
a dar solo si. Pero bueno, además de esa idea había más y la recuerdo como espectacular, 
pero también como un indicio como de que en aquel momento se estaba trabajando de una 
forma importante en el ámbito Europeo de las migraciones.  
Cuál era la reacción de Francia como gran protagonista de las políticas europeas con 
relación a lo que España comenzaba a proponer?  
A ver, yo creo que en esa época ellos, los franceses estaban muy obsesionados con Argelia. 
Recuerda que los noventa en Argelia fueron muy duros, luego, Francia llegó a tener cerrados 
los servicios consulares en Argelia. Era una situación muy complicada, y para de la historia 
de la UPM tiene que ver con esto, y es que Francia tenía que liderar las políticas 
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mediterráneas en Europa. Tampoco vieron a España como un problema porque nunca lo 
vieron como un competidor. Ellos se creían sobre, en un papel dominador por una trayectoria 
histórica. Estamos hablando de un período muy largo, pero por ejemplo Francia avaló la 
conferencia Euro-Mediterránea en Barcelona, y después de 10 años se volvió a reunir en 
Barcelona y la UPM acabó teniendo su sede en Barcelona. Eso nos costó mucho! Yo estaba 
en el gobierno de la Generalitat en aquel momento apretando.  
Entonces había un cierto combate diplomático de alguna manera por atraer.  
Ellos, los Franceses estaban o se creían muy por encima de España. El punto de inflexión fue 
que ahí fue la ampliación porque ellos daban por sentado que el ámbito de influencia 
Alemana era uno y entonces pensaban que el Mediterráneo era su ámbito natural. Pero ahí 
curiosamente, incluso con Marruecos, y mira que con Marruecos la historia de España es 
complicada, pero incluso con Marruecos por falta de pasado colonial descriptible, damos 
menos miedo al mediterráneo. Nosotros por ejemplo con Egipto tenemos una relación de 
Partners, una relación muy fuerte entre asociaciones, sociedad civil española por la 
transición, por la experiencia de la transición, etc. Nuestra relación es fácil, no hay un pasado 
como el británico o incluso como el francés, que aunque no tenga una relación directa con 
Egipto si la tiene con los vecinos de la zona lo que hace que se vean de una forma más 
sospechosa.  
Yo creo, que esto ha beneficiado mucho el rol de España en las políticas Euro-
Mediterráneas. El resto que el partner no te vea como el ex colono que vuelves otra vez 
con fórmulas de soft power, para intentar imponerte, sino que puedes una relación con 
ellos mucho más fluida.  
Exacto, a pesar de que con Marruecos tenemos todos los contenciosos del mundo abiertos, 
tenemos Ceutas, Melilla. Muchas veces Marruecos dice, esto vamos a hacerlo con España, 
porque se sienten más cómodos en el fondo. Hay menos tensión histórica. Ahora desde ese 
punto de vista del cruce de las políticas Euro-Mediterráneas y de las políticas migratorias, 
Francia lleva muchos años haciendo frente al discurso de Le Pen y yo creo que de una forma 
equivocada, porque cuando los partidos del mainstream caen en la retórica del populismo 
xenófobo lo que haces es legitimar y ensanchar el espacio de juego y eso se ha demostrado, y 
se demostró en las elecciones Chirac-Le Pen y se ha demostrado siempre. En Holanda 
también, en Dinamarca. Y yo creo que ahí Francia está incómoda porque por un lado tiene 
que ofrecer esa política de espacio común mediterráneo y por otro lado se siente muy 
presionada en materia migratoria. El tema migratorio está más fuerte que nunca y además 
creo que Francia lo lleva muy mal, porque ellos siempre tuvieron esa idea republicana del 
francés universal. Es complicado. Tienen muchos franceses de origen mediterráneo y 
Maghrebí. No acaban de llevarlo, no acaban de encontrar el discurso que les permita trabajar 
esto. 
España, es verdad que estamos en un período duro. Es la primera vez que tenemos una 
situación de crisis con un 10% de inmigración y venimos de una experiencia intensa y muy 
corta, pero yo creo que seguimos que teniendo esa visión de gestión global de los flujos una 
de cuyas piernas fundamentales es la Unión Europea. Yo recuerdo estos días, algunas 
anécdotas, cuando estaba Antonio Vitorino de comisario y cuando se hizo la comunicación de 
la Comisión y antes el plan de trabajo de Tampere que era un plan de trabajo con un esquema 
racional de migraciones que empezaban por las entradas por motivos económicos, por 
entradas humanitarias, hablábamos de que no era posible sostener el espacio de libre 
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circulación interior y el mercado único sin una política común de inmigración. Por razones 
obvias.  
Y yo el otro día lo pensaba durante una reunión que teníamos y decíamos, lo que yo nunca 
hubiese imaginado en aquel momento es que lo que acabaríamos poniendo en cuestión era 
Schengen! Si no cómo consolidamos una política migratoria que nos permita tener ese 
espacio interior! Teníamos razón en el planteamiento de la tesis pero nos equivocamos 
completamente en la conclusión. La conclusión no es que debía haber una política de 
inmigración, sino que no íbamos a consolidar Schengen. Es muy sorprendente.  
Claro, desde este punto de vista y teniendo que las políticas migratorias son motor de 
muchas de tensiones entre países emisores, de recepción y de tránsito, yo recuerdo de 
una reunión que tuvimos en Egipto con Euromesco, allí, uno de los diplomáticos 
egipcios, Gamal Bayouni, y este hombre decía, sí de un lado las políticas generales, la 
apertura del mercado, el área de libre comercio, pero a la hora de verdad a la hora de 
las políticas migratorias nos bloqueáis. Nos castigáis. Siendo una tan sensible, que resta 
a flor de piel, que tiene que ver con seres humanos, cómo un cambio de políticas puede 
cambiar las relaciones multilaterales y bilaterales con los socios del sur desde el punto 
de vista.  
Este es un factor muy patente. Yo si quieres te hago una visión pesimista desde el punto de 
vista más de la relación política, que tiene la realidad, a mi hay un fenómeno ahí detrás que 
me preocupa mucho y que yo lo describo con la frase de “doble populismo”. En el debate 
internacional, en las relaciones internacionales, puedes coger por ejemplo, el esfuerzo sobre 
las migraciones, las incipientes y fragilísimas estructuras del diálogo internacional sobre la 
migración, lo que se está produciendo es por un lado esa emergencia del discurso europeo 
populista, duro. Y por otro lado un discurso, y lamento decirlo, igualmente populista, 
izquierdoso, donde países de origen de la emigración, donde no hay el mayor esfuerzo por 
mejorar la situación de su gente y en cambio han desarrollado un discurso de protección de 
sus ciudadanos en el exterior.  
Yo que me ocupo de las dos cosas en España, de emigración e inmigración creo que es una 
deriva muy preocupante. Yo por ejemplo me tuve que pelear para que la organización 
ecuatoriana de la inmigración, la SENAMI, no armara un lío en Lorca después del terremoto. 
Porque nuestra preocupación allí era que allí no había inmigrantes, había lorquinos, y que en 
cualquier caso, antes que ecuatorianos, o marroquíes o senegaleses, eran víctimas del 
terremoto que iban a entrar por el carril normal de ayuda, y tuvimos nuestros momentos de 
tensión. Porque había gente que decía, este paquete que se lo trague inmigración.  
En términos retóricos inflama mucho. Hay un elemento complicado que es el de meter la 
política europea y la política norte-americana en un mismo paquete, y donde Arizona parece 
lo mismo que la directiva de retorno, pero esperen, un momento.  
Pero claro eso a los gobiernos populistas les ayuda mucho. Marruecos en otro orden de cosas 
también lanza ese mensaje a su gente en el exterior. Es diferente, pero existe. Yo me acuerdo 
en El Salvador en la preparatoria regional iberoamericana del Foro Global que al final, me 
molestó todo tanto, que dije, mire, igual es verdad que somos un poco racistas, pero en mi 
país si un niño ecuatoriano con su familia o sin familia no tiene papeles para un riñón y está 
en una lista antes del mío, le van a transplantar un riñón antes que al mío. Y la gente ha 
accedido a eso. Y si tiene que entrar en un colegio entra, y si queda otro niño fuera, queda 
fuera. Hay una cierta aceptación social que es así mientras que en sus países esos niños en sus 
países no tienen garantizada la asistencia básica sanitaria.  
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Entonces, claro, hay que meter todas estas cosas en un paquete. Por tanto este discurso está 
emborronando mucho las relaciones internacionales. En cambio, luego si aterrizamos en el 
terreno de la realidad, yo creo que hay una dramática falta de institucionalización de la 
gestión de las migraciones y de lo que yo creo que es un fenómeno cada vez más diferente de 
la migración tradicional que es la movilidad de las personas en el siglo XXI.  
Y que no es exactamente como el movimiento de las migraciones en el siglo XX. Ya nos es 
el hombre que llega que encuentra trabajo, que luego trae a la mujer y a los hijos con la idea 
de permanecer. No, estamos viendo una aceleración muy grande de los procesos. En España 
hay gente que se va, que se mueve por la Unión Europea. La inmigración en España se ha 
convertido, a nivel de géneros en casi lo mismo, con los costes que significa eso también para 
las mujeres, a nivel personal y profesional y no digo que la mujer se deba ocupar de los hijos, 
etc, pero que es lo que sucede en los países de origen. Y no hay ningún nivel de 
institucionalización. Es una pena la situación que vivimos en Europa porque la 
renacionalización en este terreno nos va a hacer perder mucho tiempo. Deberíamos estar 
pensando en cómo gestionar ese marco migratorio.  
Idea de estado-nación inventado 300 años atrás que no se corresponde con la realidad.  
Y es que nunca hemos salido de esa idea. Por esa razón que la afirmación: “no puede haber 
un mercado único en un espacio de libre circulación sin política migratoria” era correcta, y 
era la conclusión práctica que nosotros pensábamos en aquel momento que era la política 
europea de  migraciones, no es lo que está pasando.  
Hay un momento también de recesión económica que cada país debe responder ante su 
ciudadanía.  
Y está claro, en época de recesión no puedes tener una política migratoria que facilite la 
entrada. Pero si necesitas tener un marco claro de cómo y porqué se admite el ingreso y cuál 
es la relación entre los estados europeos sobre los flujos migratorios.  
Y cómo veis vosotros por ejemplo que la reformulación de Sarkozy de la Unión por el 
Mediterráneo haya metido el tema de la emigración como un tema fuerte. Se puede ver 
como una idea de Francia por querer tomar el tema de la emigración como aspecto 
fundamental de las relaciones Euro-Mediterráneas y tratar de controlarlo a través de 
este marco?  
En realidad ese tema ha estado siempre allí y es la patata caliente con la que nadie sabe como 
trabajar. Porque por un lado Sarkozy hace eso y por otro lado hace ese acuerdo con Italia. Es 
una boutade para para la opinión pública y cuando intentas que eso tenga algún 
recorrido…Los últimos consejos de las comisiones JAI del Consejo Europeo con relación a 
Schengen es para verlo.  
Yo estoy muy contenta porque hemos sido una de las fuerzas que hemos conseguido 
reconducir esto al terreno de la racionalidad. Porque las primeras propuestas eran…La 
primera propuesta de las conclusiones de Consejo que decía que “la inmigración irregular y la 
presión inmigratoria irregular era un motivo para el cierre de fronteras interiores a través de 
un mecanismo comunitario” es que vamos. En primer lugar, técnicamente era insostenible. O 
que hay un terremoto en Argel y sale gente…qué haces. Además tenía un potencial 
destructivo enorme. Al final lo que hemos hecho ha sido una cosa mucho más razonable. En 
la propuesta del Consejo lo que dice es que es que el mecanismo se va a poner en marcha 
cuando haya una quiebra en el control de fronteras. Es decir, si sucede como en el 2006, 
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llegan 30.000 personas a España y nosotros ponemos en marcha todos los mecanismos de 
política interior y exterior para gestionar esto, lo que tiene que hacer la Unión Europea es 
venir a ayudarnos. No cerrarnos los Pirineos.  
Ahora bien, si hay un país que sistemáticamente quiebra el control de fronteras y además 
tiene una presión fuerte, ahí sí que parece razonable que además de los mecanismos de ayuda 
podamos actuar, y la Unión Europea pueda proponer un cierre temporal de fronteras. 
Entonces las primeras propuestas eran absurdas. Se vive siempre un poco esta tensión. 
Inmigración siempre ha sido la patata caliente de la política euro-mediterránea, pero no de la 
UPM, ya el famoso espacio de libre comercio de 2010 del que ya nadie habla. Siempre se ha 
tenido el elemento frágil de la circulación de personas. Siempre lo ha tenido. En la UPM se 
plantea ya desde el punto de vista de la liberalización del espacio desde una perspectiva de la 
política migratoria. También es el típico tópico de la agenda mediterránea, muy válida para el 
Maghreb y menos para oriente medio. Bueno, la UPM debería ocuparse de eso. Es la enésima 
vez que se intenta y se repite.  
La realidad ahora es interesante la propuesta que hay sobre la mesa sobre la circularidad en el 
Mediterráneo al hilo de la primavera árabe. Vuelven a cruzarse las políticas euro-
mediterráneas, las políticas de inmigración, el consejo JAI, podría reforzar esa línea en la 
UPM, pero yo creo que vamos a empezar con cosas como investigadores, estudiantes, 
trabajadores cualificados. Pero vamos… 
Entonces creéis que el hecho que la sede de UPM se sitúe en Barcelona sea un éxito de la 
diplomacia española?  
Sí, se ha trabajado duro en eso .Yo estuve con Moratinos en la delegación que fue a Marsella 
y yo en aquel momento estaba en el gobierno de la Generalitat, fui una de las pocas de un 
gobierno autonómico que formó parte de una delegación del Estado. La verdad que España lo 
trabajó mucho.  
Hubo oposiciones también por parte de Francia?  
No, había una propuesta de Marsella, pero Francia nunca iba a elegir Marsella. Francia es 
París. Y algo a lo que ellos dan importancia no puede estar en Marsella. Cuando aquí todos 
estaban preocupados por Marsella, decía, mira, Marsella es una candidatura del alcalde de 
Marsella. Tener nada que hacer. Un diplomático francés considera que poner algo en 
Marsella es degradarlo. Ellos en Marsella tienen el Institute de la Mediterrànèe y el 
observatorio económico del marido de la señora Guigou.  
Pero el problema que tenemos en las relaciones euro-mediterráneas es que la parte europea 
está muy institucionalizada y la parte mediterránea no. Con lo cual, tu no tienes una 
contraparte árabe.  
Claro, las relaciones intra-maghrebíes dificultan eso. Argelia y Marruecos se eliminan 
de entrada.  
Es bueno que el secretario general de la UPM sea un marroquí, piensa que aquel momento no 
pudo ser por la oposición argelina y eso también es secreto. Pero es bueno que este momento 
se haya aceptado por todo el mundo este secretario general marroquí. Pero claro, ha una 
situación de desigualdad que Sarkozy trató de romper con esa tontería de que eso ya no va a 
ser Europa y que las cosas se iban a a hacer Estado a Estado y claro es falso, porque necesitas 
a la Unión. Y ahora vamos a ver como van las cosas, porque por un lado está Amrani y por el 
otro la señora Ashton, en presidencia esta, porque creo que el co-presidente árabe está en la 
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cárcel que era Mubarak. Es decir, hay algunos inconvenientes. Y vamos a ver. Ahora yo 
tengo todo el interés del mundo por trabajar en este ámbito.  
Es una cosa necesaria para la estabilidad de todos.  
Es imprescindible. Yo creo que es francamente necesario que podamos trabajar en ese tema.  
Sí, porque puedes hablar de política económica, puedes hablar de ayuda al desarrollo, 
puedes hablar de lo que quieras, pero si las bases de la comunicación no exíste, hacer 
estas cosas es abocar las cosas al fracaso una y otra vez.  
Tenemos que hacerlo con un punto de partida totalmente diferente. Hay que reconocer la 
vecindad, hay que reconocer que el espacio es siempre más pequeño. Yo siempre digo que la 
diferencia entre Latinoamérica y Marruecos es que un emigrante está a 1200 euros de 
distancia y Marruecos a 30 euros de Madrid con EasyJet. Entonces cuando la gente está a 30 
euros de Easyjet…  
Ejemplo: Vacaciones de los niños que van a Marruecos al pueblo durante el verano. Algo que 
ocurría con los catalanes cuando en verano se iban al pueblo 3 meses a Extremadura.  
Y claro, esto te rompe los esquemas de cualquier ley de extranjería. Hay unos líos increíbles. 
Muchos marroquís en el paro, vuelven a Marruecos, vienen a firmar la tarjeta de residencia, 
la mujer está con los niños allí porque es más barato, y luego para mantener los papeles van 
viajando. Entonces tu intentas meter esto en la misma ley de extranjería que regula a los 
chinos a los ecuatorianos, etc. Ahora hay un problema porque les estamos quitando la 
prestación de desempleo a muchos marroquíes. Pero claro, es que estos tíos en su pueblo 
viven, y aquí no. Entonces creo que tendríamos que ver en esa mirada transfronteriza para ver 
cómo podemos organizar la circulación de personas en el mediterráneo, sabiendo que es una 
cuestión maghrebí. Porque Egipto no tiene ese problema, el Líbano es otro universo, con 
Siria veremos lo que pasa.  
Lo que es terrible es que para mantener un cierto orden y estabilidad (caso Sirio, Arab 
Spring) la gente tenga que vivir en malas condiciones.  
La situación actual en el Mediterráneo me recuerda mucho al debate de los primeros años 
sobre el Este. Me recuerda mucho a los 89-90 y 91. Cuando la gente decía que sorpresa! 
Cómo podemos decir esto por segunda vez? Cómo podemos estar diciendo 25 años después 
lo mismo que se nos ocurrió decir cuando cayó el muro de Berlín. Sorpresa que la gente no 
quiera vivir más de 40 años en la miseria? Pero la reacción Europea ha sido muy 
conservadora. Ahora migraciones va a seguir ahí. What’s next? No se que será next. Ahora 
mismo y me pongo el gorro de gobierno Español, hemos hecho un esfuerzo muy para situar 
una cierta política migratoria adaptada al momento actual de crisis y para mantener eso frío. 
Con éxitos diferentes.  
La gran población de la población inmigrante de Cataluña es maghrebí y eso no es que sea 
más preocupante, pero es que antes no votaban en las municipales. En otros espacios los 
latinoamericanos son mayoría, en Madrid, por ejemplo. Luego veremos que pasará con las 
generales. Pero los partidos de izquierdas de derechas en Europa tendrán que ponerse al hilo 
de si seguimos la deriva de la retórica populista o no. Que no quiere decir no hacer política de 
inmigración, ni hacer discursos sobre la inmigración, que hay que hacerlos. Pero lo que no 
puedes hacer es retórica. Tiene que estar fundamentada con elementos de la realidad. Pero es 
muy difícil dar argumentos racionales contra los slogans populistas.  
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Por otro lado, nosotros seguimos pensando que necesitamos una política Europea y una 
política euro-mediterránea que incluya migraciones, incluso en este momento de crisis 
seguimos teniendo un interés activo en la relación con los países de origen, seguimos 
trabajando con África. Estamos trabajando programas de retorno desde otros puntos de vista. 
Ni van a entrar ni se van a marchar los inmigrantes en masa. No. Hay ayudas de repatriación, 
tratando de reconocer la experiencia profesional de los que han estado aquí, acompañando, 
intentando vincularla a proyectos económicos en origen. Senegal está pidiendo a algunos 
inversores extranjeros que guarden algunos puestos de trabajo para senegaleses que quieran 
volver al país. Generar esos flujos, y luego ver un poco como nosotros avanzamos hacia una 
gestión política de los flujos internacionales. En 2013, se celebrará la conferencia de las 
Naciones Unidas, confío poco porque está muy orientada hacia los temas de desarrollo por la 
propia naturaleza de la emigración y yo creo que debería estar más orientada a ver como en el 
ámbito del derecho internacional la gobernanza mundial puede encauzar el tema migratorio. 
Pero creo que todo esto seguirá siendo en forma de escalera sino en forma de sierra. 
Idealmente en forma de escalera, sino en forma de sierra. Los quince años de Tampere han 
sido esto, a forma de sierra.  
Y esto es muy difícil para mantener una cierta coherencia política.  
Claro, y es decir, oiga, que teníamos una estructura una lógica y ahora tenemos una explosión 
cósmica donde las piezas legislativas sobre inmigración avanzan en perfecto orden de caos. 
Ahora tenemos esto, mañana tenemos otra cosa. Yo creo que la política migratoria está 
inventada. Por un lado tienes que controlar las fuerzas del mercado, equilibrar, y por otro lado 
evitar los espacios de exclusión de derechos. Porque los espacios de exclusión de derechos 
comienzan por el último que ha llegado, pero luego no se sabe donde terminan. Mira 
Dinamarca, que empezó con la retórica contra los inmigrantes y terminó proponiendo 
fronteras con Suecia y Alemania. Es que menos mal que en Alemania han levantado la mano 
y han dicho perdone usted, hasta aquí hemos llegado. Pero es que con el miedo a lo otro nos 
podemos cargar la libre circulación interior y por lo tanto el dinamismo mínimo que nos 
queda en el espacio. Y se propone todo lo contrario.  
Vamos a ver, what’s next. Yo no me atrevo. Te acuerdas de Barcelona en el 95 y ves lo que 
hay ahora y dices, Dios mio.  
Claro, pero en aquel momento se vivía un período muy optimista.  
Sí, obviamente, se venía de la conferencia de Paz de Madrid. El otro día estuve cenando en la 
casa Ana Palacio con el ministro de exteriores palestino y con Shlomo Ben Ami que dijo una 
cosa que me aterrorizó: El problema es que el conflicto entre Palestina e Israel está en la cara 
oculta de la luna al común de los ciudadanos israelíes. Lo han congelado, lo han metido ahí, 
pero les da igual. Forma parte del paisaje. Les da igual. El coste es aceptable. Entonces claro, 
con esos mimbres nos vamos al garete. Es muy complicado.  
Mira que yo he estado en el parlamento europeo 10 años, luego me pasé en el gobierno de 
Cataluña estaba en el comité de las regiones, que es un lugar que habría que pasar 
obligatoriamente todo el mundo que se ocupa de Europa, porque, el resto de las instituciones 
son muy sofisticadas y aquello es Europa en estado puro. Te lo juro. Es el concejal o el 
consejero de la región norte. Es política local. Y ahora estoy aquí y estoy en la mesa del 
consejo JAI (Consejo de Justicia y Asuntos de Interior, el 2008 fue consagrado a la 
inmigración) y te juro que yo creo que las fuerzas son estas. Un repliegue de las regiones muy 
fuerte. El repliegue era local. Los landers alemanes reivindicaban contra Europa la capacidad 








Básicamente me interesaría trazar un poco la historia de las relaciones internacionales 
entre España y el Norte de África con relación a tres puntos fundamentales, como 
pueden ser la política económica, el tema de la seguridad y el tema de la emigración 
desde que España entra en la CCE, 1985-1986, en un momento en el que obviamente 
España venía de un pasado muy largo de aislamiento político y de descrédito a los ojos 
de una Europa que tenía unas cartas sobre la mesa muy diferentes. Me interesa por 
tanto mucho ver como la política exterior de España con relación a Europa y con 
relación a algunos países importantes en el área como pueden ser Francia ha ido 
evolucionando desde ese 1985-1986, marcado un poco por el ritmo de los gobiernos que 
desde entonces han estado presentes. Y me interesa ver esto desde una perspectiva tanto 
oficial, lo que habéis visto vosotros desde dentro como también una cuestión más 
personal, una reflexión donde quizá ciertas anécdotas se puedan contar.  
Yo soy más experto en temas europeos que en temas del norte de África y estoy dedicado a 
los temas europeos desde el año 1985 que llegué a Bruselas desde Praga donde estaba 
destinado en el consejo de la Embajada. Trabajé en diferentes sectores hasta llegar a ser 
Secretario de Estado para la Unión Europea durante la primera legislatura de Zapatero. Luego 
me fui a Lisboa de embajador y después el Rey y el presidente me pidieron de venir aquí a 
Rabat. Por tanto no soy un experto en el Norte de África.  
Desde mi perspectiva, España cuando entra en las Comunidades Europeas en el 85-86, era 
casi un país en vías de desarrollo. Habíamos recibido el último préstamo del Banco Mundial 
y desde el punto comercial por ejemplo, para otros países éramos considerados un país en 
vías de desarrollo. La renta per cápita debía estar en unos 5000 dólares de la época y la claro, 
la transformación que se ha vivido en estos últimos 25 años de pertenencia a la Unión 
Europea y no he visto ningún período de la historia de España con tanta estabilidad. Muchas 
veces no se valora lo suficiente en España, pero hemos recibido de Bruselas más de 3 veces el 
plan Marshall actualizado, solo para España a precios de hoy. Y los saldos netos, y las 
transferencias netas que han venido de fondos, es decir, para poner un ejemplo: las 
transferencias netas de lo que España paga a los presupuestos comunitarios es lo que recibe 
cada año de los presupuestos comunitarios pues ahora se sitúa más o menos en el 1% de 
nuestro PIL cada año de media. Esto se puede ver casi como el ejemplo de solidaridad entre 
países mayor de la historia, no? Y eso todavía se valora poco en nuestra sociedad. Pero la 
verdad es que España pasó de ser un país pobre a un país próspero, estamos por encima de la 
media comunitaria, somos el octavo o noveno país más donante del mundo, ya no somos un 
país en vías de desarrollo, ya no somos un país de emigración, lo fuimos hasta el año 1996, a 
partir de entonces empezamos a recibir más. Por tanto en los últimos diez años, España, 
detrás de los Estados Unidos es el país del mundo que ha recibido más inmigración. Y ahora 
más del 5% de la población española tiene origen emigrante.  
Y desde ahí, digamos la relación con Marruecos, no ha podido más que ir a bien. Tiene un 
pasado que se desconoce mucho, más en España que en Marruecos, cuyas élites conocen 
mejor la historia de España que muchos españoles la historia de Marruecos. Hay todavía 
algunos clichés muy fuertes.  
Entonces cuando vosotros políticos españoles comenzáis a estar presentes en la 
comunidad Europea y a ser considerados como fuerza política. Teniendo en cuenta este 
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pasado que usted ha descrito muy bien. Cómo ven ustedes la aceptación que tienen 
desde Europa como políticos españoles, se vieron ciertas resistencias o no? 
Efectivamente al inicio había un poco de miedo y desconfianza porque España tenía una 
economía cerrada, culpa de la autarquía de Franco, luego viene el plan de estabilización de 
Ullastres en el 1959 y empieza a abrirse un poquito. España tenía una economía más cerrada 
que Portugal. El 85 llegó con ciertos resabios autárquicos y había un cierto miedo en Europa, 
sobre todo en Francia, con relación a la agricultura y por el tema de inmigración también, 
pensando que quizá podría haber una avalancha de españoles. Incluso, en aquel momento 
España tenía un 23% de paro, una inflación de 2 dígitos también, una situación económica 
mala. Y eso a Francia le ponía nervioso. Nosotros pedimos la adhesión a la vez que Grecia y 
Giscard dijo que Grecia podía entrar pero que España era un problema para los intereses 
franceses y que debía esperar.  
Grecia así protagoniza la segunda entrada en la CEE, la primera fue la de Dinamarca y el 
Reino Unido en el 1973, la segunda es la de Grecia en el 81. Pero el Giscardazo famoso nos 
retrasó la adhesión de 5 años porque después la señora Thatcher vino con el famoso Money 
back y después en el consejo europeo de Fontainebleau del 1984 esto terminó regulándose.  
Visto ahora con perspectiva, Giscard que es un hombre muy inteligente que fundó el G7, el 
G8, quien habló del Euro y ha hecho grandes cosas, sin embargo en esto se equivocó, porque 
España podría haber entrado en el 81, y si hay alguien que se ha beneficiado de la adhesión 
de España ha sido Francia y la presencia francesa en España, los Carrefour, etc. Francia tiene 
su mayor expediente comercial del mundo lo cual demuestra que ha sido un excelente 
negocio. Sin embargo, había sus miedos. Por tanto los tratados de adhesión de España y 
Portugal son muy duros, con unas condiciones y unas cláusulas de salvaguardia y de períodos 
transitorios muy largos y mucho más duros que los países que ingresan en la EU en el año 
2004. Y claro, durante 10 años se tuvieron que mantener ciertas normas. 7 años para la libre 
circulación de personas, es decir una serie de condiciones que ahora se nos han olvidado 
porque está Schengen, etc. Después hay más comunitarios que vienen a instalarse a España 
que españoles que se instalan en el extranjero. 
Pero en general se debe aceptar que aportó sabia nueva. La entrada de Portugal y España son 
reconocidas. Son dos países profundamente europeístas, que ya se está viendo ahora los 
problemas que tienen Italia y Francia con los tunecinos, que básicamente quieren liquidar uno 
de los grandes Aquiles de la construcción que es junto con el Euro, el tratado de Schengen, 
eso en España no ocurre. En España valoramos esas libertades que se no ha dado Europa y no 
hay ese sentimiento que puede haber en Italia o en Francia, ese populismo, y de Sarkozy que 
se pone a jugar con Schengen, al revés, es una reacción de decir, oiga, que esto no se puede 
tocar. Y eso en Europa se valora mucho, y la actuación Española se ha puesto como ejemplo 
del éxito de integración a diferencia con Portugal que ha tenido algunas dificultades, a 
diferencia de Grecia. En general porque España mandó a Bruselas a las y a los mejores, Abel 
Matutes, Terrón, José Borrell, José María Gil Robles, Pedro Solbes, Loyola de Palacios, 
Javier Solana. Gente que ha dejado huella en la Unión Europea.  
Ahora que menciona a Abel Matutes. En el 1992, durante el consejo Europeo de Lisboa, 
dice, atención con el Norte de África porque tenemos una bomba de relojería. Una 
incipiente presión migratoria. Pero Europa estaba también en un momento en el que 
estaba mirando hacia el Este. Qué rol está jugando España en este contexto tratando de 
desarrollar políticas y de proyectar una cierta imagen España, o una cierta fuerza 
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diplomática en el esfuerzo de crear una política común europea que mire más hacia los 
intereses que tiene España que podrían ser Latinoamérica o el Norte de África.  
Sí. Mirando hacia atrás no hace más falta que ver como estábamos. América Latina 
prácticamente no existía a efectos comunitarios, había solo una comisión, una delegación que 
estaba en Caracas, que es donde se traslada después del golpe de Pinochet en Santiago de 
Chile, con el mismo personal que tenía la comisión en Togo, porque, pues porque Togo 
recibía tanto volumen de recurso como toda América Latina junta en 1986. Y los países 
latinoamericanos formaban parte de lo que se llamaba los países no asociados. Por tanto una 
terminología un tanto peyorativa y una forma de decir que no eran países preferenciales. 
Francia tenía sus relaciones con América Latina, Italia, Alemania, pero eran relaciones 
solamente de tipo bilateral. Europa como tal ya te digo, eran países no asociados con una sola 
oficina para todo el continente, que estaba en Caracas. En estos años, gracias a la tarea que 
han hecho entre otros Abel Matutes, Javier Solana que han trabajado en Europa. Ahora hay 
oficinas de la Unión en todas las capitales. España no tenía un esquema comercial cuando 
entramos en la CEE. Al contrario.  
Por el Mediterráneo sur, el norte de África sería hablar del proceso de Barcelona, que ha sido 
mucho más exitoso de lo que muchas veces se dice y ahora con la UPM vamos a ver, pero 
hasta ahora no ha estado haciendo nada en comparación con el proceso de Barcelona desde el 
año 1995, con lo que fue la segunda presidencia española de la Unión Europea. Ahí se han 
hecho también muchas cosas. Se han creado instrumentos financieros nuevos. Ahora en estos 
momentos la presencia que tiene Europa es muy mejorable y se va a mejorar, ahora va a 
haber un representante oficial de la Unión para los países árabes y las reformas que va a ser 
un español, Bernardino León. España va a seguir trabajando obviamente en todos los 
ámbitos, igual que se impuso FRONTEX, políticas en el ámbito migratorio, y liderando todas 
la serie de iniciativas para el mediterráneo. Dicho todo eso, pues Europa está en crisis y no 
este el mejor momento para hacer iniciativas porque la propia Europa está en serios 
problemas internos, con el Euro bajo ataques, los que no creen en el Euro, varias Europas, 
porque hablar de la Unión Europea, pues, no es lo mismo hablar de Rumanía que es un país 
que no está en Schengen, que no tiene el Euro, que tiene todavía unas cláusulas que tienen los 
rumanos que les impiden entrar a algunos mercados laborales. O la situación del Reino Unido 
que tampoco está en Schengen ni en el Euro. Es decir no todos los países están en todas las 
políticas como está España, en Schengen, en el Euro, etc. Hay países que como Dinamarca no 
participan en la defensa Europea y se ha vuelto una Europa muy compleja y además ahora 
estamos viviendo momentos de crisis. Entonces eso se traduce en falta de liderazgo, de 
digestión del tratado de Lisboa. Y en esos momentos de crisis, que hace la gente? Pues tirar 
hacia lo suyo.  
Entonces ahora hay una ausencia de Europa en el Norte de África clamorosa. La gente se 
queja de que la Unión Europea no está presente.  
Y esa falta de presencia se ha manifestado fuertemente en los primeros días, en las 
primeras semanas de la explosión de la primavera Árabe.  
Sí, y aquí se ve una presencia cada vez mayor de Turquía que quiere ir cubriendo espacios. 
Es una presencia también mayor de Qatar y de los Emiratos Árabes, una mayor ausencia de 
Europa. Luego países independientemente como Francia en Libia en una operación dirigida 
por los Estados Unidos y la OTAN, pero Israel está ahora muy discreto, no ha hablado para 
nada de estas reformas y en ninguna ha habido un acto hostil a Israel, o sea Israel no ha dado 
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la bienvenida a estas reformas, al contrario. Ha estado queriendo que Mubarak no se fuera y 
bueno estamos en una situación muy intensa.  
Una de las palabras interesantes que ha mencionado antes es: liderazgo. España, por lo 
que he visto, por lo que he leído, por lo que intuyo, ha desarrollado un trabajo 
diplomático fuerte en Europa a la hora de proyectar poder en estas áreas, sea 
Latinoamérica o el Norte de África. Son zonas estratégicas, estas zonas estratégicas 
todavía se ven más ahora con los fenómenos migratorios, etc, quizá desde el 92 al 95 
todavía no era tan evidente la importancia que hoy está adquiriendo la zona. Entonces 
España dio como un paso adelante, también por que le interesaba a ella como país, 
donde estaba Francia en esos momentos en los que España estaba proyectando esta 
acción diplomática? 
Francia, de otra manera ha estado siempre delante de nosotros. Pues porque han tenido más 
presencia, por ejemplo una presencia muy fuerte a nivel de material de inversiones, bancos, 
seguros y en ese sentido estamos a una gran distancia de Francia. En el tema comercial 
estamos muy pegaditos y España va a superar a Francia porque estamos más cerca. Pero 
digamos que Francia ha ido por delante. Es un país permanente del consejo de Seguridad de 
las Naciones Unidas. España ha aprendido de algunas cosas que ha hecho Francia, hemos 
hecho algunas cosas juntos. Yo cuando era secretario de estado con mi colega francés, a 
iniciativa mía hicimos un viaje aquí juntos a Marruecos y eso se recuerda aquí porque fue la 
primera vez que Francia y España vinieron juntos para ofrecer a Marruecos un anclaje más 
profundo en Europa. Pidió la adhesión Hassan II, siempre se ha querido sentir un país más 
occidental y el más europeo de todo el mundo árabe. Entonces, para nosotros, Francia ha ido 
muchos pasos por delante y hay que tratar de adelantarles todo lo que podamos y acercarnos 
más a ese, y apostar por todo aquello que contribuya a tejer un colchón de intereses entre los 
dos países porque esos son los que amortiguan los conflictos y bueno, es claro que también la 
estabilidad de Marruecos es la estabilidad de España, que la prosperidad de Marruecos es la 
prosperidad de España y esta visión de antigua que existía que al vecino había que 
empobrecerlo y cortarles las vías de comunicación etc., pues ahora es todo lo contrario, y si 
Marruecos prospera, eso va a beneficiar mucho a España. 
Y ya aunque hay muchas limitaciones porque hay mucha gente que tiene una visión muy 
cerrada ya cuando hablas de naranjas de pepinos marroquíes, como toca nuestros intereses ya 
no interesa. Cuando eso es un completo error. Yo creo que nosotros somos el país del mundo 
más interesado en Marruecos, no veo otro. Quizá Argelia, el día de mañana, pero hoy por 
hoy, si Marruecos prospera y se estabiliza el que más se va a beneficiar va a ser España. En 
ese sentido espero que poco a poco podamos ir cambiando esa mentalidad y somos 
conscientes que no podemos levantar el muro que levantaron en Alemania, levantarlo aquí, y 
decir aquí no pasan las personas, pero tampoco pasan los productos, etc. Eso es insostenible a 
corto y medio plazo. No se puede decir no a las personas, no a los productos y decir sí a tus 
peces y sí a tus fosfatos. O sea que esto tiene que ir cambiando. Pero en España hay una 
mentalidad todavía muy cerrada.  
Y esto es lo que pasó entre nosotros y Francia. Francia era un país más evolucionado, pero 
bueno, eso está muy activo en la menta, la agricultura y la pesca y en un momento de crisis 
salta. Eso pasa hasta en Suiza, cuando España quería introducir su queso manchego. Y en eso 
cuando se va a la realidad y se rascan los detalles las realidades se ven. En Europa ya hay 
programas exitosos como el Erasmus, de intercambio de jóvenes universitarios, y eso hay que 
hacerlo también con países del norte de África, porque cuesta poco dinero y cambia las 
mentalidades. Pero con los visados etc., es el problema que tenemos siempre.  
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Sobre el proceso de Barcelona, como quizás una de las políticas multilaterales de largo 
aliento, 10 años, envolviendo tantos sectores, tantas críticas, cuáles han sido sin 
embargo los elementos positivos que se podrían subrayar?  
Como sabes, el proceso de Barcelona tiene muchos elementos. Pero bueno, al menos se 
puede decir, que es el único sitio en que se sientan juntos Israel y Siria. Ya solo eso tiene un 
valor increíble. No ninguna otra organización, no hay ninguna otra plataforma del mundo 
donde se sienten a hablar Siria e Israel. A los niveles que sean. Es decir, están juntos dos 
países que están en guerra formalmente. Bueno, pues solo con eso ya vale. Y eso si no 
existiera habría que inventarlo, la diplomacia multilateral. Luego hay una serie de programas 
que se han puesto en marcha, ahora se va a intentar con la UPM poner en marcha nuevamente 
todo lo que se había hecho con el proceso de Barcelona. Ha habido multitud de encuentros, 
de ciudades, de sociedad civil, hay programa de intercambio de jóvenes universitarios, hay 
mucha labor hecha en un marco que es complejo, porque está el conflicto de oriente medio, y 
va a seguir estando ahí, y hay todo tipo de conflictos, porque comienzas por aquí y ves Ceuta 
y Melilla y pasas y ves cómo está Túnez y ves cómo está Libia, en guerra, y vas a Egipto y 
vas a Gaza y vas a Oriente Medio y vas a Chipre, con el norte y el sur, Grecia, Turquía, 
entonces, con todos esos temas y con todos esos problemas, al menos tenemos algo donde se 
sienta todo el mundo.  
Y salvo Libia, pero bueno. Al menos hay una alternativa de algo, como se han mejorado las 
cosas, que se puede hacer. La UPM ha sido muy loable, lo que ha intentado Sarkozy, pues 
por ahora no ha hecho nada. No se ha aprobado un solo proyecto. Hoy estaba hablando en 
Barcelona con Amrani, con el secretario General que se incorpora mañana. Hay que levantar 
la UPM, hay que ponerla en marcha en unos 6 o 7 ámbitos que tiene, porque lo tiene que 
hacer es el método comunitario, ir haciendo cosas, pequeños pasos, y a base de pequeños 
pasos te das cuenta que has hecho mucho. Hay que ir impulsando proyectos en cada uno. Y 
yo le dije, mira, la legitimidad te la va a dar el trabajo y la acción. Por ejemplo como Solana. 
Cuando llegó Solana nadie daba un duro. Y sin embargo al final Solana estaba negociando no 
solo en nombre de la EU sino también de los Estados Unidos. Creó el cuarteto que no existía 
para oriente medio, algo que no existía. Claro, esos 10 años de Solana, pues claro, para la 
señora Ashton. Ahora veremos si Amrani es capaz.  
Quizá me estoy equivocando, pero se ve que Sarkozy ha querido tener un protagonismo, 
y quizá ha sido una estrategia más efectista que de trabajo a través de acciones 
concretas. Pero por ejemplo, si Sarkozy está interesado en desarrollar UPM, porque no 
defiende más la candidatura de Marsella y poner allí la sede.  
Él defendió Marsella, por supuesto. Pero ganó España. Al final se vota y se decide y no 
siempre se consigue todo lo que quieres. No ganas por goleada y Francia no gana siempre. Y 
Francia no gana siempre, en algunas cosas si, pero no en todo. Ahora Lagard se ha llevado el 
Fondo Monetario Internacional otra vez. España tiene una diplomacia muy activa que a veces 
consigue cosas. Barcelona es una capital del Mediterráneo en muchos sentido. Lo han hecho 
muy bien, son muy listos, en comunicación, en imagen y si tu pides a todos, a ver, donde 
quieres que se ponga la sede, pues hoy por hoy, la gente prefiere Barcelona. Es más abierta, 
más simpática. Por eso la imagen de Barcelona es muy buena. Esto cuesta hacerlo, pero lo 
han hecho muy bien durante el tiempo, y tiene una imagen y unas infraestructuras etc, que no 
tiene Marsella.  
Hablando más macro, los noventa eran más optimistas, de más colaboración, un interés 
por crear un espacio Euro-Mediterráneo más consolidado, es claro que por ejemplo la 
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UE forma como bloque, un interlocutor más sólido que lo que es el Norte de África, en 
momentos de crisis económica, donde ese optimismo se pierde por razones naturales, en 
la que cada país busca por responder de forma rápida a sus exigencias, cómo es posible 
defender la coherencia de las políticas de largo plazo, donde cada país tiende a cerrarse.  
Es obvio que hay países más afectados que otros. Lo que hay que intentar uno desde su 
puesto tratar de hacer cosas. Yo por ejemplo cuando llegué aquí me sorprendió que no 
hubiera vuelo Rabat-Madrid. Y mañana comenzará Iberia. Y ha costado mucho, pero estoy 
muy satisfecho. Y esto lo he conseguido en época de crisis, algo que no había sido 
conseguido en épocas de muchísima mayor bonanza económica. Y eso sin lugar a dudas va a 
acercar a dos reinos vecinos. Antes solo había vuelos de Rabat con París. La semana que 
viene habrá un encuentro de rectores españoles y marroquíes, para ver si se puede hacer algo. 
Entonces cada uno en la medida que puede va haciendo sus cosas. Intentas acercar a las 
sociedades, en crisis más que nunca hay que apostar por este tipo de políticas de vínculos, de 
crear riqueza, empleo y comercio. Pero es verdad que los gobiernos están más tratando de 
solucionar problemas internos. Como aquí en Marruecos, reforma constitucional, el 
referendum, etc.  
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Pues mira, el tema de migraciones es un tema que la EU intenta ir poco a poco tener 
competencias, tener capacidad de propuesta para definir una política a nivel europeo con los 
estados miembros. Pero es un campo muy complicado donde hemos hecho avances, pero que 
sigue en una situación un poco híbrida. Tenemos unas competencias europeas bien 
determinadas, pero sigue siendo una materia inter-gubernamental. Porque son temas que en 
gran parte, los Estados miembros no quieren delegar parte de su soberanía. Y desde ese punto 
de vista, migración y soberanía es un tema difícil. Sin embargo, gracias al tratado de 
Amsterdam y de otras evoluciones políticas, es verdad que nos vamos, se van dando cuenta 
los estados miembros, que si quieren desarrollar una política eficaz y transparente y visible, 
es necesario articular reglas que se adecuen a todos.  
Si eso lo reflejamos en los problemas existentes en este país y en los países Árabes, en primer 
lugar con Marruecos estamos en una dificultad real de no concretar desde hace bastante 
tiempo un proyecto importante que era el acuerdo de readmisión. Que fijamos a nivel 
europeo de hace ya unos cuantos años la idea de que íbamos a negociar con los países 
externos acuerdos de readmisión a nivel global a toda la UE y en cambio una vez esto 
adquirido desarrollar políticas más abiertas de facilitación de los visados.  
Estamos en un momento donde no hemos logrado que esto se acepte. Y gracias a una 
iniciativa que acabamos de tomar en Bruselas a través de una comunicación de Ashton y de 
de la comisión al parlamento y al consejo de ministros sobre una nueva política de vecindad 
que hemos hecho que se aprobó en el consejo de ministros, el viernes de la semana pasada y 
hubo bendición por parte de los jefes de estado y de gobierno que se reunieron en Bruselas en 
viernes pasado. Sobre esta nueva estrategia hacia los países árabes para tomar en cuenta la 
condición política de la primavera árabe. Esta nueva propuesta espero va a modificar la 
realidad en el sentido de que.  
Ahora hablamos de un pacto de movilidad donde para Marruecos, Egipto y Túnez, podemos 
entablar y empezar un diálogo que ponga sobre la mesa la totalidad de la problemática de la 
inmigración. Y lo importante es que se ha considerado el principio de no condicionar el 
diálogo sobre movilidad y facilitación de visas al tema de la represión. Y que ponemos todo 
encima de la mesa. Era una reclamación de los marroquíes con toda la razón. Pero a nivel de 
asuntos exteriores podemos llegar a acuerdos, pero cuando llegamos a los ministros de 
asuntos interiores la cosa cambia. Esta realidad nueva política en el mundo árabe y la presión 
ejercida por los acontecimientos y las declaraciones al más alto nivel, de jefes de estado y de 
gobierno permitan meter esto en acto. La conclusión de la cumbre de jefes de estado y de 
gobierno indica que tenemos de forma urgente de empezar un diálogo nuevo con estos países.  
A mí me interesaría mucho conocer mucho sus opiniones, desde los años 85-86 sobre 
estas cuestiones de acción diplomática de la unión europea. Es verdad que el tema de la 
emigración ha surgido, ha explotado como algo fundamental. Quizá en el año 92 esto se 
intuía, no estaba todavía claro, España comenzó a hablar sobre esto, entre los primeros 
países en Europa. Matutes. Bomba de relojería. Yo creo que ahí, España jugó un papel 
importante en intuir lo que quizá podría pasar. Algo que la historia más tarde se ha 
encargado de demostrar. Pero en ese momento en el que España entra en Europa, 
Europa como veía la participación de España. “Es que los españoles lo hacen muy 
bien”. Después de una época de dictadura y país subdesarrollado, España casi de la 
noche a la mañana juega un papel, y quiere jugarlo.  
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Esto es muy interesante porque vamos de la mano de Felipe González, entramos en Europa y 
con la idea fundamental que yo oía al presidente de Gobierno, diciéndome antes de ir a 
Bruselas diciéndome, allí no vamos a pedir, allí vamos a trabajar con los demás, a construir 
Europa, así que los que vayáis allá y teníamos a Abel Matutes y Manuel Marín de 
Comisarios, Eduardo Peña y yo como director general, éramos los más destacados como 
españoles y el mensaje fue claro. Y nos involucramos totalmente en la tarea en una actividad 
fantástica. Había un proyecto, el mercado interior y la cohesión económica y social. González 
insistió mucho en que nos dieran la dirección general de política regional y ahí me metieron. 
El caso es que llegamos con un proyecto político de participación en una tarea política más 
allá de la defensa de nuestros intereses como país, aunque eso también sea legítimo.  
Claro, aparecemos ahí y con entusiasmo y juventud y con ganas es verdad que al cabo del 
tiempo contamos más de lo que representa España en ese momento en el conjunto y gran 
parte se debió al trabajo de Felipe González en todos los procesos de decisión y su gran 
confianza con Jacques Delors, su gran amistad y su visión Europea aunque no hubo una gran 
química con François Mitterrand, eso está claro. Esto, qué consecuencias tiene? Por un lado 
que nos consideran como socios y luego que si podemos influir en una serie de temas donde 
aportamos una sensibilidad, una experiencia y un conocimiento que muchos de los miembros 
no tienen.  
Y todo el tema es esta cuestión del acercamiento con el mundo árabe, la historia española y 
de la necesidad de desarrollar una política mediterránea, hacia el mediterráneo, que sea una 
política consistente. Y el papel que tenemos es doble. 1 ayudamos a permitir una cierta 
conciencia a esta gente de la realidad del mundo árabe y 2 participamos en que estas 
cuestiones se sitúen en un nivel en la agenda a un nivel adecuado. Y es esto. Y se va adelante 
hasta llegar hasta a Barcelona.  
Pero antes de Barcelona, EU estaba interesada también hacia el este, no? Como se 
podían armonizar estos intereses divergentes?  
Yo no he sentido esta rivalidad. Me he sensibilizado cuando llegué como director general de 
ampliación y negociador jefe de la adhesión de países candidatos. Es decir, yo ya estaba en 
ese momento muy volcado con los países del este, una negociación durísima. Pero no había 
una real oposición. Había una competencia y competencia que nos llevaba a negociar 
fuertemente los dineros. Y es verdad la prioridad hasta 2004 fue la adhesión de los países 
candidatos. Para eso se trataba de cómo les tratamos, cómo les metemos en la familia y con 
qué condiciones. Ucrania y todo lo demás, lo que iba más allá no tenía consistencia. Y en el 
2004 comenzamos a pensar en las políticas de vecindad que no solo se desarrolla con el sur 
con estas políticas existentes, sino también al este al este del la Europa anexionada. Y eso 
empezamos, con la Merkel, que intenta empujar y comienza una operación de relanzamiento 
de Trading de la relación con los países del Este durante la presidencia alemana, le pedimos 
que haga esto, diciendo que no tienen que ser los alemanes ni la presidencia alemana que 
lleven a cabo tal y cual, lo que nos permitió más tarde poder ir a Sarkozy y decirle que no 
tenía que ser Francia el único protagonista de una política del Mediterráneo. Y hubo los líos, 
que hubo.  
Pero digamos, que hasta 2004 no hay realmente ningún de conflicto a partir de ese momento 
competencia. Y se traduce sobre todo en la cuestión de la distribución de los dineros. Y 
llegamos a un acuerdo, que seguimos hoy a la regla, que es que en el paquete global del 
dinero las 2/3 son para el sur y 1/3 para el este. Ahora con lo que ha pasado en el sur, hemos 
añadido más de 1200 millones de euros para el sur. Pero yo creo que hay una, nunca me ha 
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preocupado este tema. Porque siempre he pensado que a finales de cuentas, lo que es 
importante, es que, seamos del sur o del este apoyar una política de vecindad fuerte, como un 
elemento prioritario de la política exterior europea. Política exterior europea que es: los 
Balcanes porque hay están y luego la política de vecindad, donde es en esa zona, en el este y 
en el sur donde podemos ser una potencia no solo económica, sino política. Está claro, como 
EU. China claro, sí, nos interesa, porque los chinos quieren que Europa se abra, y por eso 
podemos hacer. Pero como corazón y prioridad absoluta de la política exterior europea, 
donde podemos contar más que los otros, más que los demás que las otras potencias es ahí. Y 
aquí tenemos intereses para trabajar juntos para englobar esta política de vecindad. Y luego 
tenemos nuestra cocina interna para saber, pero no hay contradicción.  
El Proceso de Barcelona, un concepto muy importante, en un momento de optimismo, 
donde el multiculturalismo tiene importancia, España, creo que se sitúa bien como 
negociador. Que evaluación haces de estos primeros compases en los que se comienza a 
gestar esta política euro-mediterránea.  
No cabe duda de que la oferta de este proceso, fue en primer lugar un salto cualitativo 
importante para que el mediterráneo sea tomado mejor en consideración por el conjunto de la 
UE y no solo por los españoles o los italianos. Era un proyecto global, europeo y no cabe 
duda que España jugó un papel muy fuerte, y que logramos eso por la influencia que tuvimos 
durante la época de Felipe González. Está claro, está claro. Interesante. Pero cometimos 
errores, errores muy grandes. De creer que podíamos con estos países árabes, entablar un tipo 
de diálogo de región a región sin tomar en cuenta las divisiones internas que existen en estos 
países. Y ni tomar en cuenta la influencia radical que tenía en este contexto el proceso bélico 
entre Israel y Palestina. Ahí cometimos un error muy grande muy grande que estamos 
pagando hoy todavía, ese tipo de imposibilidad de ir más allá que haya un diálogo bilateral 
entre la unión europea y cada uno de los países dentro de la política de vecindad.  
Menos mal que inventamos y Romano Prodi fue uno de los grandes protagonistas de eso, y 
que analizando, me acuerdo muy bien, era el 2003 y 2004 analizando ya la dificultad del 
proceso de Barcelona, cómo podemos salir de esta dificultad donde está todo bloqueado, pues 
empezamos a decir, a ver si podemos tener con cada uno de los países una política muy 
diferenciada y entablar con ellos un tipo de cooperación que vaya donde ellos tengan la 
ambición de ir: que los argelinos no quieren, pues no quieren, pero vamos adelante. Y eso es 
lo que nos ha permitido como Unión Europea tener una presencia fuerte en diversos países, 
pero acordando las ambiciones y el contenido de esta cooperación a la realidad de cada país, 
pero claro, por allá negando la posibilidad del diálogo regional.  
Es decir, hacer una política Taylor-made para cada país.  
Claro, pero que no es ideal, porque lo ideal sería la política tener la política que tenemos y 
que la vamos a llevar en el futuro con cada país en función a sus ambiciones democráticas de 
integración en el mercado interior. Pero luego tienes que tener una política de 
regionalización, y esto mientras exista el conflicto israelo-palestino. Y ahí pecamos y 
tenemos responsabilidades los españoles un poco. Porque el tema se planteaba, no se planteó 
realmente, o sea, no se planteó directamente pero estaba ahí sobre la mesa. Temíamos meter a 
los israelíes en este tinglado, porque es la presencia de Israel en el proceso la que impide todo 
tipo de reunión ministerial o demás, porque su presencia es vetada por los demás debido a su 
política y a partir de ahí está todo bloqueado. Si no hubiese estado Israel en esa realidad, creo 
que hubiéramos avanzado mucho más.  
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A nivel de los gobiernos de España, el papel de Felipe González, fundamental sin 
ninguna duda, Aznar, que papel juega la política exterior de España durante este 
proceso durante su gobierno? Cambian las cosas?  
Sí, cambian, cambian. Para mi Aznar fue, la política de Aznar fue muy negativa para los 
intereses españoles. Porque creo que en el fondo, Aznar y su gente no tenían una apuesta real 
y comprometida hacia Europa. Son nacionalistas españoles, que creen que de repente cuando 
las cosas económicamente van bien pueden jugar un papel de nuevo, por si misma en el 
mundo internacional y en la comunidad internacional siendo el aliado privilegiado de los US. 
Y claro, se cree esto y al final considera a Europa simplemente como una fuente de fondos 
estructurales de dinero para asegurar el desarrollo, y de ahí viene su incomprensión y mala 
relación con los líderes europeos, sea con Schröeder que con Chirac, por qué? Porque se ve a 
España, no ya como un socio, que participa de los que asegura el funcionamiento de la 
locomotora europea, que arriman el hombro, que se sacrifican, que piensan en el interés 
general que dan ejemplo. Pero esta imagen. Y una España más nacionalista, no 
verdaderamente europea, anti-francesa, antifrancesa y es decir, vuelve, lo que es la derecha 
española. Gente que tiene su ideología que tiene su propia historia e identidad y es eso. Es la 
España cerrada, es la España que teme de los otros europeos, que no tienen confianza en las 
ideas liberales y que cree que el señor Bush es el aliado y que le va a regalar todo y bueno 
hay perdimos mucha influencia.  
Si España jugó un papel tan importante con relación al establecimiento de estas 
políticas con el sur durante Felipe González, con Aznar se produce este cambio de 
orientación más atlantista, de más relación con los Estados Unidos, lo que se puede 
intuir es que esta fuerza que empuja, por parte de España por crear estas condiciones 
de diálogo, de apertura, de europeísmo, de cercanía con los Partners del sur, se ve que si 
esa fuerza que existía antes, ahora con Aznar, no existe ya, quizá uno de los puntos 
negativos que luego se evalúan de fracaso del proceso de Barcelona etc, se puede deber 
también a este vacío, a esta falta de fuerza que España deja de hacer.  
Yo no lo creo. Es decir, que la fuerza que teníamos no era lo suficientemente importante 
como para que en caso de desaparecer dejar un vacío. Es verdad y creo que lo que dices es 
totalmente objetivo, pero no es un factor determinante. Aún teniendo esa capacidad de 
influencia y siguiendo la misma política, no hubiese permitido el fracaso del proceso de 
Barcelona. El tema ha sido más una política agresiva Israelí que ya no permitía a los árabes 
de juntarse en una mesa y poder trabajar técnicamente. Esto ya fue más que suficiente como 
para derrotar al proceso. Y luego la división del mundo árabe. Que no se tomó en cuenta lo 
suficiente, el peso de esta división, y claro, ante la incapacidad e impotencia de los países 
árabes del sur de tener posturas conjuntas con Europa lo que esto se achacaba más allá de las 
críticas que se hacían de nuestras políticas demasiado simpáticas a las tesis políticas israelíes, 
en este proceso, lo que quieren ustedes es imponernos algo. Imponer nada. Esto no es 
imponer. Pero claro esto era el pretexto para ocultar de definir posturas respecto a nosotros. 
Menos mal que tuvimos la capacidad de lanzar y de desarrollar la política de vecindad, 
porque por lo menos eso es lo que nos ha mantenido con cierta capacidad de contacto pero 
bueno.  
Y en estos primeros compases, de gestación de estas primeras políticas euro-
mediterráneas, Francia un socio importante, fundamental de la Unión Europea, del 
Mediterráneo, como ve, como interactúa con España. Hay ciertas competencia entre los 
dos países?  
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Se que hay mucha rivalidad entre los dos países, está claro. Yo creo que si bien hay bastante 
rivalidad, hay en términos de posturas, posiciones, en la familia europea, hay una 
coincidencia muy fuerte. Es decir, que estos dos países con Italia incluida, estos países, están 
absolutamente de acuerdo, que, para defender sus intereses, para ampliar la influencia que 
tienen en el mundo árabe, como con el sur del mediterráneo, tienen que trabajar juntos para 
arrancar a nivel Europeo las decisiones que les favorecen a ellos. Luego habrá una lucha de 
influencias a ciertos niveles, está claro, la iniciativa tomada por Sarkozy por iniciar la Unión 
por el Mediterráneo, no gustó nada a los españoles. Vamos a ver. Pero por otra parte, 
Zapatero y Moratinos, aguantaron, tragaron el cactus y tuvieron que adaptarse, porque veían 
que la locomotora Sarkozy era tal que no podían oponerse y no dieron la cara. Nosotros 
dimos la cara en Bruselas, con Merkel, oiga, esto no es de recibo, usted no puede hacer una 
política europea determinada por un grupillo de países. Hay una política europea, o no hay 
una política europea. Y de la misma manera que impedimos a Merkel el año pasado que 
tuviera una política propia, con medios europeos con Polonia y hacia el este, y esto es una 
política global de todos, incluidos los suecos y griegos.  
Porqué Sarkozy se lanza?  
Se lanza porque es un hombre que reacciona en función a intuiciones, no es un hombre de 
pensamiento profundo, no es un hombre que haya elaborado durante años una doctrina 
particular. Es un pragmático, con una energía increíble, increíble, y que actúa en función de 
elementos tácticos políticos. Es un señor que tiene mucha habilidad y tiene un asesor que es 
Henry Guinoud, que es un neo-gaullista nostálgico de la Francia gaullienne, esta y que da un 
discurso en Marsella para crear la Unión del Mediterráneo. Y luego otro discurso en Tánger, 
donde es una visión completamente neo-soberanista francesa, pero que quiere aplicar a 
Europa en su conjunto. Yo me acuerdo de una reunión que tuve en un grupo de reflexión 
parisino, y estaba Felipe González, Juppè, y hace 2 años y en este coloquio, me pidieron 
presentar un poco la postura de Bruselas en cuanto este UPM y tal y cual, y terminé diciendo 
que eso era una utopía. Y eso es, un concepto intelectual fuera de toda realidad, donde nadie 
puede estar en contra. Porque hacer la unión, y la unión no se ha hecho todavía, pues claro 
que no hay una persona sensata.  
Con los países del sur, una unión de la misma forma. Pero es que para nosotros la unión, para 
los europeístas significa algo. Es decir, libre circulación de personas, de servicios, de 
capitales, es políticas comunes, tiene un cuerpo de identidad y de definición, y vemos lo que 
ha costado en 60 años la ampliación europea, y las dificultades que hay, pero lo que se ha 
logrado es extraordinario. Y si Barcelona no funciona, cómo va a funcionar la unión del 
mediterráneo. Es totalmente absurdo. Porque claro, y eso que consecuencias tiene. Que lanzar 
este tipo de iniciativa política que no tiene capacidad de concretarse realmente a corto plazo, 
tiene efectos muy negativos en las relaciones políticas. En política lo peor es crear 
expectaciones. Es la falta de coherencia de mandar mensajes a la gente y luego se ve que aquí 
hay la realidad objetiva de los hechos políticos, económicos, culturales, no permiten en 
ningún momento hacerlo. En Europa comenzamos a hacerlo porque tuvimos una segunda 
guerra mundial. Y de repente unas personas que tienen una visión de futuro y que además 
tienen capacidad de concretar el proceso empezando por el acero, involucrando las dos 
potencias que hicieron entre si 3 guerras en menos de un siglo, y dos mundiales, Adenauer, 
etc., y es un proceso.  
Es un proceso entonces donde la idea general existe, pero existe también una estructura 
de objetivos de corto, medio y largo plazo. Que obviamente siempre hay momentos de 
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altas y bajas donde estos objetivos no se pueden cumplir pero con esa estructura, al 
menos, la factibilidad es mayor. Ahora obviamente no. 
Yo tuve 2 enganchadas muy fuertes con Henry Guaino, porque claro me consideraba como 
un tecnócrata. Eurocrata. Y parecía que yo quería impedir la puesta en marcha de su gran 
proyecto del siglo. Y lo que decía a Henry, precisamente en París, el 13 de Julio de 2008. Las 
mismas causas produciendo los mismos efectos, el fracaso de Barcelona, es el fracaso de la 
UPM si no se cambia lo que ha originado el fracaso parcial de Barcelona. Si no hay ninguna 
posibilidad a corto plazo de arreglar el caso israelo-palestino, y si no hay capacidad de ir 
hacia un mejoramiento de las relaciones entre países árabes, olvídate. Y la realidad fue tal 
que París lanza la gran iniciativa, en el Grand Palais, y a los tres meses tenemos los 
acontecimientos de Gaza. Y esto en primer lugar.  
En segundo lugar dije, no se hace nada bueno criticando sin ningún tipo de objetividad las 
experiencias del pasado. Barcelona era una mierda y los españoles no reaccionan. Cuando 
habían sido parte importantísima del pasado.  
Porque no reaccionan?  
Porque no se atrevían a oponerse a Sarkozy. Y había ahí el pacto de los del sur ante un ataque 
de los eurocratas de Bruselas y de los alemanes que ellos quieren evitar. En la actitud de 
Merkel, se interpretó que fue un ataque directo para que este tipo de políticas no recoja 
demasiado apoyo por parte de la EU en detrimento del este que puede ser verdad. Yo creo 
que convencimos a Merkel de que nada más iniciar los discursos de Marsella y tal, que era un 
peligro enorme para la política exterior de la UE que tengamos socios depende de la 
proximidad y que desarrollen su propia política sin que vosotros participéis. O hacemos algo 
unidos, o si no, no existe. Y los polacos tienen que estar interesados en esto, como los 
españoles tenemos que estar interesados con lo que puede pasar en Ucrania o donde sea. Está 
clarísimo. Esto lo integró. Que ella haya tenido más allá de eso intereses propios para limitar 
el éxito, eso sin duda, pero es aparte. Y bueno, pues hubo este tipo de incapacidad de los 
españoles de desquitarse. Hubo explicación, sí, porque al final Sarkozy organiza una cena en 
Roma con Zapatero, para que se pusieran todos de acuerdo.  
Pero porqué cree usted que España no reacciona?  
Por dos razones. La primera que España no tiene las soluciones. Está claro, España, considera 
que el proceso de Barcelona tiene sus grandes defectos y tiene grandes limitaciones aunque se 
hayan hecho cosas muy positivas, yo siempre he insistido en esto, y claro, al no tener una 
respuesta clara de decir lo que hay que hacer, pues claro, no puede llevar un protagonismo al 
no tener argumentos ni instrumentos en mano. Y segundo, porque no viene mal que Sarkozy, 
sacuda un poco todo el tinglado en beneficio del sur. Que se queme él, pero algo ya quedará. 
Y es verdad que provocó Sarkozy de positivo, es el de reponer el Mediterráneo en la agenda 
arriba de los temas que se hablaban en Europa. Y si vemos lo que ha pasado estos meses en el 
mundo árabe, todavía fuerza más la necesidad de corresponder y de tener una política 
consistente y fuerte. No únicamente porque son fuentes de peligro, de emigración de 
terrorismo o demás, sino porque hay luchas internas en estos países con protagonistas 
modernos que quieren cierta democracia que nos interesan para organizar este espacio de 
estabilidad y seguridad que necesitamos todos, y hemos entendido por fin esto.  
Se había integrado en Europa de forma tácita pero estaba integrado en las mentes, y era que 
estos países del sur, iban de forma ineluctable hacia un radicalismo político-religioso. Era una 
realidad que no nos gustaba pero no íbamos a iniciar nuevamente unas cruzadas. Y lo que 
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había que hacer era mantener estas políticas de estabilización y de ahí la explicación de estas 
políticas de ayuda a Ben Ali, a Mubarak y demás. Apoyábamos dictadores porque nos daban 
cierta seguridad que controlaban los flujos de inmigración y controlaban el terrorismo. Y 
luego claro no mirábamos muy de cerca lo que hacían con sus pueblos. La realpolitik.  
Y hoy pues de repente nos damos cuenta de que la gente en estos países no forzosamente no 
quiere un gobierno como el de Irán. Y lo que los jóvenes quieren son libertades, quieren que 
se eche mano a la corrupción, que haya menos desigualdades y que los jóvenes diplomados 
puedan encontrar trabajo. Ahora yo creo que es interesante la estrategia que ponemos en 
marcha, veamos cómo se concreta, pero ya te digo, apoyaremos de forma privilegiada a todos 
los países que se encaminan hacia una profundización de democracia, hacia una defensa de 
los derechos humanos, etc. Tenemos ahora una política mucho más arriesgada de lo que 
teníamos hasta ahora. Pero ahora tenemos que hacerlo. Porque hay coincidencia de 
movimientos, incluyendo este de fondo, pero hay una realidad profunda. Es una tendencia 
pesada, no son acontecimientos políticos coyunturales, es algo estructural que va hacia 
delante, y al mismo tiempo tenemos una respuesta europea que es rápida.  
En este caso de la primavera árabe hemos reaccionado muy rápidamente. El 8 de marzo 
cumbre de los jefes de estado y de gobierno que toman unas orientaciones en un papel que 
presenta Barroso, y a finales de mayo una política de orientación de la política de vecindad. 
Más apoyo democrático, más apoyo a la sociedad civil más apoyo, y el pacto de movilidad, 
etc. Que puede pasar? Esto no nos acerca de la política de Sarkozy, porque lo que vamos a 
tener es una diferenciación mayor, una heterogeneidad mayor, pero es el mismo café 
descafeinado para todos o la diferenciación que pueda agudizar las contradicciones del 
mundo árabe y dificultar un diálogo global.  
Pero bueno, si por otra parte tenemos el día de mañana no solo con Marruecos, pero también 
con Libia y con Túnez un estatuto avanzado, y Jordania, podemos crear un club de países 
avanzados que reciben mucho más de Europa en términos de acuerdos comerciales, de 
apoyos financieros, de apertura, que podría estimular todo lo demás. Y el tema de 
migraciones, esto es muy importante, porque si de verdad, vamos a ser un poco optimistas, 
dentro de algunos meses logramos un acuerdo con Egipto, Túnez y Marruecos en términos de 
pacto de movilidad, que permita a mucha de este país de poder ir a Europa con facilidad, que 
consolide la cooperación de las políticas contra la inmigración ilegal, que den más capacidad 
a la migración legal, de desarrollarse en plenas condiciones en respeto de las condiciones, etc. 
Es decir que pongan en funcionamiento los principios de una política global, pues eso aquí 
será muy importante porque es una herida muy grande que hay aquí.  
Se sienten humillados, es lo que intento explicar. Qué peligro hay para un profesor de 
universidad que venga a dar una conferencia en Amberes, que no le den el visado o que le 
tengan que. Y lo mismo para los businessman, porque si no aparecemos como una fortaleza, 
totalmente contradictorio, entre los discursos maravillosos que hacen y luego las realidades 
concretas donde les despreciamos.  
Caso Bayoumi. Egipto.  
Y más aún cuando damos beneficios de este tipo a países que representan un peligro mucho 
más grande en temas de inmigración. Como Ucrania, por razones políticas, tuvimos que 
apoyar la revolución y yo estuve muy implicado en eso. Pero no hay nada de coherencia.  
Hay 3 cosas que tenemos que mejorar para tener una mayor credibilidad en estos países. 
Todo el tema de la movilidad de la gente. Tener una forma menos dura, más abierta, más de 
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partenariado, y si esto lo logramos cambiaremos muchas cosas en la mente y en la percepción 
de la gente con respecto a nosotros. Tenemos por otra parte que abrir más nuestros mercados, 
porque si no no hay credibilidad, porque al final resulta que ellos no pueden exportar 3 
toneladas de lo que sea. Es absurdo. Y esto está en los documentos firmados por los jefes de 
estado, a ver si lo concretamos. Y tercero es una ayuda más grande financiera, no solo a 
temas de desarrollo económico, sino al desarrollo proceso político democrático. Sin en estos 
tres temas logramos en los próximos años, crear cierto cambio, se mejoraran mucho las cosas.  
Pero bueno están las cosas muy interesantes. Vamos a tener complicaciones, está claro. Muy 
provocado por lo de Túnez, Egipto está controlando las cosas, pero digamos que aquí no, no 
va a haber nada. Esto (Marruecos) me hace recordar a la España de Franco, al final, que es un 
cierto autoritarismo, expresión de ciertas libertades, de propaganda, pero bueno, donde hay 
avances. Contradicciones muy grandes, donde hay ciertas libertades que no hay en otros 
sitios, donde hay poco dinamismo, etc. Y si, muchas contradicciones, pero al final, un 
monarca que tiene muchos poderes, que ha cedido muy poco, pero ha permitido que se 
desarrolle todo el espacio de libertades públicas. En eso es un avance muy grande. Pero en 
términos de control no va a cambiar nada.  
Taxista, usted cómo ve esto del referendum? Y me dice, Oui, non, mais oui.  
Es que esto, es muy hábil. Si uno no es republicano de convicción profunda y los hay, o 
islamista extremista, es muy difícil decir que no. Es una oferta de rebajas. Pero por lo menos 
ahí está. Así que es una sociedad que se mueve, que tiene muchas contradicciones, pero que 
está en movimiento.  
Está en ciertos aspectos como cuando estábamos nosotros muy jóvenes. En esa época al final 
de franquismo, con una esperanza tremenda, con un optimismo tremendo, no podíamos vivir 
peor que nuestros padres, íbamos a comernos el mundo y también en una situación objetiva 
muy difícil, muy complicada, pero y eso es fundamental. Es algo que hemos perdido en 
Europa. Eso en España también se ha perdido. Somos nuevos ricos, y perder riqueza es 
mucho más duro que ganarla. Con España hemos crecido demasiado, sin control político 
serio, ni intelectual maduro, hemos desarrollado comportamientos de nuevos ricos. Todo 
tiene un precio. Hemos tenido autopistas, etc. Pero todo tiene un precio.  
Pero es cierto, estoy convencido desde que llegué como director general de las redes, que las 
evoluciones de nuestro mundo, evoluciones pesadas, obligan a, si queremos como ciudadanos 
del mundo, y hablo de Europa, continuar existiendo con cierta influencia en este mundo 
multipolar, que se desarrolla a grande velocidad, no hay otro remedio que mejorar las 
condiciones de una presencia Europea como tal en la gobernanza global. Y eso exige una 
profundización de la integración de la Unión Europea a niveles políticos, que no tiene. Y ni 
Francia ni Inglaterra solos van a poder. Las fuerzas de ese tsunami es tan fuerte, que o bien 
hacemos un muro muy grande o bien desaparecemos. Esa es la condición primaria.  
Y en segundo lugar, si queremos de verdad, en ese pilar europeo, del mundo multipolar, tener 
más influencia aún, debemos sin dudas, desarrollar con nuestros vecinos, una política 
estratégica de cooperación fuerte, para asentar y consolidar esa presencia ante los americanos, 
ante China, y eso quiere decir que con Rusia, con Turquía y con el Maghreb, debemos tener 
una visión estratégica que corresponda a una puesta en marcha que nos guste o no nos guste 
habrá que hacerlo. Y no hay otra manera. Y yo no creo en la unión del mundo árabe para 
nada. Pero creo que para nosotros europeos en un plazo político de 10 o 20 años debemos 
hacer muchos más esfuerzos para que este Maghreb exista, porque estos países no van a 
solucionar sus problemas si no entran en un proceso de integración regional.  
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Si queremos atraer aquí las inversiones necesarias para provocar un crecimiento, un 
dinamismo, una creación de empleo, como es necesario, tiene que haber Maghreb, porque es 
una realidad de 100 millones de personas comienza a ser interesante y a partir de ahí cuando 
la gente trabaja, abre sus fronteras, crea una unión aduanera, se hace más responsable 
también de estos temas. Tenemos una contradicción fuerte, pero que debemos absolutamente 
superar, que son nuestras posturas respecto a las relaciones entre Argelia y Marruecos. Estas 
decisiones internas son las que se pueden bloquear todo.  
Exacto, y se piensa en el AMU, en realidad nunca existió desde que se originó.  
Así es. Yo creo que con Turquía y Rusia será más fácil. El mundo árabe es difícil. Por donde 
se puede empezar? El sueño de Sarkozy: por el Maghreb. Es ahí donde se ve posibilidad, hay 
cierta homogeneidad étnica, hay muchas cosas, pero claro, eso requiere muchas iniciativas. 






Me interesa sobre todo reflexionar sobre el papel que ha ido jugando España en las 
políticas euro-mediterráneas desde que entra en Europa. Como al principio, por 
ejemplo, el Mediterráneo para Europa, contaba, pero contaba poco, y como España, 
fue, sobre todo llevada de la mano al principio por Felipe González, evaluando también 
esta carta que podía jugar de forma que tuviera un papel cada vez más importante y 
verse cada vez más respetado por los miembros-colegas de la CEE. También como 
poder ver, como un país más consolidado como Francia, las reacciones que ha podido 
tener con relación a estas acciones de proyección diplomática Española donde 
obviamente el proceso de Barcelona juega un papel fundamental, donde el 9/11 también 
hasta llegar hasta la situación actual. La idea es buscar este hilo conductor.  
Tal y como yo lo veo y puedo equivocarme, aunque he trabajado ininterrumpidamente en este 
sector desde el año 1997. He trabajado con el mundo árabe desde el año 1995, principalmente 
con los países del golfo, pero desde el 1997 en el Mediterráneo. Entonces desde mi punto de 
vista, el proceso de Barcelona que surgió en el año 1995, es el resultado de dos factores 
históricos: la caída del muro de Berlín y la necesidad por parte de España y los países 
mediterráneos de que había falta hacer alguna cosa para los países del sur. Que Europa no 
podía exclusivamente centrarse en los países del este y que luego se unirían a la UE desde el 
2004, así que teníamos que dar un mensaje claro y esperanzador a los países del sur del 
Mediterráneo.  
Segundo factor histórico: la perspectiva de paz de Medio Oriente después de la conferencia 
de Madrid en que se abría una perspectiva de paz. En esa época que se consideraba 
prometedora.  
Y como resultado de estas dos cosas y como resultado de una cierta coincidencia, esa gestión 
e iniciativa de Felipe González como tú muy bien has mencionado, de la presidencia del 
señor Marín como comisario europeo de relaciones exteriores, surgió la propuesta del 
proceso de Barcelona. Desde una perspectiva comunitaria, muy Europea. Con un señor 
Delors que tenía un perfil político e intelectual importante, que tenía capacidad de intelectual 
y capacidad de proposición. Entonces, surgió el proceso de Barcelona y surgió como ese 
partenariado (entre comillas) para cubrir toda la región y para hacer una propuesta atractiva, 
sexy, interesante a los países. Y esa propuesta consistía en ofrecer un reforzamiento de las 
relaciones políticas y un reforzamiento de las relaciones económicas. Con un punto clave que 
era la creación de una zona de libre cambio mediterránea. El objetivo del 2010, que era la 
única fecha que había en la declaración de Barcelona.  
Eso a menudo se olvida. Es decir, había muchos objetivos pero no fechados. Como se dice en 
inglés, cuando uno tiene un martillo se cree que todos los problemas son clavos. Entonces la 
comisión Europea en aquella época, que tenía una política comercial muy potente, y la sigue 
teniendo (aunque hoy en día la política comercial es cada vez menos importante) pero en 
aquella época la política comercial era muy importante, y entonces se ofreció esto. Se ofreció 
el librecambio con los países del sur del Mediterráneo. Hoy si lo propusiéramos, no 
conseguiríamos. En esa época se consiguió.  
A veces creo que se infravalora la importancia de lo conseguido en esos años. Y 
efectivamente, la comisión europea propuso su arma de política exterior más importante que 
era reducir aranceles y concluir acuerdos de libre cambio. Y concluirlos con un objetivo, 
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reconocidamente economicista pero aún así lo suficientemente inteligente como para tenerlo 
en cuenta y era que al ofrecer acuerdos de libre cambio recíprocos, no solamente acceso al 
mercado europeo sin pagar aranceles que ya existía en esa época, sino reciprocidad en ambos 
lados, se pensaba que esto era una forma de inducir cambios en la gobernanza económica de 
esos países que tarde o temprano experimentarían cambios en la gobernanza política. El 
esquema era lógico, que a lo mejor un día dicen, pues tenían razón. Mira lo que está 
sucediendo ahora, ¿no? A lo mejor hasta funcionó.  
En alguna medida ha sucedido efectivamente el surgimiento de un cierto sector privado. Una 
transición económica de economías basadas en el sector público y de economías basadas en 
el sector privado. El surgimiento de una clase media. Todo esto, pues ha producido cambios 
en esas sociedades. Ha producido mejoras en la gobernanza económica, inducidas por 
muchas cosas. La intervención del Banco Mundial, tan criticado, creo que este caso ha 
trabajado muy bien en estos países. La cooperación con la UE, ha sido importante. Y los 
cambios en la gobernanza económica.  
Pues esto, ha traído, yo creo que cambios positivos que a su vez han introducido mejoras en 
el tejido productivo, en la competitividad de estos países. Y en el surgimiento de una clase 
media. En Túnez eso es muy claro, en Marruecos también. En Argelia, menos, ya sabes que 
el acuerdo acaba de comenzar a aplicarse y ahora ya hay críticas en el país. En Egipto estaba 
funcionando bastante bien y seguirá funcionando bien. En el Líbano también. En Siria, nunca 
se ha hecho este acuerdo. Se ha cumplido el acuerdo pero no se ha ratificado todavía. En 
Jordania también con efectos positivos. Es decir, todo esto era la esencia del proceso de 
Barcelona, que tenía una vertiente bilateral que son los acuerdos de asociación con ese núcleo 
duro que era el libre cambio y que tenía una vertiente multilateral, con un trabajo colectivo, 
que ha dado menos resultados pero que aún así ha producido un cierto ambiente de 
comunicación y de diálogo. A veces se ha limitado a un talk show, pero ha permitido 
comunicar a los países.  
Y eso fue en gran parte una iniciativa Española, con esa constelación Felipe González, Marín, 
Delors…y la voluntad de los países de hacer un gesto político-económico con los países del 
sur de Mediterráneo en unos momentos en los que el protagonismo lo tenían los países del 
este.  
El protagonismo español, nominal, porque se llamaba proceso de Barcelona, y sustancial 
porque había habido mucha contribución española, fue importante. Luego vino la política de 
vecindad. Fundamentalmente ideada en el 2003 por una comunicación de la Comisión 
Europea y puesta en práctica a partir del año 2005, con los planes de acción. La política de 
vecindad es, fundamentalmente, una idea británica, danesa con influencia anglosajona, de 
todos modos, para que, la UE estableciera, nuevas políticas con respecto a los nuevos 
vecinos. Y ahí el señor Prodi, entonces presidente de la Comisión Europea, quiso que los 
países del sur del Mediterráneo estuvieran también integrados. Aunque ellos no eran los 
destinatarios, al principio, porque se consideraba que eso era únicamente para los países del 
este europeo más allá de las fronteras comunitarias, pero yo creo que con buen criterio se 
dijo, pero bueno, es que Chipre y Malta son también. Y establecen así nuevas fronteras. Y 
hace falta que en esa política de vecindad se incluya también el sur, en este anillo de amigos 
y de vecinos, desde Rabat hasta Moscú, por decirlo de alguna manera.  
La política de vecindad ha sido muy criticada, por muchas cosas, pero ha tenido aspectos 
muy positivos. Ha sido, introducir la metodología de la ampliación, para países que no tenían 
vocación para ser miembros de la UE a excepción de otros como Ukrania u otros. Aunque 
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algunos de ellos hicieron una demanda oficial como Marruecos. Y entonces esta oferta, esa 
política de vecindad, tenía una metodología que era buena, pero quizá tenía un horizonte que 
era menos claro. ¿Qué se ofrecía a cambio?  
Entonces la comunicación del 2003 era muy ambiciosa. Se hablaba de las cuatro libertades, 
movimiento de capitales, de personas, de mercancías y de servicios. Entonces, bueno, esa 
ambición ha quedado muy reducida. Luego hubo esa famosa entrevista y eso ha quedado, 
porque las ideas simples pero atractivas se quedan. Que decía: “todo excepto las 
instituciones”. Y eso es algo que dijo Prodi en el año 2005, creo recordar, el caso es que lo 
dijo y eso quedo en el espíritu de la gente. Pero no era rigurosamente cierto, porque la 
participación en el mercado interior, porque al final las cuatro libertades significan participar 
en el mercado interior, exige o puede demandar la participación en algunas instituciones. Y 
de hecho la política de vecindad preveía la participación de los países vecinos en algunas 
instituciones. Ahora Marruecos por ejemplo participa en la agenda europea del medio 
ambiente pero es cierto, no significa sentarse en el consejo ni tener un comisario.  
En este contexto, reconociendo el papel estimulante Español por desarrollar estas 
políticas muy llevadas de la mano por Felipe González al inicio, y por personas capaces, 
respetadas en Europa, desde el inicio del acceso de España en la EEC, esta fuerza que 
consigue tener España, o esta representación, ¿cómo cambió si es que cambió y qué 
efectos crees que tuvo en la segunda legislatura de Aznar con relación a su política 
exterior? ¿Cómo afecta esto al trabajo de diálogo euro-mediterráneo y de las 
instituciones?  
Yo creo que lo que afecta el diálogo euro-mediterráneo no es tanto el cambio político que 
haya podido existir durante la época de Aznar, que afectó particularmente a Marruecos. La 
política exterior española siempre tiene que encontrar o buscar un equilibrio con Marruecos y 
Argelia. Esto es evidente. En esta época, la balanza quizá se inclinó más hacia Argelia que 
hacia Marruecos. Es más cuestión de opiniones que de datos. Es verdad que perejil tiene una 
influencia, no cabe duda de que un cierto nacionalismo puede tener también una influencia, 
no cabe duda que algunas cartas no se jugaron bien. En esa época contó más Argelia. La 
componente energética, el hecho que había un choque de nacionalismos marroquíes. Y el 
proceso de Barcelona y el diálogo euro-mediterráneo entraron en crisis porque entró también 
en crisis el proceso de paz. Y era muy dependiente del proceso de paz. Inevitablemente 
dependiente.  
En una entrevista con Eneko Landaburu me comentaba precisamente eso, quizá hemos 
sido un poco optimistas en pensar que podríamos resolver el conflicto de Israel-
Palestina.  
Sí, este era el aspecto más difícil. Y no solo era un aspecto muy difícil, sino que nunca se 
creyó que el proceso de Barcelona debiera servir para resolver el conflicto. Se crearon para 
apoyar en el desarrollo y la consolidación una vez el conflicto se hubiera resuelto. Para dar 
ese marco de relación una vez que el conflicto se hubiera resuelto. Pero claro, falló la primera 
premisa y no se pudo completar el proyecto. Lo cual ha sido una pena en muchos sentidos. 
Pero bueno,  ha sido una víctima colateral del conflicto como otras cosas y esa ha sido 
particularmente importante, porque no se ha podido hacer un auténtico trabajo. Y una de esas 
víctimas fue la conferencia de Marsella en el 2001 sobre la carta de paz y de estabilidad en el 
Mediterráneo, que hubiera podido crear una auténtica OSCE del Mediterráneo, que hubiera 
podido crear una organización dedicada a la seguridad colectiva en la región. Pero no pudo 
hacerse por esto.  
328 
 
Pero el protagonismo de España fue esencial. Pero yo no creo que el hecho de que hubiera un 
conflicto específico dañara todo esto. Los conflictos bilaterales han tenido un impacto menor 
curiosamente en el proceso de Barcelona. Con la excepción del proceso de paz. El conflicto 
entre Marruecos y Argelia nunca tuvo un impacto. El conflicto entre Chipre y Turquía 
tampoco. Los conflictos que pudieran existir entre España y Marruecos tampoco tuvieron una 
gran relevancia. Esto es curioso.  
Vosotros trabajando en Bruselas, ¿cómo veíais el diálogo, las negociaciones entre los 
diferentes miembros? ¿Ha habido un cierto consenso entre todos? ¿Han existido 
momentos en los que haya habido particulares tensiones?  
Yo creo que en el Mediterráneo, por lo que respecta a los países de la Unión Europea,  
siempre ha habido un grupo de países escépticos, y los países que han querido desarrollar 
estos planes contra viento y marea. Yo siempre explico que el ejemplo que es significativo de 
las diferencias entre la realpolitik y el idealismo, ¿no? Como tú sabes los embajadores y los 
consejeros a distintos niveles de la UE se reúnen bajo la presidencia de la presidencia 
Europea y la presidencia del servicio exterior, se reúnen en las capitales. Entonces hay 
reuniones en Rabat y hay reuniones en el Cairo, como las hay en Argel, etc. Yo siempre digo 
que cuando tu ibas a una reunión en Rabat ves como el realpolitik lo defendía Francia y como 
el idealismo político por ejemplo era desarrollado por el Reino Unido. La misma reunión en 
el Cairo era exactamente lo contrario. El que representaba la visión derechos del hombre y 
tenemos que exigir de la administración de que hagan esfuerzos (esto antes de las 
revoluciones) de democratización y de participación, era Francia. Después el Reino Unido 
representaba la realpolitik. Esto sucede con mucha frecuencia.  
Es la típica dicotomía que aparece en los tratados de la Unión Europea entre intereses y 
valores. Y en el tratado de Maastricht había un artículo que creaba la PESC, decía: la política 
exterior de la UE estará basada en intereses y valores. Pero no decía como resolver las 
contradicciones, cuando las hay y las creamos.  
Este es un tema especialmente sensible cuando uno intenta hacer política. Porque tu 
puedes desarrollar un discurso idealista o más realista que luego en la traducción 
práctica existe un hueco importante de cubrir y a la hora de entenderlo por las 
contrapartes del sur pueden decir: oigan señores, ¿qué nos están intentando vender? Y 
esto hace que se pierda la confianza, ¿no? Sobre en temas muy sensibles que se han 
estado desarrollando durante los últimos años como es el tema de emigración. Donde 
quizá cuando el problema se intuía, pero no era una realidad, el discurso era mucho 
más abierto y multicultural, valores, etc. En el momento en el que se comienza a ver la 
emigración como una cosa un poco más seria, el discurso cambia. Tú, por un lado 
puedes sugerir la apertura de mercados siguiendo tesis neo-liberales, que pueden 
funcionar o no en el corto, mediano o largo plazo, pero eso implica también una 
apertura del espacio para el movimiento de las personas. Como ha sido el ejemplo de la 
UE donde primero se abre el espacio a los mercados y luego a las personas. Esto para 
los países del sur, resulta algo muy delicado. Por un lado nos ofrecen sacar nuestros 
productos e intercambiar, y por el otro castigan a nuestros emigrantes.  
Eso desde un punto de vista emocional, eso me recuerda a una reunión durante una época 
pretérita de mi carrera profesional, en las discusiones de la ronda del The Uruguay Round en 
Ginebra, sobre la liberación del comercio. Y entonces yo en esa época me encargaba de Asia. 
De Asia, excepto de Japón. Y entonces teníamos reuniones bilaterales, muy a menudo y esas 
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reuniones eran con países como la India, etc. Y en esa época nos reunimos –presididos por un 
embajador inglés- la Unión Europea con Bangladesh.  
Eso para la liberalización del comercio, para una reducción de los aranceles, etc. Entonces el 
embajador comienza la negociación, y eso se hace como en un mercado de alfombras. Tu 
proponías tus productos y ellos los suyos y se llegaban a acuerdos. Entonces el embajador 
europeo le propuso cosas para la liberalización de Bangladesh y el representante de 
Bangladesh respondió de una forma un tanto caricatural pero muy significativa. Yo acepto 
todo eso. Pero yo tengo una mercancía que quiero exportar y que es la mercancía que yo más 
exporto, que son emigrantes. Y las respuestas fueron, no porque esto no se puede cubrir. Y a 
mí me gustó mucho la reacción del embajador, porque es verdad, ellos exportaban 
emigrantes.  
El problema es muy complejo pero muy interesante y resurge siempre que se negocia sobre la 
liberalización de los servicios. Y en el GATT, la OMC actualmente, existen los cuatro modos 
de prestación de servicios y uno de ellos es la representación de tu propia gente en otro país. 
Servicios transfronterizos. Y ahí hay un gran problema siempre con los países en vías de 
desarrollo. Quieren poder mandar gente, aunque sea temporalmente para la prestación de 
servicios. Esto ha sido tema de discusión en el interior de la UE.  
Me interesaría también mucho poder discutir contigo el tema de la UFM. ¿Cómo ve 
Europa las primeras declaraciones de Sarkozy cuando comienza a hablar de la Unión 
del Mediterráneo, con ese discurso un poco neo-gaullista?  
El primero era criticar el proceso de Barcelona  y sustituirlo por algo nuevo con Leadership. 
En eso quizá no han fracasado. Tenían un interés por recuperar el protagonismo por parte 
francesa de lo que tenía en gran parte, una percepción  más comunitaria y más española, 
donde el share español era más elevado. Así que han querido de alguna manera reincorporar 
eso en una iniciativa más francesa. Pero había otros aspectos de esa iniciativa que fueron mal 
orientados y que no han tenido éxito.  
Uno fue el de ofrecer una alternativa. No funcionó por ejemplo con los turcos quienes 
enseguida recibieron ese discurso con mucho escepticismo, incluso con una cierta hostilidad. 
Y lo se porque pocas semanas después del discurso estuve en Ankara y el mensaje que 
recibimos por parte del ministerio fue muy claro. Y luego el tercer objetivo que no podía 
tener éxito, es que desde una perspectiva claramente nacionalista, ellos querían abrir un 
marco de relación multilateral, paralelo a la UE donde Francia tuviera el liderazgo. Por eso la 
quisieron llamar Union Mediterranèe. Plantear un nombre tan ambicioso para una unión tan 
laxa y tan poco concreta, eso eran palabras mayores. Y esa es la razón por la que luego se 
cambió el nombre. UM podría dar la impresión de que estábamos en un proceso constituyente 
de un colectivo similar al de la UE. Entonces, claro, ellos querían tener el liderazgo sobre 
esto. Una visión excesivamente ambiciosa y casi utópica.  
Luego el discurso fue aterrizando en la realidad y hasta que desde luego el punto clave fue 
una discusión si no recuerdo mal, en marzo del 2008 entre Merkel y Sarkozy en el que se 
llegó al acuerdo de que no participarían solo los estados mediterráneos sino todos los estados 
miembros de la UE. Y es cuando se comenzó a hablar de la Unión para el Mediterráneo y se 
establecen las bases que tenemos actualmente y se encarga a la UE de hacer un proyecto, una 
comunicación que luego se convertiría en el proyecto de la declaración de París.  
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Entonces este cambio, por ejemplo, desde que se comienza a aterrizar este modelo de 
Unión por el Mediterráneo hasta que se comienza, hasta que se instituye una sede aquí 
en Barcelona, pasa tiempo.  
En realidad pasó muy poco tiempo, porque esto se hizo entre julio del 2008 y noviembre del 
mismo año. La ministerial de asuntos exteriores del 3 y 4 de noviembre en Marsella bajo 
presidencia francesa también, acaba de perfilar el perímetro de la UPM. Lo hace con el 
establecimiento de una sede y de una sede en Barcelona. Lo que pasa es que eso se concluye 
y el 27 y 28 de noviembre hay el conflicto en Gaza. La entrada de las tropas israelíes que 
paró completamente toda cooperación hasta junio del 2009. En junio del 2009 se 
reemprenden las conversaciones para negociar los estatutos de la secretaría y no se llega a un 
acuerdo con todas las dificultades inherentes a algo tan complejo hasta marzo del 2010 y en 
marzo de 2010 arranca la secretaría.  
Esta cuestión de poner la sede aquí en Barcelona, o quizá un cierto interés francés por 
ponerla en Marsella o en otro lugar del norte de África, si es que este fuera el caso, 
como lo vive Sarkozy o el gobierno, cuando se vota por Barcelona cuando la iniciativa 
parte de la parte francesa?  
Bueno, los franceses querían que la sede, y yo creo que en eso tenían razón, en un país del 
sur, pero cuando vieron que eso no era posible por razones políticas, porque ningún país del 
sur, es decir, había una serie de países en el sur que no querían que la sede estuviera en el sur. 
Aunque había un país que sí que hubiera aceptado la sede. Entonces esos países que decían, 
que no aceptaban que la sede estuviera por ejemplo en Túnez,  pero no aceptamos que en un 
país árabe haya una sede con una organización internacional integrando a Israel. Entonces 
cuando se vio que no había consenso en esto, nunca se produjo una candidatura, entonces 
surgieron dos candidaturas y la tercera, Marsella nunca existió. Malta estuvo hasta el último 
minuto. Entonces claro el peso político de España fue mayor, entonces fue cuando se aceptó 
como mal menor, por así decirlo, ya que no podía ser en un país del sur del Mediterráneo, 
pues establecer la sede en Barcelona, aceptando como contrapartida, que se perdía la 
denominación de Unión para el Mediterráneo/Proceso de Barcelona.  
Evidentemente, para Francia, hubiera sido mucho mejor una sede en Túnez con un 
secretario francés.  
Yo creo que los franceses querían evitar en todo caso evitar el fracaso de la iniciativa. Y yo 
creo que ellos han estado detrás de esta iniciativa con toda la potencia de la política exterior 
francesa y con una voluntad política importante. Porque la Unión para el Mediterráneo 
fundamentalmente tiene 3 cosas importantes que son institucionales las 3. 1 es la creación de 
la secretaría, 2 es la co-presidencia y 3 la conferencia cada dos años que todavía no se ha 
podido celebrar. Esas tres cosas constituyen un avance institucional con respecto al proceso 
de Barcelona.  
Y estas iniciativas nacen en un momento en el que se declara de forma abierta la crisis 
económica mundial. Cómo impacta esto en las políticas que se quieren desarrollar en el 
Mediterráneo? Los países tienen que ser más cautos, hay una tendencia política más 
conservadora. Cómo eso impacta en las políticas de diálogo euro-mediterráneo cuando 
efectivamente hay ciertas urgencias nacionales a las que responder?  
Yo creo que impacta hasta ahora poco. Vamos a ver, hay dos cosas fundamentales. Una es, si 
se me permite la expresión, cuál es el nivel de exportación de la crisis europea a los países del 
sur. Los cuatro vectores de exportación de la crisis, que son las inversiones, exportaciones, 
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turismo y transferencias de inmigrantes, han tenido un impacto, pero menos importante de lo 
que se preveía. Y esos cuatro vectores han existido pero de una forma menos importante. Y 
Egipto, antes de enero de este año, estaba en tasas de crecimiento del 5-6%, Argelia viven en 
otra liga, y Marruecos también estaba en 4-5%.  
Que va a pasar ahora con la crisis financiera? Ahora se está diciendo mucho esta correlación 
de la crisis económica de los países mediterráneos del norte del mediterráneo y de crisis 
política en los países del sur. No se que impacto tendrá sinceramente. Yo no me atrevo a 
hacer una predicción. Luego, sí, el otro impacto posible son la cooperación al desarrollo. Y 
ahí los fondos europeos, no han sido aceptados. Y los fondos bilaterales supongo que sí que 
lo serán, pero es que los fondos bilaterales no eran tan importantes como los fondos europeos. 
El impacto va a venir por la baja tremenda del turismo en Egipto y en Túnez que vivían 
mucho de este sector y que les ha afectado mucho. Y luego que claro, las inversiones directas 
también han bajado.  
Pero son las tres etapas a tener en cuenta. 1) El proceso de Barcelona, 2) La política de 
vecindad y 3) la Unión para el Mediterráneo. 1) Iniciativa española- comunitaria, 2) iniciativa 
anglosajona si se me permite con Italia también y 3) iniciativa francesa.  
Y España, cuando Sarkozy se lanza a esta iniciativa, a este liderazgo, un hombre más de 
impulsos que de consolidada ideología, cómo reacciona España?  
Moratinos se sube al tren enseguida. Hay esa declaración que se llama Appel de Rome en 
2007 con la participación de los tres ministros de asuntos exteriores, Francia, Italia y España 
en la cual juntos declaran su voluntad de lanzar la Unión por el Mediterráneo. Y creo que es 
ahí donde se produce el cambio de nombre entre Unión “del” a unión “para”. Por voluntad 
expresa de Moratinos. (Do not quote me) pero Moratinos no es un pro-europeo. Por 
supuesto, era una persona que quería hacer avanzar todo el nuevo proceso y había que apoyar 
a los franceses.  
Es un tema muy complicado que junta muchos vectores, situaciones, contextos políticos, 
económicos, sociales y culturales.  
Efectivamente. España percibió perfectamente la necesidad de apoyar la iniciativa francesa 
desde el principio. Y hacerlo inclinándola, haciéndola más europea y haciendo que España 
siguiera teniendo protagonismo.  
O sea que no se puede hablar en este sentido de rivalidad, sino de tratar de aprovechar 
la inercia lanzada por uno para transformarla y traducirla en acción concreta en 
beneficio de todos.  
Exactamente, completamente de acuerdo. Un pragmatismo muy bien orientado desde este 
punto de vista.  
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Yo lo que estoy trabajando básicamente es el período desde el cual España entra en la 
ECC en el 1986 y como comienza España comienza a desarrollar ciertas estrategias 
diplomáticas de cara a tener una mayor influencia en Europa. Obviamente como apenas 
entrada tenía que hacer ciertos méritos para ganarse la confianza de los socios 
europeos. Me gustaría saber mucho que opinas sobre el hecho de cómo España ha sido 
capaz de vender en una primera instancia una cierta imagen en Europa y vender el 
Mediterráneo y sus aspectos urgentes, como puede ser la emigración, la seguridad.  
Yo creo que hay por un lado hay mucho de geografía. Hay tan solo 18 kilómetros que nos 
separan de Marruecos por tanto, el hecho de estar en el front line, los riesgos y también las 
oportunidades de las relaciones de los países de Europa y los países del Norte de África. La 
geografía es muy determinante, sobre todo al principio durante la transición, porque se puede 
decir en este sentido que es más importante la geografía que la demografía. La demografía no 
es muy relevante. España es un país con poca inmigración magrebí, la emigración viene 
después, es decir, después viene la demografía, que es muy relevante porque es parte del 
desarrollo socio-económico español, es parte de su milagro económico y quizá eso también 
sea hoy parte del problema. Una vez que ese milagro ha mostrado sus debilidades.  
Y yo creo que la visión que tiene Felipe González con un grupo de embajadores que fueron 
decisivos para eso, está basado en la necesidad y en la respuesta a la pregunta: España que es 
en Europa? Es un país discreto económicamente, es un país que tiene una vocación 
latinoamericana, aunque esa vocación no estaba acompañada de inversiones en América 
Latina, que vendrían más tarde. Qué cartas tiene España? De qué puede hablar? Qué puede 
liderar entonces España? Es obvio que es el tema Mediterráneo. Basado en algunos aspectos 
históricos, de conexión con el mundo árabe, la historia, el mito del Al-Andalus, la proximidad 
geográfica. Entonces, creo que Felipe entiende enseguida, que si habla del Mediterráneo le 
escuchan. No solo le escuchan cuando habla de América Latina por ser Español. Entonces se 
da cuenta de que puede desarrollar una política que dará a España más peso en la Unión 
Europea.  
Se puede entonces hablar de una estrategia? 
Claro, una estrategia basada en una necesidad ya que necesita leverage. Juega sus bazas, la 
latinoamericana es obvia pero un poco abstracta aunque se consolide más adelante con las 
inversiones de los bancos, etc.  La mediterránea es muy importante porque los Europeos 
comienzan a ver el mediterráneo como una zona de riesgo, y entonces la política Española 
está ahí, de acuerdo, estamos en la primera línea, pero nosotros somos capaces de transformar 
esos riesgos en oportunidades con un proyecto Euro-Mediterráneo. Entonces España, 
aprovechando algunas iniciativas que ya habían desarrollado italianos, etc, pues España 
apoya y se involucra mucho en el proyecto Euro-Mediterráneo. Está basado en una visión, 
pero también en una necesidad. Tener una carta en Bruselas y yo creo que esa política fue 
muy inteligente. Todo el mundo le reconoció a España esta posibilidad, e incluso, es curioso 
que se le reconoció a España más allá de la auténtica presencia Española en el mediterráneo. 
Antes de los años 90 esa presencia es muy débil, económicamente, políticamente. España está 
siempre entre el cuarto o quinto lugar entre los inversores. En términos de comercio, España 
está muy lejos de Italia, de Alemania, del Reino Unido y de Francia. En países como Egipto, 
España viene en 6 o 7 posición. Pero bueno, España juega bien la carta geo-política y asume 
un liderazgo en los temas euro-mediterráneos.  
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Un liderazgo que de otra parte es contestado por algunas otras potencias que pueden 
tener también intereses en la zona, como Francia?  
Este liderazgo es contestado, bueno, es visto con el escepticismo grandielocuente siempre de 
los franceses, pero Felipe González que es un hombre hábil y que tiene pronto una cierta 
personalidad en el contexto europeo, jugó muy bien la carta de Alemania. Cambia el apoyo 
de la Ostpolitik de Khol por el apoyo de Khol a la política, porque España no podía pagar la 
factura del proyecto euro-mediterráneo. Y es Felipe quien hace esto, tú hagas esta factura y 
yo te apoyo frente a Mitterrand que era muy escéptico, los ingleses, la ostpolitik. Y España 
tiene una carta en el Mediterráneo para todas estas cosas y ese apoyo de Khol fue 
fundamental. Los detalles de esta historia los conozco bien porque he tenido una buena 
relación con Jordi Pujol. Pujol fue un eslabón de este acuerdo con los alemanes. Jordi Pujol 
era un liberal-conservador, con una buena relación con Khol, habla perfectamente el alemán, 
entonces tiene una relación privilegiada con Khol y Felipez González le hace jugar a Pujol el 
papel importante de esta acción. Todo esto ocurre hacia el final del mandato de Felipe 
González.  
El último año de Felipe fue terrible, la corrupción, etc. Durante 1 año, Pujol recibe muchas 
presiones para abandonar. Felipe ya no tenía mayoría absoluta y su mayoría dependía del 
apoyo de la minoría catalana, y necesitaba esta ayuda para aprobar los presupuestos. Pujol 
sigue apoyando a González durante 1 año, en contra de la opinión de otras fuerzas políticas 
como Convergencia i Unió, que decía que había que abandonar a los socialistas para no estar 
alineados con esa corrupción y con esa mala imagen. Pero le apoya entre otras muchas 
razones porque da mucha importancia al proceso que poco a poco se va culminando en el 
proceso de Barcelona. Es una historia muy interesante que no ha sido contada, pero que 
merece la pena.  
Es Felipe con la intervención de Pujol y eso es lo que coloca a España en la agenda 
Mediterránea, incluso por encima del potencial real español. Las empresas españolas en 
Marruecos, por ejemplo, se desarrollan a partir de aquel momento. El contrato de Telefónica 
en Marruecos es posterior, pero con todo, España juega muy bien la carta geo-política. La 
juega muy bien, busca aliados, los encuentra en los alemanes fundamentalmente, también con 
los países nórdicos. Juega bien el bilateral con Italia, Italia apoya siempre.  
Francia sigue el proceso sin mucho entusiasmo, porque Francia ha siempre tenido una 
aproximación muy nacional, muy basada en el papel histórico de Francia, protagonismo que 
ha tratado de recuperar un poco con la Unión por el Mediterráneo. Francia fue siempre un 
poco escéptica al principio con el proceso de Barcelona. Después lo siguió, se adaptó, lo 
apoyó, pero la existencia de una política multilateral juntando los 27 países de la UE en una 
acción multilateral, Francia era muy escéptica. Francia siempre se opuso mucho al papel de la 
Comisión Europea. Por eso cuando lanza la propuesta de la Unión del Mediterráneo, en una 
nueva arquitectura de la Unión en la Comisión Europea, etc. También hay colaboración con 
Francia después, no es que haya una guerra entre Francia y España en los temas 
mediterráneos. Son unos años en los que España necesita mucho de Francia, con el tema de 
ETA, y hay acuerdo, hay negociación, hay convergencia de políticas, y, luego España apoya 
la propuesta de Francia y tuvo un papel decisivo para el desarrollo de la Unión por el 
Mediterráneo, pese a las reticencias alemanas.  
Pero al principio la historia es esta. Es una historia española con un eje con Alemania, con un 
acuerdo con Italia, la época de una relación muy intensa entre Moratinos y De Michelis, 
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ministro italiano de asuntos exteriores. No hace mucho estuve en Italia con De Michelis y 
coincidía con todos estos puntos de vista.  
Crees de alguna manera, que el hecho de tener que vender por fuerza este tema 
mediterráneo a Europa, se hizo a través de un discurso público muy realista (Abel) y 
veo un cambio de tendencia en el discurso público de ser realista, en el sentido de tener 
que vender a través de ciertas “amenazas”, emergencias o urgencias, a convertirse con 
el Proceso de Barcelona en un discurso un poco más abierto, más optimista, más liberal.  
Sí. Hay sensibilidades políticas distintas por parte del partido popular que por definición ha 
tenido una visión más realista, pero también había que vender esto a Europa. Y Europa, y en 
Europa hay una cultura muy profunda del mediterráneo como problema, y riesgo. Y esa 
cultura se ha ido cambiando a través de mucha pedagogía, de mucha relación. Yo creo, que 
cuando se habla de balances del proceso de Barcelona, etc., evidentemente si se hace un 
balance de comparar los objetivos conseguidos, etc., una cosa que ha cambiado ha sido esta. 
Como en Europa al inicio se tenía una visión ligada al Mediterráneo como problema, 
problema para algunos. Todos los temas del mediterráneo estaban en la agenda migratoria, y 
la migración era una agenda de interior, o en la agenda del terrorismo. Era el Islám-
terrorismo y migraciones-fronteras interiores. Y una cosa muy positiva de todo el proceso es 
que ha pasado a ser una agenda de la política exterior europea, ha pasado a ser parte de una 
política de vecindad y con lo cual ahora hay una visión más comprehensive, más global. No 
han desaparecido los riesgos que efectivamente siguen ahí, pero la aproximación es más 
global.  
Nunca se ha interesado en discutir esta vocación más vertida de los gobiernos de 
González hacia  Latino América o el Mediterráneo en contraposición al segundo 
mandato de Aznar mucho más atlantista. Cómo afecta este cambio de visión a las 
políticas desarrolladas precedentemente y que sentaron las bases de una política Euro-
Mediterránea? Porque al final estamos hablando de comunicación política, de cambio 
de intereses políticos y estratégicos. Afectaron estos cambios al desarrollo del proceso de 
Barcelona desde entonces?  
Aznar tiene 2 gobiernos que son muy distintos entre uno y otro y sobre todo también en 
temas ligados a la política exterior.  El primer mandato donde gobierna en coalición, pero 
aquel pacto sirvió para que la política de Aznar fuera en general más moderada. Yo estaba 
todavía como periodista y conocí a Aznar como periodista, y era una persona curiosa, abierta, 
interesada y hablaba mucho con él sobre los temas del mediterráneo y creo que cuando llega 
de presidente el primer viaje que hace es un viaje a Marruecos, el primer viaje, hay que ir a 
Marruecos, y se interesa. Y ve también enseguida como el tema del Mediterráneo era 
importante. Cuando se va al Consejo cada cual habla de lo que tiene, entonces que tiene 
Aznar, al principio vende la política mediterránea y la exhibe. Es la época de Piqué que es 
uno de los grandes de este proceso. La fundación Anna Lindh se crea por ejemplo en la 
ministerial de Valencia.  
Varias ministeriales fueron importantes, pero la ministerial de Valencia fue esencial para la 
creación de la Fundación Anna Lindh. Interesante porque es una fundación para el diálogo 
intercultural, se crea en el año 2004 en Valencia, y es la reacción moderada a los eventos del 
11 de septiembre. Es decir, no es una reacción de decir vamos a combatir. Vamos a buscar la 
manera de dialogar, de entender, etc. La primera parte del gobierno de Aznar, es una parte, de 
profundización en la agenda mediterránea que había lanzado González. Luego las cosas se 
complican con Marruecos. Aznar recibe muy mal esta actitud de Marruecos. Yo creo que se 
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equivoca allí porque con Marruecos siempre hay dificultades. Es un país que reacciona 
siempre de forma un tanto ingrata en algunos temas. Entonces Aznar reaccionó de la forma 
que todos recordamos y a partir de ahí hay una agenda más atlantista, el tema de las Azores y 
eso es mal recibido y mal visto por los países árabes y el reacciona así, una reacción global 
hacia el mundo árabe y hacia el Islam. Y bueno se crea ahí una dinámica que es muy negativa 
para España, luego vienen los atentados terroristas. Fueron unos años de  acción-reacción 
muy malos.  
Estos factores influyen en el proceso de Barcelona?  
Claro, influye en todo. El atentado terrorista de Madrid, influye en todo. Eso es un choque 
para los que gobiernan tremendo. Y esto influye la política de exterior, influye esta voluntad 
de Aznar de ser casi cabeza de puente de la política americana en Europa. Eso a él le da 
muchos réditos, como personalidad. España tiene un momento aparentemente brillante en la 
política exterior, de cierta relevancia. Eso hay que reconocerlo. Y yo creo que gestiona mal y 
confunde un poco la realidad con las apariencias, se lanza a una política que tenía poco 
desarrollo y entonces se encuentra con los problemas. Los problemas con la proximidad y eso 
hay que rebobinarlo, hay que cambiar la política. Pero es importante diferenciar las dos 
etapas porque si no, no se entiende.  
La primera etapa fue muy positiva y de continuidad y de profundización del proceso de 
Barcelona, en la cual Piqué jugó un papel muy importante. La gran diferencia entre Piqué y la 
ministra que vino después fue clarísima. Creo que Palacio tiene una actitud con Marruecos 
por ejemplo. Recuerdo una vez que le regalé un libro sobre la sociedad civil de Marruecos, en 
el momento en el que yo era miembro del consorcio IEMED, y dijo, ¡ah! “pues no sabía que 
había sociedad civil en Marruecos”. Entonces fue una anécdota muy divertida. Después de 
esta sesión en el IEMED viajaba al sur de Marruecos, donde tenía una entrevista con el Rey, 
para arreglar toda la situación. Entonces en el avión se leyó el libro, entonces la mujer muy 
estudiosa, se lo estudió. Entonces empezó la entrevista con el Rey y lo sé por un embajador 
que estaba en ese momento allí, y dio un discurso muy positivo sobre el papel de la sociedad 
civil marroquí y el Rey se quedó impresionado, de ver que la ministra conocía tanto de la 
sociedad civil marroquí.  
Yo creo que el ciclo es este.  
Y luego, claro, salen temas como el que has comentado muy acertadamente, según mi 
criterio. Este aspecto fundamental se quiera o no, como es el tema de emigración. Que 
antes era controlada por los ministerios de asuntos interiores y que más tarde pasó a ser 
parte de la agenda de exteriores.  
Sí, pero esto cambió. Por ejemplo, la emigración actúa sobre la política exterior en el 
Mediterráneo en un doble sentido. Un sentido positivo donde se ve que es una realidad que 
hay que gestionarla, por tanto hay que desarrollar una política. España pasa a ser pasa a ser 
un país donde la diversidad de emigrante, sobre todo marroquí, es muy relevante. Pasamos a 
ser un país europeo normal, como Francia, etc. Y es una carta en las agendas de interior, 
desarrolló toda la política de seguridad, y España la gestiona bien. Siempre con una visión 
global, no solo desarrollar solo mecanismos de seguridad y vigilancia en las costas. Pero la 
migración  como es muy repentina y muy masiva, la migración tiene un impacto muy 
negativo sobre la opinión pública española. Y entonces los políticos son muy sensibles a esto. 
Esto se ve claro en Cataluña por ejemplo. El gobierno de Pujol continúa siendo muy 
mediterraneísta, pero claro, hay que gestionar los problemas estos, en los municipios, que 
tienen que ver con los marroquíes aquí.  
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El mundo de musulmán pasa de ser una abstracción a ser una realidad. Una realidad, sesgada 
por el origen rural y masivo y pobre de los que vienen. Por lo que se acentúa una visión del 
Islam muy primaria. Aquí solo vienen los campesinos que vienen del norte de Marruecos, etc. 
Entonces hay unos años que coinciden con los años de gobierno del Partido Popular y otros 
gobiernos donde los gobiernos tienen una posición más avanzada que la misma sociedad. 
Porque en la sociedad las encuestas son demoledoras. El rating de la islamofobia es muy alto. 
Hay un papel muy positivo del gobierno, de algunos medios de comunicación. Pero donde de 
verdad hay un sentimiento difícil de gestionar es en la sociedad española. Y que se vuelve 
todavía más difícil de gestionar cuando comienza la crisis económica.  
Entonces la migración actúa en doble sentido. Yo creo que la emigración en España, porque 
ahora hay más de 1 millón de marroquíes, a medio plazo será una cuestión fundamental para 
la política mediterránea española. A corto plazo, de 1 o 2 generaciones, sobre todo en un 
contexto de crisis tan profunda como la actual, no siempre ayuda.  
Tu que trabajas en la Fundación Anna Lindh, donde la comunicación intercultural, la 
aproximación entre los pueblos, también es un elemento donde la confianza es vital.  
Cómo afecta la falta de coherencia política (realpolitik vs. Idealismo), a esta 
comunicación, al entendimiento entre los pueblos del norte y del sur?  
Afecta, sí. Afecta todo el proceso de diálogo mediterráneo, porque la opinión pública aquí es 
reacia y porque el feedback en los países del sur, se traduce en falta de credibilidad del 
proceso como tal. Se plantea de una forma muy fuerte la cuestión de la movilidad, como se 
puede pretender crear una zona de libre comercio del 2010 y a la vez con políticas cada vez 
más restrictivas en términos de visas, incluso para segmentos muy específicos de la población 
como profesores, etc. Eso sigue siendo en nuestra vida diaria una pesadilla.  
Si porque por ejemplo la Unión Europea nace al inicio como una unión económica y 
comercial, y luego se crea Schengen, un espacio abierto para la movilidad de las 
personas. Son dos cosas que deben ir de la mano.  
Sí, y eso es una dinámica que ha pesado mucho. La falta de credibilidad. Y algunas cosas 
recientes o actitudes recientes con relación a la emigración procedente de Libia. Claro montar 
todo este show porque había 18.000 tunecinos en Ventimiglia, sobre 750 millones, deben ser 
un 0.0005 %. Entonces eso en el sur es percibido, como que en el fondo no se quiere. Que en 
el fondo lo que se quiere es algunas medidas de libre comercio, destinadas a facilitar las 
inversiones allí. Pero si eso va acompañado con restricciones en el ámbito de la movilidad y 
dificultades en una política agraria que dificulta también el acceso a los mercados europeos, 
entonces los dos principales principios de credibilidad del proceso son estos. Política agraria 
y política migratoria.  
Es verdad, son temas serios. Pero se podría tener a corto plazo las medidas que hay que tener, 
pero dejar clara la perspectiva. Pero claro, la perspectiva está ahí. La perspectiva es 
demográfica. Hay una necesidad de mano de obra y de rejuvenecimiento de la población 
europea evidente. En términos de hacer frente al peligro de decadencia europea, y de 
mantener ese 14-15 o 16% del PIB mundial  que tiene la EU. Hoy creo que estamos en el 
18%. Hay algunos estudios demográficos que son demoledores si no hay aportación de 
demografía, etc, en 2050 se baja al 12 al 13% del PIB mundial.  
Es decir, Europa pasa a ser una región mucho menos relevante. Esto que todo el mundo sabe, 
porqué no se dice? Entonces no es cuestión de decir, vamos a abrir las fronteras. Se trata de 
tener una estrategia donde los países del sur tienen que saber que hay una posibilidad de 
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complementariedad demográfica. Pero claro, todos los políticos tienen miedo de eso y luego 
se crea una paradoja. Como va pasando el tiempo, cuando se va a reconocer eso, como ha 
dicho Senen Florensa, ya se habrá producido un proceso de cambio demográfico en el sur y 
ya no podemos tener gente de esta zona, sino que tendremos que tener gente de África. Con 
las excepciones de Egipto y Palestina se están a estándares europeos.  
Entonces creo que es uno de los problemas es eso, la falta de visión. En el proceso de 
Barcelona, había una cosa, y es que había una visión. Esa visión se ha ido perdiendo por la 
crisis económica, por dinámicas políticas internas, y también hay que decirlo, por el statu quo 
en el sur. Uno de los grandes defectos o limitaciones del proceso de Barcelona es que 
pretendía dibujar un escenario en el medio o largo plazo sin cambiar el statu-quo en los países 
del sur. Y yo creo que eso fue un error, un statu-quo que fue sellado fundamentalmente por 
los americanos mucho tiempo atrás por Roosevelt en esa entrevista con el rey de Arabia 
Saudí en el 45. Este statu-quo los europeos lo deberían haber manejado distintamente. Yo 
creo que ha habido 2 o 3 cosas que han pesado mucho en dicho statu-quo. Uno es la crisis 
energética. Otra es la visión estereotipada del mundo Islámico, donde más vale apoyar un 
dictador laico y conocido que un islamista por conocer. Y después el tema de Israel ha jugado 
también mucho en este statu-quo, porque cualquier ruptura de este statu-quo ponía en peligro 
al estado de Israel.  
Ahora con la nueva coyuntura, desde Estambul hasta Túnez, hay un marco donde los partidos 
islamistas pueden tener una posición mayoritaria, y si se crean ellos una corriente reformista, 
puede ser una oportunidad histórica.  
Vosotros ahora dentro de la fundación Anna Lindh, como veis las ciertas dificultades 
que puede entrañar la falta de coherencia política hasta ahora en el desarrollo de estas 
nuevas coyunturas.  
Yo creo que la Unión Europea como tal, ha reaccionado particularmente. Al principio estaba 
muy sorprendida, como todos. Después ha reaccionado bastante bien. Todo eso constituye un 
esfuerzo de reacción muy positivo. Hay falta de dinero. Estas revoluciones llegan en un muy 
mal momento. No hay los fondos que se atribuyeron cuando las transiciones democráticas se 
produjeron al este de Europa. Hay una comprensión del papel de la sociedad civil muy 
importante. Y después hay una voluntad de hablar con todo el mundo.  
Yo creo que la EU ahora tiene una buena oportunidad, porque si aplica esa política de more 
for more y less for less, restricciones con Siria, de gran apertura con Túnez, con Marruecos, 
con Jordania con Egipto, eso puede hacer re-credibilizar este proceso. Yo estuve en la 
reunión de la Task Force que se hizo hace 15 días. Fue interesante. Bernardino León tiene un 
papel muy interesante de coordinador de acciones que se pueden desarrollar en política 
exterior europea. Luego está Stephan Fülle, comisario de la neighborhood, que es un hombre 
muy committed en todo esto. Entiende también muy bien que al final todo dependerá de la 
sociedad civil. Hace falta un marco institucional, una constitución abierta, hacen falta 
transformaciones, una democracia, pero sobre todo lo que hace falta es una sociedad civil 
fuerte, plural, abierta que siga desarrollando la democracia en estos países. Y he escuchado 
de él ideas que no he escuchado en ningún otro dirigente de la Unión Europea. Me parece 
importante.  
Para ir terminando, como habéis percibido cuando Sarkozy anunció su programa de 
Unión por el Mediterráneo, y cómo ha evolucionado hasta hoy esa percepción?  
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Cuando se lanzó en Julio de 2008, sorprendió la forma en la que lo hizo. En sí mismo suponía 
un salto importante. Porque tocaba temas que son de gran interés. Introducía un elemento 
interesante aunque se gestionó de una manera un poco controvertida que era el tema del 
sharing responsibilities, de las 2 co-presidencias, para terminar con una idea del proceso de 
Barcelona como un proceso Europeo.  
Yo creo que no se gestionó mal, es que se gestionó con Mubarak. Es que ahora hay que ver la 
imagen completa. Yo estaba en París en la sala grande con el presidente de la fundación, yo 
estaba en la silla detrás de los “sherpas”, y no puedo olvidar foto, yo tenía delante a Sarkozy, 
Ben Ali, Asaad, etc. Yo tengo obsesión con esa foto, eso es lo que había. No estaba el rey de 
Marruecos, no estaba el rey de Jordania, estaba el primer ministro, pero los que de verdad 
estaban al máximo nivel, menos Ghadaffi, todos. Entonces la cuestión era que había la ilusión 
de construir un futuro con esta gente.  
Yo entiendo la realpolitik, pero habría que decir las cosas más claras. Ya había un criterio de 
condicionalidad que estaba introducido desde el principio del proceso de Barcelona, pero en 
la práctica este principio de condicionalidad se dejó para algunas declaraciones y se trabajaba 
con acuerdos bilaterales, ahora con Argelia, luego con Siria, y había que tener claro esto. 
Ahora se ha introducido esta condicionalidad positiva que es mucho más relevante. Y ese 
criterio se tenía que haber introducido más y antes. Como se tendría que haber apoyado más 
la sociedad civil que abogaba por los derechos humanos.  
Esto es muy interesante porque pocos meses antes de que explotaran estas revueltas 
todos los indicadores económicos y políticos auguraban buenas perspectivas para el 
norte de África. Incluso el UNHDR hablaba del “milagro norte africano” y poco 
después salta todo.  
Nosotros publicamos en 2010 un informe que analizaba datos de una encuesta de Gallup, y 
aunque los resultados que se publicaron allí fueron limitados, porque tuvimos problemas con 
la administración de Mubarak que no quería que se publicara, el report no es sobre valores 
democráticos, es sobre valores culturales, pero en el report aparece una de las cosas más 
marginales de lo que está ocurriendo ahora, y esos valores los ves como percepciones 
distorsionadas. Con el terrorismo, con lo que sea, las percepciones están distorsionadas, pero 
los valores son mucho más cercanos de lo que imaginábamos.  
Lo que descubrimos con ese informe es que ese clash de civilizaciones, no era un clash de 
valores, era un clash de ignorancia mutua. En el sur también se piensa en el individualismo, 
en estereotipos del mundo occidental. Pero esto digamos lo sabían. Lo presentamos en 
Bruselas con Fülle y se hicieron comentarios interesantes. La juventud en el sur está 
cambiando. Porque lo que mostraba el informe es que hay unos valores sobre los cuales basar 
un cambio. En el fondo no se puede apoyar una apoyar una perspectiva democrática, porque 
será una perspectiva iraní, o lo que sea. Eso se ha acabado. La situación ahora es muy 
interesante. Ahora hay condiciones para lanzar un proceso de Barcelona, Unión por el 
Mediterráneo, pero verdadero.  
Basado en valores. Basado en transiciones democráticas efectivas, incluso para intercambiar 
ideas de desarrollo. Si no hay democracia, cómo vas a intercambiar eso. En Alejandría por 
ejemplo, es una ciudad que no tiene ni alcalde, solo un gobernador nombrado por Mubarak. 
Qué quiere decir desarrollo sostenible si no hay un mínimo de democracia, si no hay 
participación de los ciudadanos? Donde no tienen la mínima oportunidad de expresar su 
opinión sobre aspectos básicos como la recogida de basuras, sobre el tráfico, sobre el 
desarrollo urbanístico. Ahora la gente está abierta.  
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Y ahora puedes imaginar un futuro común. La historia de las ministeriales del proceso de 
Barcelona es una historia de recortes lideradas por Egipto, de recortes sistemáticos a 
cualquier referencia a la democracia, a la igualdad de las mujeres. Ahora eso comienza a 
existir. Ahora aunque los gobiernos que vayan a establecerse sean gobiernos conservadores, 






Si tuviera que explicar la política exterior de los gobiernos del Partido Popular empezaría por 
la idea de España que tenía el presidente del Gobierno. La figura del presidente del gobierno 
es determinante. Este libro, tenía una faja, donde había una frase del presidente Aznar donde 
decía, ‘teníamos la ambición de hacer de España una de las mejores democracias del mundo’. 
Eso es lo que encuadraría su visión de política exterior y de política interior. Yo creo que la 
política es política. Soy diplomático y después de tantos años creo que las dos políticas son 
indistiguibles. Y cito nuevamente al presidente cuando dice; ‘no hay mejor política exterior 
que una política interior’. Los países en una sociedad internacional hobbesiana, están basadas 
en un derecho blando, pero digamos que la fortaleza de un estado de cara al exterior la da la 
cohesión interior.  
Dicho esto, es evidente que si uno estudia esos años hay líneas de continuidad con todo lo 
anterior. Hay unas líneas maestras de la política exterior española desde la transición, con 
vectores claros, que son los de siempre: Europa, Iberoamérica, Estados Unidos y el 
Mediterráneo. El resto también está pero queda más lejos. Pero admitiendo esos vectores de 
continuidad, hay inflexiones hacia un sentido. Cito una frase de Francisco Fernández 
Ordóñez, que contrasta con la que figuraba en la faja del libro que he comentado, y él decía 
que la política exterior de España en la Unión Europea consistía en hablar los quintos. Es 
decir, después de oír a Francia, Italia, el Reino Unido y Francia, entonces la posición 
Española era entre medias, donde no se molestara a nadie. Pero, claro eso era conformarse 
con no ser un país con un estatus cómodo pero, eso, hablar los quintos. Eso conscientemente 
Aznar lo quiso cambiar. Y eso, consistía en cambiarlo en esos cuatro escenarios. Es cierto 
que en Iberoamérica se tenía una presencia mayor. Eso está muy bien narrado por Alejandro 
Muñoz Alonso.  
Yo creo que si uno analiza esos años, claramente, el objetivo político que marca el cambio, es 
que se desarrolla una política exterior que tiene una repercusión en la política interior. Que es 
el Euro. Entonces, el objetivo político es ingresar en el Euro, en ese momento, cumpliendo 
todos los objetivos y sin hacer trampas. Eso implicaba romper con una tradición larga de no 
equilibrio presupuestarios en las cuentas públicas que implicaba unas tasas de inflación 
mayores que las de la Unión Europea. Eso implicaba un índice de desempleo mayor, etc.  
Dicho esto, eso denotaba esa ambición por ser una de las mejores democracias del mundo, 
eso implicaba renunciar a hablar los quintos. A hablar los primeros. A tener una idea de 
Europa. A pasar por delante. Ciertas iniciativas innovadoras por ejemplo en Iberoamérica, la 
creación la Secretaría General Iberoamericana, etc. Cosas que se habían hecho antes pero con 
una intensidad y una ambición distinta.  
Para nosotros el Mediterráneo comienza al sur. Y yo creo que al sur de España, uno tiene dos 
vecinos: Marruecos y Argelia. Eso es una cosa complicada. Es decir, al sur no limitamos con 
Austria y Suiza. Son otra cosa. Entonces yo creo que por hacer un resumen muy grande, eso 
marca mucho la política exterior española, porque en esos años ocurre un hecho 
determinante, que es la muerte del Rey Hassan II y el acceso al trono de su hijo Mohammed 
VI. También una cosa que es la no resolución del conflicto del Sahara occidental. Yo creo 
que los asuntos de política exterior que más importan a España son tres: Sahara, Cuba y 
Guinea Ecuatorial. Lo demás son cosas a las que se dedican los académicos y diplomáticos. 
Pero lo que de verdad importa son estos tres puntos. Por tanto se trata de buscar un equilibro. 
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Este equilibrio es el que se pactó en la transición. Se sabe que España tiene un pecado 
original ahí. España abandonó la zona en las condiciones en las que lo hizo, etc.  
Con esto ¿qué quiero decir? En este asunto, nominalmente no hubo un cambio de posición, 
pero lo que creo es que el Partido Socialista, sí había cambiado de postura y lo habían hecho 
en privado. Pero eso es una cosa muy delicada que no consta. Yo creo que si la posición 
tradicional de España, era decir, existe un conflicto existente que debe resolverse de acuerdo 
a la legalidad internacional, el acuerdo de las partes, y esa legalidad internacional exige el 
reconocimiento del derecho de autodeterminación que tiene el pueblo saharaui y eso implica 
la celebración de un referendum donde una de las posibles opciones es que se otorgue al 
pueblo saharaui es la independencia. Yo creo que eso en algún momento, se cuestionó. Yo 
creo que el gobierno socialista de Felipe González, sin decirlo, se alinea con Marruecos. 
Entonces, eso trae muchos problemas.  
Eso se añade al cambio de monarca en Marruecos, donde se da una posición inicial muy 
generosa del gobierno Español al nuevo rey, pero luego ocurre la crisis de Perejil, motivada 
porque por la crisis producida por la retirada del embajador marroquí por la celebración de 
ese referendum convocado ni más ni menos que por la Junta de Andalucía. Son estas 
contradicciones de nuestros queridos socialistas que a veces son entrañables. Entonces eso es 
un dato importante a tener en cuenta por la tensión que eso generó y motivó la aprobación el 
31 de Julio de 2003 de una resolución en las Naciones Unidas presidida entonces por España, 
aprobada por unanimidad, endosando el plan Baker 2. Luego la historia fue distinta.  
Creo que este equilibrio se mantuvo con turbulencias graves a lo largo de 8 años. Y yo creo 
que fue muy importante establecer una relación más franca con Argelia, dada también la 
importancia que tiene también por cuestiones de abastecimiento energético, etc. A mí lo que 
me parece relevante es que la política y la retórica que se hizo era congruente y que se puede 
leer hoy sin sonrojarse. La historia cambia, pero como decía Carlos Alberto Montaner, en una 
reunión dijo que en contra de lo que decía Lord Palmer, los países no solo tienen que tener 
intereses permanentes, porque la historia puede cambiar, sino que lo que tienen que tener los 
países son principios permanentes. Porque los intereses son de los particulares, de las 
empresas, de las personas y esos pueden cambiar. Entonces lo que debe tener un país, son 
principios permanentes. Y obviamente para un liberal conservador o para una democracia es; 
respeto de los derechos humanos, dignidad de la persona, tolerancia, etc. Eso es importante 
con todo lo que está pasando.  
Es importante también señalar de todos esos años, que la cercanía creciente con los Estados 
Unidos, que también es una cosa que viene de atrás, a finales de los años 90 estaba dando la 
lata Irak. Sadam Hussein. La primera vez que España y el Gobierno de Aznar apoya al 
gobierno de los Estados Unidos, lo hace con Bill Clinton, cuando Sadam Hussein expulsa a 
equipo de observadores de Naciones Unidas. Esa es digamos la primera vez, en el año 1997-
1998. Pero a lo que voy es que desde el primer momento, en esos años hay una visión muy 
definida de hacer de España un socio privilegiado de los Estados Unidos. Algo que venía de 
la transición, de los acuerdos del 53 pero ratificado con todas las turbulencias que 
conocemos, OTAN sí, OTAN no, etc., pero se le quería dar otra intensidad.  
Eso fue muy importante. También para el Mediterráneo, porque al fin y al cabo si hay una 
potencia mediterránea, esta son los Estados Unidos. Y eso lo saben todos los que están en el 
Mediterráneo. Entonces eso es importante. De hecho no se si estará citado, una de las 
iniciativas que se hicieron en esa época, con el apoyo del Presidente del Gobierno era el Foro 
Formentor. Que era organizado por la Fundación Repsol. En ese foro se reunían gente del 
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norte y del sur del Mediterráneo, de los Estados Unidos y Rusia. Era un foro donde se 
discutían aspectos del Mediterráneo con actores gubernamentales, no gubernamentales, 
académicos, etc. A lo largo de esos años, lo que pasó, es que primero, España era un país 
ascendente. Tenía prestigio, una economía dinámica, adquirió mayores responsabilidades en 
algunas cuestiones internacionales. Comenzó a participar en el presupuesto estructural de la 
OTAN en 1997 y poco a poco, se fue viendo que había una relación estrecha entre los países 
y Estados Unidos comenzó a ver a España con un aliado privilegiado.  
Eso se vio, antes del 11 de Septiembre ya que Bush en su primera visita oficial internacional 
a Europa, al primer país que visita es a España. Y eso no es que sea algo casual. Y no es 
porque se llevara bien con Aznar, que no se conocían en aquella época, sino que en la visión 
estratégica de los Estados Unidos, se demostraba el interés prioritario que tenía sobre España. 
Primero como importante socio dentro de la Unión Europea, segundo, con un gran peso en 
Iberoamérica y por último debido a nuestra posición geográfica en el Mediterráneo y en el 
estrecho. Esa relación que fue muy buena y muy intensa.  
Lo que pasa en esos años, es que todo ese mundo árabe ve que España puede ser una guía, y 
un canal para hacer llegar mensajes a los Estados Unidos. Y eso ocurre, no en el 
Mediterráneo, sino también en Irán. Aznar tiene una relación cordial por ejemplo con el 
presidente Khatami.  
La relación con Francia como un protagonista en el Mediterráneo, como se vivió?  
Claro, esa fue una relación, que tiene sus más y sus menos. Francia ve el Mediterráneo desde 
Francia. Ve un Marruecos que tiene una frontera hasta Mauritania y eso es un problema 
porque no se comparte la misma visión. Esa división tiene una incidencia grave en la crisis de 
Perejil. La crisis de Perejil se resuelve en una cierta manera y quien sale garante del acuerdo 
del respeto del statu quo son los Estados Unidos. Y también, claro, la España de esos años 
que es una potencia ascendente en política internacional, no hay vacíos. Ser una potencia 
ascendente implica también hacerse un poco sitio.  
Sobre el proceso de Barcelona se ha escrito y dicho mucho. Algunos dicen que ha 
fracasado, otros que ha servido al menos como un instrumento de diálogo. España fue 
uno de sus máximos impulsores. En la segunda legislatura del Gobierno de Aznar, esta 
tendencia más atlantista, ¿cree que alejó a España de ese rol líder, y la imagen española 
perdió consistencia y de imagen frente a los socios del sur del Mediterráneo?  
Yo creo que no. Al contrario. Si uno se da cuenta de los datos la presidencia Española en la 
Unión Europea en el 2002, es la que convoca una reunión del proceso de Barcelona con jefes 
de Estado y de Gobierno. Amor no quita conocimiento. Entonces, esta retórica de amistad 
con el mundo árabe está muy bien, y es real, pero también pasa una cosa en todo este tiempo, 
que es un parte aguas de la historia que es el 11 de Septiembre. Que se puede criticar mucho 
lo que pasó. Yo creo que la respuesta estratégica que se da, está en el segundo discurso 
inaugural del presidente Bush es la correcta. O el discurso de Condolezza Rice en la 
Universidad del Cairo. Durante mucho tiempo hemos sacrificado la libertad en aras de la 
estabilidad de la seguridad y la estabilidad y al final nos vamos a quedar sin las dos cosas. 
Entonces, esa es la reacción al 11 de Septiembre. Entonces la respuesta a este desafío es más 
democracia y más libertad. Esa cosa ya ni se nombra pero es iniciativa del Greater Middle 
East, es la reforma democrática de toda una región, etc. A veces decimos democracia y 
pensamos que es libertad, y no es lo mismo, no es lo mismo. Hay que releer a Ortega. Esto no 
se ha acabado.  
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Yo creo que leer todos esos discursos es muy ilustrativo y con todo lo que se pueda criticar de 
Irak, me parece que con toda su inestabilidad etc., ha tenido ya algunas elecciones. Ha sido 
un ejemplo para lo que ha ocurrido en las revueltas árabes. Pero hay que ser consciente de 
que esto no se ha acabado. Todo esto se incuba en este período. El mundo islámico tiene un 





Yo viví estas cosas desde antes, desde el año 1979, durante el gobierno de UCD, yo era 
asesor para la Secretaría de Estado para las Relaciones con las Comunidades Europeas con el 
ministro Calvo Sotelo, que era el ministro para las relaciones con Europa. Después vino otro 
ministro que fue Eduardo Punset, que fue su jefe de gabinete. Después esto se redujo a 
Secretaría de Estado y es lo que se ha mantenido hasta ahora.   
Cómo vivió estos primeros momentos hasta el 86, que era España en Europa?  
España en aquella época era una nueva democracia, con una democracia amenazada 
esporádicamente con el golpe de estado, que produjo una reacción de consternación en las 
cancillerías europeas, y un sentimiento también de culpa. Las negociaciones para la adhesión 
se estaban prolongando excesivamente, el principal obstáculo era Francia, con un temor a que 
la agricultura española y los productos y vino españoles invadieran Francia y los franceses 
del Langedoc-Rousillon no pudieran vivir, algo que se ha demostrado posteriormente como 
algo totalmente falso, sino todo lo contrario. Y también la pesca, el problema principal de la 
flota de la armada invencible española en este sentido que producía pavor. Estos eran los dos 
obstáculos. Luego era un país todavía muy atrasado, con problemas, que tenía que haberse 
puesto al día, pero las negociaciones duraron excesivamente. Fue el referéndum de la OTAN 
lo que las desbloqueó. Para la OTAN hubiera sido un revés que hubiera salido un no, 
entonces, los principales aliados nuestros, sobre todo Alemania, Gensel fue quien dijo que no 
se podía pretender que un soldado español nos defienda en la OTAN mientras que les 
negamos la entrada en la Unión Europea.  
Al final todo se desbloquea con Fernando Morán y Manolo Marín. Yo era el jefe del equipo 
técnico negociador con una serie de problemas y capítulos que vivimos muy intensamente. 
Tuvimos que aceptar el acta única tal y como estaba redactada porque en aquel periodo en el 
que la acta única se firma, todavía no éramos miembros. Habíamos llegado a terminar las 
negociaciones y a firmar en junio de 1985. Y entonces desde junio de 1985 al 1 de enero de 
1986,  que es cuando se materializaba el ingreso, teníamos voz, pero no teníamos voto. En 
fin, el acta única nos venía bien. El mercado interior, a pesar de que había unos sectores 
proteccionistas ancestrales en España, al final se impuso, que un mercado interior en España, 
no tenía más que beneficiarse, sino lo contrario. Y así entramos en la Comunidad Europea en 
un momento de euforia, de euro-optimismo. La entrada de España y Portugal coinciden con 
ese momento de euro-optimismo, y España y Portugal dan una dinámica nueva y fue la 
época, como la llama Felipe González, “de la gran galopada”.  
Es una época en la que se hace prácticamente casi todo, y entre otras cosas, lo que España 
puede aportar, es básicamente, un europeísmo convencido, es decir una construcción Europea 
en la que España siempre estuvo en la vanguardia y nuestro gran valor añadido eran nuestras 
relaciones con América Latina y las relaciones con el norte de África y el sur del 
Mediterráneo. Las pruebas están en dos elementos. Las presiones para desarrollar los 
acuerdos de Mercosur, las zonas de libre cambio con América Latina, un acercamiento de la 
Unión Europea a América Latina evidente. Y en la política mediterránea también.  
La política mediterránea, era y sigue siendo una prioridad que nosotros ya lo concebimos 
como una prioridad española, pero que ahora es también una prioridad europea. Sobre todo a 
partir de la primavera árabe nos hemos dado cuenta todavía más lo importante que es, y sobre 
todo en un momento en que hay una deriva del eje de gravedad político hacia el este y hacia 
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China y los países emergentes y que Europa podría seguir siendo relevante, pero que si no 
hace nada, como no hace nada, pues vamos a perder relevancia poco a poco. Y el problema es 
que el Mediterráneo nos podría dar relevancia. Nos podría reforzar, la capacidad de 
influencia de España como un polo de influencia. Mucho más que nosotros solos, junto los 
que son afines a nuestros valores como la comunidad trasatlántica, es decir: Estados Unidos, 
Canadá, Latinoamérica más el Mediterráneo, a mi juicio es lo que a España, con un 
reforzamiento de la política económica y por lo tanto del reforzamiento de la Unión Europea, 
podríamos recuperar esta influencia que hemos tenido y que hemos perdido. Es decir, cuando 
uno crece el otro disminuye relativamente.  
El gran drama sería si también disminuimos en términos absolutos. Si es relativo es menos 
malo, todos podemos crecer, etc., no pasa nada, China crece más, Brasil crece más, eso es 
normal. El problema es que nosotros como estamos en este momento, pensemos a decrecer y 
a desmantelar el estado de bienestar, la economía social de mercado. Entonces ahora estamos 
en esta encrucijada.  
Entonces España cuando entra a la CE en el 1986, todavía como un país pequeño, tiene 
que hacerse un rol en Europa, tiene que hacerse acreedora de la confianza, cómo son 
estos primeros momentos para España, como es el trabajo de los diplomáticos españoles 
en Europa, como son vistos?  
La percepción es que en Europa y el mundo, porque estando en Europa teníamos más 
influencia también en América Latina y con los Estados Unidos. Fue durante la presidencia 
española cuando se organizó la primera cumbre transatlántica donde se firmaba esa agenda 
transatlántica entre Bill Clinton y Felipe González  representando la Unión Europea en 1995. 
Su secretario de estado Madeleine Albright cuando fui a Naciones Unidas de representante 
permanente y ella también lo era, había sido antes secretaria de estado, igual que yo fui 
ministros de asuntos exteriores brevemente, me dijo que: “hay que reconocer que España 
golpea por encima de su peso”. Es decir que España “punches over its weight”. Es decir que 
somos un welter pero que golpeamos como uno de peso pesado. Y eso le hacía gracia. Eso 
como se consigue? En primer lugar, eso se consigue en primer lugar siendo un socio leal de la 
Unión Europea. Cuando haces favores a tus socios, llegas a compromisos en temas 
importantes para ellos, y uno de ellos fue fundamental, el de la reunificación alemana. Ahí, la 
gratitud de Helmut Kohl hacia Felipe González fue grande. Siendo un socio leal, teniendo 
una presidencia europea donde servías a los intereses europeos y de paso a los españoles, eso 
te da una gran credibilidad.  
En segundo lugar, eso ocurrirá también con los Estados Unidos. El hecho de que cuando 
Baker estando todavía Bush padre de presidente, le pide a Paco Fernández Ordóñez (ministro 
de asuntos exteriores 1985-1992) yo estaba en Sevilla y le veo a Paco con el teléfono en la 
mano con cara de preocupado y me dice: “Era Baker que me pide que le organice la 
conferencia en Madrid sobre oriente medio porque se fía de nosotros”. Y Paco Fernández 
Ordóñez que tenía un sentido del gol como hay pocos en términos futbolísticos, acertó 
inmediatamente y fue otro gol importante, lo que trajo más credibilidad con Estados Unidos y 
con el mundo, porque no fue fácil convencer a los sirios, convencer a los israelíes. Y se hizo 
después el proceso de Barcelona y todo eso puso a España como había dicho Fernando 
Morán, en su sitio. Incluso por encima de sus posibilidades.  
Lo que pasa es que eso, hay que pelearlo mucho y no te regalan nunca nada en esas primeras 
posiciones y hay otros que también van subiendo. Después se produce la ampliación, entra 
Polonia y España, relativamente pierde la primera línea. Yo ahora como he estado ayudando 
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a Felipe González allí, he vuelto al “lugar del crimen” a Bruselas, pues haciendo el informe 
de la Europa del 2030, la gente me decía, quien nos ha visto y quién nos ve! Nosotros además 
y esto te da credibilidad es que dimos la batalla por conseguir los fondos estructurales, el 
fondo de cohesión y hemos sido los que más nos hemos beneficiado de los fondos 
estructurales que ningún otro país.  
Quién fue el artífice que permitió que conseguir estos fondos estructurales?  
Pues un equipo muy conjuntado, muy entusiasta, el ministerio de exteriores y otros 
ministerios, y sobre todo, Felipe González que se metió en el bolsillo a Kohl a Mitterrand, a 
los grandes líderes de la época. Y que a cambio de apoyar la reunificación alemana pues 
obtuvo la comprensión de una Alemania que al final era la que tenía que pagar el 25 por 
ciento de lo que contribuía a los fondos. Y luego esa fue en grandes líneas las razones.  
Luego era un país que creció bastante, que tuvo un éxito económico, antes de la crisis de la 
crisis del 2008, España creció más y generó más empleo que toda la Unión Europea junta. Lo 
que pasa es que estaba fundamentalmente basado en el ladrillo, y ahora estamos donde 
estamos. Y yo creo que todo es recuperable, pero obviamente antes que nada se debe 
recuperar Europa, y ahí, España es un aliado. Porque si le va bien a Europa nos irá bien a 
nosotros y viceversa. Y después estando en Europa, tienes que ser un socio leal, un socio 
trabajador, tener éxito económico. Tener éxito económico es un punto muy importante y 
luego con nuestras dos grandes bazas que es una relación buena y natural con el Mediterráneo 
y con América Latina. Esas son nuestras prioridades eternas. Luego hay otras nuevas. Son 
otras áreas en las que hay que trabajar como son por ejemplo, el área de extremo oriente, las 
relaciones con Japón con China, con las potencias emergentes. Pero ahí somos más del 
montón. No tenemos un rol de líder.  
En el tema del Mediterráneo y el norte de África y de Oriente Medio, a parte del conflicto de 
la madre de todos los conflictos que es el tema de Israel y Palestina, ahí hemos hecho de 
ayudar en ese proceso y se hizo todo lo que se pudo, pero este proceso sale de nuestras 
capacidades. Ni siquiera Estados Unidos la tiene y ahora tenemos que ver lo que va a pasar 
entre Irán e Israel y Siria. Eso es terrible.  
En el tema de la primavera árabe y de la política mediterránea, está claro que la Unión 
Europea ha hecho muchas cosas por política mediterránea, España estaba detrás ayudando y 
hay como distintos modelos según las épocas. Ahora no me acuerdo de memoria pero hemos 
pasado por todos los tipos de modelos hasta llegar a la Unión por el Mediterráneo, que es una 
entelequia, ahí Sarkozy con sus ocurrencias, algunos miembros se quedan fuera, Alemania 
protesta y al final se hace una cosa general que coincide con lo que ya había. En este contexto 
ocurre la primavera árabe, y ante la primavera árabe, la Unión Europea hace un nuevo 
enfoque, que llama algo así como el partenariado para el desarrollo y la democracia, donde 
hay algo más concreto, más fondos de ayuda y más apertura comercial. Yo estoy convencido 
que el proceso de democratización es irreversible, que va a pasar sin duda alguna por el 
acceso al poder de los islamistas, ojala que moderados, pero eso es inevitable. Pero el 
problema está en que en esos países, los hay que no tienen renta de petróleo y van a tener 
muchas dificultades para poder atender las demandas de su población descontenta y ahí hay 
que hacer un esfuerzo titánico, sobre todo en Túnez, Marruecos.  
Nosotros por ejemplo hemos propuesto al gobierno de Qatar que el foro de Doha que tendrá 
lugar en mayo que tengamos una conferencia con la gente del Club de Madrid con jefes de 
Estado y de gobierno, para lanzar una idea de un plan Marshall para estos países. Esto en 
realidad ya se ha hecho. Si se pusiera en conjunto y se coordinaran los fondos, fondos 
347 
 
habrían. El problema es que cada uno va por su lado. Hay duplicidades, hay ineficiencias. 
Ahora es básicamente decir, a ver de qué manera podemos crear una estructura ligera pero 
que coordine todo esto, y no es fácil. Entonces, a ver si lo hacemos y lo queremos llamar 
Alianza para el Desarrollo y la Democracia. Tendría que pasar también por una liberalización 
de los intercambios entre ellos mismos. En este sentido entre Marruecos y Argelia se dan la 
espalda, y eso no tiene ningún sentido, pero eso son cosas que hay que hacer y empujar.  
Y al final, como antes te decía, la estabilidad de Europa y sobre todo de la Europa nuestra, 
más meridional, pasa por la estabilidad en el norte de África y la estabilidad del norte de 
África depende de la estabilidad en el medio oriente y de la democratización en esos países. 
Son como 300 millones de personas o 500 millones o más los que van a habitar en esa región, 
y claro eso con la Unión Europea etc., pues podríamos tener peso. Eso es como lo vemos.  
Entonces usted cree que una vez superadas las dificultades obvias tenidas durante la 
etapa con Giscard d’Estaign, la nueva etapa de las relaciones España-Francia-Europa 
con Mitterrand, Felipe González, descubre o abre esta oportunidad política de vender a 
Europa el Mediterráneo y las preocupaciones que tenía España en esta región?  
Sin duda. Yo creo que eso fue así. Es una realidad que está ahí y que se cuenta y que se puede 
rellenar con hechos. Después entramos en un periodo donde los gobiernos de Aznar son más 
atlantistas. Era una apuesta interesante, pero un poco digamos, que fue más espectacular en la 
medida que nos alineamos en las Azores con Bush y Blair. Para sorpresa de Bush que se 
preguntaba a qué viene este entusiasmo de los españoles. Él lo aprovechó y entre otras cosas 
atacó Irak para revalidad su segundo mandato. Nadie cambia de comandante en jefe cuando 
hay una guerra y el hizo la guerra de Irak para ganar las elecciones, eso es así de claro. Y yo 
creo que ahí es donde Aznar se equivocó. Se equivocó porque al final los Estados Unidos no 
necesitan tanto de esos estados-cipayo. Estados Unidos hacen más caso a Francia por 
ejemplo. Porque Francia les lee la cartilla, les dice que no. Los americanos se mueren de 
gusto con los franceses, les encanta que les maltraten. Y claro, creo que ahí nos equivocamos. 
Al escorarse mucho hacia el lado atlántico, descuidamos el lado europeo. Había elementos en 
el gobierno de Aznar que eran bastante euro-escépticos.  
Creo que de alguna manera, si, durante la época de González se vende justificadamente, 
la política del mediterráneo para un interés para España pero también como un interés 
para Europa, obviamente todo lo que se haga con esos terceros países tiene una 
dimensión emocional muy grande en el sentido de la comunicación entre el norte y el 
sur. Que según creo, si al final, no hay una coherencia política todo se viene abajo. Si al 
principio España tiene un rol de líder en la venta, en la publicidad de esta política euro-
mediterránea y llega un momento en el que España, sobre todo durante el segundo 
mandato de Aznar, desarrolla una versión política mucho más atlantista, toda esta 
capacidad de dialogar se descompone y todos los esfuerzos hechos previamente se 
arruinan.  
Así es, así es. Es una cuestión de tiempo. No ocurre de la noche a la mañana pero con el 
tiempo se va erosionando. Y luego que pasa? No solo Aznar, sino también durante los 
gobiernos de Zapatero, el problema es que había una muy mala relación con los Estados 
Unidos durante la época de Bush. A mí me tocó ser embajador allí y sufrirlo. Cuando los 
elementos de relaciones de base, es decir, los acuerdos comerciales, los intercambios, las 
inversiones españolas en los Estados Unidos, las americanas en España, los acuerdos defensa, 
la compra de armas, la lucha antiterrorista, etc., todo esto funcionaba bien porque los 
intereses eran los mismos. Pero esa mala relación en la cumbre lastraba nuestras posibilidades 
348 
 
de influencia en el resto del mundo. También se producía un desinterés de Zapatero hacia la 
política exterior en general, que se la dejó en manos a Moratinos que es un hombre muy 
volcado y muy unidimensional en el mundo del medio oriente. Todo esto en un momento en 
el que ya no teníamos ningún peso. Es decir, no solo fue en la época de Aznar, sino también 
durante la época de Zapatero.  
Al principio éramos la décima o la octava potencia mundial. Habíamos crecido más que los 
demás y claro, eso se nos viene abajo como un soufflé. En este momento estamos en un 
momento de muy baja credibilidad. Somos uno de los PIGS, que tampoco es una muy bonita 
liga en la que jugar. Todo eso hay que volver a pedalear y a recuperarlo. El gobierno de ahora 
es un gobierno muy europeo, sobre todo porque el aznarismo no está ya tan presente, García 
Margallo es un hombre convencido de que España puede recuperar peso en Europa y también 
de recuperar las constantes. Luego ha tenido el detalle de convocarnos en un consejo asesor a 
todos los que hemos sido ministros, y él quiere hacer de la política exterior una política 
consensuada y creo que eso te refuerza. Entonces hay que mantener la esperanza.  
Pensando en Francia. Es un país muy poderoso alrededor del Mediterráneo y sus 
intereses por proyectar o liderar la política mediterránea han ido variando. Su gran 
interés por el Mediterráneo fue muy claro a inicio de los años setenta con Pompidou, 
luego declina. Después es España la que toma el relevo por proyectar influencia política 
y por liderar la política mediterránea con Europa, etc. Son dos países vecinos, con un 
claro interés geo-estratégico sobre el área.  
Tampoco se puede olvidar Italia. Italia es otro país que está en horas bajas y que solo le 
faltaba el comportamiento de este capitán del Costa Concordia, en cambio Monti está 
haciendo por recuperar posiciones, porque Italia es la tercera economía de la Unión Europea. 
Y es un país Mediterráneo y tanto España como Italia deberían llevarse mejor, y no nos 
llevamos bien. Probablemente porque hemos querido a veces superar a los italianos y los 
italianos llevan en Europa mucho más tiempo que nosotros, eran de los seis fundadores, y eso 
no lo han visto nunca bien. Siempre que han podido nos han puesto en nuestro lugar. Y 
bueno, creo que a Italia no habría que descuidarla.  
Al mismo tiempo el resto de los Europeos. Yo siempre fui muy partidario de la unión con los 
países bálticos. Primero porque es Europa, y todo lo que es bueno para Europa es bueno para 
nosotros. En segundo lugar, si tu apoyas a Suecia, Dinamarca o Finlandia en su política 
báltica ellos no te van a dejar de apoyar en tu política mediterránea. Y esto es así. Es así 
como funciona. De lo que hay que ser consciente es de saber lo que quieres. Si lo tenemos 
claro lo que queremos, las cosas eternas y las coyunturales, hay que luchar por ello.  
Enlazando con la anterior pregunta con relación a estos intereses por el Mediterráneo 
tanto por parte de España y Francia a lo largo de las décadas, se viven momentos de 
rivalidad entre España y Francia por el Mediterráneo, o ha sido una cooperación.  
No no, fue a través de cumbres bilaterales. Una relación con Mitterrand diferente a la que 
tuvo Felipe con Kohl, más patronizing por parte del viejo socialista francés, y además a los 
franceses les gusta hacerlo así, así que tienes que dejarles. Poco a poco, cuando yo empecé 
con aquellas políticas, con el Giscardazo la prensa española era muy antifrancesa y te sacaban 
cosas incluso de la época de la independencia. Y yo recuerdo que había un periódico llamado 
Diario 16 y un grupo de escritores, muy antifranceses. Sobre el año 86 y hasta bien entrados 
los noventa, la opinión pública con relación a la simpatía por países, era muy mala. También 
con un Chirac que dijo que iba a tratar de renegociar el tratado de adhesión de España y yo le 
dije, mira, no te arriesgo las ganancias porque renegociar un tratado en primer lugar requiere 
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la unanimidad y tú a mí no me vas a tocar las  pelotas. Así de sencillo y tienes que estar 
convencido de que no te las toquen.  
Obviamente a España se le exigió mucho para adherirse. Pero, los sondeos sobre Francia que 
fue uno de los principales enemigos, junto probablemente a Gran Bretaña, estaban muy bajos. 
A mí me sorprendió hace unos dos o tres años, donde Francia para los españoles estaban 
entre los más simpáticos, lo que no deja de ser curioso el ver como se transforma una 
conciencia colectiva a través de qué? A través de una Francia cooperadora y que te ha 
acabado con ETA y que te ha comenzado a mandar etarras. Hasta hace 6 o 7 años, durante la 
época socialista francesa, mucho más legalistas, se les daba mucha más libertad a los jueces, 
se veía un movimiento de ETA como un movimiento de liberación nacional. Bueno, yo creo 
que el gobierno de Sarkozy ha hecho muchísimo en este sentido.  
Entonces ha cambiado totalmente la percepción, afortunadamente. Y yo creo que en este 
momento, no sé cómo estarán los sondeos pero uno de los países con más simpatía para los 
españoles es Francia, que me parece que es algo insólito pero que demuestra como los países 
colectivamente pueden cambiar de opinión. Y eso es positivo.  
La semana pasada estuve en Barcelona en la sede principal de la Unión por el 
Mediterráneo y percibí un optimismo enturbiado por una sensación de estar 
maniatados por el hecho de poder hacer muy pocas cosas. Entonces lo que se generó 
como una ocurrencia de Sarkozy tratando de reformular un proceso de Barcelona, 
quizá haya perdido fuerza y consistencia.  
Y al final porque quería llevárselo él, y los méritos de él.  
Fue un en realidad al final con especie de golpe de efecto para re-acercarse la política 
mediterránea.  
Correcto. Con la enemistad de los países del norte, muy a regañadientes aceptaron y lo que es 
peor, con la enemistad de las instituciones europeas y de la Comisión.  
Y al final para qué?  
Pues para tener una sede y un secretario general, no?  
Pero dos años después nada de nada.  
Claro, es así. Es un fiasco y un fracaso muy grande.  
Porque a mí lo que parece de alguna manera es como a través de una política y un 
discurso público efectista trata de identificar oportunidades políticas de corto plazo, que 
en el mediano y en largo lo que pase da lo mismo, no?  
Sí.  
Y, eso es una falta de seriedad muy grande, sobre todo en procesos en los que se 
requiere generar una confianza muy grande entre los potenciales socios, socios 
complicados y heterogéneos como son los socios del sur.  
Y además creo que ahí se ha metido a todo el mundo, no? Todos países que se llevan fatal 
entre ellos, están ahí metidos.  
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Precisamente me había reunido con la embajadora de Malta en la Unión por el 
Mediterráneo, Cecilia Attard Pirotta y con el representante palestino, Rafik Husseini y 
coincidían en el hecho de que si uno de los socios dice A, el otro dice B, y si el otro dice D 
el otro F. Entonces no hay posibilidad de generar un consenso para desarrollar 
programas o proyectos consistentes.  
Así es, y eso además choca también con el proceso de Barcelona, con todo. Yo no conozco en 
detalle esta cuestión. Yo creo que eso no tiene futuro, a menos que no lo reconduzcan de 
alguna manera, no? Es una pena, y hoy además Europa está fundamentalmente distraída con 
el tema económico. Yo creo que en lo que es la unión política de Europa va a haber un 
paréntesis importante hasta que no haya un relanzamiento económico y una unión que 
vendrá, económica. Y la unión económica será volver otra vez a la teoría funcionalista, a ver 
si la economía tira de la política, pero faltará. Y falta dinero. O sea que estamos en unos 






Tenemos que tener presente que Cataluña es un punto de confluencia de tres influencias. 
Nosotros somos un pueblo con una fuerte vinculación y atracción por Europa. Nosotros 
somos de origen carolingio. Somos la única parte del Estado español que es de origen 
carolingia, y esto que parece una tontería, no lo es. Tenemos una fuerte influencia europea y 
centro-europea, número uno. Evidentemente nosotros tenemos una fuerte vinculación con el 
Mediterráneo. Nuestras gestas más importantes de la historia es cuando tenemos que crear 
una política potente para el Mediterráneo, porque somos un país mediterráneo, número dos. Y 
tercero, tenemos la influencia española, un componente español importante.  
Por lo tanto, para Cataluña, en el momento en el que Cataluña intenta jugar un papel, todo lo 
modesto que usted quiera, pero propio, con ideas propias, pues el Mediterráneo siempre 
surge. Esto por un lado. Por otro lado, nosotros pensamos que nuestro desarrollo económico, 
cultural y político, va muy ligado a dos dimensiones: la Unión Europea y el Mediterráneo. 
Frente a lo español tenemos a veces que defendernos. Esto hace que a pesar de las 
limitaciones de un gobierno como el de la Generalitat, nosotros intentemos practicar una 
política mediterránea. Estoy hablando desde una perspectiva catalana que no es exactamente 
la que usted necesita, pero a lo mejor le puede ser de utilidad en varios aspectos.  
En primer lugar, intentar dar importancia a lo que nosotros empezamos llamando el 
Mediterráneo noroccidental, que es el que va desde Murcia a medio camino hasta casi cerca 
de Roma, este arco. El que entendemos que puede estar llamado al desarrollo económico 
realmente importante. Esto tiene ciertas conclusiones o propuestas. Cuando nosotros 
defendemos el corredor del Mediterráneo, está respondiendo a esto. Cierto es que la fachada 
mediterránea de España es una de las que tiene más posibilidades de desarrollo económico. 
Pero es que España sistemáticamente esto no lo ha aceptado muy bien, pero así. No es que 
sea la única, porque también está el país vasco con un potencial muy importante, Madrid por 
supuesto, pero esto es muy importante. Entonces nosotros jugamos esta carta y comenzamos 
a establecer contactos con el sur de Francia y con Lombardía.  
En segundo lugar, en el futuro, el espacio económico del Mediterráneo tiene que ir hacia 
arriba. Porque si es verdad que el futuro pasará en buena parte por el desarrollo asiático, la 
relación de Asia con Europa se hace por el Mediterráneo. Otra cosa es que como nosotros los 
mediterráneos no hemos estado lo suficientemente alertas, pues luego se pasa de largo por el 
Mediterráneo y se pasa por Rotterdam.  
Tercer aspecto. Nosotros como europeístas que somos por nacimiento carolingio, 
necesitamos no quedar demasiado desplazados de Europa. No solamente nosotros sino el 
resto del estado español. El centro de gravedad de Europa donde estaba, donde está y donde 
debe estar? Y si no está aquí, Europa está muerta. Está en Francia y Alemania. Añada a esto 
usted si quiere al norte de Italia. Es decir, esto de ser carolingios no es una casualidad. La 
Unión Europea es el antiguo imperio de Carlo Magno. Y por lo tanto nos interesa reforzar el 
sur, la entrada de Portugal, la entrada de España, la entrada de Grecia, el papel que jugaba 
todavía boyante de Italia, etc. Por lo tanto nosotros en lo que muy modestamente podemos 
hacer tenemos que darle auge a esto. Como catalanes, como Generalitat de Cataluña, a través 
de las organizaciones Europeas, de las regiones de Europa, etc., y luego evidentemente, 
predicando en Europa y procurando que el gobierno español se interese por esto.  
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Y entonces sobre estas bases realizamos algunas acciones. Tenga usted presente además, que 
España, clásicamente, desde hace siglos pero también modernamente más o menos, ha estado 
más interesada en poner su centro de gravedad más en el Mediterráneo que en el atlántico. 
Por ejemplo, Felipe González trató de conseguir un equilibrio entre estos ejes: el atlántico, 
Sudamérica, buena relación con los Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea, jugada a fondo y 
además con inteligencia y bien. Realmente quien tuvo una gran relación con Kohl fue Felipe 
González. Y España muy clarividente a favor de la reunificación de Alemania, y el 
Mediterráneo. Y en el Mediterráneo, en una cosa que nosotros no le habíamos precedido, el 
norte de África y de forma especial, Marruecos.  
Durante Aznar, sin embargo, no se cómo lo consigue, pero consigue totalmente la relación 
con Marruecos tanto en la primera como en la segunda legislatura. Segundo, no le interesa 
Europa. Le interesa Europa por los fondos de cohesión. No siente simpatía por Francia, no 
siente simpatía por Alemania. Por Francia siente gran antipatía, por Alemania simplemente 
no siente simpatía. Desprecia a Italia, y entonces se enfoca con los Estados Unidos y por 
consiguiente con Gran Bretaña porque van juntos, y Atlántico. Por tanto la política que inicia 
Felipe González queda interrumpida. 
La política Mediterránea de Felipe González, creo que será una idea de él mismo, pero sí es 
cierto que yo fui varias veces a decirle que España tenía que tener una política mediterránea. 
Y nosotros como Generalitat de Cataluña en lo que nos corresponda estamos dispuestos a 
ayudar a que así sea en lo que nosotros podamos. Di muchas conferencias en Europa. Por 
ejemplo hice una serie de intervenciones muy diversos. La primera que hice, la hice en 
Estocolmo en 1987. Ir a hablar del Mediterráneo a Estocolmo es una pérdida de tiempo y 
darla en Gran Bretaña también. Pero, yo lo hice en Estocolmo, para así, de entrada darle 
dimensión Europea.  
En Alemania que también las di, por ejemplo en Hamburgo, también se perdía tiempo. 
Obviamente las que di en España, en Francia, en Cataluña por supuesto, en el norte de África, 
incluso di una, que fue divertimento en la Universidad George Washington, también fue 
perder el tiempo. En mi intento de hacer entender a nivel europeo la importancia del 
Mediterráneo, tenía dos discursos. Cuál es la frontera importante de la Unión Europea? Cada 
vez más, y evidentemente después del 1989, es el Mediterráneo. No es la frontera oriental, 
hoy sí lo es, pero se sabe cómo funciona, está estabilizada y luego cuando se desestabilizó, se 
desestabilizó en el sentido de crear problemas, pero no de crear problemas de amenazas de 
que entraran los tanques, sino de ver como aquello se recomponía.  
La frontera peligrosa es el Mediterráneo. Porque el Mediterráneo es la frontera de Europa con 
el subdesarrollo, la explosión demográfica. Por consiguiente esto quiere decir emigración. Y 
en cuarto lugar, es una frontera ideológica. No es que haya creado muchos problemas, pero 
en teoría podría haberlos creado, de hecho algunos ha creado. En todo caso es una frontera 
ideológica. Por tanto estas cuatro cosas obliga a que Europa se fije más en el Mediterráneo. 
Esto la verdad es que no lo compró casi nadie. Esto ocurre entre el 1987 hasta que Felipe 
González, porque yo lo predicaba o porque simplemente quiero creer, porque de verdad se 
dio cuenta de esto, le quiso dar impulso y lanzó el proceso de Barcelona, con apoyo nuestro 
obviamente, pero fundamentalmente fue el gobierno español.  
Y esto del proceso de Barcelona ha fracasado, la Unión por el Mediterráneo ha vuelto a 
fracasar, y, por lo tanto, esto no ha funcionado bien. Por culpa europea porque no se ha 
interesado bien suficientemente por ello y por culpa también de los norte africanos. Conste 
que no se lo han tomado en serio tampoco. Tienen sus problemas que no pueden resolver. Es 
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difícil darle empuje a esto, mientras Argelia y Marruecos no se traten. Y mientras España se 
encuentre incapaz de salir de la cuestión de Sahara.  
A nivel práctico, cómo se implementó esta política euro-mediterránea liderada por 
España?  
Se aprovechó un momento de distracción. Italia era incapaz de tomar decisiones de este tipo 
porque estaba sumida en conflictos y dificultades internas. Y Francia sorprendentemente 
tampoco se interesó por esto. El caso llevamos adelante nuestra idea. La conferencia de 
Barcelona quedó muy bien. Y luego, creamos inmediatamente otra reunión en Barcelona 
sobre la sociedad civil y el hombre que a mí me inspiró en todo esto fue Baltasar Porcel. 
Baltasar Porcel era un escritor mallorquín, hombre de gran cultura, muy mediterráneo y este 
es el que me inspiró alguna de estas cosas. Luego comenzamos a desarrollar ciertas cosas de 
forma modesta, porque la política exterior de Cataluña es modesta, y, evidentemente lo que 
yo apoyé siempre fue la política pro-marroquí de González. Incluso la política de González 
yo la apoyé dando discursos por el estado. Y esa política era aceptar que la Unión Europea 
abriese más la puerta a la exportación de productos marroquíes.  
Entonces yo hacía un discurso que decía lo siguiente. Oiga, hay cuatro cosas que cada una 
por su lado se pueden defender, pero no todas juntas. No queremos que Europa importe 
tomates marroquíes. Segundo, los pescadores españoles tienen que poder pescar hasta que la 
barca se embarranque, es decir a 200 metros. Tercero, no hay que hacer inversiones 
industriales en Marruecos. Yo recuerdo que habíamos tenido protestas aquí en Cataluña por 
los sindicatos porque que yo y mi ministro, mi consejero de industria nos habíamos 
pronunciado muy a favor de la inversión industrial en Marruecos por parte de empresas 
catalanas. Decíamos que llegaría un momento en el que no seríamos más competitivos aquí y 
que por lo tanto había que buscar otros países, y bueno, pues se podría poner estas industrias 
en Marruecos. Y cuarta cosa, no queremos inmigración. Conste que a mi, me preocupa 
mucho la inmigración en general y en particular la inmigración marroquí. Pero claro, no se 
puede decir, ni tomates, ni pescado, ni fábricas y además quédense ustedes allí.  
Al final para tratar de resolver estas limitaciones y dificultades, se celebró la reunión de 
Barcelona y eso lo hicimos y fue bien, pero luego no funcionó. No funcionó por desidia de 
los norteafricanos. La reunión de Barcelona fue un éxito porque vino el israelí, el libio.  
Y antes de que se completara el proceso de Barcelona en el 1995, cómo se convenció a  
Europa de que hacer esto era importante?  
No, no se convenció. O sea, si se convenció, pero por ejemplo en el 95 vinieron muy pocos 
representantes europeos de importancia. Fíjese usted que un par de años después el rey 
Hassan convocó una gran conferencia mediterránea a parte del proceso de Barcelona en 
Tánger y fue Felipe González, fue Cavaco Silva, los alemanes mandaron un ministro de 
exteriores que no dijo nada, los franceses también enviaron un ministro que fue dio su 
discurso y se marchó, y de los italianos no vino nadie. O sea que Europa no respondió y la 
Unión Europea, no digo que la culpa fuera suya, pero actuó con mucha lentitud. Tramitar una 
ayuda de aquellas que se establecieron entonces para que la Unión Europea ayudara al norte 
de África pues iban pasando los meses, etc. Esto no era mala voluntad, sino operatividad 
ineficiente burocrática. Pero aquello fue languideciendo y languideciendo.  
La segunda conferencia ya fue mal porque curiosamente ya no vinieron muchos de los países 
del sur, vinieron quizá niveles más bajos, pero vinieron curiosamente más europeos, la jugada 
estaba ya vigilada. En esta segunda ocasión ya estaba Aznar y se desinteresó totalmente del 
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proceso de Barcelona. Tenía como ministro de asuntos exteriores a un mediterráneo como 
Abel Matutes y el otro fue Piqué que sí que entendía de esto, pero al final se desinteresó. Él 
tenía la vista hacia los Estados Unidos y eso languideció y murió.  
Luego vino Sarkozy que hizo una maniobra muy extraña. Muy típicamente de Sarkozy. Hizo 
una campaña electoral hace cinco años en el que en ningún momento habló del mediterráneo. 
En teoría seguía existiendo el proceso de Barcelona, pero yo quedé muy sorprendido, porque 
el día que el salió elegido en la votación, el domingo, por la radio oí el discurso de Sarkozy 
para celebrar la victoria y dijo, “y crearemos la unión por el Mediterráneo, que además 
englobará países del Norte de África y de toda Europa y haremos un pacto, etc…” Esto se lo 
acabada de sacar de la chistera, esto es una cosa típica de Sarkozy. Creo que en esto jugó 
parte de la improvisación o alguna nota que le paso alguien de su gabinete, Guinoud. Ahí 
jugaron dos cosas: la grandeur francesa de que esto se hiciera aquí en Barcelona, y la 
grandeur de Sarkozy. Sarkozy es un hombre que vale mucho pero que le pierde su carácter y 
su temperamento. Lógicamente ahora debería perder las elecciones, aunque eso nunca se 
sabe. Entonces se creó esto y la verdad es que esto tampoco ha funcionado.  
Zapatero intentó volver a reestablecer relaciones más positivas con Marruecos. Yo creo que 
Rajoy no va a seguir las huellas de Aznar. La prueba es que ha ido a Marruecos enseguida. A 
lo mejor vuelve a interesarse por el mundo mediterráneo. Está por ver.  
Por qué piensa usted quizá que Francia como uno de los principales vendedores del 
Mediterráneo desde la década de los setenta principalmente, posteriormente pierde este 
interés en liderar la política mediterránea?  
No sé si pierde interés. Francia siempre ha seguido de forma muy atenta la defensa de sus 
intereses comerciales. Con Argelia tiene problemas. Tiene una relación de amor-odio que la 
hace difícil. Argelia es verdad que es difícil para todo el mundo. Para Marruecos es distinto. 
Pero no entiendo bien esta falta de interés. Porque teóricamente el país que tenía que haber 
sentido la ambición y además tenía más posibilidades que España de liderar el gran proyecto 
mediterráneo era Francia, pero no lo ha hecho. En ciertos aspectos lo hizo. Ellos pretendían, 
lo que me había comentado el ministro de defensa en Francia, que cuando la caída del muro y 
se requería una cierta reorganización de las estructuras militares en Europa, el mando del 
mediterráneo, que es naval, que es americano, pasa a ser Francia, con Charles Mignon a la 
cabeza.  
Yo había sostenido la idea, de que España no se tenía que involucrar en todo el Mediterráneo, 
sino en el Mediterráneo occidental, de Malta hacia aquí. De Malta hacia aquí somos alguien, 
de Malta hacia el oriente no somos nadie. Tampoco Italia, tampoco Francia, Francia es nadie, 
allí son los americanos. Allí están los israelíes y los árabes. Así que el Mediterráneo 
occidental sí. Libia es un país que he tratado de evitar siempre.  
Sobre el tema Mediterráneo al final los alemanes se desinteresaron y yo me temo que sigan 
estando desinteresados. Ahora como ves no han ido ni a Libia.  
Una vez que se lanza el proceso de Barcelona, quizá se podría pensar que esa grandeur 
francesa, que luego cuando España toma el liderazgo eso podría ser un acicate para los 
franceses, bueno pues ahora queremos retomar la iniciativa, hubo algún cierto roce 
entre España y Francia en ese sentido o fue cooperación?  
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Sarkozy empezó mal porque al día siguiente le llamó Merkel y le dijo, mire esto que usted 
quiere hacer, no lo puede hacer. No puede hacer un tratado con el norte de África que no 
tenga en cuenta a Bruselas. Luego quedó en nada.  
En qué consistió exactamente su mediación entre el gobierno de Aznar y Alemania  a 
través de Helmut Kohl?  
Lo de Kohl, fui a ver a Kohl una vez como defensor por así decirlo de la posición española en 
un tema y eso fue en el 1996 y fue por el tema del Euro. Y cuando España dice que quiere 
entrar en el Euro en enero del 2001, pero claro tenía que cumplir los compromisos y los 
criterios de convergencia de Maastricht. Algunos países europeos como Alemania, Holanda, 
Francia incluso daba a entender de que España no podía entrar porque tenía un déficit, y que 
España no podía cumplir estas condiciones. Y Aznar decía que sí. Y convence a Cabal y 
luego medio convence mientras fuerza la mano a Prodi, que dice estos ya veremos que harán. 
En Valencia Prodi decía que España podía hacer una especie de pequeña trampa y Aznar de 
la forma que es, muy ensoberbecido dijo que no había ni pequeñas trampas ni maniobras y 
vamos a cumplir y España cumplirá y usted señor Prodi, mi consejo es que usted cumpla. Y 
entonces en Alemania y en Holanda, Francia menos, comenzaron a decir, que bien, que ya 
estamos de acuerdo que el señor Aznar es un hombre serio, pero, el señor Aznar no tiene 
mayoría y por lo tanto como deberá desplegar políticas impopulares no las podrá aplicar.  
Entonces nosotros dijimos, bien, el señor Aznar no tiene mayoría pero con nosotros sí tiene 
mayoría. Y nosotros garantizamos que todo lo que haya que hacer para poder entrar en el 
Euro en la fecha convenida será hecho. Y entonces yo de acuerdo con Aznar, fui a visitar a 
Helmut Kohl y a otras autoridades en Francia fui a visitar entre otros a Chirac, etc. Entonces 
yo a toda esta gente les decía que Aznar es un señor de palabra que va a cumplir y podrán 
hacerlo porque tenían nuestro consenso.  
Obviamente este episodio de entrada en el Euro termina por redondear esta acelerada 
entrada de España en los mecanismos de la Unión Europea de forma completa y que se 
había iniciado desde mediados de los ochenta. En otro orden de cosas y continuando con 
el Mediterráneo, porqué cree usted que el proceso de Barcelona ha fracasado?  
Yo creo que ha fracaso por desinterés. En primer lugar por dificultades de funcionamiento, 
cuestiones administrativas. Costaba mucho hacer arrancar las cosas. Porque además los 
países del sur no pagaban sus cuotas. Mire usted, en política como en todo hay una cualidad 
fundamental. Que es la seriedad. Los países del sur del Mediterráneo puede que tengan un 
concepto de seriedad muy importante, pero es otro concepto. Y los países del sur de Europa, 
o sea, nosotros, somos un poco más serios, pero tampoco. El problema que hay en entre el 
norte y el sur de Europa es que en el sur no somos serios. No hemos sido serios. Es decir, 
cuando yo visitaba a esta gente, algunos como Kohl eran muy simpáticos, otros menos, 
especialmente el inventor de los criterios de convergencia de Maastricht, quien decía que, 
para hacer lo que usted dice y que dice que harán se requiere mucha “ernsthaftigkeit”, es 
decir, mucha seriedad. Hay que ser serios, no me dijo, ustedes no lo son.  
Seriedad quiere decir coherencia, compromiso, visión de medio y largo plazo, autodisciplina, 
autoexigencia y exigencia. Y claro por ejemplo los griegos no son serios. No lo han sido 
nunca. Los italianos, en algunas cosas son serios y en otras no. España, también, según con 
que cosas. En el tema económico España no lo ha sido. Tiene muchísima gente seria y hacen 
cosas muy importantes, pero los dos últimos gobiernos socialistas, no han sido serios. Aznar 
es más serio. Aznar tendrá muchos defectos, y alguna virtud. Y una de sus virtudes es que es 
serio. Nosotros hemos terminado mal. Es cumplidor. También es cumplidor cuando te 
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amenaza porque cumple. El gobierno y la gente de Felipe González si eran cumplidores y 
eran serios e hicieron una gran labor. Y eso le llevó a España a estar donde estuvo. También 
Aznar en su primera legislatura y parte de la segunda también fue muy considerado. Lo que 
pasa es que Aznar, en la segunda sobre todo se creó enemigos. Se creó el francés, el enemigo 
alemán. Los trató mal. Y se dejó llevar por su soberbia y su suficiencia. Rodríguez Zapatero 
lo ha hecho todo mal desde el primer día. No se porqué, pero ha sido un desastre.  







Mi investigación se basa en analizar las claves que permitieron a España después de su 
entrada en la Comunidad Económica Europea, de identificar una ventana política como 
la del Mediterráneo para proyectar una cierta imagen hacia Europa.  
Eso es lógico. Está claro que España era un país muy joven con plazas de soberanía, por muy 
españolas que sean en el continente africano, tenemos gran interés en que esa región 
permanezca estable, lo que implica a su vez, unos niveles de prosperidad, de democracia 
mínimos y en este sentido, el vecino rico, que en este caso es Europa, también tiene esta 
prioridad aunque quizá no esté tan sensibilizado como los países del Mediterráneo de la 
Unión Europea, como España. Por tanto que hubiera esta prioridad era algo lógico. Luego 
había que renovar una política mediterránea que quizá no se había adaptado a los nuevos 
tiempos. Era una política que se basaba fundamentalmente en unos protocolos financieros, 
rígidos, escasos y que quizá no se adaptaban a las necesidades.  
Estamos hablando de la Política Global Mediterránea.  
Estamos hablando de la política mediterránea de la Unión Europea, y por eso, pues yo me 
encargué de rediseñar, de diseñar, mejor dicho, una nueva política mediterránea. Que por un 
lado mejoraba las ayudas y protocolos financieros, y por otro, intentaba ayudar no tanto a los 
aspectos puramente financieros, sino permitirles de fomentar una mayor creación de riqueza 
en estos países. Es decir, sacar un poco más de partido de sus potenciales. Para ello, era 
imprescindible involucrarles en el comercio, darles oportunidades comerciales. Lo cual no es 
fácil, porque en aquellos aspectos que la Unión Europea puede ser más liberal, como la 
política industrial, comercio de productos manufacturados o tecnológicos, pues esos países no 
tenían grandes condiciones para hacer frente a la propia competencia. Por tanto había que ir a  
lo que ellos producían, se trate del aceite de oliva, de las naranjas, los productos agrícolas 
tradicionales, que justamente, son delicados y siempre pisabas los callos de alguien, porque 
claro, si les dabas 2 productos típicos como los del sur de España, Francia o Italia, y si se lo 
dabas sobre producciones más del norte del Europa como el trigo, la leche, maíz, pues 
naturalmente chocabas con esas políticas. De ahí que el margen de maniobra fuera estrecho 
pero realmente esa política mediterránea acabó implantándose y dio resultados.  
Y es lo que llamamos Política Renovada del Mediterráneo.  
Exactamente, y además de eso, instituir lo que a partir de entonces se podría llamar un 
diálogo político. Incluso más allá del diálogo una cierta cooperación. Y en ese aspecto, yo 
creo que el diálogo fructífero que tuve con el Rey Hassan de Marruecos, ayudó a que se 
redactara esa constitución, la actual, la cual yo creo que se ha adelantado un poco a la de 
otros vecinos, y que de momento le ha permitido sortear las dificultades que otros países del 
Sur del Mediterráneo como Túnez y Egipto no han podido. De manera que esa es la cuestión. 
Yo recuerdo en Túnez donde era muy bien recibido, pude incrementar los contingentes de 
aceite de oliva, un producto que va a más y que se consume cada vez más tanto en Europa 
como en el resto del mundo. Digamos que esos países fueron muy receptivos a esto y nos 
ayudaron a nosotros en el diálogo de Oriente Medio, que no es un diálogo fácil, pero que esos 
países del lado árabe jugaron un papel positivo.  
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En esta creación de un diálogo en la que España comienza a tomar un papel de líder en 
la política euro-mediterránea, obviamente Francia un país que tiene un papel muy 
fuerte cómo reacciona?  
Ha tenido un papel muy fuerte y lo sigue teniendo. Porque el Mediterráneo es un prioridad 
para Francia y que históricamente ha estado muy vinculado. Tanto en Túnez como en 
Marruecos, que fue protectorado y no digamos Argelia, que era una provincia francesa.   
En este proceso, en el que España comienza a tener un creciente liderazgo, como se 
entiende como Mitterrand que creo el diálogo 4+5 que luego se retomó entre González y 
Craxi, hubo algún tipo de tensión?  
No. Como presidente de la Comisión en mis tiempos era Jacques Delors, francés, y del 
partido socialista, muy amigo de Mitterrand, fue ministro de economía, y en todo  momento 
me sentí muy respaldado por esta política. Es más, el rey Hassan envió a su hijo el actual rey 
a hacer un stage en Bruselas, y nos nombró el Rey a Delors y a mí, tutores. Y como Delors 
todavía estaba más escaso de tiempo que yo, delegó bastante esa función en mí, y eso 
demuestra que en ningún momento, ni hubo celos ni interferencias. Y también tengo que 
decir que mi relación con los distintos ministros de exteriores franceses, Roland Dumas, con 
el antiguo comisario de política mediterránea, etc., fue muy buena. Luego yo como ministro 
de asuntos exteriores de España, la colaboración de España y Francia en mi experiencia ha 
sido extraordinaria, ha sido franca y a su vez, nosotros le ayudamos también a Francia, a 
tener una mayor presencia y una mayor implicación en Iberoamérica. O sea que esa relación 
Hispano-Francesa, frente a lo que algunos siempre quieren ver, fue fructífera y agradable. No 
hubo fricciones ni desacuerdos.  
Precisamente esta es una de las cuestiones que se suele leer a veces, de una rivalidad 
hispano-francesa en el liderazgo de las políticas mediterráneas, así que es interesante 
ver, analizar y contrastar estos hechos.  
Evidentemente, es cierto que también hay que ver las personas. Ciertamente los intereses no 
están enfrentados. Tanto España como Francia tienen interés en que el Mediterráneo se 
desarrolle, una región que exporte estabilidad, democracia, los principios que mantenemos en 
la UE de cooperación inter-nos y con el resto del mundo. En ese aspecto, por lo menos, mi 
experiencia, después de tres mandatos de comisario y cuatro años de ministro de exteriores ha 
sido muy positiva, muy fructífera, la relación de Francia en este contexto.  
En este contexto se crea la Conferencia de la Seguridad y Cooperación en el 
Mediterráneo. Se comienzan a identificar los problemas que se quieren solventar.  
Eso es. Hubo ese interés. Eso es cuando yo estaba fuera del gobierno. Efectivamente, el que 
yo nombré director general de relaciones norte-sur que antes fue jefe de gabinete, Juan Prat, 
luego desarrolló, porque el gobierno español le nombró delegado permanente en esta materia 
y ya no la seguí tan de cerca. Pero sé que se aplicó a ese trabajo con interés. Después cuando 
me vine a España de ministro le nombré embajador en la OTAN, y cuando ya me fui acabó 
de delegado para esa conferencia del Mediterráneo, intentando hacer además de Barcelona 
uno de los centros de ese diálogo. La relación entre España y esa parte del mundo creo que es 
buena y sigue mejorando.  
A todo el mundo le gusta que su país sea el privilegiado en relaciones y por todo, pero si las 
cosas se hacen bien, salen bien. Por ejemplo, teníamos un tratado de libre comercio con 
México y Francia mostraba algunas preocupaciones. Y entonces, ese tratado lo había lanzado 
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como Comisario, había logrado que se aprobara en la comisión a pesar de las reticencias de 
algunos. Después cuando me fui de Comisario para ir al Parlamento Europeo, estaba de 
presidente de la comisión de política exterior y seguridad común y tuve que sacar lo que 
también estaba atascado en el parlamento europeo y después de dos años de estar de 
presidente que de ahí lo mandé al consejo de ministros estaba atascado en el consejo de 
ministros de la Unión y entonces me habían nombrado ministro de exteriores y tenía que 
sacarlo. Y ahí hubo un poco de reticencias. Al final logré una fórmula de transacción que 
ellos vieron que les daba una salida y que además quedaban bien y que no quedaban todo el 
rato contra la pared, al final eso hizo que la confianza mutua, sabiendo que siempre se jugaba 
con las cartas limpias, incluso para asociarlos y que compartieran mérito hizo que, repito al 
final las personas son muy importantes. Porque si tú eres capaz de crear un clima de 
confianza entre tus interlocutores, consigues muchísimo más que no dándotelas de listo y 
tratando de engañar a la gente.  
Si usted tuviera que definir la labor de Felipe González como impulsor de la política 
euro-mediterránea, cómo definiría esto.  
Yo diría que es cierto. González este tema lo tuvo muy claro desde el primer día, yo tuve 
como es lógico ocasión de compartir en ese aspecto sus ideas, cuando después de mi primer 
mandato, le pedí que me ayudara a convencer a Delors para que me diera esta cartera, eran 
las relaciones con el Mediterráneo, con América Latina y con países del Asia y relaciones 
Norte-Sur, me ayudó con toda nobleza y eficacia, tuvimos ocasión de especificar mucho del 
contenido de esa política que yo quería darle, por lo tanto, el papel de Felipe, fue un papel 
importante generosa y de futuro. Y lo mismo Aznar que cuando me nombró ministro de 
exteriores, le expliqué los grandes ejes que quería y como es lógico era el Mediterráneo y fue 
un gran impulsor en todo momento de esa política.  
Entre la política euro-mediterránea y el gobierno de González y el primer mandato de 
Aznar, un poco se siguen las líneas maestras.  
Sin duda. En política exterior está clarísimo. Eso lo han dicho toda la vida Felipe y Aznar y 
yo creo que en general la han practicado. Es una política de estado, de intereses permanentes 
y que por lo tanto necesitan de una permanencia y de una constancia. Si vas bandeando con la 
política internacional y haciendo una política de partido, no consigues nada, si no que al final 
te quedas sin política exterior. Eso es lo que decía aquel famoso primer ministro inglés, y le 
preguntaron cuáles eran sus prioridades, cuáles eran sus amigos y sus enemigos, y respondió, 
Inglaterra no tiene ni amigos ni enemigos permanentes, tiene intereses permanentes.  
En todo este panorama del desarrollo de las políticas mediterráneas, qué papel juega 
Alemania?  
Alemania, dejaba hacer. Obviamente a Alemania, igual que a los ingleses les hubiera gustado 
tener que poner menos dinero, y más comercio, otros países hubieran querido más dinero y 
menos comercio, pero al final hay que hacer una combinación de ambas. Alemania dejó 
hacer, no fue nunca un obstáculo.  
Ayudaría obviamente la amistad entre Kohl y González, no?  
Sin duda, Kohl, mantuvo una muy buena relación con González y con Aznar, muy buena y 
yo soy testigo y co-protagonismo. Era un hombre de estado, que con suavidad acababa 
metiendo los temas y que terminado siendo uno de los grandes de la cohesión interna de la 
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Unión Europea, con el propio Mitterrand, pero que hay que reconocer que como líder hizo un 
gran tándem con Kohl, como antes lo habían hecho Schmidt y Giscard d’Estaign.  
A mi básicamente en mi investigación me interesan tres variables: la política económica, 
la migración y la seguridad. Que creo que son tres vectores cruciales, que se 
complementan, recuerdo una intervención suya en la reunión de Lisboa en 1992, donde 
usted decía, el Magreb, “atención señores, es una bomba de tiempo”. Cómo se veía todo 
esto desde España, que necesidad había de hacer llegar este mensaje a Europa, que 
España tiene un interés en la potencial explosión demográfica o la migración que puede 
venir desde el sur.  
Eso creo que lo has dicho muy bien. Te has informado muy bien. Eso, todo el mundo lo 
comparte. Y en Lisboa lo dije porque lo que ocurre es que uno comparte las ideas y comparte 
los principios, pero a la hora de ponerlos en práctica pues siempre salen algunos más 
perjudicados que otros. Aunque uno no lo pretenda siempre se pisa algún callo. Y el tema de 
la emigración pues hay que ser conscientes de que no se puede por las buenas levantar todas 
las barreras y hacer un espacio Schengen porque automáticamente te cargas el experimento. 
Porque para poder producirse la inmigración en condiciones de integración, de seguridad y un 
mínimo nivel de vida, tienen que haber puestos de trabajo. Recuerdo que en los años sesenta 
para emigrar a Alemania, los emigrantes españoles, si no tenían un contrato de trabajo no te 
ibas a Alemania. Y ahí ni había problemas de religión, ni problemas de razas, ni problemas 
de nada.  
Era un problema de pensar en que la convivencia y la integración si no se dan unas mínimas 
condiciones, y en vez de fomentar esta convivencia e integración lo que estás haciendo es 
fomentar el enfrentamiento y la exclusión. Entonces, todos estos son procesos que hay que 
arrancar y que hay que ir modulando en función de las circunstancias y de las posibilidades. 
No puedes poner un  principio en marcha y caiga quien caiga arrollar porque se vuelve contra 
ti.  
El papel de España yo creo que también era reconocido cuando Francisco Fernández 
Ordóñez recibe esta llamada de los Estados Unidos pidiéndole que organice la 
conferencia de paz en Oriente Medio en Madrid en 1991. Algunos autores dicen que es 
España lo único que fue consistió en organizar este evento, pero que no tuvo un mayor 
peso.  
España fue el anfitrión, pero se hizo el anfitrión por una cosa tan señalada por alguna razón. 
La verdad es que Felipe González, en particular había cuidado mucho las relaciones con 
Estados Unidos y además España era un país muy equilibrado, en el conflicto de Oriente 
Medio. Y obviamente no fue una casualidad que fuera en España. Era un punto intermedio 
entre los dos, Europa había querido jugar algún papel en ese diálogo que en aquel momento 
era a dos, con dos grandes supervisores, soviéticos y estadounidenses. Los americanos se 
dieron cuenta de que el papel de Europa tenía que ser mayor y en esos momentos que ya 
Rusia se estaba cayendo, con más razón. Entonces quedaba un árbitro que podía parecer que 
estaba escorado porque buscas la paz, pero ciertamente, tienes grandes intereses estratégicos 
allá, y en la UE, España tenía una posición muy matizada que estaba muy en esta línea.  
Yo creo que el trabajo que se vino haciendo desde 1986 comenzó a dar verdaderos 
frutos a partir de este momento, con este reconocimiento de organizar este evento por 
parte de los Estados Unidos por decir, sois interlocutores muy válidos para la resolución 
del conflicto entre Israel y Palestina y para la estabilidad de la zona.  
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Eso es así. Yo había tenido muchas conversaciones con el secretario de Estado americano, 
que siguió siendo amigo mío, y realmente el papel de España fue muy apreciado.  
Entonces llegamos al proceso de Barcelona,  
Sí, yo ahí no estaba pero se había preparado el terreno. Además Jordi Pujol estaba muy 
interesado en este tema y en dar un protagonismo a Barcelona y me invitaba numerosas veces 
a Barcelona a algunas conferencias sobre política mediterránea y al final eso era para él un 
monotema.  
Hasta que punto Jordi Pujol influyó en el ideario de González en desarrollar la política 
Mediterránea?  
Pues francamente no lo sé, pero lo que se, es que en ese tema todos estábamos en sintonía. 
Había muy buena sintonía. Jordi Pujol tenía una frase que decía con referencia al 
Mediterráneo; “Siempre hemos estado pegándonos intensamente, pero siempre ha habido una 
interrelación muy intensa. Unas veces con abrazos y otras con cañonazos, pero nunca hemos 
dejado de interactuar”. Claro ésta relación con el tiempo y con la civilización de las gentes va 
mejorando, pero esa relación existe desde los Cartagineses.  
La hipótesis de trabajo era la siguiente: vamos a trabajar a través del comercio, para 
crear una zona de estabilidad que al norte de África le permita mejorar y eso va a 
mejorar la condición económica de estos países, y como consecuencia se reducirán los 
incentivos para la emigración.  
Exacto, es tan sencillo como eso. Y luego es verdad que los protocolos financieros podría 
haber sido mayores, que el comercio podría haber sido mayor y además podría haberse 
buscado una política más integradora con ellos, pues seguramente, pero a pesar de todo se dio 
un gran avance. Porque esos países tenían un nivel de vida mucho más bajo en el pasado.  
En una de las primeras visitas que hice a Túnez todavía estaba Bourguiba, y el primer 
ministro después de las conversaciones, me dice, vamos a hacer la visita al presidente y 
Bourguiba me recibió en su palacete al lado del mar, me explicó la lucha de su vida por 
conseguir la independencia, me explicaba que era un país muy liberal, y de repente me dice, 
“y usted señor comisario es español, verdad?, Entonces como está mi buen amigo Francisco 
Franco?” Estamos hablando del 1987. Y poco después tres meses más tarde, más o menos, 
Ben Ali dio un golpe de estado y le dejó en su palacete, más perdido en sus ensoñaciones, 
pero tomó el poder.  
Más o menos aunque usted estuvo más desviado de la política siguió los desarrollos del 
proceso de Barcelona?  
Sí, claro que sí, seguía en buenas relaciones con ministros de exteriores hasta el propio 
Moratinos, pero con Moratinos, me llamaba y me pedía algunas gestiones. Aznar y yo le 
nombramos delegado de la Unión Europea para Oriente Medio y fue donde se hizo un buen 
nombre, porque de allí pasaban los mandatarios de todo el mundo, y el delegado de la Unión 
Europeo, era Moratinos que les atendía.  
Sobre el proceso de Barcelona hay gente que dice, que fracasó rotundamente, casi desde 
el inicio… 
Un poco sí, en la medida esos países debido a los acontecimientos que todos conocemos lo 
prioritario ha sido ese diálogo y ha existido. Pero los contextos cambian. Luego la crisis 
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económica ha favorecido que Europa se concentrara en resolverla y en salir del atasco, 
porque ahora Europa tiene un gran problema. Antes éramos 15 y ahora 25. Toda ampliación 
resta profundización. Quien mucho abarca poco aprieta. Entonces todo eso implica que se 
vaya siguiendo el paso de los más atrasados.  
Este dicho de “quien mucho abarca poco aprieta” podría definir de alguna manera la 
amplitud y las dificultades de este partenariado euro-mediterráneo.  
Sí, y por lo vasto que es, es algo que no se arregla en un día solo con dinero.  
Porque al final, al norte tenemos una Unión Europea, que es una unión institucional, de 
voluntades, que también ahora está atascada, y en el sur tenemos dos países como 
Argelia y Marruecos que prácticamente no se hablan y por otro lado tenemos el 
conflicto de los árabes y los israelíes.  
Efectivamente, son realidades que no son muy homogéneas, el Magreb y el Maschreq, donde 
cada uno tiene sus conflictos.  
Eso ayuda a crear más abstracción y a dificultar cualquier intento de desarrollar 
políticas coherentes y productivas.  
Exactamente. Yo he visto en los últimos meses, una voluntad tanto de Argelia como de 
Marruecos, de reavivar un poco la UMA (Unión del Magreb Árabe), esperemos que tengan 
éxito.  
Cómo vio usted la salida de Sarkozy cuando anunció por primera vez la Unión del 
Mediterráneo?  
De una forma muy tranquila. Como una manera de querer reactivar ese proceso que estaba un 
poco dormido. Cuestión distinta es que seamos entre todos de darle velocidad. Es que claro, 
en este momento con la crisis no es algo de lo que más preocupe.  
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I would like to know from the Turkish perspective, a major player in the 
Mediterranean, how Turkey has been, or even considering your experience as the 
former Turkey’s Ambassador to the EU, how would you assess these process that try to 
put together a very wide array of complex countries trying to help to increase 
development.  
I am now speaking as an individual as I am not any longer involved in the EU. Of course, 
creating some kind of union, or unity, of course, in the Mediterranean basin makes a lot of 
sense. It should be one of the main targets of all countries in the Mediterranean region. 
Because, everything started here. There are a lot of commonalities, there a shared history and 
a shared future. But at the same time is very problematic. A lot of divergences, a lot of 
conflicts. A lot of problems. It’s quite a challenge to create this area of cooperation and then 
of prosperity. Prosperity should be the target of cooperation. But we have to work in this 
direction. Of course, in real politics you have to be very realistic. Whatever we can do, we 
should do it.  
So in this sense the Barcelona Process, the Union for the Mediterranean and the rest of 
Mediterranean structures and policies, in order to develop the Euro-Mediterranean flank is 
important. And I support and Turkey supports that also. But somehow it should not be used 
as a means to aspire to lead the others, to aspire to be the leaders of the region. It will not 
work. Neither France nor Spain can be the leaders of the Mediterranean. Because there are 
also very strong countries in the region like Turkey and Egypt. But of course there are main 
actors, so it is important to put to cooperate all together, Spain, France, Turkey, Egypt 
mainly. We should cooperate and we should create spaces of cooperation, trade.  
But there are of course a lot of conflicts that prevent to achieve solutions. The most important 
conflict is the Arab-Israeli one. As long as the Palestinian conflict is not properly addressed it 
is only to be a dream to establish an area of cooperation in the Mediterranean. It is 
responsibility of the west, of the EU and the Americans to do something. Because to have 
cooperation and enhance cooperation in the Mediterranean is in the interest of the West. The 
United States, is also necessary for Israel. This is the main problem.  
I agree with you when you say that there should not be a European country that wants 
to be the leader.  
That should not work.  
But on the other hand we see that the EU is a union, is kind of solid, institutionally 
speaking, but the southern Mediterranean is much fragmented. Internal conflicts, etc.  
Establishing Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms and schemes would help to address bilaterally 
those conflicts. It would be good if they would discuss together in multilateral forums to do 
collective projects or cooperation or speak to each other. So, mechanisms such as the 
Barcelona process could have helped to address these issues. Regarding the approach of the 
EU with regards to the Euro-Mediterranean process, it is very much divided. Northern 
European countries are not very interested in Mediterranean politics. But this is wrong. They 
see mainly the European Union as mostly a Germanic union. So it seems that they are not 
interested in cooperation with Latin countries, but that is wrong. That is a very short-sighted 
vision, and the EU should have a more united interest toward Mediterranean politics.  
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This union should not imply competition for leadership. It should be a genuine interest in 
developing policies for mutual interests in the Mediterranean.  
When you worked in Europe, did you see any particular rivalry between France and 
Spain?  
No so much. Because in fact they are close to each other, but of course, during the 
constitution of the Union for the Mediterranean, that rivalry was visible of course. They 
wanted to have the Secretariat. Sarkozy wanted to put himself as the leader of the Union for 
the Mediterranean.  
Per the Secretariat, I remember they had a lot of plans and projects. But what they have done 
or how these projects have been translated into reality I do not know. During the first meeting 
took place in Paris and my assessment what that it was a good “photo opportunity” that 
Sarkozy needed to launch their agenda.  
Coming back few years, if we remember, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the main 
obstacle to develop Euro-Mediterranean politics and diplomatic projects. And there was 
a lot of optimism.  
We had to do whatever it was possible to do. It is not a question of doing a big progress, but 
at the end, here or there is possible to do a small progress. For instance the creation of the 
Anna Lindh Foundation or the Euro-Mediterranean Assembly, all that helps. They are 
important meaningful steps. The creation of the free trade area would be wonderful progress, 
but with the developments in the Arab world together to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is very 
difficult.  
From an organizational point of view, for instance, Turkey or other Mediterranean 
countries, how do you feel about the role of your countries.  
Of course, Turkey is an addition, is a bridge to the EU and it could play a very fundamental 
role in the constitution of the Euro-Mediterranean as an area of cooperation.  
When Sarkozy announced the Mediterranean Union, how was the reaction of Turkey?  
We clearly opposed to that because it was a trap designed only for Turkey, because they 
created the Mediterranean Union, a virtual or fictitious entity. They would say to Turkey, you 
have the Mediterranean Union, so, don’t try to come to the European Union. But at the end he 
had to changed. In 1997, had created a sort of European conference, and Turkey presented its 
candidacy in Luxembourg to be part of the EU, and they offered us to be part of that 
European conference. That was the first attempt.  
Mr. Sarkozy thought that he was the most clever politician in the world but he had done a lot 
of harm to Turkey and we will not forget it. And personally I think that is not a man worthy 
of France, he is not a state-man. He thought only in short term issues.  
What about the success or the failure of both the Barcelona Process and the Union for 
the Mediterranean?  
Probably in the future there are going to be more chances to reactivate these processes. 
Mainly after the Syrian case. Countries like Spain, France, Egypt and Turkey should come 
together. In order to create a reflection group, not excluding Germany, and not excluding 
United States.  
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How would you assess the diplomatic power of the EU in the Middle East?  
The EU does not exist in the Middle East. There is only the Americans. Is not an actor. 
Probably to some extent France or the UK, but nothing else. They are not like the US, that is 
why is important to have Americans on board as well. Is a part of the Western world.  
What do you think, how would you assess the Barcelona process? It was only a question 
of meeting governments and people? Is not that very expensive?  
The rationalization of the resources in these diplomatic processes is very important because 
they spend a lot of money and waste a lot a time for few political results.  
The EU has been funding dictators on one hand, and on the other hand they have been 
deploying a very liberal discourse defending promotion of democracy, human rights, 
etc. How do you see this?  
This is true. That is why it was created in 2004 the ENP aiming at creating bilateral 
agreements with certain governments. However this did not work neither as many of these 
dictators did not accept the implementation of such agreements or parts of them. Only Israel 
accepted to some extent. However to make this work you of course need the cooperation of 
those dictators.  
If you should summarize these projects, are they a success or a failure?  
I would say that it has a limited success. But in terms of aspirations, it is a failure. No realistic 
person would expect these aspirations to become reality in the very short time. In terms of 
expectations they have raised, in mediatic terms, has been very big. There were done big 
steps, but it was not possible to do more. Probably the biggest mistake was raising a lot of 
expectations.  
The Secretariat was defined as an entity to develop technical projects, but the political 
aspects would remain in the hands of special political delegates and governments. How 
is possible to split these political aspects and the technical aspects?  
It is not possible of course. This language has been only created for political convenience. To 
find a compromise at the end of the conferences. But we should not raise high sort-term 
expectations in the Mediterranean. It would be necessary to continue working with these 
goals in mind but in a very realistic way. Now with the Euro-Mediterranean crisis nothing 
can be done.  
From a Turkish point of view, do you see that the EU has been very patronising, 
communicating very vertically, or on the contrary, the EU has been trying to find 
integrative communicational formulas?  
They try to be patron. There is a kind of imperial attitude. They want to teach everybody 
what to say what to do. The Eastern Europe has been always saying, “yes sir” “yes sir”. So, 
people wanting to be integrated in the EU have to be very good students. That’s wrong.  
If we want to create common basis this kind of communication does not incentive 
integration processes, right?  
Exactly. We have principles, we have policies. Is more vertical. They want to impose, that’s 
it. Germany, Spain, Turkey, US, France, Egypt, have to create a reflection group. Not 
necessarily the EU. If we are not pragmatic we cannot do anything. They want to apply their 
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rules and that does not work, and they do not understand that. That is why the EU is nobody 




El Mediterráneo es un prioritario para España como para Francia. Yo creo que el proceso de 
Barcelona fue para los dos países una ocasión de interesar al resto de Europa a la cuestión 
Mediterránea, pero que el proceso de Barcelona, fue dificultado por el conflicto Israelo-
palestino que frenó bastante el proceso. Pero entre España y Francia más convergencia que 
competencia. Yo diría que el segundo mandato de Aznar ha sido dominado por el 
enfrentamiento entre Francia y España gracias a Irak y a la política de Bush. El primer 
mandato de Aznar fue bastante consensual, incluso en términos de política exterior. Se quedó 
en el marco de la transición. En el compromiso de la política exterior de la transición. A 
partir del 2000 hasta el 2004 rompió lo que yo creo que es el compromiso en política exterior 
de la transición y Aznar bascula hacia el neo-conservadurismo norteamericano, el modelo 
anglosajón de economía, política exterior y rechaza de forma bastante fuerte a Francia, a 
quien considera un país con un estado demasiado pesado, con una ideología de laicismo que 
él rechaza también. Rechaza Francia como un país que no está alineado con los Estados 
Unidos, que no es la línea de Aznar que sigue de una forma bastante ciega a los 
estadounidenses.  
Eso afectó bastante a los gobiernos españoles y franceses y tuvo un impacto sobre la 
cooperación bilateral y sobre la política mediterránea que podíamos tener. Hubo también 
tensión fuerte entre España y Marruecos a propósito de los eventos de Perejil. La paradoja es 
que la mediación se hizo con los Estados Unidos a través de Colin Powell y no Europa. Y 
Francia podría haber sido un buen intermediario porque Chirac era próximo a la familia real 
marroquí, y hubiera podido ser un buen mediación. Y esta fórmula no fue usada porque 
primero Aznar no quería meter a Francia en este lío y estaba fascinado por el modelo 
norteamericano.  
Con Zapatero, España vuelve en el ritmo más clásico de su política exterior. Reanuda con los 
ejes prioritarios de la política exterior clásica, es decir, Latinoamérica, Unión Europea y 
Mediterráneo. Y de nuevo, la luna de miel entre España y Francia vuelve normal, hacia una 
convergencia fuerte sobre estos temas.  
La llegada de Sarkozy, creo que con Zapatero se lleva bien, hay el eje franco-español en la 
lucha con el terrorismo. El ministro de interior en Francia siempre está bien visto en España 
por la necesaria colaboración contra ETA. Entonces eso lo vi, porque estuve en España hasta 
el 2005. Después de un año de la llegada de Zapatero, Sarkozy en cuanto llega como ministro 
de interior, era muy amigo de Acebes, ministro de interior con Aznar, pero con el gobierno de 
Zapatero no hay ningún problema. Sarkozy no hace ninguna diferencia. Está muy vinculado 
con Aznar, pero acepta muy bien la alternancia en España. El hecho es qua partir del 
momento en el que Zapatero lo recibe casi como un jefe de gobierno, porque él ya está en 
plena campaña presidencial para suceder a Chirac, para él le parece muy bien, y además lo 
utiliza a Zapatero contra los socialistas franceses, diciendo que él es un socialista moderado y 
lo usa para criticar a los socialistas franceses.  
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Entonces el eje hispano-francés funciona de nuevo bien. Sarkozy, electo presidente toma la 
propuesta y se lanza la propuesta de Unión para el Mediterráneo. Yo creo que lo hace muy “a 
la Sarkozy”. Con egocentrismo. No se si asocia mucho a España en la elaboración de su 
proyecto. Sarkozy está en una dinámica muy egocéntrica en aquel momento y lo será todo a 
lo largo de su mandato. No estoy seguro que se apoya en Zapatero para llevar a cabo su 
proyecto. Pero de todos modos se trata de modernizar el proceso de Barcelona.  
La dificultad es que dentro del mundo del Elíseo de aquella época y el que lleva este proyecto 
y lo empuja es Henry Guaino. Que lo ha conceptualizado junto a Jean Louis Guigou. Henry 
Guaino es muy antieuropeo. Él lo ve como un proyecto alternativo al proceso de Barcelona 
más que como una ocasión de modernizarlo. Y eso va a fracasar contra el muro alemán y 
Berlín va a decir que eso no se puede hacer así. Va a haber una pugna dentro del Eliséo entre 
Jean David Levitte, consejero diplomático y Henry Guaino. Y Alemania reacciona muy mal 
al proyecto inicial de la Unión para el Mediterráneo, porque lo ve demasiado fuera de la 
Unión Europea. Así que va a ver fuertes tensiones dentro del Eliséo y entre París y Berlín 
sobre este tema.  
Dentro del Eliseo de Sarkozy hay una batalla bastante fuerte entre consejeros. Henry Guaino 
que es consejero especial de Sarkozy. Tiene la autorización de expresarse en los medios de 
comunicación. Es un consejero político. Es un consejero muy potente. Jean David Levitte es 
también influyente como consejero diplomático. Lo había sido de Chirac, lo había sido de 
Giscard. Era también muy potente, un intelectual de las relaciones internacionales. Es un 
funcionario, un tecnócrata. Eso va a perjudicar el proyecto desde el principio. Va a haber esa 
reunión del 14 de Julio del 2008. Lo más importante para Sarkozy es la “Photo opportunity”, 
con todos esos jefes de estado. Que ahora ha sido un boomerang: Mubarak, Al Asaad, Ben 
Ali. Ghadaffi no vino para esa ocasión, vino en diciembre para una visita bilateral. Bashar al 
Asaad estuvo en el desfile el 14 de julio. Y eso lo pagará Sarkozy con las revoluciones en 
Siria de una forma muy cara. La “Photo opportunity” es un éxito. No hay que negarlo. 
Vienen casi todo, los israelíes, los palestinos, etc. Bashar Al-Assad estaba desde hacía tiempo 
un poco apartado de las relaciones internacionales. Sarkozy toma la revancha sobre Chirac 
que estaba muy en contra de Bashar a causa del asesinato de Rafik Hariri. Fue un tinglado un 
poco francés.  
La foto fue buena y el fracaso son primero, en diciembre de 2008 y en enero del 2009, la 
nueva ofensiva israelí en Gaza, la operación plomo endurecido, que va a bloquear el proceso 
de la Unión para el Mediterráneo. Como hay muertos, los árabes se ponen tensos. Y después 
va a bloquearse con las revoluciones árabes. Eso va a bloquearlo todo o bastante. Túnez, 
Egipto, Libia, ahora Siria va a bloquear el proceso.  
Lo que podemos decir en resumidas cuentas es que el eje Mediterráneo queda prioritario para 
nosotros. François Holland, electo presidente, en su discurso de política exterior en 
conferencia de los embajadores a finales de agosto de 2012, que es la hoja de ruta y tiene un 
párrafo sobre la política Mediterránea, con la idea de utilizar el secretario general de la Unión 
para el Mediterráneo como la herramienta para hacer proyectos concretos, para adelantar la 
cooperación. Y como la Unión para el Mediterráneo es algo pesado de mover porque son 44 
estados. Utilizar si es posible y si se puede, como núcleo duro el 5+5. Que existía desde los 
años. Son 10 países. El tamaño más reducido permite quizás más eficacia, menos bloqueos. 
Hemos tenido una reunión en Malta y ha funcionado bastante bien. A ver si sigue, porque 
siempre hay que ver que pasa después de las reuniones. Hemos lanzado una idea de reunión 
en el seno del 5+5 de los ministros de economía y hacienda. A ver si funciona y a ver si lo 
podemos concretar a principios del 2013.  
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La idea es no oponer la idea del 5+5 a la UFM pero hacerlo complementarlo. Es decir, crear 
un núcleo duro. Es como en la Unión Europea se hacen cooperaciones reforzadas. Por 
ejemplo podemos considerar la zona euro como una zona de núcleo duro que podría ser en un 
futuro, es nuestra idea ahora, el corazón de Europa, y los países de alrededor que quieren 
entrar. Y otros países como Inglaterra que no quieren entrar y quizá quieran salir del todo. 
Cada uno va a lo suyo. Pero hay un núcleo, y a ese núcleo duro nadie le impide de adelantar o 
de avanzar. Es importante, no en contra de los miembros de la Unión Europea, pero que 
pueda adelantar, porque cada vez que queremos hacer unión social o unión fiscal, siempre 
hay uno que levanta la mano y dice que no quiero y eso es un infierno. La Unión Europea a 
15 miembros funcionaba bastante bien. A 27, es un éxito, pero hay muchos bloqueos y si 
queremos avanzar hay que utilizar la cooperación reforzada.  
Por ejemplo la tasa sobre las transacciones financieras. Se llevaba años discutiendo. Lo 
hacemos con una cooperación reforzada. Se necesitaban 9 estados, ahora tenemos 10 o 12 y 
podemos avanzar. El 5+5 podría ser el núcleo duro de la Unión para el Mediterráneo. Porque 
el tema es que ahora con las incertidumbres de la zona, no podemos reunir a 44. ¿Quién 
vamos a invitar de Siria? Hay otros estados que están convalecientes como Túnez. Entonces 
lo más eficaz es crear cooperaciones reforzadas entre estados que quieren.  
La fotografía es muy compleja. Tuve una entrevista hace un tiempo con Jordi Pujol y 
decía que a Felipe González le decía que había que actuar pero allí donde somos algo, en 
el oeste del Mediterráneo, porque en el Medio Oriente la influencia es de los 
americanos. Claro, desde el punto de vista operativo y desde la conceptualización tan 
complicada de un proceso como estos, te das cuenta que un proceso como el de Israel y 
Palestina te bloquea todo lo demás. ¿Hasta qué punto no hubiera sido mejor 
concentrarse en la parte Oeste del Mediterráneo? Y otros de pueden decir con justa 
razón, sí, pero no puedes hacer una política Euro-Mediterránea sin considerar Israel y 
Palestina. Pero al final, si un proyecto no está claramente definido, con objetivos reales 
etc,  las abstracciones se pagan caras. Es cierto que España vendió bien a Europa la 
carta Mediterránea. Y jugó bien esa carta. Pero luego a la hora de definir el objeto 
principal y concreto, se mezclaron muchas abstracciones que luego se pagaron y se 
están pagando.  
Quien mucho abarca poco aprieta. Creo que la política Mediterránea, surgió también después 
del proceso de Barcelona,  de la expansión de la Unión Europea. Porque oponían el 
Mediterráneo a otros intereses geográficos, donde Alemania decía que había que dar 
prioridad a los países excomunistas a quien había que ayudar primero que a la parte 
Mediterránea. Entonces creo que eso frenó el proceso. Y ahora claro tenemos esas 
revoluciones árabes y que nos impone una política mediterránea ambiciosa y si no la tenemos 
lo pagaremos muy caro.  
Al hablar de hacer política Euro-mediterránea, es interesante ver los socios con los que 
había que hacer dicha política: Ben Ali, Gaddafi, Mubarak, etc.  
Pero claro, no teníamos otros actores y nadie había predicho el derrumbe en pocos días de 
estos regímenes. Vivíamos siempre con la idea de que Ben Ali, Mubarak, estarían en el poder 
y falta un análisis de esas sociedades.  
Y claro, por otro lado, el pragmatismo de unos países del norte que ven en la 
financiación de estos regímenes dictatoriales un elemento y característica de la 
Realpolitik. Una política que teóricamente debería haber contribuido a mantener una 
cierta seguridad. Que al final tal seguridad no fue tanta, y solo hay que ver el atentado 
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de Madrid del 11-M. Con relación a la primera parte de la entrevista, estoy de acuerdo 
con lo que ha dicho. El proceso de era Barcelona era un proceso débil desde el inicio por 
la conceptualización abstracta y por el conflicto de Israel y Palestina.  
Para matizar, la idea creo que era incluir Israel y Palestina para sacar siempre esos dos países 
del proceso de paz. Ahí sin hablar del proceso de paz se podían adelantar operaciones 
concretas que permitirían asociar estos dos países sin hablar de la paz. Así que en el concepto 
inicial no se trataba de solucionar el conflicto de Israel y Palestina dentro del proceso de paz. 
Tampoco hay que diabolizar a los que concibieron este proyecto. La idea era la de meter 
estos dos países que eran muy complejos pero diciendo, dentro del proceso de Barcelona no 
vamos a hablar del proceso de paz, pero vamos a hablar de cooperación económica, etc. 
Tampoco era tan imbécil. Lo que pasa es que claro, quizás era un poco naif porque al final el 
proceso de paz es algo muy importante y tan relevante desde el punto de visto de político, que 
cada conflicto entre los dos, y los hay cada dos años, tensiones, el riesgo era que eso podía 
bloquear. Yo estoy convencido de que Francia empujó para poner estos dos estados dentro 
del proceso. Yo conozco a nuestra diplomacia y nuestra diplomacia es así.  
Pero quizá haya algún problema adicional a la hora de conceptualizar lo que es y lo que 
no es conflicto. Así lo expresó Khraisni el embajador de Palestina para las Naciones 
Unidas, quien dijo que el conflicto no lo tenía Palestina. El conflicto lo tenía Israel que 
no quiere respetar las resoluciones. Pero dejando esto aparte de momento quisiera 
preguntarle qué opina usted de esta hipótesis. Si España fue uno de los motores de la 
política euro-mediterránea, cree que el segundo mandato de Aznar contribuyó a 
deteriorar y a hacer caer el proceso de Barcelona?  
Yo creo que sí. Es una pena que Aznar se haya alejado tanto de Francia y que se haya 
enfadado con Francia. En una entrevista dijo que había puesto fin a dos siglos de dominación 
francesa. Esa especie de visión de una cierta corriente de derecha española obviando a 
Francia, su laicismo. Toda la tradición intelectual francesa vista por gente como país en 
declive que tiene un complejo de superioridad pero que no lo merece. La visión de Aznar era 
esa. Con una España en pleno auge, conquistadora. Esa era la visión. Yo soy un partidario de 
España y de la influencia de España en el mundo, pero su discurso era caricaturesco. Creo 
que fue contraproducente en su rivalidad con Francia. Yo lo percibía ya en España durante 
aquella época pero la fragilidad de la economía española se percibía muy bien. El turismo y 
el ladrillo no es una herencia de Aznar, pero que no se hayan dado cuenta de ello y hayan 
presumido tanto, ahora lo están pagando muy caro. Y yo creo que ahora no se en qué estado 
está la derecha española. Rajoy cuando vino aquí en Mayo tenía un discurso muy germano. 
Vino a visitar a Holland pero no quería emplear todas las ideas de Holland en aquel 
momento, en Mayo 2012. Estaba recién elegido como nuevo presidente español. 
Crecimiento, bonos europeos, Rajoy no empleaba ciertas palabras, miraba el problema 
bancario español pero las palabras que podían enfadar a Merkel no las quería emplear. Y 
ahora está totalmente con nosotros.  
Me hace mucha gracia porque veo que ha evolucionado pero es curioso. Los españoles, una 
cierta corriente española tiene un prejuicio favorable a los alemanes. Los franceses siempre 
hay una especie de temor, de rivalidad, y los alemanes siempre son los mejores buena 
economía etc. Así que Rajoy ha cambiado mucho porque al principio en Mayo fue muy 
germano pero ahora los alemanes le están machacando. No hay otra palabra. Así que ve que 
no puede haber una alianza muy fiable con Merkel. Y quien le puede ayudar es Holland.  
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Yo lo digo como francés pero creo que es una constatación objetiva, Francia y España tienen 
mucho que hacer juntos. Hay muchísima proximidad. Por la geografía y la historia nuestros 
intereses son juntos. Creo que podemos llevar un proyecto para Europa, tener una visión más 
o menos común para la construcción de Europa, porque ahora Europa está muy estancada. Y 
Francia y España creo tienen un visión común. Cada uno puede tener su propia personalidad 
y dar su propio toque, pero son muy próximas. Yo creo que en la relación internacional 
podemos defender el modelo económico y social bastante próximo. Tenemos una idea 
bastante cercana del papel de la cultura, del humanismo. Lo que me hizo sufrir durante el 
período de Aznar es que Aznar estaba llevando a España del lado neo-conservadurista con 
una visión del mundo muy particular. Y me dolía que España si hubiera seguido esta 
corriente se hubiera acercado más al modelo anglosajón que a un modelo latino-europeo  y 
eso es un poco triste.  
Hablando de actividades y proyectos conjuntos, para desarrollar iniciativas hace falta 
dinero. La Unión por el Mediterráneo ha nacido dentro del contexto de crisis 
económica. Cómo puede afectar esto al desarrollo de las políticas puestas en marcha?  
Nosotros hablamos de todos los recursos europeos que pueden ser utilizados para el proyecto 
Mediterráneo: la banca europea para las inversiones, etc. Es decir, utilizar todos los recursos 
y los mecanismos europeos para desarrollar esta política. Las empresas por su dinamismo, las 
del norte y las del sur pueden contribuir. Hay un crecimiento económico en el sur en el norte 
de África que nos puede ayudar. El África negra tiene un crecimiento del 5%, el Maghreb es 
más complejo. Túnez está convalenciente. El país con más recursos es Argelia. Toda la 
incertidumbre política de Argelia no sabemos qué va  a pasar. No sabemos cuánto tiempo 
estará Bouteflika. Ellos tienen dinero pero no estoy seguro que lo gasten bien. Y para 
nosotros Argelia es muy importante. Holland va a ir allí el 19 y el 20 de Diciembre de 2012. 
Argelia es un socio, político muy importante. Es esencial para el mantenimiento de la 
estabilidad del Sahel. La crisis de AQIM es muy grave y es un socio “indomable”, reacio. No 
es fácil tratar con Argelia.  
Como vivió Francia la “ofensiva” diplomática española por obtener la sede de la Unión 
por el Mediterráneo? Francia hubiera preferido tener la sede en Túnez y poner un 
secretario francés. Pero la realidad es que con la crisis económica, las revueltas del 
Magreb, la incapacidad de reaccionar por parte de la Unión Europea, debido a intereses 
nacionales e incapacidades institucionales, la UPM está muy paralizada.  
Yo no supe bien de esta negociación porque no estuve implicado. Creo que es bueno que 
España tenga la Secretaría. Si hubiera existido en el Maghreb, Túnez no hubiera sido bueno. 
Nosotros queremos incentivar e impulsar nuevamente la Unión por el Mediterráneo. Por eso 
hemos estado en Malta a nivel de jefes de Estado. No había cumbre a nivel de jefes de Estado 
desde hace 10 años del Mediterráneo occidental. Vino Rajoy, Monti, y creo que tenemos que 
seguir con esta dinámica. Porque no creo que haya una cumbre Unión para el Mediterráneo 
después de mucho tiempo.  
Activar mecanismos mucho más flexibles y dinámicos es fundamental. Que aparquen 
las ambiciones de la Leadership y que insistan más en la cooperación entre Partners. 
Esto me lo comentaba el Embajador de Turquía para las Naciones Unidas. Habría 
probablemente que horizontalizar la comunicación entre Partners y buscar potencias de 
negociación similares en lugar de que existan profesores y alumnos. El escenario es tan 
complejo que buscar las fórmulas de dinamizarlo y de hacerlo eficiente a través del 
establecimiento de objetivos de corto, mediano y largo plazo, y que se concreten es 
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fundamental, porque si no nos caemos de ilusiones que al final no se concretan en nada 
particular. Quizá y esto es una opinión personal, de lo que se cansan mucho los países 
del sur –y hay que tenerlo muy en cuenta porque ellos son expertos en saber cómo 
reivindicar y pedir- es que el medio plazo te pueden recriminar, “sí pero es que nos 
habéis prometido muchas cosas”. En el largo plazo luego parece inevitable que la 
comunicación se bloquee.  
Efectivamente, pero yo creo que el gran desafío del momento es llevar a cabo muchas 
prioridades en un contexto en el que los Estados están debilitados por la crisis. Tenemos la 
prioridad del Sahel, tenemos la prioridad de Siria, la Europea, sacar a España, Italia y Grecia 
de la crisis. Tenemos que reanudar el Mediterráneo.  No tenemos que olvidar África. 
Tenemos que crear lazos con Asia que es la zona emergente. La semana próxima estaremos 
en Laos en la cumbre Unión Europea-Asia con el presidente. Date cuenta. Una agenda brutal. 
Y las administraciones no pueden seguir ese ritmo. Para que te voy a mentir. Yo participo en 
todas estas cumbres. En Malta por ejemplo hemos pactado muchas cosas pero todo esto tiene 
que seguir, tienen que seguir las administraciones, las empresas, las organizaciones civiles. 
Yo lo veo complejo, porque es muy complejo. ¿Cuántas prioridades tenemos?  
Entonces, el Mediterráneo sí es una petición para nosotros desde el principio. Es un eje, hay 
que profundizar. Hacemos visitas, en diciembre Argelia, a principios de año iremos a 
Marruecos, estuvo el presidente de Mauritania.  
Con España de momento no veo volver momentos de tensión como lo tuvimos durante la 
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Les questions sont d’abord, une première analyse de l’intérêt politique de la France 
pendant les années 80 dans la méditerranée. 
Je ne suis pas un spécialiste,…euh… je vais vous donner un livre que je viens d’écrire sur le 
bassin méditerranéen, vous verrez que le seul souvenir très marqué que j’ai c’est que 
globalement l’Espagne a toujours été très intéressée par l’Amérique du Sud. L’Espagne 
continue des conflits qu’elle a avec le Maroc depuis 1815(), depuis l’indépendance du Tsar 
occidentale. L’Espagne n’avait pas d’intérêt, aucun intérêt dans l’Afrique du Nord, les 
moresses n’ont pas une bonne image et donc les espagnols sont très intéressée par l’Amérique 
du Sud. Il y eu dans les années Mitterrand, et surtout après la chute de Berlin, Mitterrand a 
toujours considéré que si l’Allemagne s’élargissait avec des pays de L’est, eh bien,…euh si 
l’Allemagne est ici, si la France est ici, si l’Allemagne a son échéance à l’EST, il s’est dit que 
la France a son échéance au Sud. Et donc il avait a lancé son fameux 5 pour 5 par un appel de 
Marrakesh mais je ne suis pas un spécialiste de l’histoire. Mais plutôt ce qui m’intéresse 
c’est… l’Espagne est une chose, Barcelone est très différent de l’Espagne. Barcelone, la 
Catalogne, la dépendante poursuit sa stratégie.  
Et donc la Catalogne a un intérêt dans la méditerranée mais l’Espagne a un intérêt en 
Amérique du Sud ce sont deux choses très différentes. Barcelone a toujours fait beaucoup de 
commerce dans la méditerranée et très les espagnoles ont pu avoir les accords Barcelone, 
c’est une très longue histoire. Mais ce qui s’est passé par la suite, ça été les accords 
Barcelone, bon ils sont ce qu’ils sont. Mais les accords de Barcelone n’ont pas abouti à du 
Moyenne-Orient, à de la Palestine. Les accords n’ont pas marché parce que surtout il y a une 
disparité de la puissance de la commission et la faiblesse des pays Arabes. Et puis Barcelone 
a toujours mis, pas Barcelone mais la commission Européen a toujours mis des 
conditionnalités. Donc les Arabes étaient humiliés, il y a des dictateurs. Ce n’est pas…, moi 
je trouve que  la période devient intéressante à partir de la crise crée pas Sarkozy. 
Parce que à partir de 2007. Il ya Sarkozy qui monte au créneau et sa campagne. Je suis en 
relation avec Henri Génaux, qui est un copain et qui était un conseiller de Sarkozy. Et donc il 
mais beaucoup l’accent sur l’Europe et la  méditarranée. Moi, j’ai vu Sarkozy 
personnellement et je lui ai défendu la thèse que à l’heure actuelle si on mettait en place dans 
le monde des grands blocs, L’Alena  et Mercosur, d’ici Asiane plus cinq. Et si l’europe restait 
seule, L’europe en 2040 était  une vielle europe, une grande Suisse avec des vieux, des 
minaré et pas d’arabes, c’est le déclin. Un minimum il fallait faire 500 M européens et 500 M 
Arabs et puis maintenant il faut rajouter l’Afrique. Alors ce qu’il y a de bien c’est la période 
de maintenant, il faut pas aller trop vite dans votre…euh… 1995, cette période de 2008 ou 
Sarkozy lance l’Union méditerranée et l’Espagne n’est pas content et l’Allemagne n’est pas 
contente.  L’Espagne et l’Allemagne mettent des bâtons dans les roues parce que Sarkozy 
voulait faire une union des pays uniquement autour de la méditerranée. Donc sans 
l’Allemagne, sans L’Angleterre, donc ça été d’une grande violence. Très bien. Mais au moins 
je trouve que l’initiative de Sarkozy ca été de réveiller, c’était un choc, il était maladroit. Un 
choc et une stratégie, mais surtout un électro choc. Ça été mais européen regarder la 
méditerranée c’est pas un club méditerranée, c’est autre chose. Moi j’étais présent en 2008 
quand il y a eu le sommet et il y avait Ben Ali,  Bashar Al Assad, Mubarac, mais ça été un 
choc, le 2008 a été un choc, l’opinion française me dit qu’es-ce que c’est?.. 
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Ce choc, Mr. Sarkozy a préparée… ? 
Non il n’a rien préparé 
Non? 
Rien il a rien préparée du tout. Une bombe sous une bombe. Comme un terroriste. 
Ce n’était pas une question d’idéologies ? 
Non, c’est du terrorisme, politique. Il leur a fait peur il était fort et c’était malin. Et donc les 
Allemands ont réagi à cette violence et l’espagnol a dit il y a Barcelone qu’est-ce que vous 
allez faire… Un autre a dit que Barcelone ne marche pas. Ça marche pas très bien. C’est 
parce que… là les Espagnols sont… le Traité porte le nom de Barcelone mais c’est parce que 
ça porte le nom de Barcelone que c’est bien. Le traité est dépassé et ne fonctionne pas mais 
c’est pas à cause de Barcelone mais à cause de la commission européen qui ne l’a pas fait 
fonctionné…C’est pas à cause des Espagnols. 
Alors le problème principal de son fonctionnement… c’est….cette commission européen 
incapable… 
Oui très incapable. Elle n’a pas très bien gérée le processus de Barcelone. Elle n’a pas gérée 
l’union de méditerranée. Barouzo est un homme incapable, c’est un libéral, qui n’a pas 
d’idées, qui est néo-opportuniste. 
C’est une question d’une communication verticale de l’union européenne vers le 
Maghreb et une question non-opérative au niveau de mécanismes, des politiques… 
Ouais, ouais. C’était…. au niveau des mécaniques, ce n’était pas opérationnel. Au niveau 
politique, c’était moi je suis européen et vous êtes des arabes. 
C’était verticale… 
C’était verticale mais surtout symétrique. Moi, européen je connais la solution, vous arabes 
vous êtes sous-développées, on va vous aider. Donc ce n’a pas marché. L’union pour la 
méditerranée ça été un choc. Ça été un électrochoc. Les gens se sont dit mais qu’est-ce qui se 
passe ? Oui, après les choses évoluent très vite. Après 2008, ca bien marché l’union pour la 
méditerranée pendant 2 ans, puis en 2010-2011, il y a eu la révolution Arabes, il y a eu des 
morts, Ben Ali est mort, Moubarak est parti, Bashar Al Assad… le Roi du Maroc a été 
tourmenté, la Jordanie n’est pas stable. Et donc le choc de Sarkozy a donné un nouveau choc 
le choc du printemps Arabes qui est pour moi une chose importante. Les pays arabes ont été 
colonisés, puis dans les années 1960, les pays arabes ont été des pays libres, indépendants. 
Donc ils ont crus qu’ils allaient devenir des grands. Or, de 1960-2010 les pays arabes ont été 
dirigés par des dictateurs. Des dictateurs mis en place par des européens. 
Financé par des européen et des américains. 
Financé par des européen et des américains. Et surtout pour avoir le pétrole et le gaz. Les 
arabes ont eu la colonisation qui a duré un siècle, et après 60 ans de dictature par les 
européens. Et donc la révolution, 2010 c’est la révolution.  Et par l’ancienne période, pour les 
populations, il y avait qu’une seule façon de s’opposer aux dictateurs : c’est d’être musulman. 
Et donc la religion est devenue un rassemblement de toutes les oppositions de dictateur. Et 
donc s’Islam est politique mais pas spirituel. L’Islam est devenue le refuge des humiliés. Et 
lorsqu’il y a eu des révolutions, bah après il y a etudes votes et les intégristes musulmans ont 
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gagné les élections. C’est normale parce qu’ils étaient les seules à avoir travaillé. Et donc on 
a bien la colonisation, issue de 60 ans d’humiliation, on a les révolutions. Et Maintenant il 
faut… avec les Arabe, on a le choc de Sarkozy ça c’était en 2010, et ona le choc de Sarkozy 
c’était en 2008, il y a eu un choc avec les dictatures. Et Maintenant il faut tout recommencer à 
zéro. 
Avec des nuances, il faut tout recommencer à zéro. Eux, ils vont dire qu’est-ce qu’on fait. La 
deuxième chose c’est qu’il faut peut-être rester dans la méditerranée occidentale, ça veux dire  
5 plus 5, peut-être ca va être mieux ; France, Italie, Malte, La Libye, La Mauritanie et le 
Maghreb. On voit bien sur cette carte que le Maghreb c’est occident, ça n’a rien avoir avec 
les autres. 
Et là, moi ce que je vois à l’heure actuelle c’est  qu’il y a un début de grand intérêts pour 
l’Europe. Parce là les arabes sont marginaux mais même en pays d’Afrique les arabes sont le 
pivot. Ils sont au centre entre l’Europe et l’Afrique. Et les nouveaux qui arrivent, ceux sont 
des gens qui regardent un peu au Nord, il regarde à l’Est et il regarde vers le Sud. Alors que 
ce soit en Tunisie ou  au Maroc, il y a des stratégies pour aller en Afrique. Pour nous c’est 
important parce que, le temps qu’on regarde cette carte, ici tout ça s’est développé, ça s’est 
développé, il ne reste plus que ça. Ça c’est le dernier continent. Alors les chinois viennent, les 
américains et les européens viennent. 
Mais c’est qui va gagner? 
Moi, je pense que ceux sont le européen qui vont gagner. À cause de la proximité, la une 
proximité géographique, on tourne à la même heure, on a une profondeur historique. Et je 
pense que les européens vont gagner la bataille de l’Afrique. Les chinois sont corrompus, 
sont méchants, ils sont opportunistes et ils font que de l’argent. Les Américains sont un peu 
pareil. Nous, on est plus humanistes, et je pense que les européens ; donc les portugais 
s’occupe du mozambique et les espagnols reviennent. Alors les espagnols, les espagnols ont 
été les premiers exportateurs au Maroc, ils ont même doublé la France. Ça veux dire que les 
espagnols sont moins en amérique du Sud et ils viennent sur l’Afrique du Nord. Et les 
allemands qui ont fait le plein dans les pays de l’est. Maintenant les allemands descendent 
vers la Tunisie, on a fait des travaux. Les allemands descendent beaucoup en Afrique du 
Nord, à cause du soleil, des …. Ils viennent, ils se disent, il faut y aller. On a un retour très 
fort, il y a tout ce continent à développer. C’est énorme, énorme, énorme. 
Le monde de l’Espagne est en la méditerranée. Je suis convaincu que le terre principale 
est l’Amérique latine. Mais quand le processus de Barcelone a été crée, l’Espagne créa 
aussi une nature puissante pour créer ça. Mais avant ça, pas convaincu de l’union. 
Felipe González a fait beaucoup dans les années 80s, il a crée la Casa a la Sephorade, la Casa 
Arabe, beaucoup d’institues. Maintenant les patrons dans l’Andalusie, il traverse le Gilbraltar 
pour faire des affaires de l’autre côté. 
Je crois que l’Espagne depuis les années 85s jusqu’au processus de Barcelone, 
L’Espagne après Franco était rien, était sous-développée. Donc elle cherche un nouvel 
horizon géopolitique, géostratégique pour avoir une situation politique et diplomatique 
plus important dans… 
Vous pensez que les accords de Barcelone lui ont donnée cette position stratégique ? 
Oui, exactement. C’est une instrumentalisation des problèmes du Maghreb pour avoir 
une posture, une situation diplomatique plus importante. 
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Oui, certainement  
Pour avoir une position de management, de leadership, pour ces politiques et ceux de la 
méditerranée. 
Vous avez raison les accords de 95 ont donnée à l’Espagne une autorité. Mais les 
entrepreneurs espagnols n’étaient pas convaincus. Il n’y avait pas d’envole.  
Oui, voilà. La société… 
Non, et la bourgeoisie de Franco étaient orientés vers l’Amérique du Sud. Donc il y avait bien 
un effort diplomatique mais la société naviguait vers l’Amérique. Maintenant la société 
change et elle s’intéresse au Maghreb. Les algériens, je connais des ministres algériens qui 
vont faire beaucoup d’exposés en Espagne. Il y a un retour vers l’Espagne. L’Allemagne 
descend au Maghreb, L’Espagne descend au Maghreb. Il y a un intérêt qui recommence. 
Dans le monde méditerranée les pays les plus important sont La France, elle a de 
l’influence dans les Maghreb, L’Espagne a aussi de certaines intérêts dans la région… 
De plus en plus. 
L’Espagne et la France, es-ce qu’il y a une rivalité? 
Oui, pure rivalité. L’Italie s’intéresse à la Libye, l’Italie commence à faire des coupures-de-
presse. Mario Monti était en Algérie la semaine dernière. L’Italie commence à bouger. 
Angela Merkel va voir Butefica. Non, ça commence, ça commence, ça commence. Il  y a des 
rivalités… oui, peut-être un peu. Oui, mais je ne crois pas en ce moment. Parce que la France 
a de grands groupes sur les réseaux de vie : l’eau, c’est un réseau de vie, l’électricité. Nous 
avons sur l’eau et l’électricité les chemins fer, le téléphone. On a des grandes structures 
AEDF, GDF, Suez. Et ces grands groupes, oui, s’intéresse à la méditerranée mais ce n’est pas 
majeur. Ces grands groupes sont en Chine, en Amérique. Ce qui fait que les Espagnols eux ils 
ont beaucoup de, comme les Italiens, beaucoup de PME, PMI, des choses moins grosse. 
C’est-à-dire ce qu’ils veulent, oui, ce qu’ils veulent c’est Renaud qui est allé identifier des 
grands groupes. Mais les petits groupes ils n’y vont pas encore. Donc les espagnols, ceux sont 
des petits entreprises entre Andalousie et le riff, ceux des entreprises de 20 ouvriers, des 
petites. Puisqu’ils n’ont pas le crédit en Espagne, il traverse de l’autre côté en bateau et le 
samedi ils reviennent pour passer le weekend avec leurs familles. C’est très proches, c’est une 
heure de bateau.  
Donc il y a un peu de jalousie, il y a tout pour entre l’Espagne et la France, avec un 
historique. Vous savez pourquoi il y a de la jalousie ? Avec l’Allemagne y avait de la haine, 
avec l’Espagne y a de la jalousie. Je sais pas, c’est histoire. Vous connaissez la très mauvaise 
expression de Napoléon?  
 Non, 
Il était très humiliant, Napoléon a dit la chose suivante: « au de-là des Pyrénées, c’est 
l’Afrique qui commence. C’est très méchants, ça veut dire que les espagnols sont des mores, 
des africains. Non, c’est très méchant. Quoi qu’il en soit, moi je crois qu’il y a maintenant un 
intérêt entre la France, l’Espagne, l’Allemagne pour développer. Ce qu’il y a d’intéressant 
c’est qu’il y a, ce qu’on appelle dans notre jargon ce qu’on appelle la troisième révolution 
industrielle. et la troisième révolution industrielle c’est la révolution par l’énergie 
renouvelable. La première révolution c’est la vapeur et elle a donné la machine à vapeur. La 
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deuxième révolution c’est le moteur à explosion qui donne la voiture et l’avion. La troisième 
révolution c’est l’énergie renouvelable. L’Afrique du Nord est bien mieux placée alors tout le 
monde descend en Afrique. Il y a le gars de telephone qui vient de la Silicone Valley qui sont 
maghrébins, exilé en Amérique, qui sont très riches et maintenant reviennent très puissants. 
Ils bouffaient du business au Maroc et reviennent du Silicone Valley donc ils ont de l’argent. 
Il sont très fort ils sont très intéressants et ils viennent…,Donc les nouvelles énergies vont 
être une source. Les nouvelles technologies font que l’espace pertinent, l’espace optimum, 
c’est le replus des pays arabes.  
Les pays arabes sont absorbés dans le le… et on peut dire que les révolutions c’est la 
transformation pour entrer dans l’Europe ou pour être proche de l’Europe et ça va progresser. 
On revient à la Turquie, la Turquie ça marche très fort, l’Afrique du Nord marche très fort (il 
indique sur la carte). On sent que la pression de l’Europe les absorbe. C’est le retour de la 
proximité, on croyait que la mondialisation avait tué la proximité. On avait cru que la 
mondialisation était ; on va n’importe où, ils viennent de n’importe où, on n’importe quoi 
avec n’importe qui, et on s’est planté. Maintenant c’est la régionalisation, les grands 
ensembles, la coopération avec les voisins, lui, il appelle ça la continentalisation. Enfaite 
c’est des grands systèmes qui prennent la formes de quartiers d’Europe (il dessine sur la 
carte). Ça fait des tranches de melon. Voilà. Ça fait 4 ou 5 et ça tourne à la même heure. Il 
n’y a pas de stress, il y a des économies de transports. Et donc  j’ai fait deux articles là-
dessus… (Il demande à Marie de chercher les articles). Ceux sont des quartiers d’Europe, tout 
le monde a la même heure, tout le monde regarde la même télévision, et on est 
complémentaire. 
C’est états unis européens africaines… 
Oui, que ce soit des états unis Europe, méditerranéen ou africaines, au moins c’est un sorte de 
libre échange en Afrique. De plus en plus les sociétés Ford, Siemens, Telefonika, ils ont des 
découpages Europe, méditerranéen ou africains. Et voilà maintenant c’est comme ça. 
Et maintenant avec la crise économique, la situation de la méditerrané avec la situation 
politique… c’est maintenant une question de relation bilatérale ou l’union européen a 
perdu toute possibilité de coopération multilatérale? 
Si maintenant qu’aucune des révolutions c’est du bilatérale. Mais il y a beaucoup de 
laboratoires continuent d’avoir une conception multilatérale et régional. Oui, c’est vrai que ce 
matin on travaillait avec le Maroc, voilà- et la semaine prochaine je pars en Tunisie. C’est il y 
a des fragments, chaque pays a des niveaux très différent. Mais l’horizon c’est quand même 
la convergence. C’est le rapprochement, la complémentarité et surtout la troisième révolution 
industrielle. 
J’ai visité à Barcelone l’Union pour la méditerranée. Et j’ai vu là que l’activité est 
pratiquement paralysée. 
Quand était-ce ?  
Je crois une année, en 2011. 
2011… 
Je crois qu’on a touché toutes les choses que je voulais discuter ce que je voulais 
discuter. J’ai juste une dernière question, le future au niveau opérative, dans une 
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plateforme simple c’est plus opérative que une plateforme plus compliqué comme 
l’union pour la méditerranée…? 
Oui, mais je sens que cinq c’est simple, il y en a eu un, c’est rapide. Il va avoir le 5 du 5 pour 
sécurité alimentaire, le 5 du 5 sur l’énergie, le 5 du 5 sur le transport et la logistique. Ce qu’il 
y a de bien ave le 5 du 5, c’est qu’il les 5 du sud et les 5 du Nord, mais il y a aussi la 
commission qui est présente. Bon, le Allemand accepte que… Le 5 du 5 c’est un espace de 
discussion, ce n’est pas un espace de décision. Ils discutent de la santé, ils discutent de chose 
et d’autres, et ça remonte au niveau de la commission européen. La commission reste forte, le 
5 du 5 n’est pas décisionnaire. Non, le 5 du 5 n’est pas décisionnaire, ça reste un espace de 























   
 
